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ABSTRACT
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MISTRUST IN THE NEWS MEDIA:
MEDIA SKEPTICISM AS A MODERATOR IN MEDIA EFFECTS AND AS A FACTOR
INFLUENCING NEWS MEDIA EXPOSURE
Yariv Tsfati
Joseph N. Cappella

Survey data show that audience trust in the institutions of the news media is fading. Most
research to date has focused on the reasons for this decline in audience trust and ignored
its outcomes. This dissertation seeks to explore the consequences of audience skepticism
toward media institutions. Specifically, it hypothesizes that mistrust in the media serves
as a moderator for media effects and as a factor influencing media exposure selections.
Both propositions were tested on five separate large sample data sets, including the
National Election Study of 19%, General Social Survey, and three additional studies
conducted at the Anneberg School for Communication during the 19% and 2000 election
years. The first proposition was tested in relation to news media agenda setting, spiral of
silence, cultivation and priming effects. Findings show that media skepticism indeed
moderated agenda setting and spiral of silence processes. Hypotheses about the
moderating role of media skepticism in cultivation and priming were not supported.
Tests of the second proposition regarding the influence of media skepticism on
news exposure selections showed skepticism to be negatively related to exposure to
iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

mainstream news channels, but positively related to exposure to non-mainstream
channels like Political Talk Radio and Internet news sources. Also, media skepticism
interacted with need for cognition in their effects on mainstream media exposure, so that
the effects of skepticism were stronger when need for cognition was low. Implications of
the findings for media scholars, for journalists and for media literacy programs are
discussed.
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
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Chapter 1: A matter of tru s t

In the past three decades communication researchers have become preoccupied with the
increasingly negative attitudes audiences hold about the news media. As Cappella and
Jamieson argue, “the cynicism that has undermined every social institution is
undermining the institutions of news, which less than 25 years ago were the paragons of
trust, even for those least trusting the government” (1997, p. 228). Survey data (Chilton
Research Services, 1997) show that 47 percent of Americans think that the news media
do not protect the interests of people like themselves. 42 percent think the media get in
the way of society solving its problems. 67 percent complain that there is too much
negative news in the media. Almost one-third of Americans say they do not think
national TV networks report the news in a fair and objective way. 77 percent think the
news media care more about being the first to report a story than about the accuracy of
the story. And 47 percent say that the news media should have less influence on
American life.
General Social Survey data reveal that confidence in the press changed from 28
percent having a “great deal” of confidence in 1976 to a low of 10 percent in 1994. By
contrast, the rate of those having hardly any confidence in the press grew from a low of
14.6 percent in 1973 to a high of 41 percent in 1996. “From the mid-1980s to the mid1990s believability ratings for the major television networks (ABC, CBS, and ABC)
declined from between 86 and 87 percent to between 76 and 77 percent and the ratings
for familiar daily news correspondents dropped from 84 to 65 percent” (Moy & Pfau,
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2001:19). As media scholar James Carey (1995, p. 393) put it, “above all, the press lost
credibility and respect; it was no longer believed. As poll after poll showed, journalists
have earned the distrust of the public...‘My newspaper’ of older usage became ‘the
newspaper’; it had severed its contact and allegiance with the public.” Many other
scholars, mainstream news outlets and media pundits have documented a decrease in
public trust in the media over the past years (see American Society of Newspaper Editors,
1998; Gaziano, 1988; Liebeskind, 1997; Meyer, 1988; Kiousis, 2000).
The discovery that people mistrust the media gave rise to journalistic and academic
discourse that tried to explain the drop in audience trust. Some put the blame on
politicians, who increasingly slam the media (Domke et al., 1999). Others argued that
audience mistrust is the product of mounting coverage about the media by the media, that
results in heightened audience awareness of journalistic blunders and scandals (Johnson
et al., 1994; Watts et al., 1999). According to other explanations (Cappella & Jamieson,
1997), people are cynical about the media because the media themselves are cynical.
Along with this explanation, audience mistrust is the outcome of a spiraling process of
cynicism, in which journalists’ “strategic framing” of politics leads to audience political
cynicism which in turn feeds back on journalists. Journalists believe that politicians are
deceptive, so they report cynically. Audiences end up cynical towards politicians and
journalists alike, according to this “contagious cynicism” explanation.
Most research to date has focused on the reasons for the decline in audience trust in
the media and for the rise in audience cynicism toward journalism. By contrast, very little
attention has been devoted to the consequences of mistrust in the media. In other words,
audiences’ mistrust in the press has been treated mostly as a dependent variable, not as an
3
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independent or intervening variable. Audience skepticism has been particularly ignored
when it comes to media theory-building. Not many scholars studying the interactions
between news messages and their receivers have incorporated audience mistrust o f the
media as a covariate into their models, despite accumulating social scientific evidence
demonstrating the importance of trust in various social phenomena.

Trust as a consequential phenomenon.
The concept o f trust is the key to our understanding o f various human behaviors. For
sociologists, trust is a prerequisite to the foundation of any form of human social
organism (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984). Trust allows pairs of individuals to establish
cooperative relationships whenever doing so is mutually beneficial (Rotter, 1980) and
induces win-win solutions to prisoner-dilemma and other game-theoretic situations
(Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Frank, 1988). Without some level of trust, no kind of collective
behavior would be feasible. Trust is “the bedrock perception upon which society is
possible” (Cappella, 2001).
In line with these sociological perspectives, political scientists agree that trust is
necessary for a political system to function. They usually focus on institutional trust and
argue that the lack of it endangers democracy. Mistrust in government, they often argue,
may challenge the legitimacy of the political system and, ultimately, its very existence
(Erber & Lau, 1990:226; Moy & Pfau, 2001; Verba et al., 1995). Interpersonal and
institutional trust were found to be related to civic engagement (Putnam, 1993). High
levels of political trust were found to be related to essential political behaviors such as
taxpaying (Scholz & Lubell, 1998). On the other hand, low levels of political trust

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(combined with other factors) were found to predict less desirable modes of “direct
action”, for example, participation in riots (see Gamson, 1968; Paige, 1971; Wolfsfeld,
1985). Whether mistrust in government is good or bad, whether it represents cynicism or
realism (see Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, Chapter 2; Sniderman, 1981), are questions yet
to be settled by scholars. One thing that is already clear, given numerous books and
articles on the matter, is that citizens’ trust in their fellow citizens and in democratic
institutions affects various political attitudes and behaviors.
Sociologists and political scientists alike share the notion that trust is an essential
form of what they call “social capital” (Paldam, 2000; Putnam, 1993,1995). The analogy
between trust and financial capital is direct.
Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible
the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence.
Like physical capital and human capital, social capital is not completely
fungible... Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the
structure of relations between persons and among persons. It is lodged
neither in individuals nor in physical implements of production. (Coleman,
1990:302)
In distinguishing human capital from social capital Coleman (1990:304) argues that
“the human capital resides in the nodes, and the social capital resides in the lines
connecting the nodes”. Trust is a social resource not only because it helps people achieve
common goals, but also because it helps to reduce the costs o f arbitration and
enforcement. “Much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the
lack of mutual confidence” (Arrow, 1973:357). Putnam found that in the civic northern
regions of Italy, trust is a key ingredient in economic dynamism and government
performance. In such systems, Putnam found, “cooperation is often required - between
5
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legislature and executive, between workers and managers, among political parties...and
so on. Yet explicit ‘contracting’ and ‘monitoring’ in such cases is often costly or
impossible, and third party enforcement is impractical. Trust lubricates cooperation”
(1993:170-171). By contrast, in the regions of southern Italy, characterized by fewer civic
associations, less public engagement and lower interpersonal trust, Putnam found
economic and political stagnation. He concluded that social capital, of which trust is an
essential component, “bolsters the performance of the polity and the economy” (p. 176).
Feeling trusted, not merely trusting others, has important behavioral consequences.
Mistrustful forms o f supervision, in which supervisors make frequent checks on
subordinates, have been shown to lead to anger and aggression against the supervisor
(Day & Hamblin, 1964). An example o f the potential damage of being mistrusted was
provided by Harrell & Hartnagel (1974). Their subjects, participating in a simulated work
situation, had the opportunity to steal from a second subject serving as a supervisor or to
make money honestly. In half the cases the supervisor (a confederate) doubted the
subjects’ honesty and made frequent inspections of their work and in the other half the
supervisor was trusting. Distrustful supervising was found to lead to greater theft. Thus,
social trust becomes “social capital” not only through higher motivation of trusting
people to cooperate, but also through lower motivation of trusted people to betray trust
and inflict damage.
Psychologists have found that mistrust is related to distress, characterized by
malaise, anxiety and depression (see Mirowsky & Ross, 1986). Interpersonal trust was
found to be a predictor o f successful psychotherapy (Johnson, & Talitman, 1997). In
social psychology, trust was found to be related to teamwork (Porter & Lilly, 1996).
6
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Psychologists studying intimate relationships found trust to be one of the most desired
qualities in love relationships (Holmes & Rempel, 1989). In fact, lack of trust in such
relationships may produce distress, reduce relational rewards, and lead to relationship
dissolution (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Mikulincer, 1998). In other areas of social
psychology, scholars interested in persuasion (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Hovland, Kelly
& Janis, 1953) found that perceived source credibility (a component of trust) increases
the chances of attitude change as a result of exposure to a persuasive message. In other
words, they found that trustworthy sources were more persuasive than untrustworthy
ones.
Given the conceptualization of trust as social capital, it should come as no surprise
that economists have found that trust facilitates various economic activities (Lorenz,
1999). For example, trust has been reported to reduce transaction costs (Cummings &
Bromiley, 19%), i.e., the costs of monitoring and enforcing agreements, and in particular,
the costs of drafting detailed contracts (money, time and energy). Recently, it was argued
that trust plays an important role in electronic commerce (Ratnasingham, 1998). If you do
not trust others, why would you log on to an Internet page, leave your credit card number,
and expect that someone would ship you the merchandise you ordered?
This is just the tip of the iceberg. Trust has been used in even more diverse contexts.
In education research, mistrust in schools was found to escalate parent-school conflicts
(Lake & Billingsley, 2000). In management and organizational behavior, trust was found
to be related to the effectiveness of managerial problem solving (Zand, 1972). Even those
studying medicine found that trust plays an important role in health care settings (Davies
& Rundall, 2000; Pask, 1995). Trust has also been used as an independent variable in the
7
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disciplines of anthropology (e.g., Ekeh, 1974), international relations (e.g., Kydd, 2000),
history and sociobiology, as well as in political science, sociology and psychology (see
also Lewici & Bunker, 1996). In sum, it would not be exaggerating to say that that trust
plays a part in almost every human interaction.
The bottom line of this short review is that trust has consequences in almost every
aspect of social life. If trust in the therapist has an effect on the success of the therapeutic
process and trust in the nurse has implications for the well-being of the patient, if trust in
the boss has various consequences for organizations (Hubbell & Medved, 2001), then
why should we not study whether trust in the news media has implications for news
media processes? Indeed, it is rather surprising, given the essential role of trust in the
social sciences, that mistrust in the media has received so little attention as an
independent or intervening variable.
If trust and mistrust matter, then we should study their consequences for news media
theories. The purpose of the current research project is to focus on a particular kind of
mistrust - audience mistrust in the mainstream news media, which I call media
skepticism - and to examine its intervening role in mass media processes. This
dissertation brings trust into mass media studies not only as a result of communication,
but also as an interveningfactor that has important consequences for the interaction
between the news media and their audience. In particular, I wish to examine how trust
and mistrust in the news media intervene in media effects and in media exposure. The
rationale for focusing on these two processes will be explained shortly. In the next
section I review general definitions of trust, which leads me to the core of this
dissertation: the application of the concept of trust in the context of news media theories.
8

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Definitions of trust.
A keyword search for “trust” in the University of Pennsylvania Franklin Library Catalog
resulted in 3751 volumes (as of June, 2001). Similar searches found thousands of journal
articles about trust in various databases of various disciplines (e.g., 2248 hits in
Sociological Abstracts, 5027 in PsychlNFO and 3816 in ERIC). Having attracted so
much research, the concept of trust has been defined and conceptualized in numerous
ways. The following are a few examples of definitions of trust. Though probably not a
representative sample, they give us an idea of how scholars in diverse areas have
conceptualized trust:
1. Rotter (1967:651) states that trust is wan expectancy held by an individual
or group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another
individual can be relied upon”.
2. Cappella et al. (1998:3) claim that “Interpersonal trust is an attitude toward
other people who are not kin nor intimate”. From survey questions used to
measure trust, Cappella et al. deduce that “the central attributions of
interpersonal trust” are “trustworthiness versus harmfulness and mutual
interest versus self interest”.
3. Deatutch (1960) maintains that trust is the willingness of an individual to
behave in a manner that assumes another party will behave in accordance
with expectations in a risky situation.
4. “In trust relations there are, at minimum, two parties....I will assume both
to be purposive, having the aim of satisfying their interests...The
placement of trust allows an action on the part of the trustee that would not
have been possible otherwise...If the trustee is trustworthy, the person who
places trust is better off than if trust were not placed, whereas if the trustee
is not trustworthy, the trustor is worse off than if trust were not placed”
(Coleman, 1990:96*98).
5. According to Gambetta, when we say that we trust someone, “we implicitly
mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or
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at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in
some form of cooperation with him” (Gambetta, 1988:217).
6. “Trust is a type of expectation that alleviates the fear that one’s exchange
partner will act opportunistically” (Bradach & Eccles, 1989:104).
7. Zucker (1986:54) defines trust simply as “a set of expectations by all those
in an exchange”.
8. “Mistrust is an absence of faith in other people based on a belief that they
are out for their own good and will exploit and victimize you in pursuit of
their goals” (Mirowsky & Ross, 1986:42).
9. From a game theoretic perspective, Boyle & Bonacich (1970) have noted
that participants in PD games “often do know something, or at least guess
something, about what their opponent is like, and therefore the actual basis
for prediction about what each player will do should include...these
feelings about the opponent...We shall define interpersonal trust as the
extent to which these ’feelings’ encourage cooperative expectations...Trust
is therefore the difference between Player’s expectations of the probability
that Opponent will cooperate and the degree of cooperation implied by the
caution index” (p. 130).
10. In a breathtaking review of the issue, Seligman (1997) stresses the
importance of isolating trust from similar concepts. “Central to the
definition of trust (as opposed to confidence) is that it involves one in a
relation where the acts, character, or intentions o f the other cannot be
confirmed” (p. 21). This is what trust shares with faith, which is a form of
ontological trust “which bypasses all epistemological procedures of
verification” (p. 22). On the other hand, trust and confidence both have to
do with exchange systems. But confidence relates to “structurally
determined situations” and trust is an “unconditional principal of
generalized exchange” (p. 171). Unlike faith and confidence, Seligman
argues, trust implies solidarity and unconditionality.
11. “Trust is the calculation of the likelihood o f future cooperation...As trust
declines people are increasingly unwilling to take risks” (Ratnasingham,
1998:314).
12. From the critical perspective, trust is a “fragile way of responding to
uncertainty...Conceiving of trust as merely the way in which people relate
to each other without an understanding of trust as a normative principle
located in social, political and cultural frameworks, falls short of a critical
analytical approach that could shed light on the development of
contemporary society” (Fenton, 2000:153,157).
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13. From an economic perspective, “if firms or contracts can be viewed as the
formal mechanism for reducing uncertainty in economic transactions,
"trust’ provides a category for analyzing the informal means o f doing so.
Trust, that is, refers to the mediation of economic risk by informal relations
and rules” (Tonkiss, 2000:83).
14. For Fukuyama (1995), trust is “the expectation that arises within a
community of regular, honest and cooperative behavior, based on
commonly shared norms. Those norms can be about deep "value’ questions
like the nature of God or justice, but they also encompass secular norms
like professional standards and codes of behavior” (p. 26).
15. Bianco, a political scientist, defines trust ‘"in terms of retrospective
evaluations”. According to him, “trust is said to exist when constituents
evaluate (or are prepared to evaluate) their representative’s vote favorably,
regardless of whether they believe that the vote is consistent with their
interests (1994:23).
These definitions, though diverging on various characteristics of trust, also share
some in common. Let us try to identify these common elements, to help us better
understand what scholars mean when they talk about trust.

1. Relations. All definitions of trust use the concept to describe relations between at
least two sides: a trustor, the side that places trust, and a trustee, the side being
trusted. Many scholars talk specifically about individuals (in particular those
talking about interpersonal trust, e.g., Cappella et al., 1998; Mirowsky & Ross,
1986). However, trust is also applied to groups (Rotter, 1967), to organizations
and firms (Tonkiss, 2000), or simply to “parties” (Coleman, 1990).
2. Interests. Many scholars defining trust use concepts like “interests"" or “goals”
(e.g., definitions 2,4 ,8 ,1 5 ). Almost all other definitions imply self-motivated
actors. Hence, most scholars assume that those who engage in trust relations have
11
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objectives, and that trust is related to succeeding or failing to attain these
objectives.
3. Uncertainty from the side of the trustor. When conceptualizing trust, most
scholars use phrases like “probability” (Gambetta, 1988) or “likelihood”
(Ratnasingham, 1998). Some maintain that trust is a “guess” (Boyle & Bonacich,
1970). Still others define trust as a means to reduce risk, or to “alleviate fear”
(Bradach & Eccles, 1989). All of these concepts stress that for trust to be relevant
there has to be some uncertainty. As Seligman notes, when trust takes place,
there is no empirical way for the trustor to verify the intentions or the character
of the trustee.
4. Potential gains for the trustor. Why should trustors engage in trust relations when
they cannot be certain about the intentions or character of the trustees? The
reason, as many definitions of trust outline (e.g. Coleman, 1990), is that the
trustor has something to gain. This something has to do with the interests or goals
of the trustor, discussed above. The potential gains, or at least reduction of risks,
for the trustors are implied in most of the definitions cited above.
5. Potential costs for the trustor. Opportunism (Bradach & Eccles, 1989), selfinterest and harmfulness (Cappella et al., 1998), exploitation (Mirowsky & Ross,
1986), or at the very least, “lack of cooperation”, are often used in definitions of
trust to imply that the uncertainty about the trustee carries with it potential
damages for the trustor. The trustee, also a party with objectives and interests,
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might act in some way that would leave the trustor less well off than the trustor
would have been had the trustee acted otherwise1.
6. Expectations. The notion of expectations is invoked in many definitions of trust
(e.g. definitions 1 ,6 ,7,9 ,1 4 ). Trust is often described as the expectation that the
interaction with the trustee would lead to gains, rather than losses, to the trustor.
Some note that these expectations are informal.
7. Trust is voluntary. In no definition is trust forced on the trustor. Many trust
definitions stress that the trustor willingly engages in trust. As Seligman (2000)
argues, “for trust to make sense what is required is the free and autonomous,
hence the unknowable individual”. The voluntary nature of trust is also reflected
in Coleman’s description of trust as a “decision under risk” (p. 99). However, the
fact that trust is a free choice o f trustors, does not mean it is totally rational.
Though much of the literature about trust assumes total rationality, some, even
from the perspective of game theory, describe it as a “feeling” (Boyle &
Bonacich, 1970), an emotion. Since there is no way to verify the integrity of the
trustee, trust is often no more than a hunch.
8. The importance o f the trustee’s credibility. Since the trustor cannot be certain
about the intentions of the trustee, for trust to take place the trustee must be
considered at least somewhat believable or credible, at least at some point during
the trust relationship. That is why some definitions of trust stress the credibility

1 It is important to stress, however, that lack o f fulfillment o f the expectations o f the trustor does not
necessarily imply that the trust has been exploited by an opportunistic trustee. Many times the trustee does
not want the trust, and in other instances the trustee does not have a choice between keeping the trust and
breaking the trust (see Coleman, 1990:96).
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of the trustee (Rotter, 1967). This believability, however, cannot be entirely
confirmed, as implied by the uncertainty component of trust.
9. Time lag - All definitions of trust have some implied timeline. They either go
from past to present (as in the “retrospective” definition of Bianco, 1994), or
from present to future (e.g. definitions S, 6,8,9,11). Hence, trust relations take
place over time.

In sum, definitions o f trust stress that trust requires an interaction between two
parties with interests, in an uncertain situation in which the trustor could enjoy gains or
suffer damages. Trust is a voluntary expectation on the side of the trustor that the former
would result from the interaction with the trustee, rather than the latter.

Trust in the relations between audiences and journalists.
As we have seen, the concept of trust has been applied in numerous contexts. Scholars
have investigated interpersonal trust, but also trust in democratic institutions, trust in
nurses and therapists, trust in spouses. The question is, can this concept of trust be
applied to audiences and the news media in communication studies? Is trust at all relevant
to the relations between journalists and audiences?
For some, like Fukuyama (199S), professional standards are encompassed in the
definitions of trust For example, “we trust the doctor not to do us deliberate injury
because we expect him or her to live by the Hippocratic oath, and the standards of the
medical profession” (p. 26). Journalism, like medicine, can be perceived as a profession.
Sociologists suggest that, like other professional specialists (e.g. lawyers, social workers),
14
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journalists “are people who routinize other people’s emergencies” (Tuchman, 1973:11011)2. Although, there is no licensing for journalists (unlike in other professions),
journalism does have a detailed codebook of professional standards and norms. Some of
these journalistic standards are formal, some even legal (e.g., in the form of libel laws),
but many - perhaps most of them - are informal. The mere existence of professional
standards and norms implies that, for Fukuyama, trust relations are a part of the
interaction between the trustees - professional journalists - and their trustors, their clients
- the audience. As Liebes (2001:295) argues, “trust in serious journalism is based on our
belief in the professionalism of journalistic practice”.
So, according to Fukuyama, trust relations between audiences and journalists exist
by the definition of trust, given that journalism as a profession has well-known standards
and norms, at least in the Western Liberal journalistic model3. However, most definitions
of trust do not mention professional norms as a sufficient condition for trust relations.
Some even argue that “trust is only relevant when one must enter into risks and one
cannot control what is to happen in advance” (Ratnasingham, 1998:314). Does this typify
the relationship between media and audiences? Indeed, can we talk about risks, as well as
other features of trust described above, in the context of news media and their audiences?
1 maintain that we can. In order to explain this point, let us apply the characteristics of
general trust, which we have learned from various definitions of the concept, to the
specific context of media-audience interactions.
2 But this routinization is not as cynical as it might seem. Professionals are people who dedicate themselves
to serve other people. And indeed, surveys o f journalists (e.g. by Weaver) show that their motives are
idealistic and that many o f them have chosen journalism as a profession in order to serve the community.
3 In other models o f journalism, like the party-line model, different professional norms dictate different
types o f audicnce-joumalist relations. In authoritarian regimes, everybody knows whom the reporter is
affiliated with. This, o f course, has consequences for trust, or lack thereof.

15
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First of all, trust assumes two sides with interests. In the context of media-audience
relations these sides are individual audience members, and the institutions of the news
media in a given society. In our context the trustee is the institution of the media. Note
that the media as an institution are composed of various people - journalists, editors, and
other people working in news production. The trustor is a specific member of the
audience. As in other trust relations, each side has interests. The interests of the audience
member are diverse and change from one person to another. Some might tune in to the
news to learn about the world, while others tune in to pass the time, to feel connected to
others, to show that they are connected to others, to be entertained, to leam about the
weather, and so on. The interests of news producers are also diverse. The media probably
does not have “one interest” as an institution, but people working in the media
undoubtedly have interests. These include profit for the owners, and the economic
motives of the workers. Concepts like reputation and self-fulfillment also constitute
motives for many people working in the media. Another motivation to work in journalism
is the ability to acquire influence. In short, both journalists and audiences have interests,
and they bring these interests to the interaction, as trust assumes.
Second, as we have seen, trust implies uncertainty on the side of the trustor. In the
context of the news media, given that the media deal with the impersonal world (Mutz,
1998), audiences are always at least somewhat uncertain about news media content, in
the sense that it is usually hard for them to verify media reports with non-media sources.
It is not only hard for us to verify the validity of the information that appears in the
media; it is even harder to verify the character and intentions of those working in the
media. Hence, it is often hard to evaluate the fairness of media interpretations of reality.
16
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Much of audience mistrust in the media is concerned not only with uncertainty about the
soundness of media facts, but also with uncertainty about the intentions of people
working in the media. Are journalists the honest watchdogs they claim to be, fulfilling
their civic responsibilities? Or are they self-interested people who do not care at all about
society, and who would not let anything stand in the way of their careers? The intentions
and motivations of journalists, as well as the information they report, cannot be verified
by audience members. Hence, the uncertainty feature of mistrust applies to audiencemedia relations.
Third, as we have seen, trust implies potential gains and losses for the trustors. In
the context of media-audience relations these are minor. But they exist. Audiences can
either fulfill their interests (mentioned above) or they can fall short of satisfying their
goals as a result of their encounter with the media. The word “risk” used in some
definitions of trust relates to the chances of fulfilling these interests and thereby
achieving gains rather than losses. Admittedly, in mass media-audience contexts, the
risks on the side of the audience are not as grave as in other scenarios. People might be
wasting their time watching the news and find out that the information they got is wrong.
Moreover, they might be misled by inaccurate or unfair news portrayals that have
potential behavioral consequences. It was Lippmann (1922) who first distinguished the
real world from the “pictures in our heads”, pictures that are influenced by the mediated
realities presented by news. He observed that many times our behavior is influenced not
by reality, but rather by media-constructed images of the environment. In other words,
Lippmann argued, our trust in the news media has behavioral consequences.

17
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For example, citizens are often assumed to vote on the basis of their political
information. Inaccurate or biased information can lead people to a different voting
decision than correct information. In this sense, if the media violate their trust, many of
our political choices and behaviors are probably “wrong”. This is one of the “risks” we
take when we trust the media. Another example comes from the now-famous “Invasion
From Mars” show (Cantril, 19S2). Those who trusted the media and thought that the
Orson Welles play was part of a real news broadcast representing real events, panicked.
Some fled, others prayed to God, preparing for their imminent death. A few outraged
listeners, who had bought train tickets hoping to flee the invasion, wrote their radio
stations after the broadcast asking for compensation. These are extreme examples of real
losses caused by trust in the media. The point they try to emphasize is that relying on the
media entails some risks (though not always dramatic) on the side of the audience.
Fourth, trust implies expectations of the trustee by the trustors. In media-audience
contexts, audiences do have expectations of the news media. We learned from uses and
gratifications that news audiences use news because they expect that the media will help
them in fulfilling cognitive and integrative (but also other) needs. Audiences expect news
to provide them with information, to help them “understand what goes on in...the world”,
and to help them “obtain useful information for daily life” (quotes from survey items
used by Katz, Gurevitch & Haas, 1974). According to gratification research, audiences
also expect the media to help them “strengthen credibility, stability and status with
society and state” (see Katz, Gurevitch & Haas, 1974:166,171). Hence, as with trust
relations in general, audiences bring expectations to their encounters with the news
media.
18
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Fifth, since the trust of the audience, as in any other case of trust, is voluntary (no
one forces us to trust the media), the perceived credibility of the press is immensely
important for audience trust in the news media. As in any other case of trust, the
expectation is that “the word of the other side can be relied upon” (Rotter, 1967). This is
why factualness, credibility and accuracy are among the most basic components of
journalistic ethics. Credibility is essential to journalists, for it is the key to audience trust.
This may explain many journalistic norms, including verifying each piece of information,
presenting “hard evidence” such as numbers, separating facts from comments, demanding
proof from sources (especially non-authoritative sources), and publishing only stories that
“seem believable” to journalists and editors. The media constantly declare that they are
reliable (i.e., that they deserve trust). Each edition of Philadelphia's KYW3 Eyewitness
News local news program starts with the slogan, “You are watching real people, real
news!” CNN Headline News promotes its channel using the slogan “Real News. Real
Fast.” This exemplifies the hard work the media do to establish the impression that they
are trustworthy. As Coleman notes, “the trustee may engage in actions explicitly designed
to lead the potential trustor to place trust” (Coleman, 1990:96). The media do this almost
all the time. While not a necessary condition for trust (the trustee might not want to be
trusted according to Coleman), it shows that the relations between media and audience
are indeed ones of trust.
Finally, we know from definitions of trust that trust relations require time (Coleman,
1990:98). This condition is also applicable in audience-media relations. Almost all
audiences interact with the institutions of the media over time. In modem societies, no
one encounters the news media only once. We first meet the media during early
19
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childhood. We grow up with them. As we reach adulthood, they are still around. This is
unquestionably a long-term relationship.
In sum, the concept of trust can be easily applied to news media contexts. Two
distinguishable sides with interests and goals interact over a substantial period of time.
The trusting audience cannot be certain about the “acts, character or intentions”
(Seligman, 1997:21) of the media. Though the “risks” are often not as consequential as in
other cases, audiences receive potential gains from their interaction with the media, but
also potential losses. They willingly expect that the interaction will lead to gains rather
than losses. As we have seen, they are often encouraged by journalists to hold this
expectation.
The applicability of the concept of trust to news media studies makes even more
sense taking into account what we know about the ways people interact with media.
Research on parasocial interaction (PSI) shows that the relationships between audience
members and media characters are similar in many ways to interpersonal relations.
Parasocial interaction was defined as “interpersonal involvement of the media user with
what he or she consumes” (Rubin et al., 198S). Parasocial interaction has been observed
in news viewing in general (Levy, 1979; Palmgreen et al., 1980) and in local news in
particular (Rubin et al., 1985). One study of PSI shows that, as in interpersonal relations,
the strength of the parasocial relationship is linked to its length and its role in uncertainty
reduction (Rubin & McHugh, 1987). Though the concept of trust was not used directly in
this study, the phenomena under discussion clearly resemble trust. Hence, from the PSI
literature we learn that people develop relationships with media characters that are like
interpersonal relationships, and in some cases, these relations resemble trust
20
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Indeed, more research has shown that people treat the media as they treat other
people. Reeves and Nass conducted a series of experiments applying basic social
psychological principles to human-media interactions and reached the conclusion that “all
people automatically and unconsciously respond socially and naturally to media”
(1996:7). For example, they found that subjects teamed together with a computer
cooperated more with the computer than those not teamed, exactly as social psychology
predicts about teamwork in human-human contexts (Chapter 13). Similarly, they found
that various other psychological principles, ranging from politeness and etiquette to the
way people respond to praise, apply when people interact with media. Though none of
their experiments dealt specifically with trust, the scope of their argument is broad
enough to suggest that the principles of trust may be transferred from the interpersonal to
the media context. Since people trust each other, they are capable of trusting media,
following the logic of the Media Equation (people treat media like they treat people).
In sum, the parasocial interaction literature and the Nass and Reeves studies both
teach us that general social psychological rules originating from human contexts are also
relevant in audience-media interactions. The notion of trust could thus be applied not
only to interpersonal relations, but also to the interaction of people with media. Unlike in
parasocial interaction, the object of interaction in this dissertation is the news media as an
institution, not specific mediated personas (e.g. particular news journalists, fictional
characters). This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. In the meantime it is
sufficient to note that the logic of the PSI literature underlies the application of trust in
audience-news media context
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Before moving further, a few things shouid be clarified. First, while audience-media
relations do constitute trust relations, this is not an example of “mutual trust” (Coleman,
1990:177). Though journalists have some expectations from their audiences, one cannot
say that they necessarily “trust” their audiences. In other words, though some confuse
trust with mutual trust, the concepts are not the same, and the former is more relevant to
the context of audience-media relations than the latter. This is not to say that there is no
interdependence in the interaction between audiences and journalists. It could be argued
that journalists need audiences no less than audiences need journalists. However, this is
not in any way a symmetrical relationship (as described by Coleman in his discussion of
mutual trust).
Second, as Seligman (1997) notes, trust is distinct from confidence and faith.
However, in this dissertation 1 sometimes ignore Seligman's distinction and join “most
social scientists” (p. 16) in conflating “trust” and “confidence”. When I do so, however, I
am referring to the common elements of these separate constructs. In the context of news
media, some of the subtle distinctions between similar concepts are negligible. In fact, the
Hebrew language has only one word for trust and confidence (Emm), and the word for
faith (Emuna) stems from the same verb as trust.
Third, it is important to clarify that this dissertation does not attempt to explain
audience trust or mistrust in the media. It follows from the social psychological literature
about trust that mistrust is either the result of perceived violation of trust in the past, or of
some information about the trustee that casts doubt on the trust. We cannot tell what the
sources of audience perceptions of past violation of trust are. As 1 have mentioned, some
have argued that this information comes from politicians, while others have argued that it

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

comes from meta-communicative sources in the media. It might be that mistrust in the
media has even reached the status of a “meme” (Cappella, 2001) that spreads and
reproduces mimetically in our culture through both interpersonal and mediated channels.
In any case, the sources of information that have led people to alter their perceptions of
the media over the past thirty years will not be discussed in this dissertation. The focus is
rather on the consequences of media skepticism.
So far, we have demonstrated that trust has consequences in various fields. We have
used various definitions of trust to examine what the concept means. We then showed
that the concept of trust applies to audience-media contexts. Let us now turn to the
literature about trust in order to examine the consequences of mistrust in the media.

The consequences of mistrust in the media.
As reviewed above, the literature on the impact of trust finds that trust leads to a higher
likelihood of cooperation, and mistrust to a lower likelihood of cooperation. This finding
holds in many contexts and across different disciplines. The reason for this reduced
cooperation follows from the definition of trust. The mistrustor expects that the
interaction with the mistrusted will lead to losses rather than gains. Fear of being
exploited by an opportunistic trustee makes the mistrustor less willing to interact
cooperatively with the mistrusted. Hence, the lower the trust in one’s teammates, the
lower the teamwork; the lower the trust in another businessperson, the lower the chances
of a deal; the lower the trust in the therapist, the lower the probability of successful
treatment; the lower the trust in democratic institutions, the lower the participation in
civic activities. How do we apply this logic to media contexts? The lower the trust in the
23
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media, the lower what? What would constitute “cooperative engagement” in audiencemedia interactions?
One possible translation of the term “cooperation” into news media contexts could
be stated in terms of “influence”. The media present a picture of the world, and if we
cooperate with them we accept it. The news media actively try to convince us that the
stories they tell about the world are real. They do this by using various rhetorical, visual,
and even marketing devices. The rhetorical devices consist of what is known as the
rhetoric of objectivity, which consists of third-person language, use of passive voice, use
of quotations, and the like. The visual devices include the utilization of images (TV
footage or stills) and of charts or graphs, both used as evidence to support the validity of
the story. Even the appearance and voices of anchorpersons and journalists are carefully
selected to enhance the credibility of the media stories. In many cases, pure marketing
supplements the media’s efforts to promote the credibility of their stories (again, the
“Real People, Real News” example). In sum, the media try to persuade us that the stories
they report are true.
A set of research questions that will be examined in Section 2 deals with whether
those who mistrust the media are as likely to cooperate with the media by “buying” their
stories. The hypotheses tested in this section all propose that media skepticism would act
as a moderating factor in media effects. The concept of “effects” is used to describe
cognitive or behavioral changes that result from exposure to the media. In the context of
news, the notion of “effects” is most often used to describe cognitive changes that could
in some way be conceptualized as acceptance of the mediated world portrayed by the
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media. In section 2 ,1 hypothesize that those who mistrust the media will be less likely
than trusting audiences to be influenced by this mediated world.
Much of the trust literature is framed in terms of risk reduction. I mentioned earlier
that part of the risk that news audiences accept when they trust the media have to do with
the potential effects of the media. For example, given the possibility that the information
we use is inaccurate or slanted, we risk erroneous conclusions when we formulate
political decisions based on mediated information. It follows that mistrust in the media
might lead us to reduce these risks by refusing to accept the information. “Cooperation”
in media contexts may thus be conceptualized as susceptibility to media influence.
Following the literature on trust, mistrust should reduce cooperation, and mistrust in the
media might lead to reduced media influence. Hence,

RQ 1: Does media skepticism moderate news media effects?

One possible translation of “cooperation” into media contexts, then, is that of
“effects”. Mistrust leads to reduced cooperation, and mistrust in the media leads to
reduced media influence. Another possible translation of “cooperation” into media
contexts could be expressed in terms of “exposure”. The news media want us to attend to
them so they can sell our attention to their advertisers. If we attend, we cooperate. If we
do not want to cooper ate, we do not attend. If this is an accurate application of
“cooperation” in media contexts, mistrusting audiences should be less willing to engage
at all with the mainstream media.

25
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If mistrust leads to lower cooperation, then those mistrustful of the media might try
to seek functional alternatives. If they find more trusted alternatives, they might attend to
them in addition to or instead of the mainstream media. Section 3 of this dissertation
examines the possibility that skepticism towards the media influences media exposure.
However, in addition to examining the trust-based selectivity hypotheses, this section
also deals with the conditions under which people might attend to the media even though
they do not trust the media. Finally, it asks whether mistrustful audiences search their
environment for functional alternatives to the media. In short, Section 3 deals with
various hypotheses relating mistrust in the media to media exposure. All of these
hypotheses are connected to the following research question:

RQ 2: Does media skepticism influence media exposure?

To sum up, this dissertation deals with the outcomes of audience mistrust in the
media. Following the definitions of trust and the literature about trust, the two research
questions examined in this dissertation deal with two plausible results of audience
mistrust. Research Question 1 deals with the implications of audience mistrust in the
media for theories of media effects. This research question will be examined in Section 2.
Research Question 2 deals with the implications of mistrust in the media for media
exposure. This Research Question will be examined in Section 3.
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Summary.
Trust has consequences in almost every aspect of social life, from love to taxpaying, from
child-parent attachment to political participation. In this chapter I proposed to import the
idea that trust matters into news media research. The analysis of various definitions of
trust shows that the concept of trust is indeed relevant for audience relations with
journalists. These relations involve an interaction over time between two sides: trustors
(audience members) and trustees (journalists). The audience cannot be certain of the
character or intentions of journalists, and hence, of the quality of information they
publish. This uncertainty is what makes trust relevant for news media contexts. If they
trust the media, audiences willingly expect that the interaction will lead to gains rather
than losses.
This chapter also laid the foundation for the hypotheses that will be tested in
Sections 1 and 2 of this dissertation. Since trust is expected to reduce cooperative
engagement, mistrust in the media is expected to reduce media influence and mainstream
news media exposure by mistrusting audience members.
In the rest of this section I elaborate on the main concept used in this dissertation:
news media skepticism. In Chapter 2, this concept is defined as general feelings of
alienation and mistrust toward the mainstream news media. Prior conceptualizations and
operationalizations of trust in the media are reviewed. The operational definition of
media skepticism is presented and its validity examined. Chapter 3 deals with the valence
of the concept Given the essential role of the media in theories of liberal democracy,
many have implied that audience mistrust in the media may hurt the democratic process
by producing apathy. This issue is addressed by examining the correlates of media
27
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skepticism. Chapter 4 reviews recent trends in media skepticism: data documenting the
sharp drop in audience confidence in the media are presented, and related developments
(such as an increased tendency of politicians in recent years to attack the media, and the
development of anti-media and counter-media communication channels) are discussed.
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Chapter 2: What is media skepticism?
D efinition , o p era tio n a liza tio n , validity.

This chapter deals with things that are seemingly obvious. One might think the
assumption that responses to survey questions about the media reflect actual perceptions
and attitudes is perfectly reasonable and accept it prima facie. A reader who regards
assumptions of this kind as self-evident could easily skip to the next chapter. I do not
recommend doing so, however. In this chapter I define the concept, present its
operationalization and discuss its conceptualization, reliability and validity. Some of the
findings I obtained when examining the validity of the concept are interesting and
important by themselves. In many respects, validating the concept of media skepticism,
learning about its covariates, comparing quantitative measures with open-ended ones and
so forth, is like getting acquainted with a partner before a long journey. Explicating the
seemingly obvious is important for knowing what it is that we are investigating.
This chapter begins with a review of the ways in which audience trust in the media
has been conceptualized and measured in the past. I then define the concept of media
skepticism, present its operationalization, and examine its reliability and validity.

Conceptualizing audience trust in the media in past research.
The labels used by scholars to describe audience trust in the media have varied over the
years. While early persuasion researchers used the concept of “source credibility”, later
29
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scholars used labels like “media cynicism” (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), “trust in the
media” (Gunther, 1988), or “perceived credibility” (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986) to
describe very similar phenomena. As Table 2.1 shows, the very labels used carry with
them important implicit or explicit assumptions and implications about how the concept
is treated. In what follows I elaborate on the different concepts used by prior
communication researchers and the implicit assumptions each contains.
Early persuasion research - “source credibility”. When investigating the way
audience attitudes toward the media influenced persuasion, early scholars used the
concept of “source credibility” (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Hovland, Kelly & Janis,
1953:19-55). Their approach treated credibility as a unidimensional, objective and static
characteristic of the source of communication, independent of the audience. Accordingly,
scholars saw no problem in manipulating “credibility” in experimental designs. In
Hovland's classic studies, for example, subjects were exposed to the same content
delivered by “credible” and “untrustworthy” sources (e.g. Robert Oppenheimer vs.
Pravda or New England Journal o f Biology and Medicine vs. “A mass circulation
pictorial magazine”)- The assumption was that different sources were inherently credible
or not and that all possible audiences perceived these traits similarly across the different
sources.
The initial efforts by Hovland and his associates at Yale gave birth to a long history
of source credibility studies in experimental social psychology (see Stemthal, Phillips &
Dholakia, 1978, for a review). A meta-analysis (Wilson & Sherrell, 1993) located over
250 such studies using various source manipulations (credibility, expertise, ideological
similarity and trustworthiness). These 250 studies contained 745 published effects. The
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authors note that “most effects (80%) were from laboratory studies; 74% of the studies
used college students as subjects. Dependent variables...were usually psychological
characteristics (94%), rather than observed behavior...” (Wilson & Sherrell, 1993:105-6).
Although they do not report an average effect size, Wilson & Sherrell claim that
additional 6,697 non-significant effects would be required before their 372 significant
findings could be attributed to chance. The general finding in this large family of source
credibility studies was that enhanced credibility leads to greater attitude change.
As research in this area developed over the years, scholars devoted their attention to
finding the conditions under which credibility has the greatest mediating role (Stemthal,
Phillips & Dholakia, 1978). Perhaps the best-known contemporary offspring of the
Hovland conceptualization is found in Petty & Cacioppo’s (1986) Elaboration Likelihood
Model (ELM). ELM treats source credibility as a heuristic used only by low-involved
audiences in their processes of decision-making (Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, 1981).
Although Petty and Cacioppo conceptualized credibility as a heuristic, they
operationalized it again as a trait of the source (the credibility manipulation in this study
was “a report prepared by a local high school” vs. “a report prepared by the Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education, which was chaired by a professor of education at
Princeton University”). However, this time credibility was thought to be used by the
receivers only in some cases and not in others.
Why is the psychological literature about source credibility relevant for a study of
media skepticism? One might argue that the Yale researchers and their followers were
trying to come up with a general theory of persuasion that has little to do with audience
attitudes toward the news media. But in fact, according to Wilson & Sherrell’s (1993)
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meta-analysis, relatively few (16%) of the “source credibility” studies dealt with oral,
face-to-face presentations. Though the intention was to investigate all sources, most of
the “credibility” researchers dealt with mediated messages. Newspaper articles, recorded
audio messages, and in more recent studies, video messages, were usually the object of
investigation in this line of research.
“Trust in the media”. As we have seen, early persuasion researchers conceptualized
credibility as a static and objective characteristic of the source. But gradually, more and
more scholars began to define “credibility” in terms of the perceptions of the audience as
opposed to the attributes of the press (Berio, Lemert & Mertz, 1969; Gunther, 1992).
Since the late 1960s, and especially during the 1980s, scholars have been treating and
measuring “credibility” as a phenomenon that varies across individuals. The concept was
now labeled “perceived news credibility”, or alternatively, “trust in the media”. While
early psychological research referred to the credibility of any communication source, this
more recent line of research deals with the credibility of mass media news sources. Most
important, rather than manipulating credibility, the concept was now measured using
surveys.
Efforts to tap individual perceptions of the credibility of news sources using surveys
started in the mid-1960s. As Rubin, Palmgreen and Sypher (1994:234) note, “measures
ranged from the unidimensional Roper-like questions of Westly and Sevrin (1964) to the
multidimensional questions of Markham (1968)”. Westly and Sevrin simply asked their
respondents one question: “As between television, radio and newspapers, which one do
you feel gives the most accurate and truthful news?”. Markham (1968) had college
students evaluate the credibility of videotaped newscasters on 55 semantic differential
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items. He identified three reliability factors: reliable-logical, showmanship, and
trustworthiness. Another study (McCroskey & Jenson, 197S) used S3 semantic
differential items obtained from all previous measurement attempts and located five news
“image” factors: competence (including items such as expert-inexpert; reliableunreliable; informed-uninformed; believable-unbelievable), character (e.g. selfishunselfish; cruel-kind; sympathetic-unsympathetic), sociability (e.g. friendly-unfriendly
and good natured-irritable), composure (e.g. tense-relaxed) and extroversion (e.g. timidbold and meek-aggressive). “Sources employed in this investigation were all news media
sources: the three network television news programs, The New York Times, Time,
Newsweek, the local newspaper you most often read, the local radio station to which you
most often listen...” (p. 171).
A relatively recent effort aimed at tapping attitudes toward the media is a News
Credibility Scale developed by Gaziano & McGrath (1986; see Rubin, Palmgreen &
Sypher, 1994, pp. 234-7 for a review), who administered 16 items about attitudes toward
newspapers and television to a national sample of 1,002 respondents. They identified two
factors: credibility in 12 items, and social concerns in three (patriotic, immoral,
sensationalizes). Based on this scale, news media credibility consists of fairness, bias,
telling the whole story, accuracy, respect for privacy, looking after people’s interests,
separating fact and opinion, trustworthiness, factuality, concern for public interest, and
having well-trained reporters. Meyer (1988) reinterpreted Gaziano & McGrath’s factor
analysis, as well as his own original data, and claimed that the 12 items could be sub
divided. The credibility measure, he argued, consists of five items only: fairness,
perceived bias, telling the whole story, accuracy, and trustworthiness.
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To sum up, no agreed-upon measurement tool emerged out of this line of research.
Different scholars measured attitudes toward different news sources, with some
comparing the credibility of different media and others referring to “the most familiar”
newspaper or TV show, or to specific genres, programs, or even persons. In addition,
scholars disagreed on the components of the concept: some scaling efforts included items
measuring perceptions of credibility only, while others also included items measuring
other perceptions, some of which were relatively remote from the issue of trust (e.g.
showmanship, sociability, and character).
Media cynicism. Finally, in recent years the concept of “media cynicism” was
introduced (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), implying more than merely perceptions of
credibility problems. “Media cynicism” connotes lack of confidence, alienation, and even
anger and disgust. When measuring this concept Cappella and Jamieson used survey
items such as: “thinking about the news media - national television news, the daily
newspaper you are most familiar with and newsmagazines - would you say the news
media help society to solve its problems, OR the news media get in the way of society
solving its problems?” This sort of measurement does not relate to specific media, nor to
specific programs. It implicitly assumes that individuals have one opinion about the
media as a whole, not only about the particular news sources they are familiar with. Also,
the focus is on the media “getting in the way” of society, not solely on perceptions of
trustworthiness. Cappella and Jamieson (1997, pp. 214-15) show that media cynicism is
related to cynicism in other domains. In particular, media cynics tend to be cynical about
politics in general.
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In sum, the conceptualization of audience attitudes about the media changed
dramatically in half a century of media research. Once, “credibility” was perceived to be
an objective and static trait of the source of communication. Lately, “cynicism” is
increasingly becoming an attribute of the audience that is pretty much independent of the
source of communication.

What is media skepticism?
Although attitudes toward the media have been the focus of many studies, not many
scholars, including the ones mentioned above, have offered a nominal definition of their
concepts. I define my own concept, “media skepticism”, as a subjective feeling o f
alienation and mistrust toward the mainstream news media. For example, media
skepticism is the feeling that journalists are not fair and objective in their reports about
society and that they do not always tell the whole story. It is the feeling that mainstream
media news outlets would sacrifice accuracy and precision for personal and commercial
gains. It is the perception that one cannot believe what one reads in the newspaper or
watches on TV news. In other words, media skepticism refers to audience confidence in
the way mainstream news institutions function in society.
The fact that I’m using a new concept does not mean that I wish to ignore the
progress made in the past half-century of research and start from scratch. On the contrary,
my concept is very similar, and in some cases almost identical, to many of the ways in
which attitudes toward the media have been treated and measured in recent years. Like
recent approaches, and unlike the “source credibility” tradition, I perceive media
skepticism as relating to a subjective opinion of the audience and not to an objective trait
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of the source. Unlike some of the early trust in the media studies, media skepticism
relates to the media as a whole, rather than to a particular source. My concept is most
similar to the one of media cynicism. It exceeds perceived credibility and includes
feelings of alienation and anger toward the way the media function in society. Also, like
media cynicism, my concept implies trait-like stability on the side of the audience,
independent of the objective qualities of the source. I prefer “skepticism” to “cynicism”,
however, because it drops the negative valence of “cynicism” - 1 do not think mistrust in
the media is inherently damaging or bad for society. In short, the concept of media
skepticism builds on the progress made in the past decades of research in this area. I am
not inventing a new concept so much as elaborating on an old one.
Media skepticism is in some senses what social psychologists might call an
“attitude”4. In social psychology, attitudes represent “an enduring orientation to respond
to something favorably or unfavorably” (Price, 1992:49) or, “the affect for or against a
psychological object” (Thurstone, 1931). Like most other “attitudes”, media skepticism is
a research construct. This means that it is at least partly constructed by researchers and
their theories, interests and insights. Like all other attitudes, people’s attitudes about the
mainstream press are not directly observable. Like many other attitudes, we cannot be
certain that the constructs we use exist in reality. That is, we do not know for sure that
people indeed hold any “affect for or against” the “mainstream media”. In fact, we
cannot even tell if they hold any cognitive representation of such concepts as “the
mainstream media”. The reason we cannot be absolutely certain even about the existence

4 Note that general trust was also defined as an attitude. For example, Cappella et al. (1998) define
interpersonal trust as “an attitude toward other people who are not kin or intimate” (p. 3).
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of attitudes toward the media is because current research tools do not allow direct access
to the mental storehouse of attitudes and opinions (see Cappella & Jamieson, 1997:60).
But the fact that we cannot observe many of our constructs directly does not mean
that these constructs are merely inventions. Our lack of direct access to people’s
cognitions does not mean that any talk about attitudes is a wild guessing game that is
detached from whatever operates beyond direct observation. On the contrary, much can
be done to verify many of the assumptions made by researchers using attitudinal
constructs like media skepticism. The conventions that have been developed in the social
sciences for validating measures of unobserved phenomena involve comparison of the
results of different measures of social phenomena, either conceptually similar or
different. The strategy I use to validate my measures is no different from these
conventions. But before I get to issues of validity I would like to further explicate a few
of the assumptions I am making about my concept.
Media skepticism is subjective. Like most other attitudes (Wiebe, 1953), media
skepticism relates to subjective and private predispositions. The important implication in
the case of attitudes toward the media is their relative independence from any objective
measure of media performance. The actual performance of the media (for instance, the
“objective” degree of bias and accuracy in reporting) is mostly irrelevant for the current
study. What counts here is not how the media behave in practice, but rather, how people
perceive and evaluate media performance. Truly, we expect people to be influenced by
the media’s actual conduct when they make judgments about the media (an issue I
address elsewhere). But this does not mean that their overall judgements about the media
are determined solely by the media’s actual performance. Indeed, the variance among
37
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people attests to the subjectivity of their assessments. Subjectivity implies that (a)
audiences might diverge in the ways they interpret the conduct of the media, or even in
the criteria they use to evaluate the media, and (b) people’s attitudes toward the media
might be influenced by considerations other than the actual conduct and performance of
those working in the media. Since I am mostly interested in the consequences of media
skepticism and not in its sources, much of the research in the following chapters pretty
much ignores the reasons and motivations for mistrust in the press. In any case, at this
stage I would like to emphasize that media skepticism refers to the perceived credibility
of the news media rather than to some “objective” assessment of the media’s
performance.
Media skepticism is targeted toward the mainstream media in general. As I
already mentioned, attitudes usually refer to some “psychological object”. In this study,
the psychological object is the mainstream media in general. As Norris (1996) pointed
out, television is not merely a message, it is an institution. People respond and react not
only to given messages, but also to institutions of the news media as a whole. Thus, I am
assuming that people have attitudes toward the news media in general, and not only
toward specific channels, programs or journalists. Implicit in this is the assumption that
when most people confront a construct like “the media” in survey questions, they know
what the interviewer is talking about In other words, I am assuming that people have
some mental schemafor what “the media ” are, and that this construct operates whenever
people confront the target in survey (or any other) contexts.
Media skepticism is a relatively stable construct. Most attitudes are considered to
be enduring and stable (Price, 1992:49; Wiebe, 1953). Likewise, as an attitude toward
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the news media, media skepticism is expected to be relatively stable. This implies that
one’s attitude toward the press in time t is expected to be highly correlated with the same
person’s attitude in some (t-x) point in time in the past and in some (t+y) time in the
future. However, stability is only relative. Changes in media skepticism do occur. As
mentioned above, people may change their evaluation of the media in response to
changes in reality. The reason for such opinion changes might be the actual performance
of journalists (or some discussion about it in the public sphere). But it might also be that
people’s affect toward the messages conveyed by the media influences their opinions
about the media. In other words, people might come to dislike the messengers when they
don’t like the messages they convey. As I explained above, my interest is not in the
reasons for media skepticism, but rather in its consequences. So for the purposes of my
research it is probably enough to argue that both processes can occur simultaneously.
More central to my research is to demonstrate the relative stability of people’s skepticism
toward the media. In other words, regardless of what determines people’s attitudes
towards the media (be it the media’s performance, the content conveyed by the media, or
any other consideration), these attitudes are neither erratic nor inconsistent. They do not
change back and forth in response to every encounter between audiences and news texts.
On the contrary, they are relatively consistent and stable5. Changes across short time
spans are minimal, and changes across long time spans are gradual.

s A relatively recent testament to the stability o f attitudes toward the media comes from an analysis by
Bennet et al. (2001). Using NES 1998 data, they found that attitudes toward many o f the objects o f the
Lewinsky scandal -su ch as the impeachment, Starr and the congressional inquiry -w ere not related to
perceptions o f media fairness. This shows, they argue, that attitudes toward the media are not susceptible to
the object o f media coverage.
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The relative stability of media skepticism is consistent with the scholarly convention
that its parent concept, general trust, is relatively stable. Trust is known to develop
gradually, as a longitudinal process, sometimes spanning years (e.g. Lewici & Bunker,
19%). Each experience probably influences our future trust, but very few experiences can
alter it dramatically and instantaneously. So in the same way that interpersonal trust
would usually be only modestly affected after a single violation of trust, our media
skepticism would not change tremendously after a single incident in which we detected
inaccuracy or bias in media coverage. After such an incident we might be more
suspicious toward the particular reporter or program, and our overall level of media
skepticism might also rise slightly. But more evidence and a longer time span would be
required to alter our enduring tendency to trust - or mistrust - the institutions of
journalism in general.
At this point it might be useful to invoke the distinction between media skepticism as
a perception and as an attitude. People can have various perceptions regarding specific
media reports that they read in the press or watch on TV news. These evaluations are
momentary, ad hoc judgments. One might feel that story x is credible and suspect that
story y is totally inaccurate. These perceptions are not what I label media skepticism, but
rather an instance of a specific perception of a specific problem with story y, and lack
thereof in story x. As mentioned above, media skepticism applies to the evaluation of
mainstream media institutions in general, and not to any particular medium, outlet,
specific persona, or coverage of any specific event by any of these. In contrast to a
perception of bias in report w on issue x by person y on day z, media skepticism is the
feeling that, as a social institution, the media is biased in general. The perception of bias
40
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in a particular report may vary as conditions w, x, y and z change. However, as a
relatively enduring attitude toward the mainstream media as an institution, changes in
media skepticism are expected to be modest across time. What an audience member
thinks about the media today is not heavily influenced by any specific encounter with the
media, but is rather some generalization of many encounters with the media and about the
media. The aim here is not to study the relationship between the specific perceptions (of
various reports in various outlets) and the general skepticism concept. The focus is
entirely on the latter.

Operational definition.
Table 2.2 presents the survey items used as measures of media skepticism in the different
data sets. The items include questions about the degree to which audiences trust the
media “to report the news fairly”, and about the amount of “confidence” they have in the
people running the institutions of the press. They also include four of Gaziano &
McGrath’s (1986) News Credibility Scale items (fair, accurate, tell the whole story, can
be trusted), an item asking whether the media help society or get in the way of society
solving its problems, and an item asking whether the media care more about being the
first to report a story or about being accurate in reporting the story.
Since I do not wish to reinvent audience attitudes toward the media, my operational
definition of the concept is not very different from what has been done in the past by
perceived news credibility and media cynicism scholars. Admittedly, the primary reason
for this is that the study is based mostly on secondary analysis of existing data sets.
However, even if I could change the measures of attitudes toward the media in these data
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sets, I am not sure that I would. The reason is simply that the current items tap exactly the
general feelings of mistrust of, and alienation from, the mainstream media, which I
believe are the central components of media skepticism.
Reliability. Only one of the data sets used in this study contains all nine items (the
Electronic Dialogue data). All items in this dataset were transformed so that they would
vary between zero and one. In an exploratory factor analysis conducted on this data, all
nine items loaded on the same factor. Cronbach’s alpha for these nine items was .90,
which corresponds to a multiple correlation of .68. The different items are thus highly
correlated with one another. The requirement of internal consistency, necessary to
demonstrate that I have at hand a reliable measurement tool, is met by the data.
Content validity. The issue of content validity relates to the connection between the
items in Table 2.2 and the content world of media skepticism. Nominally, I defined
media skepticism as subjective trust in the way the media function in society. Some of
the items in Table 2.2 are pretty general, while others relate to specific aspects of media
behavior. Basically, the items ask audiences to evaluate the news media according to the
criteria generally used to evaluate journalistic work in society, which are basically the
same criteria journalists themselves use to evaluate their own work. The survey questions
in Table 2.2 all relate, in one way or another, to the professional norms of journalism. In
what follows I briefly elaborate on these norms.

Credibility as a journalistic norm.
Factualness, credibility and accuracy are among the most basic components of
journalistic ethics. The professional norm that journalism deals with facts and that these
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facts should be as credible as possible provides the rationale for such journalistic
practices as verifying each piece of information, presenting “hard evidence” such as
numbers, separating facts from comments, requiring proof from sources, and publishing
only stories that “seem believable” to journalists and editors. The journalistic norms of
credibility and factualness are further sustained by media laws (especially libel laws) that
demand accuracy in reporting and thus imply that people should expect to find factual
information in the media.
The centrality of factualness and credibility in journalistic ethics is well discussed
and thoroughly demonstrated by scholars studying journalism (e.g., see Sigal, 1986; Bird,
1990; Pauly, 1990; Schudson, 1978). One study (Eaton, 1990) focused on journalists’
reactions to the Janet Cook scandal and found that these reactions stressed the norm of
credibility using its violation. In other words, journalists who said they felt “humiliated”,
“assaulted”, or “angry and sad” about the Janet Cook case stressed the norm that
“whether it is our particular job to cover local government, a foreign war, a cocktail party
or even a sports event, we (journalists) are bound together by a common love of truth” (as
one journalist expressed it). The trust of the audience is the single most important asset
that journalists have, according to their professional codes. Thus, the credibility of
journalists and its mirror image, the trust of the audience, are crucial criteria for
evaluating the performance of newsmakers. The fact that items tapping trust in the media
are correlated so highly with survey items tapping the general performance of the media
attest to the centrality of trust in audience evaluation of the press. Indeed, this is the
reason I chose the concept of “skepticism” to describe audience attitudes toward the
media.
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Fairness and objectivity. Objectivity is another essential theme in traditional journalistic
ethics, one that is considered to be “the cornerstone of the profession” (Bird, 1990:378).
As so many scholars have noted, objectivity and fairness have become a central “strategic
ritual” for journalists (Schudson, 1978; Schiller, 1981). Again, many journalistic
practices and conventions are intended to emphasize these norms, for example: using
third-person language that implies distance, using quotes for much the same purpose,
reporting “both sides of the story”, “balancing” by collecting reactions firom those most
likely to be hurt or otherwise affected by the story, and so forth, in sum, one of the
critical professional norms in journalism is the norm of the journalist as the objective, fair
and impartial observer, the detached, scientific information gatherer.
From the audience’s viewpoint, norms of fairness and objectivity can be viewed as
logical prerequisites for credibility and trust. If reporters are perceived to be unfair, it is
impossible to trust the information they distribute. This is probably why perceptions of
fairness load together with items measuring audience trust and perceptions of accuracy.
When people trust the media, they also tend to believe in the media’s fairness6.
Social cause. According to its professional norms, journalism as an institution exists
to serve a social cause, not a private one. Journalism is expected, both by journalists
themselves and by society, to provide useful infoimation. For example, active scrutiny of
society, particularly government, is a fundamental obligation of journalists. As Ralph
Barney noted (cited by McManus, 1997:286), “a first reason for journalists to exist is the
6 Related to perceptions o f fairness are perceptions o f bias. However, note that the NCS bias item is not
included in the skepticism items. This is because it lowered the reliability o f the scale, and because it
loaded on a different factor in the EFA. The way the bias item behaved implies a qualitatively different
type o f skepticism - although still correlated to general media skepticism. As I point out later, this
component was left aside not only on empirical grounds but also because it is conceptually closer to
ideological skepticism. And the fact that bias was the only item from the list that loaded together with
ideology serves as empirical evidence for this conceptual suspicion.
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gathering and distributing of information, most particularly information that others are
taking pains to keep from being distributed”. Journalists use the metaphor of a watchdog
that deters corrupt politicians from wrong-doing while at the same time unveiling wrong
doings when they actually take place. Thus, besides the norms of objectivity and
credibility, the journalistic profession also holds that its reporting aims at serving the
public good. The media should help society, for example by watching out - and if
necessary, criticizing - the powerful in society from taking inappropriate advantage of
their power.
This is the rationale for including item 7 in the operational definition of media
skepticism, and it is also the reason it loads so well with the other items. Audiences that
trust the media, tend to believe that the media help society solve its problems. On the
other hand, audiences who distrust the media tend to think the media get in the way of
society solving its problems. Item 9 also refers to this norm by contrasting accuracy with
being “first on the story,” which connotes personal motivations that stand in opposition to
the public good.
The items measuring media skepticism do not only measure how audiences think the
media implement some basic aspects of their journalistic norms. The argument about
content validity can be strengthened by showing that the items contain some of the basic
ingredients of general trust applied towards journalists, as outlined in the previous
chapter. First, as discussed in Chapter 1, trust is a set of expectations about fulfillment of
goals and interests versus potential harms to these interests. In this light, asking whether
the media help or get in the way of society can be viewed as asking whether the media
beget gains or losses. Second, the potential opportunism of the trustee is a basic
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ingredient in the problem of trust. Item 9 asks whether journalists care more about being
the first to report a story or about being accurate in reporting a story. This is an example
of measurement of perceptions of opportunism, which has to do with the motives and
ambitions of the trustees. Third, the credibility of the trustees is an important component
of the definition of trust. The News Credibility Scale taps perceptions of media
credibility. In other words, some of the items measuring media skepticism contain basic
elements from the definition of trust. They ask audiences, both directly and indirectly,
whether they trust the media.
In sum, attitudes toward the media are measured using items tapping general
evaluations of the media, but also evaluations of more specific domains of journalistic
work, domains that correspond with the basic components of journalistic professional
norms, constituting audience expectations of the media. In other words, the operational
definition of media skepticism consists of audience evaluation of media performance in
general, but also of more specific evaluations of whether the media do what they are
expected to do. In terms of content validity, the operational definition of media
skepticism covers a few basic components of audience expectations of media institutions:
credibility, fairness, accuracy, and considerations of social good.

Convergent validity.
To estimate convergent validity I examined the correlation between the skepticism scale
described above and another measure of skepticism obtained from a content analysis of
statements respondents made about the media in an electronic discussion group. As
explained in Appendix 1, the Electronic Dialogue panel was composed of a discussion
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group, a control group, and a set-aside group. All discussion group members were invited
to log on and attend a series of electronic discussions focusing on campaign issues. The
discussants were divided to 60 groups, primarily according to scheduling matters. The
ideological composition of the groups was controlled, so that 20 of the groups were
ideologically conservative, 20 liberal, and 20 heterogeneous. In one o f the nine events,
held in December 2000, the functioning of the media in covering the presidential election
was discussed. In all 60 groups the issues of fairness, responsibility and bias were raised
by the moderators. The groups were also asked a more specific question about the
functioning o f the media on election night (referring specifically to the use of exit polls).
The transcripts o f the discussions were content analyzed to identify the degree of
media skepticism expressed by project participants. Each participant's comments7 were
coded for their valence for or against the media. Answers to moderators’ questions in
favor of the media, or other statements in the subsequent discussion that were positive in
their attitude toward the media, were coded as “pro-media” statements, and vice versa for
“con-media” statements. For example, any positive answer in response to the question,
“In your opinion, have journalists and the press acted responsibly and fairly in covering
the events that have occurred since election night?” was coded pro=l, con=0; any
negative answer to this question was coded pro=0, con=l. Any positive answer to the
question, “Do you think the coverage has been biased towards either o f the presidential
candidates, Bush or Gore?” was coded con-1, pro=0, and vice verse for positive
responses. In addition to these snapshot yes/no answers to moderators’ questions, pro
media statements included assertions that the media were fair and balanced, that the

7 A comment is defined as a section o f text entered into the on-line discussion space, followed by “enter.”
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media did their best in covering the elections under the unusual conditions, that the
coverage was thorough and illuminating, that the media “only reported what happened”,
or simply general statements of appreciation of the media. Con-media statements
included charges about unfairness, about the media being too negative and too eager to
stir up conflict, about the media rushing to be first on the story at the expense o f
cautiousness and accuracy. Con statements also included charges about too much
speculation in news coverage, about the media creating rather than reporting news, about
repetition in news coverage, and about the negative social implications resulting from
media coverage. Expressions of agreement8 with pro-media statements were also coded
as pro-media statements, while expressions of agreement with con-media statements were
coded as con-media statements - and vice versa for expressions of disagreement. Quotes
from the discussion transcripts exemplifying these categories are presented in Table 2.3.
Some of the comments got a “1” on both the pro- and con-media variables. For
example, some respondents’ answers for the fairness and responsibility question were
“Yes and no”9. Another category was “depends”. This category was used when
respondents answered that the performance of the media depended on the particular
network, program, or news persona, in a way that made it impossible for the coder to
extract their general attitudes toward the media. When applied to samples of the media
portion of the discussion, inter-coder reliabilities between two coders for this coding
scheme ranged from a Kappa of .87 for the pro-media statements variable to a Kappa of
.79 for the con-media statements variable.

1 For example, “James, I absolutely agree with you.”
9 For example, “Fairly, perhaps; the ones I have seen have tried to give different sides. Responsibly, no.
They have created this media circus.”
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Results of the content analysis provided some evidence for convergent validity. The
number of con-media statements was positively correlated with the survey skepticism
measure (r=43), while the number of pro-media statements was negatively correlated
with the survey skepticism scale (r=-.38). However, using the number of statements as a
measure of skepticism is somewhat problematic because it also reflects, in addition to
media skepticism, the tendency to make statements in electronic discussion groups
(people who talk more will have more statements, by definition). In this case, a measure
of proportion (the number of con-media statements divided by the number of con-media
plus the number of pro-media statements) is somewhat less biased. The bivariate
correlation between the media skepticism scale and this proportion measure was .53
(p<.001). In other words, the survey measure of media skepticism was highly and
positively correlated with expressions of media skepticism in an open-ended electronic
discussion. Those who reported mistrust in the media in the survey tended to express the
same in the electronic discussions, and those who reported trust in media in the survey
tended also to express this trust in the electronic discussion.
Convergent validity requires a high correlation between two different methods of
measuring the same phenomenon (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Although a higher
correlation would admittedly have been better evidence of convergent validity, a
correlation o f .53 is adequate for this sort of data. This is especially the case since we are
comparing anonymous responses to a computerized survey, on the one hand, to opinion
expression in a group context, on the other. Strictly speaking, these are not two separate
observations of the very same thing. For one thing, expression of skepticism in the group
context might be enhanced or inhibited by the presence o f other people in the chatroom (I
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will discuss the possibility of social desirability later in this chapter). Second, the
discussions focused on the conduct o f the media in the coverage of election results - a
relatively specific domain compared to the general manner in which the media skepticism
scale is constructed. Many non-skeptics might have expressed skepticism in the
discussion since they thought (despite their general trust in the media) that the media
were wrong in the way they covered election results. Thus, the two observations of media
skepticism correlate highly despite the fact that they come from two different social
contexts and despite the fact they deal with somewhat different aspects of the
phenomenon under discussion.

Discriminant validity.

Is media skepticism merely a function of some general mistrust?
One might argue that skepticism toward the media is merely a function of skepticism in
general, i.e., that mistrust in the media is simply a symptom of some general tendency not
to trust. This raises the empirical question of whether trust in the media is distinct from
general social and institutional trust. Indeed, as Table 2.4 demonstrates, four different
data sets show a positive (and in three cases significant) bivariate correlation between
mistrust in the media and interpersonal mistrust. Those who mistrust the media tend to
mistrust people in general. However, the correlation coefficients are small in magnitude,
varying between .04 and .08. Only 51 percent o f media skeptics in the PTR file scored
above the median on the interpersonal mistrust scale. The corresponding percentages
were 49 percent in the Electronic Dialogue dataset, 54 percent in the GSS data, and 37
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percent in the NES data. In other words, all data at hand point to the fact that although
skepticism is slightly associated with general interpersonal mistrust (as we should expect
it to be), the two constructs are far from being identical. There are many media skeptics
who score relatively high on interpersonal trust, and many mistrustful people who yet
have high confidence in the media.
Similarly, bivariate correlations of media skepticism with confidence in various
social and democratic institutions are presented in Table 2.5. As the table shows, media
skepticism is positively and significantly associated with mistrust in the Supreme Court,
Congress, the executive branch of the federal government, organized labor, organized
religion, and education. This time the correlations are moderate in their magnitude,
varying between .10 and .40, with most of them in the .20 range. Those who mistrust the
media tend not to trust other institutions. But again, not all media skeptics report mistrust
toward other social and democratic institutions. In the GSS file only 39.6 percent of
media skeptics had “hardly any” confidence in the federal government, 43.4 percent in
Congress, and 25.7 percent in the Supreme Court. In the EDialogue data, the figures are
similar. Of the media skeptics in this dataset, only 51.1 percent had low confidence in
Congress, 32.8 percent in the Supreme court, 41.8 percent in local government, and 63
percent in the presidency. In short, many people who mistrust the media trust other social
institutions and vice versa. In fact, in both data sets the media-skepticism items even
loaded separately from most other items in the confidence-in-institutions battery in an
exploratory factor analysis10. Media skepticism is associated with social, interpersonal

10 In the GSS confidence battery, the press loaded with television and organized labor on one factor and all
other social institutions - the Supreme Court, Congress, education, the executive branch o f the federal
government, medicine, organized religion and the army - on a separate factor. In the EDialogue data
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and institutional mistrust, as we should expect it to be. However, it is far from being
empirically identical to other forms of trust.

Is media skepticism merely a function of political ideology?
Much research in the past has pointed out the association between media skepticism and
political ideology (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). It is well known that conservatives tend
to be more mistrustful of the media than their liberal counterparts. Based on this
association one could argue that expressing mistrust in the media in a survey context does
not really reflect an attitude toward the media per se. Rather, one might argue that media
skepticism is a political statement grounded in people’s political ideologies. People’s
conservatism makes them say that the media are liberally biased. If they are liberals they
say that they trust the media, not because they really trust journalists, but rather in order
to protect the media from attacks from the right. In sum, another threat to the validity of
media skepticism is the possibility that it might be merely an artifact of political
ideology.
Indeed, media skepticism is associated with political ideology. But, again, the
bivariate association is not large. The bivariate Pearson r’s, presented in Table 2.6, vary
between -.11 and -.25", at best a moderate correlation. The association between media
skepticism and political ideology seems to be larger in magnitude than the association
between skepticism and interpersonal mistrust, and smaller than the association between

confidence battery, television loaded with the press, organized labor and the presidency on one factor and
all the other institutions - Congress, local government, the Supreme Court, organized religion and medicine
- on a different factor.
11 Note that the party-ideology variable is coded +5 for extreme liberals through >5 for extreme
conservatives.
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skepticism and institutional mistrust. Another way to look at the bivariate association
between media skepticism and political ideology is simply to calculate the rate of
skepticism within the different political ideology categories.
Table 2.7 shows that the rate of media skeptics among conservatives was much
higher than their rate among liberals or moderates in all four data sets. 54 to 74 percent of
conservatives, but only 42 to 56 percent of liberals, were mistrustful of the media,
depending on the specific data set. The difference between the rate of conservative
skeptics and liberal skeptics varied between 8.7 and 17.5 percent, always in favor of
conservatives, who tend to be much more mistrustful of the media than liberals.
But the higher rate of media skepticism among conservatives does not by itself
indicate that media skepticism is merely an artifact of political ideology. On the contrary,
the table points out the prevalence o f media skepticism, not only among conservatives,
but also among moderates and liberals. In fact, in three of the four data sets, more than a
half of the liberals were media skeptics. When one looks at the absolute numbers, without
comparing liberals to conservatives, one is forced to realize that media skepticism is not
limited to conservatives. It is not merely supporters of the right citing the criticisms of
their leaders. It is also liberals, many of whom label themselves extreme liberals, who
slam the media in public opinion surveys. Conservatives do tend to be more skeptical of
the media than liberals, it’s true. But this does not mean that media skepticism is merely a
function o f one’s political positions12.

12 In addition, ideology loaded separately from most media skepticism items in a principal component
factor analysis. All media credibility items created one factor, except bias, which loaded with ideology on a
separate factor.
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Is media skepticism merely a function of political extremity?
Some have argued that it is not the direction o f political attitudes, but rather their
extremity that influences audience mistrust in the media. For example, Gunther (1988)
reported that extreme liberals and conservatives trusted the media less than their
moderate counterparts. He also reported a curvilinear association between trust in media
coverage o f an issue and attitude about the issues, with extremists (but also neutrals) less
likely to trust the media than moderates. He uses social judgement theory to explain
these findings. People of high attitude extremity “attend closely to the information, ideas
and opinions represented in the media coverage. But much of that content, reflecting a
range of opinion necessarily diverges from the partisan's extreme attitude. Thus, much of
it is unacceptable content... People of highly polarized attitudes will have a wider latitude
of rejection”13 (1988:279-80). For Gunther, extremism implies involvement, and
involvement means more information rejection. Indeed, involvement with issues is
known to be associated with media coverage o f issues (e.g. Vallone et al., 1985, who
reported that both pro-Israelis and pro-Arabs were likely to perceive bias in media
coverage of the Beirut massacre compared to neutrals, but each side perceived bias in the
other direction). Also, it was found (Gunther, 1992) that group members perceive media
bias in the coverage of their groups (e.g., blacks perceive bias in the coverage of blacks,
union members in the coverage of union members, and so forth). All of these relate to the
idea that extremity of attitudes explains audience mistrust in the media.
13 Later, however, Stam and Dube (1994) argued that Gunther confounded attitude intensity and
involvement. They found no evidence for a curvilinear relationship between trust in the media and attitude
direction and intensity. However, they did find attitude closure to be non-linearly related with trust in the
media.
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Much of this literature is not directly relevant to this dissertation, for it deals with
media coverage of particular groups and topics. I might be a union member and mistrust
the way the media portray the unions. At the same time, I might very well trust the way
media covers large corporations and big money. Overall, although I do not like the way
my group is portrayed, I might be a non-skeptic. Nevertheless, could it still be that
political extremity confounds the measurement of media skepticism? To test whether
media skepticism is distinguished from attitude extremity I correlated the two measures
in the four data sets. The estimated correlations are presented in Table 2.8. As the table
shows, the correlation between political extremity is positive in direction, but only
modest in magnitude. That is, extreme conservatives and liberals tended to mistrust the
media somewhat more than moderates, but the association explained at best only a
fraction of the variance in skepticism (.122=.014). The measures used in this dissertation
do not merely reflect attitude extremity.

Confirmatory measurement model.
To test my argument about discriminant and convergent validity in its completeness I
estimated a confirmatory measurement model described in Figure 2.1. Media skepticism
is modeled as a latent variable affecting eight indicators noted by Xj (the i's parallel the
presentation of the items in Table 2.2). The model allows for covariances between all the
error terms of the Gaziano & McGrath News Credibility Scale items (items 2,3,4 and 5
in Table 2.2). The reason for allowing for these correlated errors is that separate items
from the same scale probably share a method factor (just by using similar wordings,
appearing in the same table, and so forth). The coefficient for x2 (the NCS fair item) was
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forced to 1.0 in order to scale the latent variable. To examine the discriminant and
convergent validity of the latent factor (skepticism), it was allowed to correlate with four
exogenous variables: interpersonal trust (TRUST), political extremity (EXTREME), the
party-ideology index (INDEX1) and the content analysis scores for the proportion o f conmedia statements in the open-ended discussion (STATED). Correlations were allowed
between all of these exogenous factors, which are assumed to be perfectly measured (due
to lack of appropriate multiple indicators). It is easy to show that this model is identified
by using identification rules for measurement models with correlated errors.
In terms of fit, the model cannot be rejected by the data. The chi-square test for the
null hypothesis that the model-implied covariance matrix equals the population
covariance matrix was 57.44 with 42 degrees of freedom (p>.05; we want a p-value
higher than .05 in this case).This is good news in light of the relatively large N and the
large number of degrees of freedom. Other fit statistics showed almost perfect fit (values
lower than .90 for these fit indices would indicate problematic fits).
Figure 2.1 presents standardized estimates for this measurement model. This means
that the coefficients for the factor loadings are standardized regression coefficients, and
the coefficients for the covariances can be interpreted as regular correlations. All factor
loadings were significantly different from zero. Removing either of the indicators
resulted in lower fit. The factor loadings are also relatively high in magnitude, except for
the coefficient for x9 (first on the story/accurate in reporting the story). Though the
loading for this indicator was low, forcing it to be zero damaged the fit of the model.
Our test for convergent validity is the correlation between media skepticism and the
content analysis-based measure of attitudes toward the media as expressed in the
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electronic discussion. The confirmatory model estimated this correlation to be .58, a
relatively high correlation. Our test for discriminant validity is the correlation between
skepticism and measures of different constructs - interpersonal trust, political ideology
and political extremity. The estimates for these correlations, according to the
measurement model, were -.08, -.35 and .13. In other words, media skepticism was not
significantly correlated with interpersonal trust. The correlation between skepticism and
political extremity was low. The correlation between skepticism and ideology was only
moderate (note that after correcting for attenuation the correlation is higher than the
estimate presented in Table 2.6). This moderate correlation might be considered a bit
high for demonstrating discriminant validity. This is why ideology will be controlled for
in all models.
Another measurement model that addresses the same issues is presented in Figure
2.2. This time, the eight indicators used in the model presented in Figure 2.1 are
collapsed into two measures: Gaziano and McGrath’s News Credibility Scale constitutes
one measure, and the rest of the mistrust items constitute another. The reduction in the
number of degrees of freedom and free parameters leads to a much higher p-value. The
other fit indices show almost perfect fit. The correlations between skepticism and the
other constructs are similar in magnitude to those reported in Figure 2.1. In other words,
the measurement structure and the tests for validity discussed above are consistent with
the data.
Is media skepticism merely a function of respondents’ social desirability?
The problem of social desirability, namely the problem of people answering questions
according to a social norm instead of giving their true opinions, has concerned many
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attitude scholars since the beginning o f public opinion polling. The answers people give
to pollsters, it is often argued, may merely be reflections of what the interviewer wants to
hear, rather than the respondents' real attitudes. Could it be that, in the case of media
skepticism, respondents give the mistrustful answer by default, due to the prevailing
social norm o f cynicism toward the media?
Some of the responses we got from the electronic discussion participants seem to
raise suspicions about social desirability (the public view of journalists and the media is
so negative that respondents could be influenced to adjust their expressed attitudes to
match the norms). For one thing, the expressed media skepticism scores (based on the
proportion of con-media arguments in the discussion) were significantly higher than the
survey media skepticism scores, the ones measured five months before the discussions
(Wilcoxon’s Sign-rank Z=-4.42; p<.000) and the ones measured right after the
discussions (Wilcoxon’s Sign-rank Z=-5.46; p<.001)M. About 67 percent of respondents
had a high media skepticism “discussion” score compared with their survey score.
However, these comparisons are somewhat flawed, due to the use of different metrics - a
proportion and a scale averaging nine different survey items. Although they both measure
the same phenomena, they are substantially different in their structure (the discussionbased measure tends to give more extreme scores - either 1 or 0).

14 A non-parametric test was used because the distributions o f the two measures are not equal. Both
measures vary between 0 and I, but the distributions are clearly different: the survey scale is approximately
normal (the Kolmogorov-Sm imov statistic was .OS (p=.20), rejecting the null hypotheses o f non-normality)
while the discussion-based measure is highly skewed (the Kolmogorov-Smimov statistic was.20 (pc.OOl).
The null cannot be rejected, indicating a very low probability that the distribution is normal, with 36% o f
respondents having a score o f 1 (indicating that all their statements were con-media) and 11% having a
score o f 0 (indicating all statements were pro-media). The corresponding T-tests yielded the same
qualitative results.
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The actual content of the comments provides even more clues to suggest social
desirability in the public discussions. A look at the comments shows a qualitative
asymmetry between the pro-media and con-media comments. While almost all negative
comments about the media were unequivocal, many of the pro-media comments were
more relative and cautious in their position. In other words, media skeptics expressed
their opinions clearly. On the other hand, media supporters, while expressing support for
the media, were more conditional.
A few quotes exemplify this point Moderators in all 60 electronic discussions asked
about the conduct of the media in covering election results. The question wording was,
“In your opinion, have journalists and the press acted responsibly and fairly in covering
the events that have occurred since election night?” The positive answers to this question
included such responses as:

•

“I think they have done better than I expected.” (Will, 22gird)

•

“Yes, everyone is at a loss, and they try hard to do right.” (Lillian, 40mango)

•

“They have tried to.” (John, lOcross)

•

“Yes, in most cases.” (William, 24hale)

•

“Pretty good but I get most of my news from PBS.” (Elizabeth, 57salve)

•

“Yes. I think so. Things have changed so rapidly that they just seem to able to keep
up without much bias.” (Doreen, 31jog)

•

“They did the best they could under these weird conditions.” (James, 3auger)

•

“I suppose so, but you can tell which ones are Democrats and which ones are
Republicans.” (Helen, 54ride)

•

“Overall, I think the news people have done a pretty good job on a subject we are
getting sick o f hearing.” (Jimmy, 13dictum)
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•

“I really do think they are trying...Things have been changing while they are still
reporting on the last development. (Candy, 60tile)

When moderators asked whether the media were biased toward either Bush or Gore in
their coverage of the campaign, the relatively positive responses included:

•

“I think they tried their best...It is hard to be unbiased.” (Mark, 54ride)

•

“The media will blast anyone they get a chance to. It knows no party affiliation.”
(Robert, 29iota)

•

“The commentators tried to be balanced and fair, but sometimes the temper of their
voices showed personal feelings.” (Joel, lOcross)

•

“Both sides have been presented the best they can.” (Tina, 47open)
In the last section of the media-related discussion, moderators asked specifically about

media projections of election results based on exit polls on election night Audiences with
relatively high trust in the media tended to say things like:

•

“I don't think they had any other choice.” (Martha, 49pear)

•

“Based on the history of exit polls and election returns they did what they have
always done.” (Mike, 34knock)

•

“Since it has always been done this way in the past I suppose they thought it was
perfectly acceptable.” (Anthony, SOpinto)

•

“Sure, based on the info they had. They just didn't have a clue it would be this close
and called it early, like they usually do quite safely.” (Rose, 56rice)

•

“They were doing what they always do...trying to be the first to ‘get it right.’” (Henry,
31jog)

•

“It is their job to beat out the competition.” (Joe, 58sedge)
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In sum, many of the pro-media comments were only relatively supportive of the
media. The media acted responsibly and fairly, but only relative to expectations, given
the unprecedented situation, or in comparison to what they usually do. Many pro-media
statements were in fact excuses for the problematic election coverage by the media. Many
of those who were relatively supportive of the media in the discussions stressed that it
was unrealistic to expect that all journalistic norms could be fulfilled in practice. No one
could be truly objective in such situations, some argued; journalists should just do their
best. The media were not perfect, but they tried to provide the most accurate information
they had at hand, given the constraints under which they operated.
In sum, in social contexts media skeptics were clearer and more unconditional in
their attitude toward the media than media supporters. There are a few ways to interpret
this information, however. For example, it could be due to the context of the specific
discussion - the failure of the media in mistakenly calling the election for Gore and later
for Bush (when the Florida vote was practically a tie), and the unprecedented legal
contest over election results. In this specific context, which was addressed in the
discussions, it could be that many of those who usually trust the media were more
skeptical, given the more problematic conduct of the media (in the coverage of the
particular events of November, 2000). It could also be that this context forced some
regular non-skeptics to be more cautious in their support and to provide excuses for the
media, rather than expressing outright support
But it is also possible that social desirability came into play. That is, that the norm of
mistrust in the media affected trusting audiences so that they expressed less trustful
opinions in the focus group than they did in the online survey. When surrounded by other
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people, those who trusted the media might have been influenced by social anti-media
sentiments, and hence less willing to express outright support for the media.
This is only a suspicion, however, and even if it is justified, it attests not only to the
problem o f social desirability in a group context, but also to the fact that it is at least
partially solved in the more confidential and anonymous electronic survey context. The
fact that people are at least somewhat influenced by the “social answer” when they
respond to questions is neither new nor surprising. Some gap, by reason of social
desirability, between true opinion and expressed opinion potentially exists every time
people answer public opinion polls. It does not mean that we should disregard all answers
people give to pollsters. In fact, attitudes toward the press are not very intimate, and the
sanctions for violating the social norm of media skepticism are surely less intimidating
then the sanctions for expressing attitudes that stand in contrast to other social norms
(e.g., expressing racism, admitting sexual misconduct, and so forth). In sum, to the extent
that people are affected by social norms when answering survey questions about their
trust in the media, social desirability is probably not a serious problem. In this respect this
study is not unique compared to what is acceptable in the social sciences.

Stability.
One could argue that people’s skepticism toward the media changes frequently, rapidly
and arbitrarily. However, talking about media skepticism as an attitude assumes that it is
relatively stable. The stability of people’s attitudes toward the media can be empirically
assessed by correlating measures of skepticism at different points in time. EDialogue
respondents were given the media skepticism battery twice: in the Wave 4 pre-survey
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conducted in late July and early August 2000, and in the Wave 8 post-survey conducted
in December 2000. The correlation between the two different measurements of the same
skepticism scale was .63 (p<.001)ls. The higher a respondent scored on the media
skepticism scale in July, the higher he or she tended to score on the same scale in
December.
In order to assess the stability of responses to the scale, we can also examine the
differences between the Wave 8 and Wave 4 skepticism scores. The cumulative
distribution of the absolute values of these difference scores (representing change in
skepticism in absolute values) is presented in Table 2.9. The numbers in the left-hand
column represent degrees of change on the 0-1 skepticism scale (composed of the nine
items presented in Table 2.2), and the numbers in the right-hand column represent the
cumulative frequency, that is, the rate of cases falling in the corresponding category of
change or lower. As the table shows, the distribution of change is heavily skewed to
smaller values. In other words, most respondents did not change their assessments of the
media at all, or changed them only slightly. For almost 30 percent of all respondents the
shift was .05 or less on the 0-1-skepticism scale. For more than half, the scores shifted
by.10 or less. About 80 percent of all respondents changed their minds by less than .20 on
the scale. More extreme opinion changes were relatively rare. The average change was
.12, the median was .10, and the mode was .03. In short, changes in media skepticism
were relatively minor. Those who did not trust the media in July did not trust them in
December. This is in spite of the drastic changes in the political reality in the five months
between Wave 4 and Wave 8. A roller-coaster presidential race, two party conventions,
15After correction for attenuation using a reliability o f .90, this correlation would be .63/sqrt(.9*.9)=.70.
Half o f the variance in skepticism could thus be explained by previous skepticism.
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three presidential debates, the failure of the media to accurately project the winner on
election night, accusations of media bias in favor o f Gore’s Florida recount claims, and
accusations from the other side that the media were portraying Gore as a sore loser in his
legal battle - all of these left little impact on audiences’ evaluations of the media. Most
people changed their assessments only slightly. In fact, the aggregate level changes were
not in any particular direction. The distribution of differences between Wave 4 and Wave
8 (as opposed to the distribution of the absolute values of change, presented in Table 2.9)
was almost normal around zero, with an average, median and mode of about zero. So
there was, on average, almost no change in media skepticism.
To the extent that we can generalize from the EDialogue two-wave data, media
skepticism is, like any other attitude, relatively stable. Today’s attitudes about the media
are similar to yesterday’s attitudes. Tomorrow’s attitudes about the media will probably
be associated with today’s. Some degree of change is, of course, expected. In the case of
the EDialogue data, however, the changes were minor. Very few people appear to have
changed their evaluations dramatically. There were only five cases with a difference
score of more than ± 0.50. In sum, attitudes toward the media are not whims that change
with every minor political event and every failure of the media in covering political life.
On the contrary, they are relatively stable, enduring attitudes.
Another strategy to evaluate the stability o f media skepticism is to examine
aggregate changes in longitudinal cross-sectional studies. This is done in Figures 2.3 and
2.4. Figure 2.3 presents seven-day moving averages for the media evaluation item across
the two months-long primary season Rolling Cross Section APPC 2000 data. Moving
averages were used to smooth the data in order to correct for random sampling variation.
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The pattern is fairly stable. Statistically speaking, it is almost a straight line. The small
variations across time can probably be dismissed as stemming from differences in sample
sizes across time, especially lower Ns in late December (probably) due to the holidays.
On the other hand, Figure 2.4 presents the trend of public lack of confidence in the press
across 24 years. As is evident from the graph, mistrust in the media increased
dramatically over this long time span. The two graphs juxtaposed demonstrate the
stability of media skepticism on the aggregate level. Over short time spans, changes in
skepticism are minor. Over years and decades changes are significant. But these changes
are neither erratic nor arbitrary. The slow and gradual shifts in skepticism demonstrate its
relative stability.
In their book, The Rational Public, Page and Shapiro (1992) debunk the myth of
capricious, frequent and rapid public opinion change. They distinguish between “abrupt”
changes in aggregate public opinion of ten percent or more per year, “fluctuations” that
are “two or more significant (opinion) changes in opposite directions within two years or
three or more within four years”16, and “gradual” changes that are defined as “any
significant shifts in opinion that are neither abrupt nor parts of fluctuations” (p. S3).
Using their criteria, it is easy to show that aggregate media skepticism scores neither
change abruptly nor fluctuate. Thus, media skepticism changes gradually, like most other
public opinion changes explored by Page and Shapiro. Such gradual changes are not
capricious, the authors argue. They represent understandable public reactions to changes
in values and life circumstances.

16 Aggregate opinion changes are said to be significant if they are changes o f six percentage points or more
(p. 53).
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Page and Shapiro claim that opinion stability is manifested by the fact that
“collective public opinion on a given issue at one moment in time is a very strong
predictor on that same issue at a later time” (p.65). It is easy to show that this assertion
applies to media skepticism. Using GSS’s 22 measurement points as a time series, trend
alone explains 87 percent o f the variance in aggregate-level mistrust in the media17.
Adding first- and second-order lag operators increases the explained variance to 93
percent18. This means that knowing the year, and given the rates of skepticism for that
and the previous year, you could almost perfectly predict the rate of skepticism for the
following year. This is exactly what stability implies - that knowledge of today can
accurately predict tomorrow.
In sum, individual panel data along with aggregate-level longitudinal data
demonstrate that media skepticism is a relatively stable phenomenon. People do not
erratically and arbitrarily change their opinion over short spans of time. One’s evaluation
of the media in July is positively and highly correlated with his or her evaluation of the
media in December. Aggregate-level longitudinal data over short time spans is basically
constant. Nonetheless, societies change their aggregate perceptions over long spans of
time. Since these changes are gradual and persistent, however, they support the claim for
stability.

Do people have a schema for the media?
In order to have attitudes toward the media, people must have some generalized
conception of what “the media” are, as well as beliefs about how they operate. Hence, I
17 Bp=1.2; SE=.10; p<.000.

11 Durbin-Watson statistic for this equation was 2.10.
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am assuming that people have a mental schema for the mainstream news media in
general. Though clearly a realistic assumption, it is not directly verifiable, as are other
assumptions I made above. However, there is much in the survey data and in the
electronic discussion transcripts to suggest that the assumption that people have a mental
schema for “the media” is probably a valid one. To begin with, the rate of the missing
data, or “don't know’' answers, to the media-related survey questions is normal. The
refusal rate for the EDialogue media battery varied between zero and one percent (among
those who completed the Wave 4 survey; almost all items having a refusal rate of .4 to .6
percent). In the NES data, the refusal rate for the trust in media item was .4% and the
“don’t know” rate was .2%. In the APPC data, the refusal rate for the trust in media item
was .4% and the “don’t know” rate was practically zero (only two cases out of 2,576
respondents gave a “don’t know” answer). There is nothing about these numbers to
suggest that respondents did not understand the questions or the concept of media
presented in the questions.
In addition, there is much in the discussion transcripts to suggest that people have
some conception of “the media”, and that their understanding of the concept is probably
not far from its use in the current research. 267 EDialogue discussants who participated
in the media discussion were asked by the moderator to evaluate whether “media” or “the
press and journalists” behaved fairly and responsibly in their election coverage. Almost
none of the participants asked the moderator to clarify what was meant by “the press and
journalists” or by “the media”. The only exception was a participant who said in response
to the fairness question, “Which journalists? CNBC-FOX News-MSNBC - yes; NBC no; ABC - no; CBS - no, no, no” - a response that implies a distinction between cable
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and broadcast networks. Of the 1,600 relevant comments19 analyzed from the media
discussion transcripts only 70 comments (about 4 percent) mentioned any specific news
outlet, media persona, or particular show when engaging in discussion about the media.
Almost none of the electronic discussions concentrated on any particular outlet or
broadcaster. When participants did mention particular channels or journalists, they
usually did so in order to demonstrate their arguments about the media in general20. Most
of the media outlets mentioned by discussants were mainstream media outlets21. Of the
newspersons mentioned, people like Dan Rather, Peter Jennings and Tom Brokaw were
the most frequently mentioned22. The fact that these were used as exemplars of the
mainstream media attests that audiences and scholars pretty much agree on what the
concept of “the news media*4includes. Altogether, references to specific news outlets,
specific shows, or particular journalists were marginal. The transcripts show that people
are able to engage in a discussion about the media in general without slipping to any

19 Ail moderator comments were coded as irrelevant. Logging in and out o f the channel was also coded
irrelevant The same is true with regard to welcoming late participants, or with comments about connection
speed or about typing. Dropping o ff all irrelevant comments reduced the number o f comments from 2,232
to 1,600.
20 However, some said they only attended to some channels so couldn’t judge the media in general. For
example, “I only watch Fox”, “I’ve mostly watched CNN, they’ve done OK in my opinion”, “I’ve been
watching CNN and they seem impartial”, “I’ll have to check them out I generally stick with NBC”.
21 Rush Limbaugh was mentioned only once. MSN (Microsoft News - an online news outlet) was
mentioned only once. NPR was mentioned once. These were all the references to non-mainstream sources.
By comparison, the large networks - ABC, NBC and CBS - and their anchormen were mentioned 27
times, Tlie cable news networks - CNN, FOX News Network and MSNBC - were mentioned 36 times.
22 For example, when one participant was asked to give an example o f bias in the media, he said, “When
Dan Rather sighs when announcing some victory for Bush”. Another one in a different discussion said, “As
you know, most anchors, Rather, Brokaw, Jennings are Democrats, and I think they try not to show their
own politics, but they all have slipped at one time or another”. Another one said he “thought Peter Jennings
was a ghost” when announcing a Bush victory.
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particular level. This provides some evidence that most people have some mental schema
for “the media”, just as we scholars do23.

Discussion.
Many of the assumptions I made at the beginning of this chapter received some empirical
support. First, in open-ended discussions, people talked about the media in general, not
just specific shows, channels and contents. I interpreted this fact as suggesting that people
probably have a mental schema for the media. Second, people have a relatively enduring
tendency to respond either positively or negatively toward the media. That is, people
have attitudes toward the media. Media skepticism was defined as general feelings of
alienation and mistrust toward the mainstream media.
In terms of content validity, the operational definition o f media skepticism simply
asks people to rate the work of the media using the criteria used in social discourse and
by journalists themselves to evaluate the media’s work. Because of the centrality of
credibility and audience trust in journalistic professional norms I labeled my concept
“media skepticism”.
This chapter also examined the discriminant and convergent validity o f media
skepticism. I argued that media skepticism does not merely reflect a general tendency not
to trust. Although the modest positive (and significant) correlations between media
skepticism and interpersonal and institutional mistrust point to the probability that

23 In addition, even if some respondents find the concept o f “the news media” obscure, most survey
questions used in this study probably make it easier for them to answer these media related questions. This
is because the question wordings provide some clarification about who “the mainstream media” are. Both
the EDialogue and the PTR surveys explain that the news media are “national television news, the daily
newspaper you are most familiar with, and newsmagazines”.
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general mistrust is a component of media skepticism, I argued that skepticism is not
merely a reflection of general mistrust. Media skepticism was also empirically distinct
from political ideology or its extremity. Though conservatives tend to be more mistrustful
o f the media than liberals, not all conservatives are media skeptics and not all liberals are
trustful of the media. In fact, most data show that most liberals rank themselves as media
skeptics. There appears to be an ideological component to media skepticism, but
skepticism certainly does not overlap with ideological and party lines. The ideological
component of media skepticism makes sense, given a skeptical component in the
conservative ideology. Conservatism tends to be suspicious of any social institution and
to stress individual responsibility and freedom as the solution to social problems.
The relative stability of media skepticism over time also attests to its relative
independence from other political judgments. If media skepticism scores were only
audience reactions to the content of specific media reports, it would seem plausible to
expect that it would change with every change in current media reports. The fact that
attitudes toward the media are relatively enduring shows that the reported attitudes are
toward the “messenger” (the institutions of the media), not just reflections of changing
attitudes toward changing messages.
Survey items measuring media skepticism are only modestly correlated to ideology
and interpersonal trust, and moderately correlated to institutional trust, but they tend to
converge highly with other media skepticism items. The skepticism scale was also highly
correlated with what respondents said about the media in open-ended electronic focus
groups. That is to say, I believe I demonstrate both discriminant and convergent validity
for the operational definition o f media skepticism.
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The causes of media skepticism, important as they are, are not the focus o f this
dissertation. The object of the current study is not to explain why some people mistrust
the media or to determine the factors that influence audience trust, but rather to determine
its consequences. Thus, the associations between media skepticism, on the one hand, and
ideology, general mistrust, the political events reported in the media at a specific point in
time, and so forth, will be treated in what follows as unexplained covariances.
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Table 2.1 Conceptualizing audience attitudes toward the madia ovir the years
Operationalization
Implications
Assumption
Exoerimental
"Source
Credibility is a
• The voice of the
credibility”
manioulations. e.a.
static trait of
audience remains
communication Pravda = ‘untrustworthy’
Early
unheard. Credibility is
sources
Oppenheimer =
persuasion
assumed to be
‘trustworthy’
research (1950constant across
1970)
A woman movie gossip
individuals.
columnist = ‘untrustworthy’ • No theoretical
Hovland &Weiss
Fortune Magazine =
justification for the
‘trustworthy*
(1951);
selection of ‘credible’
Hovland, Janis &
o r‘untrustworthy*
Kelly (1953)
sources for
experimental
manipulations.
Scholars were taking
these concepts at face
value.
Survev auestions. Mainlv
"Perceived
Credibility is
• Audience perceptions
contingent on
scales utilizing items such
news
of credibility vary
as "biased-unbiased*, ‘fairthe
credibility”
among different
perceptions of unfair’, ‘accurate(1970-an d
individuals and media
mainly 1980s)
the individual
inaccurate’, ‘tells the
outlets.
whole story’, ‘does/does
Gaziano &
not look after reader’s
McGrath (1986),
interests’. The scale,
Robinson &
originally developed by
Gaziano & McGrath (1986)
Kohut(1988)
Gunther etal.
and later elaborated by
(1994)
others, refers to specific
outlets (‘the newspaper
you are most familiar with’)
or media (TV vs. the
press).
4Madia
Cynicism is
Survey questions, e.g.
• Cynicism is perceived
cyniciam”
consistent
‘Thinking about the news
to be almost a ‘traif of
(1990’s)
within
media - national television
the audience.
individuals,
news, the daily newspaper
• Cynicism applies to
Cappella &
unrelated to
you are most familiar with
the mainstream media
Jamieson (1997) the sources
and newsmagazines as a whole, not
would you say the news
distinguishing between
media help society to solve
specific outlets. The
its problems, OR the news
only implicit distinction
media get in the way of
is between
society solving its
‘mainstream* and
problems?’
other media.

72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 2.2: S u r w Bams m m urliw media skepticism
Question wording

Answer categories

1. How much of the time do you think you can
trust media organizations to report the news
fairly?

1. Just about always
2. Most of the time
3. Only some of the time
4. None of the time
1-5 scale

Thinking about the news media in general that is, national television news, the daily
newspaper you are most familiar with, and
newsmagazines - please indicate whether you
think they:
2. Are fair
3. Tell the whole story
4. Are accurate
5. Can be trusted
6. All in all, how would you rate the job the
press has done in covering the presidential
election so far?
7. Thinking about the news media - national
television news, the daily newspaper you are
most familiar with and newsmagazines - would
you say the news media help society to solve
its problems, OR the news media get in the
way of society solving its problems?
8. Here is a list of various institutions in this
country. How much confidence would vou sav
you have in the people now running these
institutions?
9. Which do you think the news media care
more about, in general?

Datase
t
NES
EO
ED

A Excellent
BGood
C Fair
FPoor
1. The news media help society to
solve its problems
2. The news media get in the way of
society solving its problems.

ED
APPC

1. A great deal
2. Some
3. Not much
4. None at all
1. Being the first to report a story
2. Being accurate in reporting a story

ED
GSS

ED
PTR

ED
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Table 2.3: Electronic Dialogue ouot— exemplifying the content iwlwli coding «ch<nw.
Typaofstatam ant
Pro arauments
The media were fair and balanced

The media did their best in
covering the elections under the
unusual conditions
The coverage was thorough and
illuminating

The media only reflected reality
General statements of appreciation
to the media
Con arguments
Charges about unfairness

Media were too negative and too
eager to stir up conflict
The media only cared about being
first on the story, at the expense of
cautiousness and accuracy
Too much speculation in news
coverage
The media tried to create news,
not only to report it
Repetition in news coverage
Negative social implications
resulted from media coverage
‘Pro+Con" araument

‘Depends* argument

Examole

Source

’Seemed to be pretty balanced on the
news - one rep from each side*.
*1feel the media has covered both sides
equally*.
‘They did the best they could under these
weird conditions’.

32Jove
49Pear
3Auger

'Very opinionated comments’.
’Its been a bonanza for the pundits, but
I'm grateful for the analyses of the court
proceedings, because the points were so
technical*.
‘The press has only reported what
happened*.
‘Media coverage has been very good*.

43Native
3Auger

'Party affiliation of broadcasters clearly
comes through”.
’The press is definitely biased and
leaning towards the left*.
‘1think they tend to inflame the issues’.

57Slave

‘They were too quick. All wanted to be
first*.

4Blade

‘The press job is to report facts, not to
conjecture, speculate, spin.’
‘Sometimes they seem to try to make the
news instead of reporting*.
‘I'm fired of them interrupting daytime TV
and repeating the same story over and
over!*
‘The press has deepened the rift in the
peoples of the nation*.

7Cirrus

‘Fairly perhaps, the ones 1have seen
have tried to give different sides.
Responsibly, no. They have created this
media arcus*.
‘Depends on the network.*.
‘It depends on the reporter*.

14Elemen
35Krona

1Atrium
12Deuce

460ath
2Ankle
1Atrium

4SOar

450ar
51Quad
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Table 2.4; Blvariats Pearson correlations bttvwtn media skepticism and in f roorsonal
mistrust

Bivariate correlation between
media skepticism and
interpersonal mistrust
“ p<01; *“ p<.001

PTR

NES1996

6SS

ED2K

.06“

.08*“

.04“

.05

2,120

2,238

21,685

667

Table 2.5; Bivariate Pearson correlations between media skepticism and confidence In
various social Institutions.

Bivariate R
GSS data
1972-1996
(n*25,612)
Bivariate R
EDialogue
data
2000
(n=665)

Executive
branch1
.15*“

Congress
.26*“

Supreme
court
.22*“

.41“ *

.29*“

.23*“

Education Organized
Local
government
labor
.23*“
.20*“

.24*“

.31*“

.30“ *

Organized
religion
.12*“

.10“ *

*“ p< 001. In the GSS, the question is about confidence in ‘the executive branch of the federal
government”; the EDialogue question is simply about confidence in the ‘presidency*.
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TiM» 2.6: Bivariate Pearson correlations between media skepticism and political ideology
PTR
Bivariate correlation between
media skepticism and political
ideology
** p<.01; — p<.001

GSS
.11—

APPC

ED2K

-.15” *

NES 1996
-.25—

-.17—

-.20—

n=1,578

n=1,524

n=23,222

n=2,399

n=673

Table 2.7: Media skepticism and political ideology (percent of skeptics bv ideological
group)
Moderates
54.3%

Conservatives

PTR

Liberals
54.3%

NES 1996

56.4%

60.7%

73.9%

APPC

50.5%

50.2%

59.2%

ED2K

42.2%

41.4%

54.8%

69.0%

In all data sets the association between media skepticism and political ideology was significant at
the p<.001 level. In the ideological categories, ‘Liberals* include ‘Very liberals* and
‘Conservatives” include ‘Very Conservatives’ (in the NES data, ‘Liberals’ include ‘Extremely
Liberal”, ‘Liberal* and ‘Slightly Liberal”).
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TiM t 2.8: Bivariate Pw non correlations twftwwi media skepticism and political
extremity.

PTR
Bivariate correlation between
media skepticism and political
extremity?
* p<.05; - p<.01; — p<.001

GSS
.11—

APPC

ED2K

.02

NES 1996
.08-

.12—

.09*

n=1,578

n=1,509

n=23,222

n=2,399

n=673

Table 2.9: Cumulative friqm ncv of m«dl« skepticism change (NM99I.

Media skepticism change
(in absolute values)
.05
.10
.15
.20.
.25
.30
.35
.40
.45

Cumulative frequency
29.1
51.1
68.7
80.4
88.4
93.4
95.8
98.0
99.0

Note: media skepticism change is operationalized as the absolute value of the difference between
the Wave-8 and Wave-4 skepticism scores.
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Figure 2.1: Measurement modal for media skepticism (N«256)

.25

.64

.66

.45

.38

.66

.36

/ 45

media skepticism
.58

-.08
.13

.01

stated

trust
-.35
.14

-.33

.00

indexl

extreme
-.20

.15
Chi-square=57.44 (df*42). p*.06; NFI*.99; TU«.99; IFI=.99; 1-RMSEA=.97
All coefficients for factor loadings are significant at the p< .05 level.
All correlation estimates are significant at the p< 05,
except trust-media skepticism, trust-index and trust-stated
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Figure 2.2: M wureirant modgl for w d ia ik«ptict«m (N»2561
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Figure 2.3: Audianca avaluations of madia campaign covarega,
5-day MA, Dac 1999 - Jan 2000 (4*A, 0*F; APPC data)

Figure 2.4: GSS reapondants having hardly any confidanca in tha
press (1973-1996)
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Chapter 3: The valence of audience attitudes toward the media.

For years, political scientists have debated whether the loss of citizen political trust is
good or bad for democracy. The tone of most scholars writing on political mistrust has
been negative. A citizen who is overready to disapprove of government, they argue, may
be overready to contest it, or to refuse to comply with it. Others are concerned that
political alienation could translate into political apathy. A citizen who thinks all
politicians are corrupt might be less willing to invest her time and energy and to
participate in politics, by voting or other means. However, some have challenged this
point of view. For example, political scientist Paul Sniderman (1981), in his landmark
study of political alienation, argues that alienation is not necessarily bad:
The mood of disillusion which has settled over the country is disquieting. Yet
as we may be too quick to welcome popular support for public institutions,
we may be too ready to worry about its loss. What could we have though,
one might ask, if people have not become more cynical? The last two
decades have seen political scandal, assassination, riot, war, Watergate. If
people could have watched this parade of honors without having their
confidence disturbed, they would have proven themselves incapable of
judgment, and we should have had to abandon the idea of citizenship (p. 3).
The threat posed by political alienation was overestimated, Sniderman claims, “not
because the changes in public attitudes toward political institutions are superficial or
merely expressive,” but rather “because they may to a very considerable degree reflect a
temper of mind congenial to pluralistic society” (p. 153). He found that those disaffected
with politics were as likely, and in some cases more likely, to be attentive to politics and
to participate in the political process. They were no more likely than those most
81
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supportive of government to engage in adversaria] forms of protest, which pose a
potential threat to democratic stability. In short, those alienated from politics are no
worse citizens than their more trusting counterparts.
Sniderman also maintains that political alienation might be advantageous for
democracy by facilitating elite responsiveness. “Political leaders will sooner or later find
themselves committed to a course of action that touches off public dissatisfaction” (p.
164), he says. A wave of political alienation is one way that democratic elites leant that
they have made a serious mistake. Sniderman also claims that in a way, political
alienation strengthens democratic norms. “It embodies a short list of political sins in
democratic society...that is readily comprehensible and therefore broadly serviceable. It
teaches citizens at large what to look out for and what to guard against” (p. 161). In short,
he claims, some forms of political alienation might be beneficial to democratic societies.
This dissertation does not deal with political alienation in general, but rather with
alienation towards the news media in particular. However, the debate over the positive or
negative implications of alienation for democracy can easily be applied to the context of
mistrust in the media.
The news media are expected to play an important role in democratic societies.
According to the discursive model of public opinion (Price, 1992), it is the media that
facilitate the creation of communities, that set the agenda, and that provide information
and food for thought (Bryce, 1888; Tarde, 1898; Lowell, 1914; Habermas, 1989[1962]).
The news media bear the responsibility for feeding public opinion the raw materials
necessary for its formation and change. These include precise facts, a spectrum of
opinions, and a variety of “important” issues. This is possibly the reason so many
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scholars have been apprehensive of negative public attitudes toward the media. Many
have described the drop in audience trust in the news media as part of a “crisis of
confidence” that has plagued America in recent years (see Sniderman, 1981). If people do
not trust the media, it would seem the media cannot fulfill their crucial role in democratic
practice. Mistrust in the media might alienate people from the democratic process: those
who mistrust media reports of politics could turn away, refuse to take part in democratic
life, or tune out of the public sphere altogether.
However, the opposite argument can also be made. “The public does not believe
everything it encounters in the media. Such skepticism is not necessarily bad; there can
be dangers in uncritical acceptance of media fare” (Gaziano, 1988:278). The work of
journalists is rarely perfect. We want our fellow citizens to reach political decisions based
on political information. To the extent that they do so, we want the information they rely
on to be accurate. From this perspective, mistrust of the media might in fact be healthy
for democracy. Critical citizens who are not satisfied with mediocre information and hold
higher expectations of news providers might be better citizens. Rational citizens who
doubt the quality of media reports might in fact reach more informed decisions.
Cappella & Jamieson (1997) suggested we should distinguish between cynicism and
skepticism. Cynics are disposed to believe in the insincerity of human actions and express
this disposition by sneers and sarcasm. Skeptics, on the other hand, are merely uncertain
and wary. Confronted by unclear evidence, skeptics raise questions and doubts. “The
skeptic says ‘I don’t think that is true. I’m going to check this out’. The cynic says ’I
know that’s not true. It couldn’t be. I’m going to slam him’” (p. 26). Cappella and
Jamieson argue that skepticism is healthy, while cynicism is detrimental to democratic
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life. We want our fellow citizens to ask questions and to demand better information. We
don’t want them, however, to treat all information as untrustworthy and to block
themselves completely from the public sphere due to their mistrust.
According to Sniderman, political alienation is different from cynicism in general.
The politically alienated people he studied were involved in attempts to change the
political system via democratic protest, whereas cynicism implies that change is
impossible because human beings are by nature insincere.
In ordinary usage a cynic is a person who “knows” that people who say that
they act for altruistic reasons in fact act for selfish ones. A cynic is anything but
surprised to discover others acting in their own interest, despite their
protestation that they are acting in the interest of others. For a cynic to protest
that this is wrong would make no more sense than for a physicist to protest that
a stone falls. But protest is just what the politically cynical do: they complain;
they criticize; they may even become indignant, (p. 161)
Sniderman maintains, then, that protest is senseless for real cynics: they just know that
this is the way the world was, is, and will be. Since the politically alienated are politically
active and attempt to change the system, they cannot be truly cynical. The same logic can
be applied in the context of trust and mistrust in the media.
So how can we determine whether audiences are skeptical or cynical? The strategy I
will use to examine this question is straightforward. Simply, I will try, much as
Sniderman has done with political alienation, to investigate the democratic qualities of
those who do not trust the media. If those mistrustful audiences are informed, involved
and active citizens, then mistrust of the media may not be a bad thing. If, on the other
hand, the more mistrustful are uninformed and inactive, if they do not participate but only
complain, then mistrust in the press is more likely to be harmful. The guideline to this
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strategy is normative. The assumption is that informed and active citizens are better
citizens.
The question remains, then: is audience mistrust in the press good or bad for
democracy? Given the essential role that the press is expected to fulfill in our ideal
conceptions of the public sphere, we are inclined, as adherents of democracy, to hope that
people will have faith in the press. At the same time, as communication scholars, each of
us has many reservations about the functioning of the media. We acknowledge that the
job done by current media systems in conveying relevant and accurate political
information is far from perfect. But at the same time, we worry when ordinary citizens
voice similar concerns.
There is probably nothing inherently good or bad for democracy in having positive
or negative attitudes about the producers of news. Sometimes the media deserve praise, at
other times criticism. Skeptical audiences make their best efforts to isolate the former
from the latter. Cynical audiences, however, are disposed toward criticism at all times
and distrust the media even when the media present information that is necessary for their
political decision-making. The danger is not their disbelief per se, but the fact that it
could draw them away from public life. They might become apathetic to all sorts of
political information, or detached from political participation altogether. Media cynicism
could potentially translate into political apathy. It is these potentially harmful side effects
of cynicism toward the media that I shall look for in this chapter in order to determine the
valence of audience attitudes toward the media. I will do this using four survey data sets.
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Study 1: The APPC 2000 data.
The main research question of this chapter deals with the meaning of audience mistrust of
the media. Who are these skeptical and mistrustful audiences? What kind of citizens are
they? Are they more likely to be involved and to participate in politics than others? If so,
their skepticism may not be a bad sign. If, on the other hand, they only complain, but do
not take any political action, their mistrust is more likely to be unhelpful to democracy.
In order to examine these questions the main dependent variable was cross-tabulated
with measures of political participation and involvement. The results are presented in
Figures 3.1 and 3.224. In all cases, ulow media evaluation” is defined as giving the media
a “D” or an “F” for the way they covered the campaign. “High media evaluation” is
defined as giving the media a score of “C” or higher. As Figure 3.1 shows, those who
gave the media lower grades were more likely than others to vote. 87% of those who
gave the media a “D” or lower were registered to vote at the time of interview, compared
to 78% of those who gave the media higher scores. 80% of those who gave the media a
low grade voted in the 1996 presidential election, compared to only 66% of the rest of the
respondents. 66% of the media skeptics reported “always” voting, compared to only 44%
of the other respondents. In all cases, the differences were statistically significant (p<.05;
p<.01; p<.01 respectively).
Figure 3.2 presents the average political knowledge, interest and discussion scores by
evaluation of the media. Those holding negative attitudes toward the news media scored
higher on political discussion. They discussed politics an average of 2.27 days per week,

24 To save space, I present in this section only the results from the national sample. The same analyses were
run for all other samples and yielded similar patterns. As expected, repeating the same analysis with the
combined file only amplified the levels o f statistical significance o f the differences.
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compared to an average of only 1.28 days a week for other respondents (t=l .97; p=.05).
Political knowledge and involvement were also associated with media evaluations.
Respondents who gave the media a “D” or an “F” were more knowledgeable, on average,
than those who gave the media higher grades (t=-5; pc.001). They also scored higher on
the political interest item (t=4.07; p<0.001).
The same pattern holds true with respect to awareness of the candidates.
Significantly more media skeptics than non-skeptics had heard about Bauer (47%
compared to 31%, p<.001), Bradley (83% compared to 71%, p=.008), Buchanan (91%
compared to 79%, p<.001), Forbes (80% compared to 69%, p=.01), Keyes (57%
compared to 34%, p<.001) and McCain (81% compared to 59%, p<.001). In contrast, the
differences between the two groups in awareness of Clinton, Gore and Bush were not
significant.
To sum up, those who thought that the media did a “poor” or a “very poor” job in
covering the campaign were significantly more likely to vote, to know who the
candidates were, to have some knowledge about candidate’s campaign promises and
biographies, to discuss politics with other people, and to report close following of and
interest in the campaign. Those who evaluated the media more positively tended both to
talk less and to know less about politics. They also tended to participate less than their
skeptical counterparts.
Are these differences merely an artifact of demographic differences between skeptics
and non-skeptics? Or do they accurately reflect genuine differences that hold over and
above the effects of alternative explanations? Answering this question requires
multivariate analysis, which allows for tighter controls. For this purpose, cumulative
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logistic regression models were run with attitudes toward the press as the dependent
variable. Cumulative logit is the most highly recommended method for ordered
categorical dependent variables (Allison, 1999; McCulIagh, 1980). Unlike OLS, it does
not require that the dependent variable be continuous or normally distributed. Cumulative
logit also make no assumptions about the distance between the observed categories.
Education, political involvement, discussion, knowledge, and a voting index were used as
the independent variables. Media exposure, political ideology, and a set of demographic
variables (including race, sex, Hispanicity, age and religiosity) were used as control
variables. The results are presented at Table 3.1. The b coefficients represent the effect of
the covariates on the cumulative odds of being in a higher category (giving the media an
“A” vs. giving the media a lower grade; giving the media “A” or “B” vs. lower grades,
and so forth).
Consistent with previous research (e.g. Cappella & Jamieson, 1997:211) political
ideology was significantly associated with media evaluations. Liberals were more likely
to give the media higher grades and conservatives were more likely to give the media
lower grades. Much research points out that media skepticism is explained by the
political attitudes of individuals (Gunther, 1988; Stamm & Dube, 1994). From this
perspective, people are biased in their perceptions of the press because of their own views
about political issues. Conservatives are more likely to be skeptical, according to this
hypothesis, because of the allegations regarding “liberal biases” in the mainstream press
forwarded by conservative politicians in recent years (Watts et al., 1999).
But even after controlling for all demographic and political ideology, the more
knowledgeable, involved and participating respondents gave lower grades to the media.
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The more knowledgeable a respondent was, the lower the grade he or she gave to the
media. For any dividing point we choose, each one-unit increase on the knowledge scale
corresponds with an eight percent (100(eb-l)) decrease in the odds of assigning a higher
grade to the media. All other things being equal, likely voters were also more likely to
give the media lower grades. Likely voters were 42 percent less likely to give the media a
higher grade. In addition, the coefficient for political involvement is significant: the
higher the reported level of political interest, the lower the evaluation given to the media.
In contrast, the coefficient of political discussion is not significant in any of the models.
After controlling for knowledge, interest, participation and demographics, the bivariate
association between political discussion and attitude toward the media disappears. In
sum, the general pattern that emerges from Table 3.1 is similar to what we found in the
bivariate analysis. Media skeptics are more likely to be politically involved and informed,
as compared to non-skeptics.

Study 2: The PTR data.
Respondents were asked whether they thought the media Mhelp society” or “get in the
way of society solving its problems”. Those who answered that the media help society
were coded ”0”. Those who answered that the media get in the way of society were coded
“1”. Again, the two groups were compared on various measures of political involvement.
The results are presented in Table 3.2. Generally, the patterns are similar to those
obtained from the APPC data. Respondents who claimed the media get in the way of
society reported significantly more voting, more political discussion, and more political
participation. Media skeptics demonstrated a higher level of civics knowledge than their
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non-skeptical counterparts. However, media skeptics in this study were not significantly
more likely be aware of political figures (unlike in the APPC data). Also, there was no
significant difference between media skeptics and non-skeptics in issue knowledge.
Again, one needs to study the associations controlling for possible alternative
demographic and political explanations. This is in order to make sure that the associations
between knowledge, participation and skepticism are not spuriously caused by media
skeptics' tendency to be more conservative than non-skeptics, and by the association of
conservatism with knowledge and participation. For this reason, logistic regression
models were run controlling for partisanship, ideology, education, age, sex and race. The
covariates - discussion, participation and knowledge - were entered to the regression
separately due to problems of multicollinearity. The results, presented in Table 3.3, show
that even after controlling for demographic and political factors, media skeptics are
significantly more likely than non-skeptics to discuss politics, to vote and to otherwise
participate in politics. They also tend to demonstrate more civic knowledge than non
skeptics (p=.06). However, the coefficients for candidate awareness and issue knowledge
were not statistically significant.

Study 3: The Electronic Dialogue data.
Pearson correlations between media skepticism and political involvement, knowledge and
participation measures are presented in Table 3.4. The positive sign of all coefficients
indicates that enhanced media skepticism is associated with more political knowledge,
involvement and participation. However, the coefficients for voting, political
involvement and candidate awareness are not statistically significant. Discussion,
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knowledge and both measures of participation (community and political) produced
significant associations. These patterns are identical to what we found in the previous
datasets.
Turning to the multivariate analysis, since the dependent variable is a continuous
scale (rather than a single ordered categorical item), an OLS regression model was used,
with skepticism as the dependent variable and the political scales, along with other
demographics and political ideology, as covariates. The results are presented in Table 3.5.
Again, conservatism was associated with media skepticism. But even controlling for
ideology, community participation, political discussion and political knowledge had
significant effects on the dependent variable. The more knowledgeable a respondent was,
the lower his or her evaluations of the media. The more a respondent reported discussing
politics, the higher she or he scaled on the skepticism scale. Community participation
(including items tapping civic capital) also had a significant effect on media skepticism:
the more people participate in neighborhood activities the higher their media skepticism.
However, the association of political involvement (news attention and close following of
politics) and media skepticism was in the opposite direction. Unlike in the PTR or APPC
data, involved Electronic Dialogue respondents tended to be less skeptical of the media.

Study 4: NES 1996 data.
Table 3.6 presents means of various political variables by media skepticism. The table
shows that skeptics scored higher than non-skeptics on political discussion, voting,
political participation, knowledge and political interest However, the differences
between skeptics and non-skeptics were not statistically significant from zero for the
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knowledge and interest measures. The overall patterns are identical to what we found in
all previous data sets.
An OLS regression model, with skepticism as the dependent variable, is presented in
Table 3.7. Again, conservatism was associated with media skepticism. But even
controlling for ideology and demographics, political participation and political discussion
had significant effects on the dependent variable. The more a respondent reported
discussing politics, the higher she or he scored on the skepticism scale, as did those who
participated more in politics. The effects of voting, interest and knowledge were not
significant in this analysis.

Discussion.
In sum, analysis of data from four independent sources (two telephone surveys, one face
to face survey, and one administered through the Web) utilizing different measures and
sampling designs yielded a similar conclusion: media skeptics are not apathetic toward
politics. The correlations between skepticism and the political involvement measures I
used (tapping knowledge, voting, participation, and political discussion) tended to be
positive rather than negative. Those who think positively about the media are less likely
be knowledgeable about or to participate in politics than those who think negatively
about the media. It thus appears that negative attitudes toward the press are not hurting
democracy by producing apathy. On the contrary, those who are skeptical about the
media tend to be more involved, to make more efforts to gain political information, and
to try more frequently to influence politics through participation. These associations hold
even after tightly controlling for demographic and political factors, negating possible
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claims regarding spuriousness. Only in three cases (candidate awareness and political
involvement in the E-Dialogue data, interest in the NES data) were the signs of the
coefficients in the opposite directions, and two of these three coefficients were not
statistically significant. The overwhelming finding is that media skeptics know more
about politics, talk more about politics, and participate more in politics. Somewhat
paradoxically, media skeptics are closer to what is normatively expected of democratic
citizens, in our ideal conceptions of democracy.
Explanations. Why is this the case? Why do those who think negatively about the
media participate more, know more, and involve themselves more in politics than those
who think positively about the media? Before answering this question, we must first
address the issue of causal direction. Could it be that cynicism or skepticism about the
functioning of the press causes people to gain more knowledge, be more involved, or be
more likely to participate? It is hard to imagine that this is the case. One could argue that
dislike of the media causes people to make a greater effort to obtain more information
from non-media sources, which might be of better quality than that found in the media.
Hence, media skeptics might be more knowledgeable because they invest more effort in
acquiring such information. Alternatively, it could be argued that audiences who hate the
media, hate them so badly that they go out to participate just to teach journalists a lesson.
However, though these possibilities cannot be empirically negated, they do not seem very
plausible either intuitively or theoretically.
The direction of this association is probably from knowledge, involvement and
participation to media skepticism, and not the other way around. Three explanations can
be offered for this association. The first has to do with the differing capabilities of
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informed and uninformed citizens, the second with higher expectations of involved
citizens, and the third with media satiety among the informed and involved citizens.
Objective capabilities. It could be argued that the educated, involved and informed
citizens are more critical than others about the news media simply because they are more
capable of evaluating the media’s work. Educated citizens who have acquired critical
reading skills in college have learned not to believe all they read in the papers.
Knowledgeable and involved citizens can more easily compare media coverage to other
sources of information. Thus they are more likely to critically evaluate media reports and
discern inaccuracies when they encounter them. In addition, involved people who
participate more in politics might be better able to compare first-hand experiences (from
rallies, demonstrations or other events) to the coverage of these experiences in the media.
Thus, based on their personal experience, they are more likely than others to understand
the ways in which the media distort real world events in their coverage. In sum,
knowledge, participation and involvement could be associated with critical media
evaluations since participating and involved citizens are better equipped to handle media
materials.
Higher expectations. It could also be that involved citizens are more critical of the
media because they expect more of the media, compared to other citizens. Those who
vote more frequently might need different qualities of political information than one can
find in the news, just in order to reach informed decisions. For those who know politics,
media presentation of the world might seem shallow and superficial. They might want
more than what the media provide, given that the media might aim at more uninvolved
and apathetic general audiences. In sum, according to this explanation, involved citizens
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give the media poorer grades because they feel they need better coverage than the media
give them.
Media satiety. It is also possible that involved citizens are simply fed up with media
practices. They are so familiar with media genres, frames and personas that they can
sometimes guess in advance what the people in the media are going to say and how they
are going to say it. According to Cappella & Jamieson’s (1997, chapter 9) “contagious
cynicism” hypothesis, people are cynical about the media because the media themselves
are cynical (see also Kiousis, 2000). It is possible to build on this hypothesis and to claim
that informed people are getting tired of years of watching the same strategic frames, the
same worn-out expressions, and practically the same stories. In other words, informed
and involved people watch so much news that eventually they despise journalists.
However, the association between media exposure and media evaluation, reported in
Tables 3.1 and 3.S, does not settle very well with this “media satiety” explanation. The
positive sign of the slope coefficient for the media exposure variable indicates that more
exposure is associated with more positive media evaluations (this association will be
explored in much more detail in Section 3).
In sum, three explanations could be offered for the negative association between
political involvement and attitudes toward the media: differing capabilities, higher
expectations, and media satiety. These explanations are of course not mutually exclusive.
They could be working simultaneously. For example, politically involved individuals
could be better able to judge the media, and at the same time have higher expectations of
the news.
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Conclusions.
In the introduction, I argued that cynicism is detrimental, while skepticism is healthy, for
democratic life. Which of these terms, cynicism or skepticism, better describes negative
audience evaluations of the media? This is the main question I addressed in this chapter.
The strategy I used in order to answer it was simply to compare respondents who
evaluate the media positively to those who evaluated them negatively.
Critical audiences were more likely to vote or to otherwise participate, compared to
those who evaluated the media positively. Those who evaluated the news media
negatively also tended to be more involved, to discuss politics more often, and to be more
informed about politics and more aware of the candidates than their less critical
counterparts. Most of these differences held over and above demographic variables and
political ideology, in three independent data sets, utilizing different sampling schemes
and different measures of skepticism.
Since audience skepticism about the media is associated with many normatively
desirable outcomes, it cannot be said to be detrimental to democracy. Citizens who are
critical about the media tend to be better citizens - more interested, more knowledgeable
and more involved - than others. Although it is not possible to empirically infer causality,
it seems more logical that the direction of the association is “involvement -> media
skepticism” rather than “media skepticism -* involvement”. Involved citizens are more
critical of the media than uninvolved citizens, probably because they are better equipped
to assess the quality of the media’s work, and because they have higher expectations of
the media than uninvolved citizens.
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Some scholars see audience mistrust of the media as posing a problem for modem
democracy. If people do not trust their information sources, they implicitly argue,
democracy cannot function in a mass society. But audience criticisms about the press do
not necessarily mean that democracy is damaged. The interpretation of audience mistrust
of the media could be much more optimistic. Audiences are not dupes. They do not
believe every word they read in the newspaper. They are critical. They are not satisfied
with the quality of the news they are getting. They are aware of the limitations of
journalism. They need better information.
Communication researchers, who dedicate so much time and energy to evaluate
news content critically, should not look down at audiences when they do the same.
Rather, we should be glad that many active and involved members of the audience have
internalized the very critical-reading strategies we advocate. On the other hand, the line
between cynicism and skepticism is very hard to draw empirically. Although those who
give the media lower grades tend to be politically involved and active, not all of them are.
We should keep that in mind when we investigate audience attitudes toward the media.
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Figure 3.1: Media evaluation and voting, APPC 2000 data
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Figure 12: Media evaluation and political knowtadga, interest, discussion,
APPC 2000 data
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Table 3.1: Cumulative logistic m m w lon predicting media evaluation grades
(AM: F«0>: APPC 2000 data.

Political ideology (5=very liberal, 0=very conservative)
Sex (male=1)
Race (white=1)
Hispanic (=1)
Born-again Christians (=1)
Age
Education
(years of schooling)
Media exposure
(mean days in the past week)
Political discussion
(mean days past week)
Political involvement
(4=high; 1=low)
Political knowledge
(6=high; 0=low)
Likelihood of voting
R square
N
Notes: * p<.05 - p<.01 "*p<001

b
(s.e.)
.23***
(.04)
-.21**
(07)
.01
(.16)
.08
(50)
.06
(08)
.00
(00)
-.00
(.00)
.19*“
(02)
.00
(00)
-.11*
(04)
-.07**
(02)
-.53**
(02)
.11
2349

e
1.26
.80
.99
1.09
1.06
1.00
.99
1.21
1.00
.88
.92
.58
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Table 3.2: Mwn ecoree on political measures. bv media skepticism. PTR data.

Media help
society
(N=968)
Media get in
the way
(N=646)
T

Media help
society
(N=968)
Media get in
the way
(N=646)
T

Political
discussion
(4=often;
1=never)
2.88

Voting
(4=always
1=sekJom)

Political
participation25
(4=high; 0=none)

3.03

.91

2.94

3.19

.98

2.85-

5.70—

2.47-

Civic
knowledge
(2*high;
0=low)
1.21

Issue
knowledge
(4=high;
0=none)
1.14

Candidate
awareness26
(8=recognize all;
0=recognize none)
7.39

1.26

1.15

7.42

2.90—

.43

1.36

Note: "p<.01; — p<001

25 This scale is the sum o f four hems, asking whether in the past 12 months respondents contacted or wrote
to a public official, attended a public hearing or a town meeting, contacted a newspaper or television station
about an issue that concerned them, or contributed money to a political candidate or organization.
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .67. Answering “yes” was coded as “1”, and “no” as “0”. The four
hems were summed up.
26 This hem measures awareness o f eight political figures: Clinton, Dole, Gingrich, Hillary Clinton,
Buchanan, Forbes, Lamar Alexander and Bill Bennet.
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Table 3.3: Six weighted logistic regression models predicting attitudes toward the nwdli
<1«nwdla oat In the wav: Omnedla halo society). PTR data

B (s.e.)
eb
Cox & Snell R2
Unweighted N

B (s.e.)
e"
Cox & Snell R2
Unweighted N

Political
discussion
(4=often;
1=never)
.15
(06)
1.16
.04
1536

Voting
(4=always
1=seldom)

Political
participation
(4=high; 0=none)

.14”
(05)
1.15
.04
1472

.12*
(04)
1.12
.04
1536

Civic
knowledge
(2=high;
0=low)

Issue
knowledge
(4=high;
0=none)

1.15*
(07)
1.16
.04
1536

.03
(06)
1.03
.03
1535

Candidate
awareness
(8=recognize all;
0=recognize
none)
-.03
(05)
1.00
.04
1535

Notes: All models control for age, sex, education, ideology, partisanship and race. *p<10;
* p<.05; ” p<.01.
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T«bl« 3.4: P iw o n corrolationa b tw —n modia skeptic iam seals with other political
m w u iw . EDIaloous 2000 data.
Political discussion

Voting
scale

Political participation"

Political
involvement

Media skepticism

.10**

.06

.10**

.03

N

669

.669

669

673

Political knowledge Community participation Candidate awareness^
Media skepticism

.09*

.15***

.02

N

668

669

673

Note: ** p<.01; — p<.001

27 Average o f four items: voting in 1996, voting registration, evaluation o f the chances o f their voting in the
next election, and a question asking “How often do you say you vote?” All items were coded “I” for high
voting and “0” for low voting. All loaded on the same factor. Reliability for this scale was .84.
21 Eight participation items (Attended any political meetings; Done any other work for a candidate; Given
money to a candidate; Worn a candidate’s campaign button or put a campaign sticker on your car;
Contacted a public official about an issue; Talked to any people and tried to show them why they should
vote for a political candidate; Contacted a newspaper or television station about an issue; Tried to get
another person to sign a petition) were coded “1” for “participated in the past 12 months” and “0” for “did
not participate”. The item not included was “Attended a public hearing or town meeting”. The scale is the
average o f the eight items (0-1 scale). Reliability was a -.6 2 .
29 Respondents were asked if they had ever heard o f eight political figures (Bill Bradley, Pat Buchanan,
George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Alan Keyes, John McCain and Ross Perot). All items were coded
“0” for “haven’t heard of” and “ I” for heard of”. The Alan Keyes item did not load together with the
others, and hence was not added to the scale. The rest o f the items were averaged. Reliability for the scale
was a=.83.
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Table 3.S: OLS repression predicting m tdli skepticism. Electronic Dialogue data.
b
(se.)
-.01—
(.00)

Political ideology
(5=extreme liberal, *5= extreme
conservative)
Sex (male=1)
Race (white=1)
Age
Education
(years of schooling)
Media exposure
(mean days in the past week)
Political participation
Community participation
Political discussion
(mean days past week)
Political involvement
Political knowledge
Voting scale
Candidate awareness
R square
N
j. m* p<05; “ p< 01; ***p<.001
Notes: 1*p<.1;
k a . k ____ _

_

^

__ .

• *

__ —

^

-.02*
(.01)
.00
(02)
.00
(.00)
-.00
(.00)
-.00
(.00)
.06
(04)
.08“
(03)
.02*
(00)
-.02*
(01)
.15“
(05)
.00
(03)
-.03
(08)
.10
618

a a j

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 3.6: Mmii mowon political measures. bv media skepticism. NES data.
Political
discussion
(days in the
past week)
Non-skeptics
1.75
(N=557)
Skeptics
2.12
(N=967)
T
3.27Note: * p<05; - p<.01

Voting
(1=voted;
0=did not
vote)

Political
participation30
(4=htgh;
0=none)

Political
knowledge
(4=high;
0=k3w)

Political
interest

.73

.08

2.19

2.77

.78

.11

2.22

2.90

1.99*

3.06-

.40

1.39

30 This scale is the average o f five items, asking whether in the past 12 months respondents had contacted
or written to a public official, talked to others and tried to persuade them about their vote, attended a public
hearing or a town meeting, contacted a newspaper or television station about an issue that concerned them,
or contributed money to a political candidate or organization. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .58.
Answering “yes” was coded as “ 1”, and “no” as “0”. The four items were averaged.
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Table 3.7: OLS regret«ten predicting media skepticism. NES1996 data.
b
(s.e.)
-.06***
(00)

Political ideology
(5=extreme liberal, -5= extreme
conservative)
Sex (male=1)

-.04
(03)
-.00
(05)
-.00
(.00)
-.01

Race (white=1)
Age
Education
(years of schooling)

((.10)
:SS>

Political participation

Political discussion
(mean days past week)
Political involvement
Political knowledge
Voted in 1996
Rsquare
N
Notes: *p<10; * p<.05; ** p<01; ***p<001
___V _

^

J A .

*

— -

A # .

M

_

.

A J .

A A A ____ -

.02**
(00)
-.01
(.01)
.01
(02)
.01
(05)
.07
1,504

A M A
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Chapter 4: Recent trends in media skepticism.

The aim of this chapter is to review how audiences have perceived the media over the
years. The main argument is that in the past decade or so the relationship between
audiences and the media has drastically changed. Historically, the decline in the prestige
of journalism was, according to Carey (1969,1995), related to the transformation from
the “intellectual” role journalists used to play in society to their current “communicative”
role. “Journalism was traditionally conceived as a literary genre rather than as a species
of technical writing” (Carey, 1969, p. 32). From critics, interpreters or contemporary
historians, journalists were transformed into “manipulators of symbols” or “brokers in
meanings” who fulfill a technical function of “reporting”. The institutionalization of
journalism as a profession, a process that had started in the second half of the nineteenth
century, thus resulted in the dispossession of journalism from its once reputable position.
The creation of a professional canon of norms and standards of objectivity, such as
reporting all sides of a story and separating facts from interpretation, resulted in what
Carey called the “conversion downwards” of journalism, since these norms were
impossible to fulfill under the constraints of commercial communication systems.
Criticisms of the people responsible for the dissemination of news might be as old as
the press itself. Cappella and Jamieson (1997:29) mention that “founder Benjamin
Franklin, printer and publisher, was among the country’s earliest press cynics.” Kohut
and Toth (1998: 111) remind us that “even Thomas Jefferson, the founding father to
whom our press owes perhaps the most of all, was two-minded about the fiercely partisan
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press of his time.” They point out that the same Jefferson, whose preference for
“newspapers without a government” over “a government without newspapers” is very
well known, also said, “nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth
itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle” (cited on p. 116).
Perhaps the best-known of the early twentieth-century media skeptics was Walter
Lippmann, who in 1922 asserted that “news and truth are not the same thing” (p. 358).
The Hutchins commission (1947) was interested not only in the validity of “the truth”
conveyed by the mass media, but also in the fact that the news media did not represent
and reflect a variety of ideas and opinions. The mere establishment of the commission
signified that by the mid-1940s there were many who thought that the press was a part of
the problem, rather than the panacea of American democracy.
But most of those early concerns regarding the functioning of the mass media were
expressed by the elite, rather than by the general public. As far as we can tell from
historical accounts and early surveys, the public was mostly trustful of the press prior to
the 1970s. For example, a review of polls probing Americans’ opinions about the press
from the mid-1930s to the late 1960s found widespread belief in press fairness (Erskine,
1970-71).
The public’s attitude toward the media was not measured longitudinally until the
early 1970s, when polling institutions like NORC and Harris started to include
“confidence in the press” items in their surveys. NORC’s General Social Survey (GSS)
data show that confidence in the press changed from 28 percent having a “great deal” of
confidence in 1976 to a low of 10 percent in 1994. The rate of those having hardly any
confidence in the press had grown from a low of 14.6 percent in 1973 to a high of 41
108

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

percent in 1996. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present the percentage of GSS respondents who
reported having “hardly any” confidence in television or in the press. The data were
smoothed using Tukey’s 35R’H hanning technique to correct for random variation. The
graph shows that lack of confidence in the media grew only moderately from the 1970s
through the mid-1980s, but has dramatically increased in recent years. The sharpest
increase in media skepticism was recorded between 1991 and 1996, during which time
the rate of those reporting hardly any confidence in the press jumped from about 25 to 40
percent, and in TV from 30 to about 43 percent.
The same patterns, but with somewhat different numbers31, emerge from the Harris
and Gallup polls. The Harris surveys show that the rate of people having a “great deal” of
confidence in the press decreased from around 30 percent in the early 1970s to about 12
percent in 2000. The rate of respondents having “hardly any” confidence in the press
increased from around 12 percent in 1966 to more than 25 percent in the late 1990s.
Gallup polls found that that the percentage o f the public saying they had a “great deal” or
a “fair” amount of “trust and confidence” in the mass media to report the news “fully,
accurately and fairly” fell from 70 to 55 between 1972 and 1998, while the percentage
replying “not very much” or “none at all” increased from 30 to 44 (Bennet et al., 2001).
Media skepticism is not specific to the United States. Figure 4.3 presents the
frequencies of World Value Survey respondents having “not at all” or “not very much”
confidence in the press by country32. The figure shows that, in fact, Americans are

31 The different numbers probably stem from differences in treating non-response and missing data, and a
few inconsistencies between the two sources in sampling and weighting procedures.
12 These surveys, conducted in 43 countries in 1990-91, were designed to facilitate cross-national
comparisons o f political phenomena. A great deal o f effort was invested in insuring comparability across
the different contexts, especially with regard to sampling procedures and to question wordings.
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relatively trustful of their media systems. British respondents were the most skeptical
about their press, with more than 86 percent of them rating themselves on the skeptical
side of the four-point confidence-in-the-press continuum. In other Western European
countries more than half of the population were skeptical toward the media. Media
skepticism was also a problem in other developed democracies (Japan, Canada), as well
as in post-communist regimes (Belarus, Bulgaria, Russia, Romania, etc.). While there is
clearly much work to be done in explaining the cross-national variations in trust in the
press, the data presented demonstrate that media skepticism is clearly not a problem
specific to the US.
Audience attitudes about the news media have changed drastically in the past decade.
Three processes are implicated in this change. First, audience skepticism has become
widespread. Moreover, criticism of the press is not restricted to the elite, but is expressed
by a large proportion of the public. Second, the functioning of the media has become a
political issue. Politicians and social critics have made a habit of blaming the media for
almost anything wrong that happens in the country. Many audience members have
adopted this point of view, and the news media themselves increasingly cover these
allegations and devote more space to critical discussion of the functioning of the news
media. Third, in the past decade we have witnessed the development of alternatives to
the mainstream news media. The Internet, on the one hand, and genres such as political
talk radio, on the other, thrive and compete with the traditional mainstream media for the
trust o f audiences. Unsurprisingly, much o f the content o f these new channels is cynical
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about the mainstream news media. In the rest of this chapter I elaborate on each of these
processes in turn.

The people and the press.
As Figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicate, the number of Americans having hardly any confidence
in the press has tripled between 1972 and 1996. In the five years between 1991 and 1996,
the rate of GSS respondents having hardly any confidence in the press rose from about 25
percent to more than 40 percent. Similar trends have been documented by numerous
independent polls. Watts et al. (1999) reported that “in January 1988, for example, 12%
o f randomly sampled respondents claimed news media exhibit a liberal bias in
presidential election coverage. By November 1996, over two fifths of randomly sampled
respondents claimed that the news media have a liberal bias in election coverage, a
substantial increase” (p. 145). Moy and Pfau (2001) found that “from the mid-1980s to
the mid-1990s believability ratings for the major television networks (ABC, CBS, and
ABC) declined from between 86 and 87 percent to between 76 and 77 percent and the
ratings for familiar daily news correspondents dropped from 84 to 65 percent” (p. 19).
Some additional longitudinal data comes from the Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press. Their data show that

[t]he majority of Americans who believed a decade ago that the press
usually gets the facts straight has become a minority. In 1985, only one in
three Americans felt that the media were often inaccurate. By 1992, the
public was split: 44 percent said “often inaccurate”, but 49 percent said
“usually gets the facts straight.” In 1997, 56 percent said the press is often
inaccurate. Sixty-seven percent believe the media are unfair in presenting
the news on social and political issues; in 1985, 53 percent thought news
organizations were unfair. (Kohut & Toth, 1998)
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Similarly, many other scholars, mainstream news outlets and media pundits have
documented a decrease in public trust in the media over the past years (see American
Society of Newspaper Editors, 1998; Bennet et al., 2001; Liebeskind, 1997; Meyer, 1988;
Kiousis, 2000).
An ABC News poll (Chilton Research Services, 1997) shows that 47 percent of
Americans think the news media do not protect the interests of people like them. 42
percent think the media get in the way of society solving its problems. 67 percent
complain that there is too much negative news in the media. Almost one-third of
Americans say they do not think national TV networks report the news in a fair and
objective way. 77 percent think the news media care more about being the first to report a
story than about the accuracy of the story. 47 percent say that the news media should
have less influence on American life (compared to only 23 percent who say the media
should have more influence). 20 percent say that network news shows are too critical of
the government in Washington, 60 percent say they are not critical enough, and only
about 20 percent say the amount of government criticism is about right. The same poll
found that many respondents raised concerns about invasion of privacy and about
attempts to cover up stories.
The decline in public confidence in the media over the past 30 years did not take
place in isolation: during the same period the public lost confidence in other social and
democratic institutions as well. As Figure 4.4 shows, increasing rates of survey
respondents reported hardly any confidence in the people running Congress, the
Executive Branch, organized labor, religion or the educational system in 19%, compared
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to 1973. However, the trend line for confidence in the press is steeper and more
consistent than that for any other institution, as is evident from Figure 4.4. The figure
demonstrates that media skepticism does not merely reflect a growing tendency to
mistrust social institutions: it is leading this trend.
To sum up: whereas in the past, criticism of the press was expressed only by a few
members of the elite, it is now expressed by a large proportion of the American public,
and increasingly so. Huge proportions of the audience now have serious reservations
about the news media.

News as a political issue.
In recent years the functioning of the press has also become a political issue (Johnson et
al., 1996). Watts et al. (1999) present news content-analysis findings demonstrating that
the media are increasingly becoming the targets of attacks by politicians. This trend is
also evident when one looks for references to “the media’' at the Annenberg/Pew Archive
of Presidential Campaign Discourse. This archive has the most exhaustive collection of
candidate speeches, campaign ads, and presidential debates that currently exists. I
conducted searches for the use of words like “the media”, “the press”, “journalists” and
“the networks” across the years. The numbers of hits and the proportions of items
referring to the media out of the yearly total number of items are presented in Table 4.1
and Figure 4.4. The main finding is that campaign discourse about the press was indeed
much higher in the 1990s than at any time before. Candidates tended to talk more often
about the media, and especially to argue that the media are biased and unfair. This is
especially true for Republican candidates.
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In 1976, Republican candidate Gerald Ford maintained that the media were doing a
fair job: “I say with great sincerity that I feel the broadcasters have been fair,
evenhanded. I might have changed a little story here and there. As I've said, I've made a
mistake or two, but overall I think the electronic news media has handled this election
with great fairness, great equity, and in the highest tradition of your profession”
(delivered at a press conference in Portland, Oregon, on October 25, 1976). In sharp
contrast to Ford’s complimentary treatment of the media, George Bush - the Republican
candidate and incumbent president in 1992 - was constantly attacking the media. For
example, on November 2,1992 in Madison, NJ, he said: “I love these signs, ‘Annoy the
Media. Reelect Bush’. And every one of you know what that means. Every one of you
know that there has not been objectivity in the coverage. Every one of you know it. And
they are having their own debates, all these talking heads: ‘Have we been fair? Well, this
is the way we do it. That's the way we do it.’ And everyone knows that they're covering
up the fact this has been the most biased year in the history of presidential politics. But
we don’t need them anymore. We don't need them...And we are going to show them
wrong”.
Like Bush in 1992, Republican candidate Bob Dole complained, in 19%, that the
media treated him unfairly. For example, on October 24,19% , Dole said in a campaign
speech in Florida: “Something's wrong in America. Now, we know the liberal media is
not going to report on all these things because they want him (Clinton) re-elected. They
like it the way it is. But the country does not belong to the liberal media, nor does it
belong to Bill Clinton. It belongs to the people o f the United States”. On October 18,
19% Dole said: “They have spent S91 million attacking m e.. .and he (Clinton) said, ‘Oh,
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we don't believe in a negative campaign*. If I would run one negative ad, the liberal
media in this country's, ‘Oh, no, there goes Bob Dole again being negative.’ He's spent
$91 million being negative”.
In sum, there is much more political discourse about the media today than in the past.
Conservative candidates are charging the media with bias. The media themselves, Watts
et al. argue, are “turning the spotlight inward,” devoting more and more time and space to
critical evaluation of the functioning of journalism and journalists. Watts et al.’s content
analysis data show that media items over the years contain more “self coverage” (e.g.
reports about the way the media cover the campaign), as well as more allegations of
media bias, than in the past. “An increase in the amount of coverage on the topic of
media bias would seem to be a natural result o f the increasing focus by journalists,
candidates and political pundits on the role o f news media in political campaigns”, Watts
et al. argue (1999:148). The fact that news is increasingly becoming a political issue is
also reflected in the rise of news programs and media outlets that are primarily devoted to
covering the media, including CNN’s Reliable Sources, National Public Radio’s On the
Media, CNBC’s Equal Time, and the news magazine Brill’s Content.
In sum, there is now much more discourse about the media in the public sphere than
in the past. Politicians have stopped regarding news simply as a mirror reflecting social
events and realities. Many of them argue that the media are one of the problems facing
society. The media, in turn, report these accusations and charges and devote much more
space than in the past to coverage of media ethics and practices. As a result, there is much
more information available to the public about how the media work, what their norms
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and standards are, how they make mistakes, and how they can be manipulated by other
political actors.
This kind of discourse might have led scholars to attenuate the wording o f survey
questions tapping audience attitudes toward the press. Back in the 1960s, there was no
reason to ask people whether thought that the media got in the way of society. But now,
when accusations about the media have become a part of political discourse, there is little
wonder that scholars want to check whether audiences agree with these accusations.

New media channels and media skepticism.
Another development that has changed the nature of the relationship between audiences
and the mainstream news media has to do with the development of new media such as the
Internet, and new media genres such as talk radio, that compete with the mainstream
media for the trust o f the audience.
Online media skepticism. In recent years the World Wide Web has witnessed a
mushrooming of Internet sites devoted to anti-media material. Some of these sites are
affiliated with media watchdog organizations (yet another anti-media phenomenon of
recent years). Other sites simply present themselves as alternative news sources, and their
anti-media messages are more implicit than explicit. Both types of sites present two main
kinds o f information. The first is information about the allegedly distorted mainstream
media. “Why is it necessary for the media to have a watchdog?” asks one such Web site,
and answers:
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Quite frankly, the news media don't always get their stories right. What's
worse, many of them don't even seem to care...All the major media surveys
for the past 20 years have shown that 80 to 90 percent of the mainstream
media consistently vote for Democrats...But how do you know the media's
political opinions influence their reporting? Many of them are actually
admitting it these days. They admit they're anti-business, pro-big
government, anti-family and anti-religion, (from Accuracy in the Media’s
Web page)
On the other hand, a liberal media watchdog web site argues that

the so-called Liberal Media is owned by large Conservative corporations
that dictate control over biased news reporting in major newspapers and on
major television networks. The media is Conservative just like it's owners
and sponsors. You're getting the "News" the way that they want you to see
it. (The Liberal Slant Web page, 5/15/00)
The second type of-information, which is the more prevalent one, aims at refuting
facts and reports presented by the media. The Web site’s creators take a mainstream
media report, or some part of it, and present evidence that shows why the information in
the media is wrong. For example a Web site called “Media Research Center” exposed
that the media’s portrayal of Million Mom March leader Donna Dees-Thomases was
false. According to the site, the media portrayed Dees-Thomases as a suburban
homemaker who had never been politically active until she saw the footage of the August
1999 California day-care center shooting on TV. But the site argues that Dees-Thomases
was apparently not the “clueless unorganized housewife” described by the media: rather,
she was active in politics and had worked in the media for years. Thus, according to this
Web site, the media were misinforming their audiences by portraying Dees-Thomases as
a naive mother.
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This is just one example. Media watchdog Web sites contain ample information
about the way the media distort political “facts’*. However, charges are made not only
about the credibility of the facts found in the media, but also about the style and tone of
their presentation. For example, a conservative site complains that the networks presented
McCain’s endorsement of George W. Bush as “grudging” and that mainstream coverage
of candidates’ positions on social security “ridicule Bush's Social Security reform plans”
while calling Gore's scheme "conservative", thereby giving him an advantage. Another
typical criticism is that the mainstream media choose not to report important news. For
example, the Media Research Center site claims that the media are burying evidence
“casting doubt on the environmental establishment’s line on global warming”, and that
“media outlets ignore ads which underline McCain's support for tobacco tax, attacks on
pro-lifers”.
A very common criticism has to do with the alleged “double standards” of the media.
For example, a liberal Web site called FAIR asks why the media dedicated so much
attention to Ahmed Ressaman, an alleged Arab millennium terrorist, while ignoring
Kevin Ray Patterson and Charles Dennis Kiles, who were arrested for allegedly plotting
to blow up a TV tower and an electrical station, supposedly in hopes of sparking a Y2Krelated militia uprising. Anti-media Internet sites often present content analysis-like
information (such as rates of references to candidates, distribution of politicians who are
the target of attacks by late night TV hosts, etc.) designed to demonstrate that the media
are biased, and quotes from journalists “admitting” that their work is affected by their
political views.
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In sum, media-cynical Internet resources claim that the media are biased because
media outlets are either held captive by corporate America (the leftist argument), or
because they serve as a channel through which liberal journalists can disseminate their
political views (the rightists argument). The sites not only attack journalists, but also
analyze the motivations of the mainstream media, present counter-evidence, and promote
alternative agendas. As noted above, these criticisms come from both the left and the
right sides of the political map.
Thus, the development of the Internet has created a convenient arena for attacks on
the credibility of the mainstream media. The overall message, as stated by one of the
sites, is that people should “get news from the net, not the networks”. And indeed,
Internet users can get alternative information, accompanied by harsh criticism of the
norms, standards and practices of media personnel.
Media skepcism and PTR. In addition to the development of the Internet, the early
1990s saw a remarkable increase in the number of radio stations employing a full-time
talk format. Cappella, Turow and Jamieson (1996, p. S) estimate that the number of radio
stations offering talk radio programs grew from less than 500 in the late 1980s to more
than 1,000 in the mid-1990s. A nationwide survey conducted by the Times Mirror Center
for The People and The Press (1993) found that nearly half of all adults tuned in to talk
radio relatively frequently, and one in six listened regularly.
‘There is little question concerning the tone of political talk radio: it is decidedly
negative toward most institutions” (Pfau et al., 1998:732). Political Talk Radio offered
yet another arena for attacks on the mainstream media. Cappella and Jamieson (1997, p.
212) argue that “talk radio can be seen as serving the public’s need for different forms of
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news”. And indeed, content analysis data (Pfau et al., 1998) show that the content of PTR
is significantly more negative in tone toward five democratic institutions than are print,
traditional TV and nontraditional TV (TV magazines, and shows like Oprah Winfrey,
David Letterman and The Tonight Show). In particular, PTR content was significantly
more negative toward the media. Pfau et al. (1998:737-8) also reported survey results
showing that talk radio listeners ranked significantly lower on confidence in the media,
controlling for demographic and political variables. Similar results were reported by
Cappella and Jamieson (1997), who found that media cynics tended to be PTR listeners.
Much of the content of political talk radio deals with problems related to the
mainstream media. Perhaps the most notorious critic of the mainstream media on the
radio is Rush Limbaugh. An analysis of transcripts of Limbaugh’s programs from
September and October 19% (Park, 1997) shows that Rush referred to the media in each
of the 47 shows analyzed. In many cases (more than 40 percent of references to the
media), Limbaugh used the mainstream media to back up his own views - for example,
quoting data from newspaper reports. However, many of his other references to the media
(27 percent) were direct attacks, and an additional 31 percent were cases in which
Limbaugh reframed the presentation of the mainstream press. The average number of
direct attacks on the media per show was 1.11. In addition, there was an average of 1.23
cases of reframing of media stories per show.
The arguments Limbaugh raises against the media are many. He claims that they are
biased and unfair in their treatment of candidates (e.g. that the New York Times is “one
big campaign poster for Clinton”, 4/10/%) and that they use different standards when
reporting on Republicans and Democrats. He argues that journalists are “out of touch
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with mainstream America” (9/17/96) and that some of the feminist reporters are “anti
male”. Limbaugh smears reporters, attacks their credibility and personal reputations, and
ridicules journalists’ ethics. In addition, like the anti-media web sites, Limbaugh often
argues with the facts presented in the mainstream press. On other occasions, he tries to
reshape the presentation of media information to suit his ideological aims.
In sum, talk radio shows such as Limbaugh’s are yet another easily accessible and
very popular media outlet for anti-media and counter-media materials. The growth of
PTR in recent year is thus potentially related to the dramatic increase in public media
skepticism.

Summary.
This chapter dealt with trends in audience evaluations of the news media in recent years.
Public opinion surveys overwhelmingly show that news audiences are becoming
increasingly critical of the mainstream media. More and more people say that they do not
trust the press, that the media are biased, and that journalists are unethical and self
motivated. In the past decade, mistrust o f the press has reached huge proportions.
Two related processes that took place in recent years were mentioned. First, the
functioning of the media has become a political issue, and politicians’ assaults on the
media are reported daily in the media. In addition, technological developments have
created channels that host ample counter-media and anti-media information. Whereas in
the past journalists were seen as respectable, one can now find information against the
media both on the airwaves and over the Internet. The prestige that reporters once held
has evaporated.
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Most scholars have focused to date on the reasons for this drop in audience faith in
the institutions of the news media, offering a variety of explanations for the decline in
audience trust. However, the consequences of audience media skepticism have been
largely ignored. This dissertation seeks to fill this void in communication research and to
explore the outcomes of audience mistrust in the media. In other words, while others have
asked, “Why do people mistrust the media? ” this dissertation asks, "So what i f people
mistrust the media?
A review of the literature about trust pointed out that it matters in various aspects of
social life. In general, trust is associated with a higher likelihood of cooperation and
mistrust with a lower likelihood of cooperation between the trustor and the trustee. In
media contexts, cooperation could be stated in terms of influence. That is, journalists
want to have an impact on audiences. They want them to believe that the social realities
depicted by the media are true. If audiences trust the media, they will accept the media’s
social portrayals and will be influenced by the media. If, on the other hand, they are
skeptical, they are likely to remain uninfluenced by their interaction with news. This
hypothesis will be examined in the next section.
This chapter presented evidence about the drop in audience trust in the media. The
next section examines the consequences of the drop in audience trust on the influence of
the news media.
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Table 4.1: Campaign discourse about the madia. 1960-1996. bv vaar.
Year

Total Number of items Number of items
number referring to ‘the referring to ‘the
media’
press’
of items

Number of items Any reference (‘media*
referring to
o r‘the press’ or
journalists,
‘journalist* or ‘reporter*
reporters or the
or ‘the networks’)
networks
CCA
1
4
25
1960
900
22
(4.41%)
(0.00%)
(3.89%)
(0.00%)
7
4
1964
0
3
202
(0.00%)
(1.98%)
(1.48%)
(3.46%)
24
43
1968
272
9
16
(3.30%)
(8.82%)
(15.8%)
(5.88%)
11
31
1972
3
20
205
(9.77%)
(1.46%)
(5.36%)
(15.12%)
4
15
20
1976
290
6
(5.17%)
(1.37%)
(6.89%)
(2.06%)
4
9
12
21
1980
299
(3.01%)
(4.01%)
(1.33%)
(7.02%)
1984
11
7
21
8
249
(3.21%)
(4.41%)
(8.43%)
(2.81%)
3
4
4
7
1988
208
(1.44%)
(1.92%)
(1.92%)
(3.36%)
42
27
1992
206
21
70
(20.38%)
(13.10%)
(10.19%)
(33.98%)
33
57
1996
286
9
19
(6.64%)
(11.53%)
(3.14%)
(19.93%)
Source: Annenberg / Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse.
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Figure 4 .1 :6 8 8 respondents hsving hardly any confidence in television
(1973-1996)
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Figure 4.2: GSS respondents having hardly any confidence in the
press (1973-1996)
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Figure 4.3: How much confidence do you have in the press
A cross-national comparison (percents, 1990-1991)
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Figure 4.4:6SS respondents having "hardly any" confidence in
various social institutions (1973-1996, percents)
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Figure 4.5: Candidate references to the news media,
1960-1996
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SECTION 2: MEDIA SKEPTICISM AND MEDIA EFFECTS.
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Chapter 5: Resisting media effects - the theoretical rationale.

In Chapter 1, we defined trust as an interaction over time, between two parties with
interests, in an uncertain situation. Trust is the expectation on the side of the trustor that
the interaction with the trustee will lead to gains rather than losses. We have also seen
that the concept of trust can be applied in the context of audience-media relations. Two
sides - audiences (the trustors) and media institutions (the trustees) - interact over long
periods of time. Given that news deals with the non-immediate environment, there is
hardly ever an empirical way for the audience to confirm the validity of media reports
using non-media sources. It is even harder for audiences to verify the fairness of media
interpretations of reality, or the intentions or character of journalists. This uncertainty is
what makes trust relevant for audiences’ relations with the news media.
In audience-media relations, trust implies that audiences expect the media to live by
the standards of their profession (Liebes, 2001). Aware of the uncertainty built into the
interaction, media institutions, for their part, strive to cultivate the perception that they
are trustworthy and credible, i.e., that they sell “real news”. To this end they use various
means, from the journalistic requirement that every news story be verified, to the
selection of credible-looking people with credible-sounding voices to serve as
anchorpersons. In sum, we found in Chapter 1 that trust was relevant for audience-media
relations.
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Research about trust in various fields has shown that mistrust has consequences. In
general, the outcome o f mistrust involves a reduced tendency to cooperate, and the
outcome of trust involves successful cooperation. In Chapter 1,1argued that one way to
translate “cooperation” into the domain of news media studies is in terms of influence.
The trustors, journalists, want to persuade audiences that the stories they tell are accurate
reflections of the non-immediate environment: that they sell “real news”. When people
trust the media they are more likely to accept the media's portrayals o f the world despite
the uncertainty in the situation, and despite the risk and potential costs of journalistic
deception. In short, they are more likely to be influenced by the media. On the other
hand, when people are skeptical of the news media they are more likely to reject their
portrayals of the world, and hence more likely to remain unaffected by the media.
This section of the dissertation deals with the influence of audience mistrust in the
news media on media effects. In other words, the question asked in this section is, Do the
media affect people who do not trust them? In the current chapter I introduce this topic. I
begin with a brief review of the literature about news media effects. I then present my
hypothesis about media skepticism and media effects, discuss its theoretical orientation,
and outline the possible cognitive mechanisms behind it. The following chapters test
specific hypotheses about the part played by skepticism in various theories o f media
effects. Chapter 6 deals with the role of media skepticism in agenda-setting. Chapter 7
deals with the role of skepticism in spiral-of-silence. Chapter 8 deals with the role of
skepticism in cultivation, and Chapter 9 deals with its role in priming. The findings are
synthesized in Chapter 10, which concludes this section.
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Powerful media or powerful audience? A synopsis of the literature on media effects.
Media effects refer to cognitive, affective or behavioral changes that result from exposure
to mass media (Caspi, 1995). These changes can be intended or unintended on the part of
the sources of communication. They can be conscious or unconscious on the part of the
audience. Changes resulting from exposure to mass media can occur at the individual or
the societal level, in the long or the short run. Media effects can take the form of attitude
formation, conversion or reinforcement. In sum, any definition of media effects refers to
changes that happen as a result of exposure to mass communication. In the context of
news, cognitive effects on individual audience members have been emphasized. Scholars
have focused on constructs such as attitudes, opinions and perceptions when studying
news media effects.
Over the years, research on media effects has oscillated between perceptions of
powerful media and powerful audiences (Livingstone, 1997; Katz, 1980, 1987; Weimann,
2000). Since the 1970s, various communication research traditions have returned to the
conception of powerful effects (Noelle-Neumann, 1973). Agenda-setting research
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972) conceptualizes the media as having control over what people
think about. Priming research (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) claims that the agenda of the
media influences the criteria people use when making political judgments. Accounts of
“framing effects” see the media as influencing the way in which people think about
political issues. Cultivation scholars (e.g. Gerbner & Gross, 1976) argue that long hours
o f exposure to the media’s distorted images have an effect on audiences’ perceptions o f
social reality. In spiral-of-silence theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1984) the media’s impact
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steins from their influence on the perceived climate of opinion. According to this theory,
the media silence audiences that are afraid of social sanctions by telling them what others
think.
All of these theories share the perception that the media are powerful. Unlike the
early conception of a “stimulus-response'’ linear model of media effects, these relatively
recent research traditions all claim that the influence of the media is sophisticated rather
than straightforward. Agenda-setting, priming, framing, cultivation and spiral-of-silence
theories all propose media effects that appear small at first glance, but are actually
influential. The scholarly narrative describing media effects (e.g. Weimann, 2000,
Chapter 2), as reflected in these theories, is that the effects of the media are neither direct,
uniform, nor immediate. The media cannot brainwash audiences or inject their persuasive
message into audiences’ heads. Nonetheless, according to these theories, the media subtly
influence audience perceptions of social realities and problems. These are not trivial or
minimal effects, according to these theories, since they have significant social
consequences. However, when emphasizing the power of the media to exert influence
over audiences, these theories disregard, at least to some extent, the active role played by
the audience in the process of communication.
The notion of the “active audience” has been a part of media research for decades. In
diffusion research (e.g. Katz & Lazarsfeld, 19SS), the activity of the audience is
manifested through interpersonal communication, namely, by the fact that people talk
with other people about media contents. In gratifications research (e.g. Katz et al., 1974),
audience activity is seen in people’s selection of media content that corresponds to their
social and psychological needs. Claims about “selective perception” o f the media (e.g.
131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974) also portray an active audience; this time the activity is
conceptualized by some kind of psychological filter or defense mechanism. Reception
theory (e.g. Morley, 1980; Livingstone, 1998) demonstrates that people confront media
content with their everyday life experiences, and that media consumption is influenced by
its context. According to reception theorists, audiences have the ability to “resist” media
content and to interpret it in an “oppositional” manner. In short, media research has
shown that rather than being passive recipients of some magic bullet or hypodermicneedle-like media, audiences are critical and active agents who play a significant role in
the mass communication process.
The review of survey data regarding media skepticism demonstrates that audiences
are not only “active”: they also hold negative beliefs about both news media and
journalists. Many do not believe all they read in the newspaper or watch on TV. A great
part of the audience thinks that journalists are biased and self-motivated. If people do not
trust the news media, why should they be influenced by them? In a nutshell, my first
main research hypothesis posits that they should not. It expects skeptical audiences to be
less influenced and non-skeptical audiences to be more influenced by the media.
Hypothesizing that media effects are moderated by audience trust in the media may
seem intuitive, even trivial. After all, why should people be influenced by the media
when they don’t trust them? Nevertheless, the moderating role o f mistrust in media
effects has rarely been tested in practice33.
The idea that people are more influenced by what they consider credible is certainly
not a new one. The intellectual forefather of my hypotheses is, of course, the source

33 Wanta & Hu (1994) and Miller St Krosnick (2000) are examples o f such rare studies.
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credibility tradition in social psychological studies of persuasion, initiated by Hovland in
Yale (see Stemthal et al., 1978, for a review). In one of Hovland's classic studies
(Hovland & Weiss, 1951), subjects were exposed to exactly the same content delivered
by “credible” and “untrustworthy” sources (Robert Oppenheimer vs. Pravda, New
England Journal o f Biology and Medicine vs. “A mass circulation pictorial magazine”,
etc.). Hovland and Weiss found that “changes in opinion are significantly related to the
trustworthiness of the source used in the communication” (p. 647), and concluded that
source credibility induced what they called “effective communication”.
The family of “consistency” theories that were very popular in the field of
psychology in the 1950s laid the theoretical foundations for the “source credibility”
literature. These theories include the “cognitive dissonance” literature (Festinger, 1957),
“congruity theory” (Osgod & Tannenbaum, 1955) and “balance theory” (Heider, 1946).
Each of these theories stresses that humans strive for cognitive consistency and balance
(Zajonc, 1960). Figure 5.1 presents the source credibility hypothesis as a simple
consistency triangle. A natural affinity between a source and a message was assumed,
thus a positive “sign”34 between a message and a source was considered a given. Hence, a
positive correlation was expected between attitudes toward the source and attitudes
toward the message. In Figure 5.1, if there is a positive “sign” between the individual and
the source, there should also be a positive “sign” between the individual and the message.
If the “sign” linking the individual and the source is negative, then the “sign” linking the
individual and the message should also be negative. These are the only possible sign
combinations that do not violate consistency and create imbalance. In the source
34 The signs in Figure 5.1 represent the direction o f attitudes. Positive signs represent a positive attitude and
negative signs represent negative attitudes.
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credibility framework, the “sign” representing the association between the individual and
the message represents the persuasive power o f the message.
In other words, these theories postulated that people strive to be consistent. When
they do not trust the source, they do not accept the message. Accordingly, the
overwhelming finding of the source credibility literature is that perceived source
credibility moderates the persuasion process (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Hovland, Kelly &
Janis, 1953; Stemthal, Phillips & Dholakia, 1978). A meta-analysis (Wilson & Sherrell,
1993) located over 250 “source credibility” studies, and found that the general finding in
this literature has been that enhanced credibility leads to greater attitude change. Though
they do not report an average effect size, Wilson and Sherrell claim that additional 6,697
non-significant effects are required before their 372 significant findings could be
attributed to chance.
My hypothesis about media skepticism and media effects is analogous to the source
credibility literature in linking trustworthiness with influence. However, importing the
ideas of the “source credibility” tradition into the study of news effects requires some
adjustments and clarifications (see Table 5.1). First, source credibility studies refer only
to persuasion effects. Contemporary research on media effects does not expect
straightforward persuasion effects to occur unless the media violate their standards of
balancing one-sided messages (Zaller, 1996). News is not intended to persuade, and there
does not seem to be much evidence indicating that news persuades in practice (McGuire,
1986). Thus, the theories I deal with do not argue that news persuades people in a
straightforward manner. Nonetheless, according to these theories - agenda-setting, spiralof-silence, priming and cultivation - the media subtly influence audience perceptions of
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social realities and problems. Hence, while source credibility studies related to persuasive
situations, this section deals with other, more delicate influences.
Most source credibility studies utilized experimental designs rather than surveys. My
hypotheses will be tested with survey data analysis. Most source credibility scholars used
simplistic operational definitions of credibility and persuasion. They manipulated
credibility using various cues, and did not measure audience perceptions (some of the
early experiments did not even check their manipulations). Unlike them, 1 do not
conceptualize credibility as a unidimensional and static attribute of a source, but rather as
a relatively stable set o f beliefs o f individual audience members about a family of media
sources.

Postulates and assumptions.
In order to hypothesize about media skepticism and media effects, I have to make three
assumptions - two about the audience and the third about the news media:
1. People have relatively stable attitudes toward the news media.
2. People want to be as correctly informed about the world as possible, given
limited energy and cognitive resources.
3. The content of the news media is a stream of messages that portray the world
beyond the audience’s immediate environment.
My first assumption relates to the literature on people’s attitudes about the media. I
am simply assuming that audiences have opinionss about the media. People either trust
the news media, mistrust them, or are somewhere in the middle. Note that I am assuming
that people have attitudes about the news media in general, not just about specific
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channels, programs or journalists. In addition, like any other opinion, there is some
stability assumed here. Today’s attitude about the media is assumed to be similar to
yesterday’s attitude. Tomorrow’s attitudes about the media will be essentially the same
as today’s. Some degree of change is inevitable, of course, but overall attitudes toward
the media are relatively stable (as demonstrated empirically in Chapter 2).
The second assumption states that when investing energy in scanning the political
world, people strive for correct information. This assumption relates to many of the
assumptions proposed by rational choice scholars. Some of the earlier rational choice
models even assumed that people are fully and correctly politically informed, while later
approaches (like the bounded-rationality approach, see Calvert, 1985) realized that actors
do not and cannot obtain complete information. My second assumption does not negate
the bounded rationality approach. It does not suggest that people are fully informed. It
simply states that people want to be informed, and that they strive for accurate (as
opposed to full and complete) information about the world. Neither am I suggesting that
people spend unlimited resources on collecting correct information. Rather, I postulate
that when people collect information, they want it to be as accurate as possible.
In short, Assumption 2 takes into account rational choice’s notion of utility
maximization. People aren’t able to collect and process complete information. They want
to make reasoned decisions while spending the minimum amount of resources possible
(Carmines & Kuklinski, 1991; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991). Thus, when they do
gather information, they want to maximize its accuracy. As Lupia and McCubbins
(1998:20) state, “information is valuable only when it improves the accuracy of
predictions about the consequences o f choices”. Correct information maximizes the
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accuracy of political decisions. Thus, people strive to get a correct representation of the
world, given the limited resources they are willing to spend on collecting information.
The third assumption is also straightforward. Like others, I postulate that most news
content is composed of a stream o f information about the world beyond the immediate
environments of individual audience members. Journalists claim that news aims at
portraying what is going on in the world, and almost all audience members would agree
that that is what the news is supposed to do. The news media contain a lot o f political
information about society. They present the collective conditions to individual audience
members. Whenever news stories describe specific events (say, a criminal incident, or a
road accident), these events are presumed to be relevant to general collective processes.
Thus, I am assuming that news messages consist of bits of information about the
world beyond the audience’s direct experience. Note, however, that I am not assuming
anything about the accuracy of the messages. News institutions are expected, both by
their members and by their audiences, to describe society, and they constantly try to meet
these expectations by providing messages that portray society.
I also postulate that contemporary mainstream news messages are not “persuasive
messages”. That is, they are not created with the overt intention of political persuasion in
favor of one political side or another. This postulate reflects current journalistic norms
and practices. For instance, the journalistic norms of fairness and balance require that
journalists present all sides of a story. As Zaller (1996) notes, news messages are not a
univocal voice, but rather, a stream of crosscutting and competing messages. The
implication is that simple effects of opinion change, e.g., in favor of one candidate or
another, are very rarely expected. In sum, I assume that news messages aim at providing
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a portrayal of the political world, and that they actually do so (with some undetermined
and irrelevant degree of accuracy). They do not aim at simple political persuasion. Their
sole persuasive aim is to enhance the credibility o f their reports.
The four media effects I investigate in the following chapters in fact share my second
assumption about the content o f the news media (see Mutz, 1998). Agenda-setting and
priming research assumes that the media tell us what the most important problems of
society are. Spiral-of-silence theory assumes that the media convey information about
what other people think. Cultivation theory assumes that the media provide a stream of
messages about the world outside. These theories are thus united in the perception that
the media tell stories and convey information about the world. Two of these theories
assume in addition some degree of distortion in these media messages. Spiral-of-silence
assumes that the mediated climate of opinion often distorts the social climate of opinion.
Cultivation theory argues that the mediated reality is different from real-world reality.
Thus far I have said three things: people have attitudes toward the media, people
want to be correctly informed about the world, and the media portray the world. The rest
of the explanation for my hypothesis could be viewed as an extension of Figure 5.1: when
people’s attitudes about the media are negative, accepting the media’s picture of the
world would create an imbalance. Hence, people can either reject the media’s portrayals
o f the world or change their attitudes toward the media. Since these attitudes are expected
to be relatively stable, rejection of the media’s messages will be the more frequent
outcome. Given that people strive for accurate information, they will not accept
portrayals of the world from untrusted sources. Hence, my main hypothesis for this
section posits that media skepticism will moderate media effects. This hypothesis can be
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viewed as an extension of the source credibility hypothesis. In this case, however, the
sources are the news media, and instead of persuasive messages, the issue is the media's
portrayal of the world. The media want us to accept their portrayals of the world. When
we do not trust the media we do not accept these portrayals.
In sum, the cognitive mechanism behind the hypothesized moderating role of
audience mistrust in media effects could be that of cognitive consistency, the very same
one used by the source credibility scholars to explain their findings. Yet this is not the
only possible explanation for the hypothesized moderation of media effects. In recent
years scholars are increasingly explaining media effects in terms of “activation” of
cognitive constructs in memory (sometimes called “nodes”) in response to media
messages (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Price & Tewksbury, 1997; Shram, forthcoming).
The media make certain information salient and depress the importance of other
information, causing certain cognitive constructs to be more or less accessible. If this is
the process behind media effects such as agenda-setting and cultivation, then trust in the
sources might intervene in the process by enhancing the accessibility of certain constructs
in people’s memories.
It could thus be that trust in the media has an effect on the media’s ability to enhance
the cognitive accessibility of constructs discussed in the media. We know from the
accessibility literature that accessibility is influenced by prior attitudes: behaviors
congruent with prior attitudes are more easily accessible in people’s memories
(McFarland & Fletcher, 1981). So it could be that trust, as an attitude, enhances the
accessibility of the constructs discussed by a message source (Olson & Cal, 1984). In
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other words, another possible explanation for my hypothesis is that audience trust in the
media moderates media effects by influencing the cognitive accessibility of constructs.

Summary.
There are a few sound reasons for predicting that skepticism will moderate media effects.
First, the definition o f trust, as well as the extensive research on trust in diverse fields,
imply that mistrust leads to reduced cooperation and to a reduced influence of the mistrustee on the mis-trustor. Second, the source credibility tradition has demonstrated that
perceived untrustworthiness leads to reduced influence in the case of persuasion. Third,
the cognitive mechanisms of consistency or accessibility provide possible explanations of
the process behind the role of trust in media effects.
The following chapters examine the moderating role of skepticism in agenda-setting, spiralof-silence, cultivation and priming. Hypotheses 1.1 through 1.4 are summarized in Table 5.2.
These hypotheses will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. I hypothesize that
skepticism toward the media will moderate media effects. When audiences are skeptical (or
cynical) about the news media, the media lose much of their power. When people do not trust
their news sources, they are unlikely to passively adopt their agendas. When they are skeptical of
journalists, they are not likely to accept their presentation of the distribution of opinion in society.
When people mistrust the institutions of news, they are not expected to be cultivated by newsmediated realities. When they mistrust the press, they do not accept their standards when they
make political decisions. In short, I hypothesize that skeptical audiences have the ability to resist
the media's influence. These hypotheses will be examined in the next chapters.
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Table 5.1: Source credibility studies and the proposed research.
The "source credibility" tradition

The current research

Focus

Persuasion

Methodology

Experimental

Source

Any source

Agenda-setting
Cultivation
Spiral-of-silence
Priming
Survey data analysis (longitudinal
and cross-sectional)
News media sources

Operational
definition of
credibility

Experimental manipulation credibility cues (presenting the
source to the subjects as "credible"
or "not-credible")

Survey items tapping attitudes
toward the news media (in
particular, trust in the media)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 8.2: A summary of Mw hvnothese» regarding itonMchm and nwdla «Wict».

H1.1
H1.1a
H1.1b

H1.2

H1.3
H1,3a

H1,3b
H1.3c
H1.3d

H1.4
H1.4a
H1,4b

Hypothesis
Agenda-setting will be stronger for relatively trustful audiences. Audiences
that are skeptical about the media will be relatively uninfluenced by their
agenda.
The positive association between aggregate public agenda and media
agenda will be stronger for non-skeptieal audiences than for skeptics.
Media skepticism will interact with exposure in its effect on personal
agenda. The positive association between exposure to the media and
acceptance of their agenda will be stronger for non-skeptics than for
skeptics.
Positive attitudes toward the media will be associated with the perception
of a climate of opinion similar to the one presented in the media. Those
skeptical toward the media will be more likely to reject the media’s climate
of opinion than non-skeptical respondents.
Skepticism toward the media will moderate the cultivation process.
Media-skeptidsm will interact with television exposure in its effect on
social mistrust perceptions. The effect of TV viewing on social mistrust will
be weaker for those skeptical towards television than for those not
skeptical toward television.
The effect of TV viewing on perceptions of women as having more limited
capacities than men will be weaker for those skeptical toward television
than for those not skeptical toward television.
The effect of TV viewing on political ‘moderateness* will be weaker for
those skeptical toward television than for those not skeptical toward
television.
There will be a three-way interaction between television viewing, media
skepticism and demographic factors in their effect on the outcome
measure. Whereas non-skeptical viewers are expected to be
‘mainstreamed*, skeptical and heavy television viewers are expected to
remain unaffected by TVs mainstream.
Media skepticism will moderate priming effects.
The priming effect will be weaker for media skeptics than for non-skeptics
(an exposure*issue performance* media skepticism interaction).
There will be a four-way knowledge*skepticism*exposure*issueperformance interaction such that the priming effect will be stronger for
knowledgeable and trusting audiences, compared to all other groups.
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Chapter 6: Media skepticism and agenda setting.

“Rather than focusing on positive or negative attitudes toward an issue, as most public
opinion research does, agenda setting scholars focus on the salience of an issue” (Dearing
& Rogers, 1996,8). Agenda setting research asserts that “the press may not be successful
much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling
its readers what to think about" (Cohen, 1963:13). As Dearing and Rogers (1996:8-16)
argue, agenda setting has acquired the status of a “paradigm”. In recent years, some 25
annual scholarly publications on the topic turn up in communication research. There are
many excellent reviews of agenda setting studies available (e.g., Dearing & Rogers,
1996; McCombs, 1981; McCombs & Shaw, 1993; Rogers & Dearing, 1988). For this
reason, the present review will be relatively brief.
The basic “media agenda -> public agenda” hypothesis has not changed much since
it was formulated and examined by McCombs & Shaw (1972) in their landmark Chapel
Hill study.
McCombs and Shaw analyzed local and national media coverage of the
1968 election, quantifying the relative attention given to such issues as
public welfare, civil rights, and the war in Vietnam. They also measured
the relative attention given to these issues in aggregate from a small sample
of local voters. They found significant rank order correlations between the
media coverage and the public ordering of issues and concluded that this
provided evidence of media agenda setting. (Neuman, 1990:160-1)
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Dearing & Rogers (1996:40) call this method “the hierarchy approach”. They cite
many other studies that investigate the isomorphism between the hierarchy of the main
issues on the media agenda and public agenda at a certain point in time.
But the strategies used by scholars to examine this hypothesis have varied and
diversified since the seminal McCombs and Shaw paper. Some have used longitudinal
designs that focused on two or three issues and documented the rise and fall of these
issues in terms of media and public salience over time. Some of these studies (Trumbo,
1995; Zhu, 1992) demonstrated that the time order is indeed from media agenda to public
agenda and not the other way around. Others used experimental designs, manipulating the
media agenda and measuring its effect on laboratory subjects (e.g. Iyengar & Kinder,
1987). These experiments have found similar associations and led to similar conclusions.
Still others have used the case study approach, focusing on a single issue and showing
that when the issue received media attention, it also received the attention of the public.
Dearing and Rogers conclude their review of agenda setting by stressing that the
theory has received much empirical support:
Of the 112 empirical studies of the agenda setting process we reviewed, 60%
support a media agenda-public agenda relationship. Most of these studies were
cross-sectional. Subsequent longitudinal investigations continue to support this
generalization...When the media give heavy news coverage to an issue, the
public usually responds by according the issue a higher salience on the public
agenda. This relationship of the media agenda to the public agenda seems to
hold under a variety o f conditions, for a diversity o f issues, and when explored
with diverse research methods, (p. 92)
Although most scholars concur that the media agenda is related to the public agenda,
there are disagreements about the nature of the association. While McCombs and Shaw’s
original model offered a linear association (between media salience and public salience),
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later scholars have suggested that the association might be non-linear (see Brosius &
Kepplinger, 1992; Zhu et al., 1993). For example, Neumann (1990) used the logistic
curve to model how the public responds to media coverage. According to this model,
public reaction to the media is low when media coverage is low. It rises rapidly once the
coverage accumulates to a certain takeoff threshold, and eventually levels off after
reaching saturation point. Another non-linear agenda setting model was proposed by Watt
et al. (1993). They suggested a model using an exponentially declining curve to explain
agenda setting, based on cognitive theories about memory. As time from media coverage
passes, people gradually forget about prior issues. Their issue-priority judgments change
accordingly.
In sum, agenda setting research asserts that the media have a strong effect on the
salience assigned to issues by individuals. But why should people adopt the agenda of the
media when they don’t trust the media? If audiences are active and critical, they may
resist the agenda offered by the media. Indeed, Rogers and Dearing (1988:569) suggested
that perceived media credibility should moderate the agenda setting process: “A
particular individual may regard the media in general, or the particular medium to which
the individual is exposed, as low in credibility...The individual is informed about the
news item by the media, but is not convinced that the item is important”.
But although Rogers and Dearing suggested perceived credibility as a possible
moderator in agenda setting effects, not much empirical agenda setting research has been
conducted utilizing or controlling for trust in the media. Only a handful of studies have so
far tested for the moderating role of media skepticism (or similar constructs) in agenda
setting, and the results are inconclusive. One study found that agenda setting was not
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moderated by perceived credibility (Miller & Wante, 1996). Another found the
moderating effect of trust to be statistically insignificant, though in the predicted
direction (Wanta, 1997). However, in a series of agenda setting experiments, Iyengar and
Kinder (198S) found that “viewers who regarded the networks as impartial and accurate
sources of information were more influenced by the news than those with less faith in
ABC, NBC, or CBS” (p. 13S). In another study, this time using a correlational design,
Wanta & Hu (1994) found that individuals who perceived the media as more credible
were more susceptible to being influenced by the media in their personal agenda of issues
in an Illinois election. Similarly, my hypothesis in this chapter proposes that agenda
setting effects will be moderated by audience attitudes toward the media:
H l.l: Agenda setting will be stronger for relatively trustful audiences. Audiences
that are skeptical toward the media will be relatively uninfluenced by their agenda.
As noted earlier, the strategies available to examine the agenda setting hypothesis are
many. First, it is possible to use the hierarchical aggregate approach and look for a
correlation between the aggregate media agenda and the public agenda at a specific point
in time. If H l.l is correct, then such an association will occur for trustful audiences but
not for skeptical audiences. Therefore,
H I.la: The positive association between aggregate public agenda and media agenda
will be stronger for non-skeptical audiences than for skeptical ones.

In addition, some agenda setting research suggests that the degree of exposure is
positively related to the degree to which individuals accept the media agenda as their

147

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

personal agenda of issues (Weaver, McCombs & Spellman, 1975; Einsiedel, Salmone &
Schneider, 1984; Wanta & Hu, 1994). But since we expect media skepticism to moderate
media effects, it is possible to predict that this association will not hold for skeptical
audiences. Therefore,

H I.lb: Media skepticism will interact with exposure in their effect on personal
agenda. The positive association between exposure to the media and acceptance of
their agenda will be stronger for non-skeptics than for skeptics.
In sum, my first set of hypotheses seeks to find out whether media skepticism interferes
with the agenda setting process.
Intervening and conditional variables. The dependent variable in agenda setting
research - public perceptions of the important problems facing the nation - can be
influenced by factors other than the media agenda. These factors should thus be taken
into account in the statistical models.
First, there is the role of personal experience with the issues. “An individual’s
close familiarity with an issue, such as being unemployed or losing a close friend to
cancer, is a way in which a person’s personal experience with an issue overrides the
influence of the media in determining what’s important to that person” (Dearing &
Rogers, 1996:52). And indeed, research shows that the less direct experience people have
with the issues, the greater the agenda-setting influence of the media. However, personal
experience with an issue could also enhance the media’s influence on the individual’s
agenda. This is because personal experience can sensitize an individual to mass media
information about the issue. For example, someone who was affected by an automobile
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accident might come to see this issue as “the most important problem facing our country”
because he or she learns from the media that many other people have also been affected
by road accidents. In sum, issue relevance and issue experience are factors that should be
taken into account in our models.
Second, as Dearing & Rogers (1996:51) note, “the most widely studied intervening
variable in agenda setting research is the amount of interpersonal discussion about an
issue in the news”. One can think a given issue is important, not because of the media,
but because he or she has discussed the issue with other people. Social interaction has
been found to be an important factor influencing issue priority, together with media
coverage (Zhu et al., 1993). Since political conversation is correlated with media
skepticism (see Chapter 3), I must control for political discussion in the agenda setting
models in order to avoid false associations (e.g. political conversation rather than media
skepticism is causing resistance to media agendas). In other words, to vigorously test HI
I need to make sure that my agenda setting models control for interpersonal political
discussion.

Study 1: the PTR data.
All Wave 1 PTR respondents were asked for their most important problem (MIP). The
question wording was, “In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing the
country today?” Responses were coded into one of 40 categories developed by Princeton
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Survey Associates. Only the first problem mentioned by respondents was included in the
analysis35.
Print media content analysis. The content analysis data used in this study was
collected by the PTR research team in 199636. A team of five Annenberg graduate
students developed a detailed coding scheme (32 categories with a total of 152 sub
categories) for the media agenda in February 1996. They then used this coding scheme
and coded for issues covered on the front pages of the New York Times, Washington
Post, Wall Street Journal37 and Washington Times in the period between February 5 and
February 23,1996. A time lag of three weeks between this tracking of media agenda and
the measurement of the public agenda in Wave 1 was allowed. The unit of analysis was
the news story, and each story could fall into a single category only. Inter-coder
reliability for this content analysis was Krippendorffs alpha of .80 for the 32-category
scheme and .79 for the detailed category scheme.

Television network content analysis. The same 32-issue categorization was
applied for the network TV evening news agenda for the same time interval. Instead of
applying the coding scheme to the news contents directly, it was applied on the Tyndall
Reports, which are weekly reports that monitor the nightly newscasts of the three
broadcast networks (ABC, CBS and NBC). The statistics measure the amount of time (in
33 Respondents were not probed for additional problems. However, interviewers were instructed to record
additional problems when respondents mentioned any. Only a fraction o f respondents mentioned more than
one problem. Taking these additional problems into account in the analysis would have caused an
asymmetry among respondents, hence they were ignored.
361 am grateful to GangHeong Lee and Brian Southwell for helping me figure out exactly what was done
almost five years ago.
37 Wall Street Journal items were assigned a weight o f JO in the final calculation o f the media agenda. This
is due to the larger number o f stories on its front page, and because o f the heavier emphasis assigned to
economic and business-related issues in this newspaper.
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minutes) devoted to each issue. Three Annenberg graduate students content analyzed
these reports and coded each story into one of the issue categories. There was a positive
correlation between TV and print agendas (r=.43, p<.10) providing some validation for
both independent content analyses endeavors (print and TV).
“Hierarchical” agenda setting. Results from the content analyses and from the
public opinion survey are presented in Table 6.1. Overall, these data reproduce McCombs
and Shaw’s finding of a rank order correlation between public agenda and media agenda.
The aggregate public agenda was significantly correlated with the print [Spearman’s
rho=.58 (p< 05)] and network evening news agendas [Spearman’s rho=.52 (p<.05)]. A
combined rank order for the media agenda was also highly correlated with the public
agenda [Spearman’s rho=.71 (p<.01)]. In other words, the PTR data replicates the classic
“hierarchical” agenda setting finding. The higher a given issue ranks on media attention,
the higher it ranks on the public agenda. In February 1996, economic issues dominated
the agenda of the media. Three weeks later, economic issues dominated the agendas of
the audience. By contrast, gender-related issues and issues related to the elderly received
almost no media attention in February 1996. They also were not considered to be
important problems by the audience, as Table 6.1 shows.
Does audience trust in the media moderate the agenda setting effect of the media?
Hypothesis H I.la predicts a stronger hierarchical agenda setting effect for non-skeptics
than for media-skeptics. This hypothesis is examined in Table 6.2. The table presents the
rank order correlations between media and public agendas by media skepticism. No
matter how you measure media agenda (number of stories in the print media, minutes of
TV network news, or a combined measure of both), the rank order correlation is higher
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for the non-skeptics than for the skeptics, as hypothesis H I. 1a predicted. For example,
the correlation between total media agenda and public agenda was .70 for audiences who
trusted the media, and only .58 for media skeptics.
To test for the statistical significance of the difference between the rank order
correlations of media skeptics and non-skeptics, both correlations were transformed into
Fisher’s Z scores38. The difference between the two transformed scores was taken, and a
confidence interval was built around the difference. If zero is not included in the
confidence interval (as is the case in all three cases if one uses an a of .05), then the null
hypothesis may be rejected (i.e., the difference between the correlations is significantly
different from zero). In other words, the difference between the agenda setting
correlations of skeptics and non-skeptics is statistically significant. To the extent that we
interpret these correlations as evidence for an agenda setting effect of the media on
audiences (and for numerous reasons this interpretation is not an obvious one), we can
conclude that this presumed effect is stronger for non-skeptics than for media-skeptics.
Those who said that “the media help society” were closer to the media’s agenda in their
rank ordering of issues than those who argued that “the media get in the way of society
solving its problems”.
However, the significant difference between the correlations of media and public
agendas of skeptics and non-skeptics could be, at least potentially, caused by factors
other than media skepticism. The immediate suspect, o f course, is political ideology.
How can we be certain that the difference in agenda setting between skeptics and non-

MAs Z ar(1972) argues, in large samples the distribution o f Spearman’s rho approximates that o f Pearson’s
r. Hence, the same procedures for hypothesis testing (including the one I use here to test for the difference
between two independent correlation coefficients) may be applied.
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skeptics is not due to the fact that skeptics tend to be conservatives and non-skeptics to be
liberal? This apprehension is further advanced by the actual differences in issue rank
orders, which at times do mirror the ideological positions of conservative and liberal
respondents. For example, media skeptics were more likely to mention dissatisfaction
with politicians and morality (“conservative” issues, especially in the Clinton era) as the
most important problems, while non-skeptics were more likely to mention environmental
issues and health care (“liberal” issues). This suggests that at least part of the moderating
role of media skepticism in agenda setting (demonstrated above) may be accounted for by
ideological differences between skeptics and non-skeptics (see Chapter 2).
Thus, in order to substantiate the claim that media skepticism moderates agenda
setting, one would need to introduce statistical controls into the data analysis. However,
applying controls to the current design (e.g., by calculating and comparing the rank order
correlations between public and media agendas for liberal, moderate and conservative
skeptics and non-skeptics) would involve substantial reductions of the sample sizes used
in the calculation of each o f the correlations. But this would not allow us to accurately
measure public ranks for some of the issues, which are based on relatively small Ns even
without controls.
The classical hierarchical approach therefore has limited power to test for the
hypothesized associations while controlling for intervening factors. An individual level
design would be preferable in this respect. However, there is no agreed-on method to
measure agenda setting susceptibility at the individual level (see Wanta, 1996:8-19).
Many of the suggested individual-level agenda setting susceptibility or propensity
measures that have been tried in the past require more data than I have at hand. For
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example, they require respondents to rank the importance of an array of issues rather than
identify one “most important problem” (see Wanta, 1996; McLeod et al., 1974).
Individual level modeling. One approach is simply to test whether media skepticism
is associated with the likelihood of individuals giving the “media answer” to the MIP
question. Fortunately, this could be done while controlling for possible intervening
variables. This is the approach I take in Table 6.3. The table provides logistic regression
results for models predicting individuaMevel mentioning of the top media issues as MIP
using media skepticism as an independent variable, while controlling for a variety of
potential intervening factors.
Model 1, for example, predicts mentioning the economy as the MIP. As noted above,
economic issues dominated the media agenda at the time of study. More than 25 percent
of the time dedicated to the 18 main issue categories on national network evening news
programs was spent on economic issues. More than 17 percent of the print news stories
on these main issues dealt with economic matters. Agenda setting predicts that the media
increases the likelihood that people will mention economy, in this media context, as the
MIP. Model 1 shows that, as predicted by some agenda setting scholars, media exposure
was positively related to agreement with the media that economy was the MIP. The more
one was exposed to news, the greater the odds that she or he thought, like the media, that
economy was the MIP.
H I.la predicted that agenda setting would be moderated by media skepticism. As
Model 1 shows, media skepticism significantly reduces the likelihood of identifying the
economy as the MIP. Even when controlling for ideology, political extremity, issue
knowledge, demographics and political involvement, the odds of media skeptics saying
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that economy was the MIP were only .78 times the odds of non-skeptics saying that
economy was the MIP. Those who thought “the media get in the way o f society” were
less likely to agree with the media that the economy was the most important issue at the
time of study. Those thinking that “the media help society solve its problems” were more
likely to assign importance to economic issues, as media coverage did three weeks
earlier.
However, other issues besides the economy also received a lot of media attention at
the time of the study. How robust are the findings to the dichotomization of the MIP
question? In other words, if other issues besides the economy received vast media
attention, should the dependent variable (“agreement with media agenda” on the
conceptual level) be defined using other issue combinations?
Models 2,3 and 4 test for the sensitivity of Model 1 results (described above) to the
coding of the dependent variables. Only issues that received high media attention were
considered as possible candidates for assignment as “media issues”. In Model 2, all
people who said that the “economy” or “foreign policy” (the number-two issue on the
media agenda) were the MIPs were coded “1”, while all other respondents were coded
“0”. As in Model 1, media skepticism was negatively and significantly associated with
the outcome measures. Those who trusted the media were more likely to say that
economic or foreign policy issues (which together received the attention of 42 percent of
print stories and 41 percent of TV minutes) were the most important issues facing the
country.
If we add crime, the issue that was number two on the TV agenda, to the media MIP
list, the results (presented in Model 4) almost precisely replicate those of Models 1 and 2.
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Again the coefficient for media skepticism is negative and significant39. However, when
the dependent variable is coded to include dissatisfaction with politicians (the numbertwo issue on the newspaper agenda and on the combined TV and newspaper agenda)
instead o f crime, the results change slightly. Media skepticism in this case (reported in
model 3), is still negatively, but this time not significantly, associated with the dependent
variable. The overall effect size, one can conclude, varies between -.08 and -.28,
depending on the coding of the dependent variable. This corresponds to an odds ratio of
between .75 and .91, always in favor of non-skeptics, whose odds of agreeing with media
agenda are always higher. Thus, it seems we can conclude that even after controlling for
the contribution of ideology, political involvement, issue knowledge, news exposure and
demographics, media skepticism is associated with a lower likelihood of agreement with
the media on the most important problems.
Another possible test for agenda setting, though not a highly recommended one,
would be to give respondents ‘‘agenda setting” scores, based on the media rank of their
MIPs. For example, those who said the economy was the MIP would receive the highest
score, and those who cited gender-related issues and issues relating to the elderly would
get the lowest scores. These scores would then be used as dependent variables in
statistical models predicting how prominent “my issue” was on the media’s agenda.
Models using this approach are presented in Table 6.4. The MIP question was
recoded in three different ways, corresponding to Models 1,2 and 3. First, respondents
received as “agenda setting” scores the number of TV minutes that were devoted to their
39 Note that other coefficients change substantially: most dramatically, a sign reversal takes place for the
race and sex coefficients. This probably reflects the fact that females and non-whites are more concerned
about crime, since their likelihood o f being victimized is greater.
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MIP at the time of the content analysis (this is the dependent variable in Model 1). In the
second model, each respondent’s “agenda setting score” was the number of stories
devoted to subjects’ MIP on the front pages of the four newspapers examined. In the
third model the “agenda setting score” consisted of the general media rank order that the
MIP reported by subjects received (the rank scores presented in Table 6.1). In other
words, those selecting economy received an “agenda setting score” of 18, and those
selecting gender-related or elderly-related issues received a score of 1.5.
As the table shows, the agenda setting score was not related to media skepticism. In
other words, mentioning issues that received more media attention was not significantly
related to mistrust in the media. Nor was it significantly associated with media exposure.
However, the coefficients were in the predicted direction (negative for media skepticism,
implying that mistrust is associated with lower agenda setting scores; positive for media
exposure, implying that exposure is associated with acceptance of media agenda).
Agenda setting, according to this formulation, is associated positively with education and
negatively with involvement. That is, higher education and lower levels of political
involvement were associated with mentioning topics that received media attention.
However, as McCombs et al. (1995) noted, agenda setting effects have rarely been
found when assigning media ranks to individuals. This is because it would be too strict to
expect that individuals perfectly mirror the ranking of issues covered in the media. In any
case, if we use this strict formulation we find that skeptics do not differ significantly from
non-skeptics on their average issue ranking score. That is, their MIPs do not receive, on
average, more TV time or newspaper stories, than the MIPs mentioned by non-skeptics.
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Exposure*skepticism interaction. Does media skepticism interact with media
exposure in their effect on audience personal agendas? H I.lb predicts that it does, so
there would be a stronger positive effect of exposure on mentioning the media’s MIP for
non-skeptics than for media skeptics. The rationale behind this hypothesis is the same one
that guides my other hypotheses. Assuming that agenda setting is a function of the
amount of media exposure (this is not a necessary assumption, and research on this topic
produced mixed results), this hypothesis predicts that this effect will be stronger for
people who trust the media than for media skeptics.
Hypothesis 1.1b is examined in Table 6.S. As the table shows, the skepticism *
exposure interaction is indeed statistically significant in three out of the four models. In
other words, media skepticism does intervene in the association between exposure and
perception of the MIP. The interpretation of the interaction is presented in Figure 6.1 (the
other models produce similar patterns, as is evident from the similar signs and
magnitudes of the coefficients). The Y-axis in this figure represents the predicted
probability of agreement with the media on the most important problem (economy, in this
case), while the X-axis represents the amount of news-media exposure. As the figure
shows, the pattern of interaction is different than the one predicted by HI .lb. In fact, it is
exactly the opposite pattern. The “agenda setting” slope of media-skeptics is steeper than
that o f non-skeptics. All non-skeptics have a higher probability of giving the “media
answer” to the MIP question, as predicted by HI .la. But the gap between skeptics and
non-skeptics is narrow for heavily exposed respondents and wide for those with relatively
little exposure.
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Similar interaction terms were tried on OLS models with the “agenda setting scores”
described above (see Table 6.4). In all three cases (models with number of stories,
minutes of TV news, and general media rank), the skepticism * exposure interaction was
not statistically significant.
Summary. To sum up, the PTR data present some evidence for the moderating
effect of media skepticism in agenda setting. On the aggregate level, the rank order
correlations of media and public agenda are stronger for non-skeptics than for non
skeptics. On the individual level, skeptics have lower probabilities of answering the MIP
question with the media answer. This later association holds even when controlling for
political ideology, extremity, knowledge and involvement, and various demographic
factors. A stricter approach, involving the assignment of an agenda setting score to each
respondent (based on the attention that the media devoted to his or her MIP), did not
yield significant effects of media skepticism on agenda setting. Also, HI .lb did not
receive full support. Yet the pattern o f interaction, though different than the predicted
one, still does not negate the moderating role of media skepticism in agenda setting. Non
skeptics had a higher probability of mentioning the “media answer” as the MIP.
However, higher news exposure brought skeptics closer to their non-skeptical
counterparts. In other words, skeptics have a lower probability of agreement with the
media on the most important problem, but less so when they consume large amounts of
news.
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Study 2; NES 1996 Data.
National Election Study respondents, interviewed about six months after Wave 1 of the
PTR study (during the election season of 1996) were also asked for their MIP. Again,
content analysis of print and TV news media was employed to determine the media
agenda at that time. Print media content analysis included all stories from the front pages
o f the New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today and The Wall Street Journal40,
from the period between August 11 and October 7,1996. A revised version of the PTR
coding scheme41 containing 16 issue categories and 99 sub-categories was employed.
Inter-coder reliability for a sample of newspaper articles was Krippendorff s alpha of .85
for the 16-category scheme and .78 for the detailed category scheme. TV content analysis
again consisted of recoding the figures reported in the Tyndall reports, covering the
contents of national network TV news programs for the period between August 12 and
October 25, 1996. Basically, this procedure tried to replicate the methods used by the
PTR research team in 1996. The time span of media content analysis (both print and TV)
is longer in this study because of a longer time in the field for the NES survey, compared
to the Wave 1 survey of the PTR study.
Results. Table 6.6 presents the results of media content analysis and public issue
agendas. As in Study 1, the data reproduce McCombs and Shaw’s finding of hierarchical
agenda setting. Public agenda correlated with TV agenda [Spearman’s rho=.44 (pc.10)],
with newspaper agenda [Spearman’s rho=.78 (p<.01)], and with a combined measure of
media agenda [Spearman’s rho=.58 (p<.05)] (the measure was the sum of TV minutes
40 As in the previous study, each Wall Street Journal story was counted as half a story in the calculation o f
the media agenda because o f the higher number o f stories on its front page o f this paper and its heavier
emphasis on economy.
41 The revision consisted primarily o f canceling irrelevant and unused categories.
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and number of newspaper stories). As in Study 1, these rank order correlations were
higher for media skeptics than for non-skeptics.
Table 6.7 examines the hypothesis that the rank order “agenda setting” correlation is
stronger for non-skeptics than for those who mistrust the media. The table, like Table 6.2
in Study 1, presents the rank order correlations between media and public agenda by
media skepticism. No matter how you measure the media agenda (number of stories in
the print media, minutes of TV network news, or a combined measure of both), the rank
order correlation is higher for the non-skeptics then for the skeptics, as hypothesis H I. la
predicts. For example, the correlation between total media agenda and public agenda was
.70 for audiences who trusted the media, and only .51 for media skeptics. As the table
shows, Fisher transformation was again used to test for the statistical significance of the
difference between the independent correlations. As in Study 1, the differences between
the correlations of skeptics and non-skeptics were statistically significant. In other words,
the rank order correlation between media and public agendas was weaker for those saying
they “almost never” or “none of the time” trusted the media “to report the news fairly”,
than for respondents who said they could trust the media at least “some of the time”.
Again, the relationship between agenda setting and media skepticism needs to be
assessed with tighter statistical controls in order to negate alternative explanations mainly, that ideology influences personal agendas and causes the differences between
skeptics and non-skeptics. As in Study 1, this problem was addressed by moving from the
aggregate to the individual level and trying to predict, using logistic regression, whether
media skepticism was associated with giving the media answer to the MIP question. This
is done in Table 6.8.
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Model 1 of Table 6.8 presents a logit model predicting which respondents would
answer that “foreign policy and defense issues” were the most important problem facing
the country (these issues received a lot of attention at the time of the study and were
ranked number one on the combined media agenda as well as on the TV agenda
measure). As predicted by H I.la, media skepticism was negatively associated with the
outcome measure. Each one-unit increase on the skepticism scale is associated with a 36
percent decrease (100*(eb-l)) in the odds of saying that foreign policy or national defense
issues are the most important problem. This association was statistically significant
(p<.05).
However, unlike in Study 1, these results were sensitive to the dichotomization of the
dependent variable. When other combinations of media MIP answers were coded as “1”
and used as outcome variables, the coefficient for media skepticism was non-significant.
In two of the models (Model 3 and Model 4), the coefficient for skepticism was even
positive. In other words, media skepticism was associated with saying that foreign policy
was the MIP, but it was not related to mentioning other issues prominent in the media
agenda as most important Also, additional unreported models used the agenda setting
“score” approach described above, and found no significant association between media
skepticism and the agenda setting ranks, which were based on the attention that subjects’
MIP received in the media (these models paralleled the ones presented in Table 6.4 of
this chapter). Again, this formulation of agenda setting is the strictest one. As in the
previous study, neither agenda setting nor the hypothesized moderating role skepticism
gained support from the data.
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Exposure * skepticism interaction. Hypothesis 1.1b predicted an exposure *
skepticism interaction, and postulated that the effect of exposure on issue importance
would be stronger for non-skeptics than for skeptics. Table 6.9 presents models testing
this interaction on the NES 1996 data. The table shows that exposure did not, in any of
the four models, significantly interact with media skepticism in their effect on
respondents’ issue salience. In other words, the NES data did not find evidence for the
predicted association, nor did it replicate the reverse interaction patterns that were found
in Study 1. The patterns of the coefficients in Model 1 (i.e., their size and magnitude) are
similar to those found in Study 1, indicating a stronger association between exposure and
issue salience for skeptics. But again, the coefficients are not statistically significant,
hence we cannot reject the null interaction hypotheses in these cases.
Summary. The National Election Study of 1996 provides some evidence for the
moderating role of media skepticism in agenda setting. The rank order correlation
between public and media agenda was stronger for non-skeptics than for media skeptics.
Also, agreeing with the media that foreign issues stood at the top of the nation’s agenda
was negatively associated with media skepticism, even after controlling for ideology,
extremity, political discussion, knowledge involvement and demographic factors.
However, this latter result was sensitive to the dichotomization of the MIP question,
indicating that skeptics tended to disagree with non-skeptics and with the media about the
number-one problem but not about other problems that also received extensive attention
at the time of the study. Again, as in Study 1, stricter tests involving the assignment of
agenda setting scores to individuals (based on the media attention dedicated to their MIP)
did not yield support for agenda setting or for H l.la. In addition, the association between
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media skepticism and agenda setting did not interact with the amount of exposure, and
the agenda setting effects of the amount of exposure were not related to media
skepticism.

Study 3: The Electronic Dialogue data.
All baseline respondents were asked, “What is the most important problem facing our
country today?” The baseline interview was in the field between February 28 and March
10,2000. The open-ended answers were coded by a group of Annenberg graduate
students (EDialogue research assistants) into a 45-category issue variable42. This is
parallel to what is done by an interviewer in a telephone survey. Reliability for this
coding endeavor was not reported. Given the electronic format and the nature of the
question, many respondents (291 out of about 2015 completing the baseline) gave more
than one answer to this question. Since picking just one answer out o f an array of
problems would be an arbitrary decision in this case, all answers were taken into account
in the analysis. However, weighting was used to reduce the influence of respondents who
provided more than one answer. For example, the weight of a respondent mentioning four
problems was given one-fourth of the weight of a respondent mentioning only one
problem43.
Again, content analysis of print and TV news media was employed to determine the
media agenda at that time. Print media content analyses included, as in the previous

421 am grateful to Emily West for helping me access and understand the data.
43 Unweighted analysis results with similar patterns. At the aggregate level the differences are minor. At the
individual level the p-values tended to be higher in the unweighted version.
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study, all stories from the front pages of the New York Times, Washington Post, USA
Today and The Wall Street Journal44, from the period between February IS and March 7,
2000. A revised version of the previous coding schemes45, containing 19 issue categories
and 105 sub-categories, was employed. Inter-coder reliability for a sample of newspaper
articles was Krippendorf fs alpha of .80 for the 19-category scheme and .75 for the
detailed category scheme. For the TV news content analysis, the Tyndall reports for all
weekday evening newscasts from February 14 through March 6 were used. The
correlation between the TV and print issue rank order was .45 (p<.05).
Results. Table 6.10 presents the results of media content analysis and public issue
agendas. As in the previous studies, the data reproduce McCombs and Shaw’s finding of
hierarchical agenda setting. However, this time the correlations were much smaller, and
sometimes not significantly different from zero. Public agenda correlated with TV agenda
[Spearman’s rho=.45 (p<.10)], newspaper agenda [Spearman’s rho=.08 (p>. 10)], and a
combined measure of media agenda [Spearman’s rho=.13 (p>.10)] (the measure was the
sum of TV minutes and number o f newspaper stories). The reasons for these low
correlations are related to the fact that the economy received a good deal of attention in
the media, but not much attention in the public agenda. In addition, issues ranking
relatively high on the public agenda, like education and health care, received relatively
little media coverage.

44 As in the previous study, each Wall Street Journal story was counted as half a story in calculating the
media agenda because o f the higher number o f stories on the front page o f this paper and its heavier
emphasis on economy.
45 The revision consisted primarily o f adding new issues (e.g., Elian Gonzales, computer crimes) and
deleting irrelevant categories from 1996.
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Table 6.11 examines the hypothesis that the rank order “agenda setting” correlation
is stronger for non-skeptics than for those who mistrust the media (H I.la). The table
presents the rank order correlations between media and public agenda by media
skepticism. Unlike in the previous studies, the newspaper agenda setting rank order
correlation was stronger for skeptics than for non-skeptics. This is the exact opposite of
what H I.la predicts. On the other hand, the agenda setting correlations for TV and for the
combined measure were stronger for non-skeptics than for skeptics, as predicted by
H I.la. A similar procedure to that used in the previous studies was applied to test for the
significance of the difference between the correlations for skeptics and non-skeptics.
Only in the case of TV agenda setting were the correlations for skeptics and non-skeptics
significantly different from each other (p<. 10). In other words, the rank order correlation
between TV agenda and public agenda was significantly higher for non-skeptics, as
predicted by H I.la. However, there were no significant differences between skeptics and
non-skeptics in the total media agenda or in newspaper agenda correlations with public
agenda. A possible explanation is that the aggregate effects were much smaller this time
than in the other studies. In order for moderation to occur, there must be a main effect.
Methodologically, Fisher’s transformation makes it harder to detect differences between
smaller correlations. Theoretically, moderation of agenda setting by media skepticism
implies that the population at large should be affected. Given a very small association
between media agenda and public agenda, it is impossible to talk about moderation.
Moving to the individual level, Table 6.12 presents logistic regression models
predicting individual answers to the MIP questions, controlling for demographics,
political ideology, extremity knowledge and involvement The four models correspond to
166

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

four conceptualizations of the dependent variable. The models predicting mentioning
crime (among other salient issues) as the most important problem also controlled for prior
experience with crime and for feeling unsafe in one’s neighborhood (these measures were
not available in the other data sets). The reason for including these variables, as well as
that of employment throughout the chapter, is that agenda setting research asserts that
personal life experiences also exert an influence on people’s agendas.
In all four models, skepticism was negatively associated with the dependent variable.
That is, the higher the skepticism, the lower the agreement with the media on important
issues46. In one case out of four (Model 2), the effect of skepticism was not statistically
significant. The estimated adjusted odds ratio for skepticism in Model 1 was .08. This
means that a one-unit increase on the skepticism scale (the maximal increase, given the 01 coding of the skepticism variable in the ED data) was associated with a decrease of 92
percent in the odds of saying that the economy was the most important problem. The
estimated adjusted odds ratio for media skepticism in Model 4 is .55. This means that a
one-unit increase in skepticism is associated with a decrease of 45 percent in the odds of
mentioning one of the top four media problems as a MIP. The estimated odds ratio,
according to Table 6.12, probably varies between .08 and .62.
In sum, although at the aggregate level there was only partial support for H l.l, the
individual models provide a consistent answer: the higher the skepticism, the lower the
likelihood of agreeing with the media. It seems as if, in this case, agenda setting does not

46 As mentioned earlier, the unweighted analysis resulted in similar pattersn, though the p-values for the
coefficients for skepticism were higher. The following are the results from the unweighted analysis: In
Model I, b=-1.87; se=1.59; p=.23; exp0>)=.15. In Model 2, b==-.55; se*.62; p=.37; exp(b)=.57. In Model 3,
b=-1.40; se=.59; p=.01; exp(b)=24. In Model 4, b=-.70; se*.53; p*.19; exp(b>*.49.
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work so well at the aggregate level. But at the individual level, people who mistrust the
media are less likely to mention media issues as the most important problems.
Exposure * skepticism interaction. Hypothesis 1.1b predicted an exposure *
skepticism interaction, with a stronger effect of exposure on issue importance for non
skeptics than for skeptics. As in the previous studies, this hypothesis was examined using
logistic regression models, presented in Table 6.13. As before, the dependent variables
were coded “1” for providing one of the media problems as an answer to the MIP
question. Centering was used to reduce multicollinearity. In all models, there was no
significant skepticism by media exposure interaction. That is, skeptics were less likely
than non-skeptics to agree with the media on the most important problem, regardless of
the amount of exposure. H1.1b did not receive support from the EDialogue data.
Summary. The EDialogue data also contain partial evidence in favor of HI. la. The
aggregate correlations between media and public agenda were smaller in March 2000
than in September and February of 1996. However, the correlation between TV agenda
and public agenda was stronger for non-skeptics, as H I.la predicted. On the other hand,
there was no significant difference between skeptics and non-skeptics in the correlation
between public agenda and media agenda in the case of either the newspaper agenda or
the combined newspaper and TV measure. Though the aggregate level correlations were
smaller, the individual level analysis showed that, as predicted by H I.la and as was the
case in the previous data sets, skeptics were less likely to answer the MIP question with
the media’s answer. Even after various controls, skeptics were less likely to mention the
problems raised by the media - this time economy, crime, and foreign affairs/defense than non-skeptics.
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As in Study 2, and unlike in Study 1, there was no evidence for a significant
skepticism by amount of exposure interaction. That is, skeptics were less likely to
mention the media issues as MIP regardless of the amount of news coverage they got.
Those watching the news more frequently were neither closer nor further away from their
non-skeptical counterparts, at least when it came to the odds of answering that these four
issues were, in their opinion, the nation’s most important problems.

Conclusion.
The intention of this chapter was not to test the already well-tested agenda setting theory.
However, some of the findings reported above replicate findings by agenda setting
scholars, and may be interpreted as evidence consistent with agenda setting. Most
importantly, three separate studies originating in different contexts demonstrated a rank
order correlation between media and public agenda. The magnitude of the agenda setting
correlation was not consistent across data, nor was the magnitude of the moderating
effect of media skepticism. However, these effects should not be expected to be constant,
according to agenda setting research. We know by now from numerous studies that the
magnitude of agenda setting effects varies with changing conditions. For example, media
discussion about issues that have already been on the media agenda for a long time (and
have passed saturation point) are expected to affect the public agenda less than coverage
of relatively new issues. On the other hand, it takes time for the public to be affected by
the media. While in all three studies the measurement of media agenda (via content
analysis) was lagged, the length of the time lag varied across studies, for practical reasons
such as the differing lengths of field period in the three different studies.
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Measurement inconsistencies could be another source of inconsistency in the
findings. The conversion of the open-ended answers to the most important problem
question was executed by three different agencies (Princeton Survey Research for the
PTR data; NES; EDialogue research assistants) using different methods and issue
categories. It could be, for example, that the low agenda setting correlation in the
EDialogue data was due to lack of issue categories for “computer safety” and
“transportation”, issues that received some media coverage at the time of study. Lack of
defined categories for media issues could have led to situations in which respondents
actually mentioned issues that were coded as “other”, leading to potential reduction in the
agenda setting effect as a result of a measurement error.
Another potential source of inconsistency between studies lies in the media content
analysis end of the process. However, in this case, the potential for inconsistencies was
reduced by applying very similar coding schemes and content analytical procedures in all
three studies. The identical procedures could not be replicated because reality changes,
and the issues that received media attention in 1996 were not the very same issues that
received media attention in 2000. Furthermore, sometimes the ways we construct and
collapse the issue category scheme, either at the audience end (coding of open-ended
survey questions) or at the content analysis stage, have implications on the magnitude of
agenda setting effects and on the moderating effect of skepticism in the process.
Collapsing “the deficit” together with “inflation” or “unemployment” into “economy”
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may sometimes blur important context-specific distinctions that may increase or reduce
the effects of agenda setting47.
In sum, different conditions in changing realities, as well as differing study artifacts,
could be the sources of inconsistency between studies. We cannot expect to get exactly
the same results when applying similar procedures to similar data collected in different
ways, in different contexts. However, we should expect similar patterns, and that’s what
we got. In the three different data sets we found a rank order between media and public
agenda, and with one exception, this correlation was stronger for non-skeptics. Also, in
all three data sets, mentioning the number-one media issue was negatively and
significantly related to media skepticism, and there was some support for the same
association when testing for the sensitivity of the analysis to the coding of the dependent
variable. The only substantial inconsistency between the data sets was when we tested for
a skepticism by media exposure interaction.
Of course, a mere correlation between media and public agenda is not in any way
sufficient to substantiate the causality necessary to deduce that a “media effect” has taken
place. However, in this chapter I did not intend to “prove” that agenda setting is right.
The issue was the moderating effect of media skepticism, assuming agenda setting works.
Agenda setting scholars would probably interpret the correlation between media and
public agenda as an “effect” of the media on the public. To the extent that it is indeed a
media effect, we have learned that it is at least somewhat moderated by media skepticism.
We have also learned that skeptics are less likely to mention issues ranking at the top of

47 Being aware o f these issues I tried different combinations o f categories in each o f the studies, and
examined their effects on hypotheses testing. In most cases, though the numbers changed, the patterns were
the same.
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the media agenda as their answer to the “most important problem” question. This latter
association holds over and above controls for political ideology, extremity, political
discussion, knowledge and involvement. Also controlled in the logistic models were
variables relating to personal experience with media problems like employment and
crime. In sum, HI .la was generally supported by the data.
On the other hand, the studies did not find any evidence supporting HI.lb. This
hypothesis predicted an interaction between skepticism and the amount of media
exposure. The slope for the association between skepticism and exposure was supposed
to be steeper for non-skeptics than for skeptics. However, in the first study (the PTR
data), the pattern of interaction revealed by the analysis was different from the one
expected: while non-skeptics were more likely to mention media problems as their MIP
in all levels of exposure, the slope was actually steeper for the skeptics. In the two other
studies (using EDialogue and NES data), this interaction was not significantly different
from zero. The reason for this inconsistency remains unclear and could well be related to
any of the methodological factors mentioned above. In any event, none of the interaction
models supported HI.lb. The fact that H I.lb did not gain support from the data does not
negate the possibility that skepticism moderates media agenda setting effects pointed out
by the supporting evidence for HI.la.
Our interpretation of the results should depend on our interpretation of the agenda
setting process in general. If we think of agenda setting as being contingent on repeated
and continuous exposure, as cultivation is often thought of, then the interaction findings
do not settle easily with the idea that skepticism is moderating this process. On the other
hand, if we think that agenda setting is not necessarily dependent on the amount of
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exposure, than the lack of skepticism * exposure interaction does not conflict with the
moderating role of skepticism in the process. In other words, if we think agenda setting
may occur as a result of people’s brief encounter with the headlines on their way to work,
or as they watch TV in passing en route from the kitchen to the bedroom, the null
skepticism by exposure interaction settles pretty well with the hypothesized moderating
role of skepticism in agenda setting. The intensity of exposure is not related to the
moderation process: those mistrusting the media are less likely to accept their agenda,
regardless of how much they watch.
While some have suggested that agenda setting is a function of exposure length, this
is not necessarily the case. Rather than the result of an intensive engagement, the media
may affect everybody’s agenda: both those who watch much of the time and those who
watch little. That is why there is no mention of the amount of exposure in McCombs and
Shaw’s classic agenda setting model, or in the work of many others studying agenda
setting effects. In this view, the pattern of interaction, demonstrated in Study 1 but not
replicated in the other studies, does not stand in contrast to H I. The fact that skeptics who
spend a lot of time with the media are closer to the media than those who are less exposed
does not negate the possibility that skepticism moderates agenda setting, if we accept the
view that agenda setting is not necessarily a function of length of exposure.
The main limitation of the reported studies stems from their cross-sectional nature. In
other words, it might be that dissatisfaction with the media agenda is the cause, rather
than the result, of media skepticism. The time lag between the measurement of media and
public agendas is the only response I have to this problem in my studies. Admittedly, this
is not enough. A much stronger demonstration of the moderating effect of skepticism on
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agenda setting could and should be demonstrated utilizing longitudinal designs. Over
time, skeptics’ agendas should be less likely than those of non-skeptics to match the
media’s agenda. Though two of the data sets I use in this dissertation contain a
longitudinal component, so that longitudinal testing of skepticism’s moderating role in
agenda setting is at least potentially possible, I was not able to utilize the data for this
purpose here due to various, mostly practical, reasons. For example, the primary season
data I have at hand spans too short a time period and contains too few cases to allow for a
longitudinal examination of the moderating role of skepticism in agenda setting (only
one-fourth of respondents answered the skepticism question). Once the entire APPC 2000
data set is available for analysis, scholars should certainly use it for this purpose. The
EDialogue data spans longer periods of time, but the limited resources of a dissertation
project, especially coding-wise, do not allow for coding the media agenda over such a
long period. Future research, however, should use these data to examine the association
between public agenda and media agenda by skepticism over time.
To sum up: this chapter has found that agenda setting is moderated by media
skepticism. An important thing to note is that while agenda setting was weaker for media
skeptics than for non-skeptics, it was not in any way absent. Even among skeptics there
was a positive, and sometimes pretty high, correlation between media agenda and public
agenda. This shows that skeptics did not altogether reject the issues reported by the
media, nor did they have an entirely different agenda from that of the mainstream media.
Resistance to media agenda setting does not mean that skeptics’ agenda is the opposite of
the mainstream media’s. They do not say to themselves, “If this issue is heavily covered
in the media, then it is the least important problem facing our nation!’’ While skeptics
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were less likely to mention heavily-covered issues as their most important problem, many
of them still did so.
This chapter has demonstrated that skepticism moderates the agenda setting process.
In the next chapter we turn to zthe moderating role of skepticism in another media effect,
the one emerging from the literature on the spiral of silence.
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Figure 6.1: Interpreting the
exposure*skepticism interaction (Model 1,
Table 5)
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Table 6.1: H idli agenda (bv medium) and public io«nd« <hv media skepticism),
Fab. 1996 IPTR dats).

Economy/
unemployment
Foreign policy

TV
NP
NP+TV All respondents Non-skepncs Skeptics
agenda agenda combined (% mentioning (% mentioning (% mentioning
(Minutes) (N of media rank topic as MIP) topic as MIP) topic as MIP)
n*567
n=763
N=1587
order
stories)
16.70
2170
57.38
44
1
19.20
31.70

63

2

2.70

3.40

1.90

Dissatisfaction
with politicians
Morality

13.10

32

3

7.60

5.20

9.40

4.80

10

4

9.60

6.50

11.50

Crime

35.56

9

5

12.90

12.00

13.80

Education

11.30

17

6

2.60

3.40

1.80

Environment
Health care

13.50

9

7

.90

1.40

.70

15.10

7

8

3.20

3.50

3.30

Racism

9.99

11

9

3.10

3.20

3.30

Budget deficit

4.30

14

9.20

g.10

9.20

Taxes
Welfare reform

0

14

10
11.50

2.50

2.70

2.10

0

14

11.5

2.60

3.00

2.40

AIDS

12.90

13

.80

.60

1.10

Immigration

14

4

15

.60
5.30

1.10
7.30

0.20

Drugs

2.50
0

0
4

Poverty

3.10

0

16

1.80

1.30

2.00

Women's issues

0

0

17.50

.30

.00

0.50

Issues related to
the elderly

0

0

17.50

.60

0-40

0.80

3.80
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Table 6.2; The association between media agenda and public «a«ndi. bv media
skepticism: Sptannan'a rank ordar correlations and taata for tha akinlflcanca of tha
differences batwaan skeptics and non-skeptics (PTR data. Fab. 19961.
TV

NP

TV
Non- Skeptics Fisher's Fisher's Zdiff
s.e.A
p diff
+ NP skeptics (n»763) ZnMp
Zm p i m p - m p
____________
(n»567)___________________________________________

TV
1.00 .43* .81** .50*
.38
NP
1.00 .80** .60- .47*
TV+NP
1.00 .70- .58*
Non-skeptics
1.00 .89**
Skeptics_________________________ 1.00

.55
.69
.87

.40
.51
.66

.14
.18
.21

.05
.05
.05

P<.01
P<.001
P<.001

Note: * p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01
AThe standard error was calculated using the formula

a . . = ■»
*»**i

\N , - 3

* —J__

N, - 3

When N,=567, N2=762. A stricter calculation using N,=N2=18 (the number of issue pairs), would
have yielded a non-significant result
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T«M» 6.3: Looi«tic raor— ion models predicting mentioning dominant media issues as
“m o t important problem" (PTR W av 1 data. 1996).
Model
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
MIP=economy MIP=economy or
MIP=economy, foreign
MIP= economy,
foreign affairs affairs, or dissatisfaction with foreign affairs, or
__________________________________ politicians____________ crime
B (s.e.)
B (s.e.) E“ B (s.e.)
E
E
E"
B (S.e.)
-24J .78
.75
-.08
.91
-.18'
.83
Media
-.28*
skepticism
(13)
(12)
(11)
(11)
1.47
Sex (male=1)
1.29
.39—
-.08
.91
.29* 1.34
.25*
(.13)
(.12)
(11)
(11)
.05* 1.05
1.01
.01
1.01
.00
Years of
1.00
.02
(02)
(02)
education
(03)
(02)
1.20
Race (white=1) .06 1.07
1.10
.19
-.18
.83
.10
(.18)
(15)
(16)
(17)
.08*** 1.08 .08—
1.08
.05**
1.05
.05**
1.05
Political
ideology
(02)
(02)
(01)
(01)
-.04
.95
-.02
.97
-.04
.95
-.03
.96
Political
extremity
(04)
(03)
(03)
(03)
-.04
.11'
.95
Issue
.09 1.10
1.01
1.12
.01
(06)
(06)
knowledge
(07)
(06)
-.03
.96
-.10*
Political
-.13* .87
.91
.90
-.08
(05)
(05)
involvement
(06)
(05)
.24*
News media
.28* 1.33
1.33
1.25
.16*
1.17
.28exposure
(09)
(09)
(10)
(11)
Unweighted N
R2
Cases correctly
classified

1466
.04
79.81%

1466
.04
77.01%

1466
.02
68.96%

1466
.02
64.67%

Notes: # p<.10; * p<.05; -p<.01.
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Table 6.4:0L8 reor— Ion models predicting individual «wnd« setting ic o n s
(PTR Wava 1 data. 19961.
Model 2:
Dependent variable: NP
stories devoted to
subject's MIP
-.25
(85)
2.31”
(.84)
.57”
(19)
1.33
(118)
.18
(13)
.12
(26)

Model 3:
Dependent variable:
general media rank of
subject's MIP
-.01
(25)
-.08
(25)
.14*
(05)
-.07
(36)
-.00
(36)
.01
(08)

1.55
(63)
-1.82” *
(51)
.45
.96

.65
(45)
-.81*
(37)
1.05
(69)

.25*
(13)
-.27*
(11)
.09
(-21)

1289
.02

1289
.02

1289
.01

Model 1:
Dependent variable: TV
minutes devoted to
subject's MIP
Media
-1.08
skepticism
(1 19)
Sex (ma(e=1)
-1.10
(1.17)
Years of
.55*
education
(26)
Race (white=1)
-1.60
(1-65)
Political
.23
ideology
(18)
Political
.08
extremity
(36)
Issue
knowledge
Political
involvement
News media
exposure
Unweighted N
R2

Notes: # p< 10; * p<.05; ” p<.01
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Table 6.5: Testing for w noiuw * skepticism Interaction. Logistic war—sion models
predicting mentioning dominant madia l««uw as “moat important problem” (PTR Wave 1
data. 19961

Media
skepticism
News media
exposure
Media
skepticism *
exposure
Unweighted N
R2
Cases correctly
classified

Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
MIP=economy MIP=economy or MIP=economy, foreign
MIP= economy,
foreign affairs
affairs, or dissatisfaction foreign affairs, or
_______________________________ with politicians__________ crime
B (s.e.)
E
B (s.e.)
E
E
B (s.e.) E
B (s.e.)
-.25** .77 -.35—
-.19—
.82
.69
-.09*
.91
(06)
(05)
(05)
(05)
.31*** 1.37 .30—
.09*
1.09
1.36
.25**
1.29
(04)
(05)
(05)
(04)
.24**
.10
1.11
.21* 1.23
.29**
1.33
1.28
(09)
(08)
(08)
(10)
1471
.05
81.13%

1471
.05
78.25%

1471
.03
70.53%

1471
.02
64.94%

Notes: # p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01.
The models control for political ideology, issue knowledge, political involvement and
demographic factors. Centering was used in ail models to reduce multicollinearity (the
coefficients presented are those of the centered terms).
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T«M> 6.6: Media M tndi lb» medium) and public aoenda (by media skepticism).
(WES 1996 Data)
NP
TV
agenda agenda
(Minutes) (N of
stories)

All
Non-skeptics A Skeptics A
respondents (% mentioning (% mentioning

Foreign policy
Economy/taxes/
unemployment
Crime
Morality

327
165

134
158

NP+TV
combined
media rank
order
1
2

174
130

58
36

3
4

13.80
7.50

14.10
7.20

19.20
15.10

Education

119
67

46

5

7.70

2.70

19

6

6.70
4.70

5.30

2.70

72

8

7

.00

.00

.00

20

43

8

5.10

5.00

9.60

23

18

9

7.50

8.20

6.80

22

18

10

4.40

4.70

5.50

22

13

11

1.90

2.30

.00

Immigration

21

10

12

0.90

1.00

1.40

Environment
Poverty

9

13
14

3.70

4.20

1.40

15

13
4

4.10

4.50

4.10

0

3

15

4.00

4.50

2.70

Drugs
Smoking,
tobacco industry
Dissatisfaction
with politicians
Welfare / welfare
reform
Healthcare
Race

Elderly, social
security

(% mentioning
topic as MIP)
N»747

topic as MIP)
n»75

topic as MIP)
n*670

6.30
29.30

7.10
24.30

4.10
24.70

AMedia skeptics are defined in this study as respondents who said they could trust the media *to
report the news fairly’ ‘none of the time” or ‘almost never”. Non-skeptics are those who said they
could trust the media ‘just about always”, ‘most of the time*, or ‘some of the time*. The same
patterns resulted when the mid-point category was removed from the analysis. Treating the mid
point category respondents as skeptics resulted in insignificant differences between skeptics and
non-skeptics.
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T ibh 6.7: Tht — ociitlon brtmwn media w n d i and public aoenda. bv media
ilwpllelM i: Sm w im n'i rank order correlations and teats for the significance of the
differences between skeptics and nofUkiD tlci (NES 1996 d m )
TV NP TV+NP Non-skeptics Skeptics Fisher's
Fisher'sZdiff
s.e.Apdiff
(n=567) (n=763)___________Zun wuo-nw
TV
1.00.77**.95**
.41
.29 .12 P<.05
.62*
.72
.43
NP
1.00.89.77
.38 .12 P<.01
.82.651.15
TV+NP
1.00
.51*
.30 .12 P< 05
.70.86
.56
Non-skeptics
1.00
.82Skeptics
1.00
Note: * p<.10; * p<.05; - p<.01.
AThe standard error was calculated using the formula
a .

. =

«t**i

/ — !—

V Ni ~ 3

*

1

Nj - 3

When Nt=75, N2=670. A stricter calculation using Ni=N2=15 (the number of issue pairs) would
have yielded a non-significant result
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Table 6.8: Logistic raorassion models predicting mentioning dominant madia Issues m
“most important problem" INES1996 d«H>
Model 2
Model 1
MIP=foreign MIP=economy or
foreign affairs
policy
B (s.e.)
-.44*
(.20)
.32
(30)
-.04
Years of
education
(06)
Race (white=1) -.00
(.46)
Employment
•30
(33)
(=1)
.00
Political
ideology
(05)
Political
.01
extremity
(10)
Political
-.02
discussion
(07)
Political
.23
knowledge
(.19)
Political
-.06
involvement
(18)
News media
.09
(09)
exposure
Media
skepticism
Sex (male=1)

N
R2
Cases correctly
classified

E
.64
1.38
.95
.99
.73
1.00
1.01
.97
1.26
.93
1.09

1,500
.03
96.87%

B (s.e.)
-.06
(02)
.29*
(17)
-.05
(03)
-.30
(23)
.18
(19)
.04
(02)
.01
(05)
.01
(04)
-.04
(08)
.03
(10)
.03
(.05)

E“
.93
1.37
.94
.73
1.20
1.04
1 00
1.01
.95
1.04
1.03

1,500
.02
89.40%

Model 3
MIP=economy,
foreign affairs, or
crime
B (s.e.)
Eb
.06
1.07
(09)
-.03
.96
(.14)
-.06*
.93
(02)
-.23
.72
(19)
.05
1.05
(15)
-.02
.97
(05)
-.02
.97
(04)
-.01
.98
(03)
.04
1.04
(07)
.07
1.07
(08)
-.04
.97
(04)

Model 4
MIP=economy, foreign
affairs, crime or morality

1,500
.01
82.60%

1,500
.01
78.87%

B (s.e.)
.12
(08)
-.13
(13)
-.03
(02)
-.23
(.19)
-.06
(.14)
.08
(05)
-.01
(04)
-.00
(03)
.01
(06)
.07
(08)
-.05
(04)

E"
1.13
.87
.95
.76
.94
1.08
.98
.99
1.01
1.08
.94

Notes: # p<.10; * p<.05; **p<01.
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Table 6.9; Testing for w p m u w * skepticism Interaction. Logistic w a r—slon models
predicting mentioning dominant madia Im u w as "most important Bfoblwn" (NES 1996
data!
Model 2
Model
MIP=foreign MIP=economy or
policy
foreign affairs
Media
skepticism
News media
exposure
Skepticism *
exposure
interaction
N
R2
Cases correctly
classified

w
-.42'
(23)
.09
(10)
.03
(.11)

h.
.65
1.09
1.03

1,352
.05
97.12%

D / . a t

Cb

.01
(05)
.03
(06)
.03
(06)

1.01
1.01
1.03

1,352
.02
90.07%

Model 4
Model 3
MIP=economy,
MIP=economy, foreign
foreign affairs, or
affairs, crime or
morality
crime
------- h.
e»—
aU
a /. v
e °—
.07
1.07
.11
1.01
(09)
(09)
•03
.96
-.04
.95
(04)
(04)
.00
1.00
•00
.99
(04)
(.04
1,352
.01
83.21%

1,352
.01
79.22%

Notes: # p<10.
The models control for political ideology, issue Knowledge, political involvement and demographic
factors. Centering was used in all models to reduce multicollinearity (the coefficients presented
are those of the centered terms).
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Table 6.10: Madia M indi ibv medium) and public iw n d i (bv nwJIi skepticiamt. Much
2000 (EDiatoflua data)
TV agenda NP
(Minutes) agenda
(N of
stories)

NP+TV
combined
media rank
order

All respondents
(% mentioning
topic as MIP)
N=1489

Non
Skeptics
skeptics
(%
mentioning
<%
mentioning topic as MIP)
n-291
topic as MIP)
n*276
2.17
1.03
23.91
20.62
8.33
5.15
10.87
24.74
.00
.00
4.35
3.09
.36
1.37
.36
1.72
.00
.00
3.26
6.53
8.33
3.44
5.84
3.99
2.54
4.81
10.14
7.22
14.86
11.00
6.16
3.44

Economy
Crime
Foreign affairs
Morality
Transportation
Race
Energy
Environment
Computer safety
Politicians
Drugs
Elderly
Taxes
Education
Health care
Poverty ♦
Homelessness
Gender

52
42
35
20
7
8
5
9
4
14
5
4
21
9
8
0

146
115
41
36
38
22
22
18
19
9
16
17
0
11
6
7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7.5
7.5
9.5
9.5
12
12
12
14
15
16

2.15
23.30
7.59
17.39
.00
3.29
1.34
2.35
.00
4.84
5.37
3.43
3.56
9.74
9.74
5.57

3

3

17.5

.00

.00

.00

Immigration

6

0

17.5

.34

.36

.34
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Tibto 6.11: Aeeociatlon between madia agenda «nd public nwnd«. by madia skepticism:
S m in m n 'i rink order correlations and teste for the significance of the dlfhw ncw
b tw —n skeptics and non-skeptics (EDiatoque d«t«: March 2000)
NP TV TV + NP Non-skeptics Skeptics Fisher’s Z^.^. Fisher's Zdiff s.e.Apdiff
(n=276) (n=291)
ZffcM M t o D ' i f e a o
-.07 .08 p>.10
NP
1.00.45* .67.40
.42
.46*
.49
TV
.12
.03
.12
.03
.11 .08 p<.10
1.00 .93TV+NP
.13
.13
.12
.01 .08 p>.10
1.00
.12
Non-skeptics
1.00
.80Skeptics
1.00
Note: * p<.10; * p<.05; - p< 01.
AThe standard error was calculated using the formula
B .

.

*»-**

=

a

/—

1—

v Ni • 3

♦ —

!____

*2 ■ 3

When Ni=276, N2=291. A stricter calculation using N ^ N ^ tt (the number of issue pairs) would
have yielded the same null results.
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Table 6.12: Logistic regression modil« predicting mentioning dominant media issues m
“moat important problem" (EDiatooua March 2000 data!
Model 1
Model 2
MIP= MIPs Economy
Economy
orcnme
B (s.e.) E°
-2.46* .08
(101)
Sex (malesi)
1.87- 6.50
(52)
Years of education
.24* 1.28
(12)
Race (white=1)
-.15 .85
(58)
-.34“ .70
Political ideology
(-11)
-33* .71
Political extremity
(16)
Political discussion
.28 1.33
(17)
Political knowledge
-2.35* .09
(119)
Political involvement -.75“ .47
(.27)
News media exposure .02 1.03
(.15)
Employed (=1)
-.47 .62
(40)
Prior experience
w/violent crime (=1)
Feeling unsafe at
home, neighborhood
Media skepticism

Unweighted N
R2
Cases correctly
classified

630
.03
98.26%

B (s.e.)
-.47
(36)
.07
(.14)
-.04
(04)
.00
(21)
.03
(02)
.01
(04)
-.04
(06)
-.90*
(45)
.02
(08)
-.24—
(05)
-.48—
(13)
-.29*
(14)
.13
(11)

Eb
.62
1.07
.95
1.00
1.03
1.02
.95
.40
1.02
.78
.61
.61
1.14

469
.06
75.08%

Model 4
Model 3
MIP= economy,
MIPs economy, foreign
foreign affairs, or
affairs, crime or
crime
morality
B (s.e.)
Eb
B (s.e.)
Eb
-.58*
-1.33—
.26
.55
(34)
(31)
1.14
.08
1.08
.13
(12)
(13)
.04
1.04
.98
-.01
(04)
(03)
.14
1.14
.02
1.02
(19)
(18)
.94
.07—
1.08
-.05“
(02)
(01)
.08*
.03
1.03
1.08
(04)
(03)
.97
-.02
.97
-.02
(.05)
(.06)
1.47
.32
.39
-1.11(.40)
(43)
-.02
.97
-.23“
.78
(-07)
(08)
-.17—
.87
-.11*
.89
(04)
(04)
-.14
.86
.01
1.01
(12)
(13)
-.24*
78
.20
1.22
(.13)
(12)
.14
1.24
1.15
.21*
(10)
(10)
469
.06
69.15%

469
.01
57.07%

Notes: # p<.10; * p<.05; “ p<.01.
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T»bh 6.13: T—ting for exnoeure * skepticism interaction. Logistic fo r — ion models
predicting mentioning dominant madia issues m “most important problem” (EPiaiooue
March 2000 data)
Model 1
Model 2
MlP=economy MlP=economy or
crime
B (s.e.) E
Media skepticism -2.39 .24
(2.04)
News media
.10
.87
(33)
exposure
Skepticism *
1.25 8.17
(137)
exposure
interaction
N
R2
Cases correctly
classified

630
.03
98.26%

B (s.e.)
-.48
(73)
-.24*
(10)
-.04
(.43)
469
.06
75.08%

E
.61
.78
.95

Model 3
MIP=economy,
foreign affairs, or
crime
B (s.e.)
E
-1.32*
.26
(69)
-.17*
.84
(09)
.28
1.32
(.41)

Model 4
MIP=economy, foreign
affairs, crime or morality

469
.07
69.44%

469
.04
55.35%

B (S.e.)
-.60 (.62)

E"
.54

-.11
(08)
.10
(36)

.89
1.24

Notes: # p<10.
The models control for political ideology, political extremity, political discussion, issue knowledge,
political involvement and demographic factors. Centering was used in all models to reduce
multicollinearity (the coefficients presented are those of the centered terms).
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Chapter 7: Media Skepticism and Climate of Opinion Perception.

The spiral of silence theory was proposed by German pollster Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann
(1974,1976,1984) more than a quarter of a century ago. Since then, it has become one of
the most influential theories of public opinion. Briefly, it states that the people employ a
“quasi-statistical sense” to scan the environment for the distribution of opinions in
society. The major source of this perceived “climate of opinion” is the mass media, which
sometimes distort the actual distribution of opinions. This leads to a spiralling process of
silencing those who perceive themselves as unsupported, for fear of social isolation. This
group, which may at times even constitute a majority, will be less willing to stand up for
their views in public, and so abandon the arena to the other camp. Thus, “a minority
convinced in their future dominance and therefore willing to express themselves...will
most probably become the dominant opinion, which cannot be contradicted without the
risk of sanctions: it will change from a factional opinion to public opinion” (NoelleNeumann, 1974: SO).
If audiences are active and skeptical toward the media, we should examine how they
react to the mediated opinion climate. Do they resist the media’s presentation of the
climate of opinion and read it “oppositionally”? Do they confront polls and other media
reports with knowledge gathered from their social environment? Given the possibility of
resistance, attitudes towards the media should be studied as a crucial intervening variable
in studies of poll effects.
190

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Indeed, Noelle-Neumann argued that the “observation of the environment has two
sources; public opinion is nourished from two springs: the individual undertakes direct
observation in his own environment, and receives information about the environment
from the mass media” (1984:155). But her conceptions of “powerful media” have
somehow worked to turn the spotlight away from audience activity and closer to media
influence. Neither Noelle-Neumann nor many of her followers, who study the effects of
election polls on public opinion, control for audience skepticism and mistrust of the
media’s portrayals of the climate of opinion. This is an interesting paradox, since NoelleNeumann herself is highly skeptical of the mass media.
A review of the literature suggests that empirical evidence supporting the spiral of
silence theory is lacking. “Noelle-Neumann’s theory, it is safe to say, has met with less
than empirical support” (Price & Allen, 1990:371). In fact, the theory consists of a set of
at least three main hypotheses, two of which were hardly tested:

1. “Media cultivation of climate of opinion” hypothesis: The media influences
audiences’ perceptions of the social climate of opinion.
2. The “silence” hypothesis: When people perceive themselves to be in the
minority, they will choose to remain silent rather than expressing their views.
3. The “silence -> demobilization” hypothesis: Choosing to remain silent in fact
means abandoning the arena in favor of the other camp. Silence means fewer
attempts to persuade others, less participation, and less political efficacy.
The theory further describes a rather exact scenario in which each of these hypotheses
recurrently takes place in a spiraling manner, resulting in an opinion change in a specific
direction (the perceived minority turns into an actual minority).
Since testing the full range of the spiral of silence theory would necessitate a
complex and expensive design, most scholars have focused on one or another of its
191
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components when searching for empirical validation for the theory. While the first and
third components of the theory have been generally neglected, the “silence hypothesis”
has produced a rather impressive body of research. Some of these tests (e.g. Taylor,
1982) have found that holders of minority opinion (defined objectively or subjectively)
often seem more and not less willing to express their opinion. Others have demonstrated
that it is the fear of being isolated by specific reference groups, not the fear of some
general societal force, that influences individuals' opinion expression (Glynn & McLeod,
1985; Glynn & Park, 1997; Krassa, 1988; Oshagan, 1996; Salmon & Kline, 1985). Still
others have shown that “people’s social and demographic characteristics, the nature of
the issue under consideration, and the salience of the issue to the individual, not a general
fear of social isolation, are primary determinants of willingness to express an opinion”
(Price & Allen, 1990:373). On the other hand, however, more than a few other studies
have provided data that supports the silence hypothesis. Most of these studies originated
outside the US. In fact, a meta-analysis summarizing 35 studies (Glynn et al., 1997) has
shown a very small (r = .055 with a confidence interval from .02 to .08) yet statistically
significant relationship between the degree to which a person believes that others hold
similar opinions and the willingness to express those opinions.
Even if the silence hypothesis holds, however (and the evidence is far from
conclusive), there is much work to be done in examining the other two hypotheses. The
focus here will be on the first hypothesis, which proposes that people are influenced by
the mass media in their perception of the climate of opinion. Although a few studies have
demonstrated that the media can influence the perception of the distribution of opinion in
society (e.g. Glynn & McLeod, 1985; Mutz & Soss, 1977; Mutz, 1998), most of these
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works find interaction effects rather than simple main effects. In other words, they show
that the media are more likely to influence perception of the climate of opinion under
certain conditions rather than others. Hence, investigation of Noelle-Neumann’s strong
effects hypothesis might bring us closer to limited effects conclusions. Why should
people accept the media’s description of the climate of opinion when they do not trust the
media? Why would they be influenced by the media’s dominant opinion if they think that
journalists distort reality in their presentation of the world?
The following hypothesis can thus be formulated:
HI.2: Positive attitudes toward the media will be associated with the perception of a
climate of opinion similar to the one presented in the media, controlling for
demographic and media-related factors. On the other hand, media skeptics will be
more likely to reject the media’s climate of opinion, as compared with non-skeptical
respondents.
To sum up, the second hypothesis argues that skepticism toward the media will
moderate audiences’ acceptance of the media climate of opinion.

Study 1: NES 1996 data.
The media were unanimous in their presentation of the climate of opinion during the
presidential campaign of 1996. All polls published in the months prior to the elections
gave Clinton the lead48. In all but one or two cases49 Clinton’s lead was outside the
margin of error. In almost all cases, Clinton had what journalists often called a double
digit lead50 of between 10 and 20 points51. The media portrayed this as a “big lead”52, or a

49 See “One constant in race has been Clinton’s lead”, USA Today, November 4,1996.
49 See “Lone poll shows Clinton lead below 4 points”, Los Angeles Times, November 4,1996, p. IS.
30 E.g. “Race for control o f the house still too close to call”, USA Today, October 29,1996, p. 11A.
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“solid”53, “wide”54, “sizeable”55, or “comfortable”56 lead. As The Los Angeles Times
wrote a week before Election Day57 that voters appeared “poised to present President
Clinton with a decisive victory”. Journalists portrayed Clinton as “buoyed by polls”58,
and Dole as “trailing”59 or “far behind”60. According to journalists, Dole was “fighting a
hopeless battle”61. CNN commentator and Chicago Sun-Times journalist Robert Novak
even said that “there's just no way he [Dole] can, in my opinion, even get close to 270
electoral votes” 62.
In sum, media reports about the climate of opinion in 19% unanimously and
consistently predicted that Clinton would win the elections by a wide margin of over
10%. In this context, according to HI.2, media skepticism is expected to be associated
31 The following table provides a few examples o f such polls, published by the media:
Polling agency
Poll date Clinton Dole
Time/CNN
53%
35%
Oct 12
Time/CNN
54%
40%
Sept 6
57%
Time/CNN
Aug 9
36%
37%
ABC News/ Washington Post Sept 5
51%
47%
ABC News/ Washington Post Aug 4
31%
ABC News/ Washington Post June 23
53%
43%
New York Times/ CBS News Nov 2
33%
50%
54%
New York Times/ CBS News Oct 20
32%
New York Times/ CBS News Oct 13
53%
35%
New York Times/ CBS News Sept 4
50%
35%
New York Times/ CBS News Aug 18
49%
37%
17%
New York Times/ CBS News Aug 5
75%
54%
34%
New York Times/ CBS News June 23
Source: Polling the Nations
32 E.g. “Clinton maintains big lead; fight for congress is tight”, Los Angeles Times, October 29,1996, p. I.
53 E.g. “Good feelings carry Clinton to a solid lead”, Los Angeles Times, September 12,19% , p.l; also
CNN Early Edition, October 15,19% .
54 E.g. CBS Evening News, October 9,19% .
33ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, October 7 , 19%.
36 CNN Early Prime, November 1,19% .
S7 “Clinton maintains big lead; fight for congress is tight”, October 29,19% , p. I.
5* “Buoyed by polls, Clinton tunes out Dole”, Boston Globe, October 29,19% , p. A22.
39 CBS This Morning, August 8,19% .
60 CBS This Morning, November 4,19% ; “In an era when the polls are kings”. New York Times,
November 2,19% , p.8.
61 “Dole campaign runs on empty: Own words echo sense he’s fighting a hopeless battle”. Daily News
(New York), October 30,19% .
62 CNN Inside Politics November 4,19% .
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with a perception that Clinton would not win. Trust in the media, on the other hand, is
expected to correlate with a perception that Clinton would win the elections by a wide
margin.
Dependent variable. The perceived climate of opinion was measured using two
NES questions. First, respondents were asked who they thought would win the
presidential election. Response categories were Clinton, Dole, Perot, or “some other
candidate”. They were then asked if they thought the presidential race would be close or
whether their predicted winner would win by quite a bit. These two items were combined
into a single variable coded “5” for Clinton winning by quite a bit (the “media” answer),
“4” for Clinton winning in a close race, “3” for don’t know, “2” for either of the other
candidates (Dole, Perot, or “someone else”) winning by a close margin, and “ 1” for either
of the other candidates winning by quite a bit.

Results.
To test for HI.2, an OLS regression model was run, with the perceived climate of opinion
as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 7.1. According to this
model, the perceived climate of opinion is not a function of demographic factors. Neither
age, sex, education nor race was significantly associated with thinking that Clinton would
win the elections. Also unrelated to the perception of Clinton as winning were political
discussion and the political interest scale.
As the positive sign of the significant coefficient for the party-ideology index shows,
all other things being equal, the more liberal a respondent was, the closer he or she was to
the perception that Clinton was winning “by quite a bit”. This finding is in line with a
195
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long tradition of research about “projection”, which shows that the perception of societal
opinion is a function of one’s own opinion (Fields & Schuman, 1976; Kennamer, 1990;
Mutz, 1997). People tend to think that other people think like they do, which is why
conservatives scored lower on the climate of opinion scale (and thus tended to think that
either Dole or Perot would win), whereas liberals scored higher (and thus tended to think
that Clinton would be the winner). The negative and significant coefficient for extremity
shows, however, that in general, moderates were more likely to perceive that Clinton
would win.
The perceived climate of opinion was also significantly related to political
knowledge and to news media exposure, controlling for all other factors. The more
people followed the media and the more they learned from the media about politics, the
closer they were to the media in their perception of the climate of opinion. This is in line
with theories stressing the important role of the media in the perception of collective
opinion (e.g. Mutz, 1998). However, there was no significant association between the
perceived climate of opinion and the campaign interest scale.
The perceived climate of opinion was also not significantly associated with the
amount of political discussion. Those who talked politics more often were not more likely
to think Clinton would win, nor were they more likely to think Dole or Perot would win.
The 1996 NES survey did not contain measures about the contents of the conversations or
at least about the amount of agreement or disagreement in these political discussions. A
measure tapping the amount of conversation, as well as the direction of impressions
received in the conversation, might have produced an effect. As the spiral of silence
theory tells us, the perceived climate of opinion is influenced not only by media reports,
1%
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but also by direct environmental observation. The fact that the current measure of
conversation does not reflect the role of political conversation is probably due to the
limitations of the data.
Hypothesis HI .2 predicted that media skepticism would be associated with climate
of opinion perceptions. Those who trust the media are expected to accept the climate of
opinion reported by the media. On the other hand, media skeptics are expected to reject
the media's climate of opinion. This is exactly what the significant and negative
coefficient for media skepticism shows. The lower one’s skepticism (higher trust in the
media), the closer he or she was to perceiving, like the media, that Clinton was winning
by a large margin. On the other hand, higher skepticism was associated with a perception
that Clinton would not win: This association holds even when controlling for political
ideology and extremity, knowledge, campaign interest, political discussion, media
exposure and demographics. Thus, the fact that media skeptics were less likely to think
that Clinton would win is not merely a product of the fact that they tended to be
conservatives, or of their higher political involvement. Those who trusted the media
accepted the media’s prophecies regarding the winner of the election and their portrayal
of the collective opinion. Those who did not trust the media, whom I call media skeptics,
rejected these prophecies and thought that Dole was more likely to win.
One might argue that the use of OLS in the model reported in Table 7.1 is at least
somewhat problematic since the dependent variable is ordinal and is far from being
normally distributed. For this reason, I tested a similar model on the same date, but this
time using logistic regression. The dependent variable was coded “ 1” for perceiving that
Clinton would win, and “0” for perceiving that Dole, Perot or some other candidate
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would win. The model replicated the findings reported in table 7.1 in terms of the signs of
the coefficients and results of hypothesis testing. Most important, media skepticism was
again negatively and significantly associated with climate of opinion perceptions (b=-.44;
se=. 11; pc.001; eb=.64). Each one unit increase on the skepticism scale was associated
with a 36 percent decrease in the odds of perceiving Clinton as the would-be winner. To
get a sense of the strength of the effect of media skepticism I calculated a few predicted
probabilities. The probability of perceiving that Clinton would be the winner for a
moderate white male with average values on age, education and the political covariates
was .76 if the man had a score of “ 1” on the skepticism scale (trust the media “just about
always”). A similar person demographically and ideologically, but this time with a score
of “S” on the skepticism scale (trust the media “none of the time”) had a predicted
probability of .36. The predicted probability was .57 for another person with the same
values on all covariates but a skepticism score of “3”. Thus, the effect of media
skepticism on the likelihood of agreeing with the media about the perceived winner is not
a minor one. It could substantially alter the perception of the climate of opinion.

Study 2: The electronic dialogue data.
In the months prior to the 2000 presidential elections, the media climate of opinion was
much less clear than it was in 19%. Throughout the campaign, the gap between A1 Gore
and George W. Bush was much smaller than the gap between Bill Clinton and Bob Dole
in the prior presidential contest In fact this gap was sometimes within the margin of
error, implying a statistical tie. In addition to the closer margin, the 2000 race was also
much less stable than in 19%, with Gore leading over Bush some of the time and Bush
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leading on other occasions. One more factor that contributed to the relative vagueness of
the media climate of opinion was the fact that, at least at some points in time, different
media outlets reported different poll results that were inconsistent in their projected
winner.
The electronic dialogue project measured the perceived climate of opinion at two
points in time: in the pre-discussion 4 survey, administered in late July and early
October63, and in the pre-discussion 6 survey completed in late September64. Luckily or
not, the media answer to the would-be winner question was different at each of these
points in time.
In late July and early August, when the pre-discussion 4 survey was in the field,
Bush had a lead of 2 to 12 percent. Some outlets and media commentators reported that
Bush had “surged” in the polls65. For example, Fox News emphasized that all polls were
showing that Bush was ahead, “some of them outside of the margin of error, some of
them even topping over 50 percent’166. USA Today reported that Bush “heads to the
Republican National Convention next week with a comfortable lead and a clear
advantage over his opponent”67. The Baltimore Sun reported that “if polls are accurate,
(Bush) is running well ahead of his Democratic opponent, Vice President A1 Gore1168.

63 The survey was in the field July 28 through August 6,2000.
64 The survey was in the field September 22 through October 2.
63 CNN Today, July 28,2000.
“ The OTeilly Factor, July 31,2000.
67 Page, Susan, “Good news, bad news for the Texas governor Bush going to GOP convention with a
comfortable lead,” USA Today, July 28,2000, p. I2A.
MJack W. Germond, “Bush hopes speech tonight will erase doubt, avoid gafTe”, The Baltimore Sun,
August 3,2000, p. I7A.
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Others reported that Bush was in “close race with Gore”69 or that the race was “neck
and neck”70. The Miami Herald reported that Bush “has strengthened his position with
moderate and independent voters but still has not persuaded Americans tom between him
and Democratic opponent A1 Gore”71. These reports all emphasize the closeness and
fragility of Bush’s lead. Still others, like ABC’s George Watson, reported that:
While reading tealeaves might do just as well, I've been consulting all the
opinion polls to determine who's on first in the presidential contest. And the
winner is too close to call. It's true that George Bush enjoys an edge ranging
from two percent in the Gallup Poll to three percent in the ABC News polls to
six percent in the New York Times survey of voters. But Bush’s lead is
statistically insignificant, within the margin of error that pollsters calculate for
their arcane sampling techniques72.

In sum, at the time the pre-discussion 4 survey was in the field, Bush had a small
lead in the polls that varied in its statistical significance and journalistic interpretation,
depending on time, media outlet, and the caution taken by reporters and commentators.
All polls, however, showed that Bush had some edge, and most commentary referred to
him as having the lead.
The situation in late September, when respondents completed the September wave,
was reversed. By then, according to some journalists, Bush’s “lead in the polls had
vanished”73. This time the media reported that “Gore has a slim electoral edge”74. Most

w NPR, Weekend Edition, Saturday, July 29,2000.
70 ABC World News Now, July 25,2000.
71 Ronald Brownstein, “Bush performance propels campaign”, The Miami Herald, August 5,2000, p. 1.
72 World News Now, July 27,2000.
71 E.g., James Dao, “Bush is pointing to the cloud in the silver lining”, The New York Times, September
27,2000, p. A19.
74 Paul West, “Contest volatile as debates approach” The Baltimore Sun, October 1,2000.
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media in late September reported that Gore was leading Bush by two to eight points75. In
addition, most state-by-state analyses found, at that point, that Gore was winning the
Electoral College. For example, Fox News reported that “Vice President Gore is leading
Governor Bush in the electoral votes” and that “right now we see Gore leading in states
with 213 electoral votes”76. Bush was portrayed, at least by some journalists, as being
“behind in polls”77. CNN reported that Gore made gains in polls, and “widened his lead
over George W. Bush”78.
Other journalists, however, pointed out that although Gore had a lead in the polls,
Bush had managed to reduce the boost Gore got from the Democratic convention in
August79. Some polls, increasingly in late September and in early October, actually
showed Bush leading by a small margin.80 Much commentary talked about
methodological difficulties and complications that caused the inconsistencies among
pollsters81 and doubted whether it was at all possible to get any valid prediction in such a
close race82. Reporters often used phrases like “a statistical dead heat”83, “Very close,
very close. Absolutely tied”84, a “very tight race”85, “too close to call”86, and so on, in
their interpretations of the campaign.

75 E.g., a poll reported in CNN's Early Edition in September gave Gore a 49*41 lead.
76 Fox News Network, The Creilly Factor, September 20,2000.
77 CNN Ahead O f The Curve, September 18,2000.
71 CNN Morning News, September 22,2000.
79 E.g., Jeanne Cummings, “Bush enjoys a small bounce in polls while Gore hews to health-care issues",
Wall Street Journal, September 26,2000, p. A28.
10 NBC Today Show, September 28,2000.
11 Dick Polman, “Up, down and tied: The often conflicting polls”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, September 27,
2000, p. I.
° Janet Elder, "The polls: Despite ups and downs, surveys show race is tied”. The New York Times,
September 28,2000, p. A22.
° E.g., NBC News Today Show, September 29,2000.
MEditor-in-chief o f the Gallup Organization, Frank Newport. Fox, The Edge With Paula Zahn. September
28,2000.
“ ABC World News Now, September 28,2000.
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In sum, in late August Bush had a small lead over Gore, while in late September the
situation was reversed, with Gore leading over Bush. Figure 7.1 presents graphs
summarizing tracking polls that reflect this image. Both graphs show a Bush lead in July
and a Gore lead in September. So if HI.2 holds, media skepticism should be associated
with a decreased likelihood of perceiving in late July that Bush would win, and with a
decreased likelihood of perceiving in late September that Gore would win.
Dependent variables. Respondents were asked: “Regardless of who you support,
who do you think will end up being elected President in November?” Response
categories were Gore, Bush and “someone else”. Both variables were coded so that “ 1”
would represent the media answer (Bush for pre-discussion 4 and Gore for pre-discussion
6), and “0” the other two answers. While 66.9 percent gave the media answer in the pre
discussion 4 survey (i.e., said Bush would win), only S5.1 percent gave the media answer
in the pre-discussion 6 survey (i.e., reported thinking Gore would win).
Results.
Table 7.2 tests hypothesis HI .2 on the EDialogue data. The table presents two logistic
regression models predicting the perceived climate of opinion. The dependent variable in
Model 1 is the pre-discussion 4 climate of opinion, and in Model 2, the pre-discussion 6
climate of opinion. Both variables were set up so that the media climate of opinion (Bush
in July and Gore in September) was coded “ 1” and all other answers were coded “0”.
As in the NES data, the perceived climate of opinion was generally not a function of
demographics. In both Model 1 and Model 2 there was no significant effect of sex, race

16 E.g., CBS, The Early Show, September 27,2000; William Schneider, CNN Senior Political Analyst,
CNN Inside Politics, September 27,2000.
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or age on the perceived climate of opinion. Unlike in Study 1, however, education had a
borderline significant effect. In both models, a higher educational level was associated
with a perception that Bush would win the elections.
As in the NES data, projection played a major role in climate of opinion perceptions.
All other things being equal, political ideology was negatively associated with climate of
opinion in pre-discussion 4, and positively associated with it in pre-discussion 6. Since
the coding of the dependent variable is flipped (because the media climate of opinion
changed between the pre-4 and pre-6 surveys), the signs of the coefficients for ideology
in Models 1 and 2 are also reversed. The negative and highly significant coefficient in
Model 1 means that as one became more conservative, his or her odds of projecting that
Bush would win went up. The positive coefficient in Model 2 means that as one became
more liberal, the odds increased that he or she would predict that Gore would win. In
sum, people’s prediction of the winner was heavily influenced by their own political
leanings, both in late July and in late September. Political extremity, however, was
unrelated to climate of opinion perceptions in both models.
Unlike in the NES data, the Electronic Dialogue surveys did not show significant
effects of any of the involvement variables, after controlling for demographic factors,
political ideology and media skepticism. There is no evidence that either political
knowledge, political interest, political discussion or news exposure was associated with
the perceived climate of opinion. In some cases (especially the effect of news exposure in
Model 1), the coefficients approached statistical significance. The direction of the signs
of the coefficients for knowledge and news exposure were in the expected direction:
more knowledge and news exposure were associated with giving the media answer to the
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“who would win” question. Political discussion tended to be negatively related to the
perception that Bush was leading in July and that Gore was leading in September. Interest
in politics tended to be associated with a perception that Gore would win. Again, none of
these associations was significant.
Hypothesis HI.2 predicted that media skepticism would be associated with
individual perceptions of the winner. Those who trust the media are expected, according
to HI.2, to be more likely than media skeptics to give the media answer to the would-be
winner question. Contrary to HI.2, skepticism was not associated with the perceived
climate of opinion in Model 1. Moreover, the positive sign of the insignificant coefficient
was not the one expected by HI.2 (the positive sign implying that media skeptics tended
to think, like the media, that Bush would win). In other words, the July survey does not
support HI.2.
However, HI .2 did get support from the late-September pre-discussion 6 survey. The
negative and significant coefficient for media skepticism in Model 2 means that as media
skepticism became lower (i.e., as trust in the media increased), people were more likely
to predict, like the media, that Gore would win. As skepticism increased, people were
more likely to report that Bush would win. Each one-unit increase in the media
skepticism scale was associated with a 71% (100*(l-.eb)) decrease in the odds of saying
that Gore would win.
If media skepticism influences people to reject the media climate of opinion, then it
should also influence the way the perceived climate of opinion changes as a result of
changes in media reports. Spiral of silence theory, and other theories stressing the
importance of news in personal assessments of collective opinion, imply that when the
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media changes their reports and alter their assessments of the election winner, audiences
will follow. Thus, if the media said in July that Bush was leading, but later polls changed
and started to report that Gore was winning, audiences would be likely to follow the
media and alter their perceptions of the winner from Bush to Gore. However, HI .2
predicts that only trustful audiences would be influenced by the media. Media skeptics
are expected to remain more stable in their perceptions and be less swayed by the media
over time.
Table 7.3 presents a logistic regression model that predicts consistent “media
answers” to the questions about the winner of the elections. In other words, those who,
like the media, said in late July that Bush would win, and then changed their perception
to report in late September that Gore would win, were given a value of “1”. These people
comprised 25 percent of all respondents who completed both surveys. All other
respondents, mostly people who consistently said that either Bush or Gore was winning,
were coded “0” (only 4 percent of respondents who completed both surveys said that
Gore would win in July and Bush would win in September). This is the dependent
variable in Table 7.3.
As the negative and significant coefficient for the media skepticism scale shows,
skeptical respondents had lower odds of consistently giving the media answer (i.e.,
saying in July that Bush would win and in September that Gore would win). Controlling
for ideology, political knowledge, involvement, discussion and demographics, a one-unit
increase on the skepticism scale was associated with a 74 percent decrease in the odds of
consistently giving the media answer to the would-be winner question. In order to assess
the strength of this effect, I again calculated the predicted probabilities for a 42-year-old
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moderate white male with average values on the knowledge, interest and exposure scale.
The predicted probability of such a person with a maximum value on the skepticism scale
(1) was .17. The predicted probability of such a person with the minimum value on the
skepticism scale (0) was .45. The predicted value for such a person with an average value
on media skepticism was .28. Thus, the effect of media skepticism on climate of opinion
perceptions is again not a minor one. In fact, skepticism, moderateness and sex were the
only significant predictors of consistently answering the media answer to the perceived
climate of opinion question. The rest of the variables, including political ideology and all
the involvement variables, did not significantly predict the dependent variable in Table
7.3.

Discussion.
The models reported in this chapter show the major role of projection in climate of
opinion perceptions. When people were asked to name which candidate they thought
would win the election, they tended to be influenced by their own preferences. Liberals
tended to think that Clinton would win in 1996 and that Gore would win in 2000, and
conservatives tended to think that Dole would win in 1996 and that Bush would win in
2000. People tend to perceive that other people share their opinions, sometimes more
than they really do.
Involvement variables (such as knowledge and media exposure) were associated
with a perception that Clinton was winning in 1996, but they were not associated with the
perception of the climate of opinion in 2000. The reason for this difference might be the
smaller sample size in the Electronic Dialogue project, and the relatively high
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involvement levels of its dedicated participants in this data set. According to theory, we
expect people who watch the media and follow politics to be citing the media answer to
the would-be-winner question more often. In this respect, the statistical models I
presented in this chapter do not offer full support to the spiral-of-silence claim that the
media influence audience perceptions of the climate of opinion. Nonetheless, at three
different points in time respondents at large, regardless of their level of knowledge and
media exposure, tended to give the media answer when asked about their own perception
of the winner. A majority of respondents in 1996 said that Clinton would win, a majority
in July 2000 said that Bush would win, and a majority in September 2000 said that Gore
would win.
Noelle-Neumann might interpret this as evidence to her theory of powerful media.
But over and above the effects of ideology and projection, and over and above any
inconsistent effect of exposure and knowledge, media skepticism was negatively and
significantly associated with the perceived climate of opinion in two of the three models.
When people did not trust the media, they tended to reject the mediated climate of
opinion, even after controlling for their own opinions. On the other hand, when people
had faith in the media, they tended to accept their election predictions and assessments as
truthful.
I believe the best evidence for my hypothesis came when I tried to predict who
consistently thinks like the media. The media said in July that Bush was leading and in
September that Gore was leading. 25 percent of respondents accepted these media
projections and reported the same patterns in the July and September surveys. Most other
respondents consistently thought that either Gore or Bush would win. Media skepticism
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was negatively and significantly associated with consistent acceptance of the media’s
projections. This was the case even though the mediated climate of opinion was not clear
and the gap between the candidates was minor at best. Despite all this, media skepticism
was the only significant predictor, except sex, of assessing in July that Bush would win
and in September that Gore would win.
To sum up, I believe this chapter presents at least some evidence supporting my
hypothesis that media skepticism moderate the perception of the climate of opinion. Still,
one finding - the positive and insignificant coefficient for the effect of skepticism on
projected winner in July 2000 - is inconsistent with the other findings in the chapter. The
reason for this inconsistency is unclear. One possibility is that the hypothesized
association only works when the Democratic candidate is leading in the mediated opinion
climate. That is, that the ideology of the projected winner (and not only of audience
members) is intervening in the process. Due to well-developed notions and stereotypes of
“liberal media biases”, audience skepticism might only be operating when media texts are
potentially liberally slanted. In other words, skeptics might not have rejected the mediate
opinion climate in July because, in this case, it favored the Republicans. “If the media are
actually saying a Republican candidate has the lead”, a skeptic might have thought, “then
they are actually doing a fair job in this instance”. On the other hand, suspicion and
skepticism may have played a role in September, because this time the media’s projection
favored the Democrats.
This is only one possibility to account for the inconsistency of the results. Other
explanations, more plausible in my opinion, include the fact that the media presentation
was vague and unclear, changed from one media outlet to another, and perhaps even
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changed while the survey was in the field. In addition, one could argue that the
ideological controls were not strong enough. The tendency of skeptical audiences in July
to think that Bush would win might only be an artifact of their political views (that is,
skeptics thought that Bush was winning due to projection of their conservative biases).
The control for ideology should have eliminated or reduced this problem. However, if
this control does not capture ideology accurately, then the estimate of the effect of
skepticism on personal predictions of the winner could be biased due to measurement
error. All of these issues offer potential explanations. I found none of them comforting,
since all point out potential study artifacts. This chapter only reported three effects, at
different points in time, of skepticism on the projected estimation of the winner. More
research would have to report estimates for this association from other studies gathered in
other contexts. Meta-analysis would have to be used in order to leam about the average
effect of skepticism on personal projection of the winner.
We should not be too bothered with the inconsistent pre-discussion 4 finding simply
because it is a null finding. The possibility that the coefficient is actually negative (as it
should be according to HI .2) cannot be rejected. The confidence interval for the
coefficient of the effect of skepticism on pre-discussion 4 personal prediction of the
winner was -.70 to 1.50. Hence, statistically, the estimate could also be negative. The null
finding, though clearly not supporting my hypotheses, simply says that we cannot tell if
skepticism affected opinion climate perception in late July-early August 2000, or in what
ways it may have done so.
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Figure 7.1: CBS and ABC tricking poll results
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Table 7.1: OLS model predicting the w icihw d climate of opinion (5»Clinton will win by
quite a bit: 1»Dole or Parot will win by quit* a bit); NES 1996 Data.
Media skepticism
Sex (male=1)
Race (white=1)
Years of education
Age
Party-ideology index
(-5=extreme conservative/strong
Republican; +5=extreme liberal/strong
Democrat)
Political extremity
Political interest
(0=low - 5=high)
Political knowledge
(0=low - 4=high)
Political discussion
(days in the past week)
News exposure
(mean days in past week)
R2
N
Notes: * p<.05; ** p<.01; — p<.001

B (s.e.)
-.08*
(03)

P

-.06

.07
(.05)
.03
(.07)
.01
(.01)
.00
.00

.04

.08***
(00)

.25

-.04**
(.01)
-.02
(02)
.13*“
(02)
-.06
(01)

-.07

.or

.01
.04
.00

-.04
.14
-.01
.07

(.01)
.10***
1,465
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Table 7.2: Logistic war— km m odtli predicting th> pwerivid climate of opinion in July
and September 2000 <1»nwdla climate of opinion): ED2K Data.
Model 1: Pre-discussion 4 data
(1=Bush would win; 0=Gore or
someone else would)
Media skepticism
Sex (males'!)
Race (white=1)
Years of education
Age
Political ideology
(5= extreme liberal;
-5=extreme
conservative)
Political extremity
Political interest
(1=low-4=high)
Political knowledge
(0=low- 1=high)
Political discussion
(days in the past
week)
News exposure
(mean days in past
week)

B (s.e.)
.40
(56)

e
1.49

B (s.e.)
-1.22*
(57)

e
29

-.05
(20)
.31
(28)
.10'
(05)
-.01
(00)

.94

-.27
(21)
.47
(32)
-.09
(06)
-.00
(00)

.76

1.36
1.11
.98

.90
.99

.68

.31—
(03)

1.37

.05
(06)
-.16
(13)
.49
(.46)
-.05
(10)

1.05

-.10
(07)
.12
(.14)
.33
(48)
-.06
(.10)

.90

.85
1.64
.96
1.13

Intercept
-.91
R2
.32
N
623
Notes: * p<.10; * p<05; ** p<.01; *** p< 001
__ -

1.60

-.37—
(03)

.11
(07)

M

Model 2: Pre-discussion 6 data
(1=Gore would win; 0=Bush or
someone else would)

. A A A __ -

.01
(08)

1.12
1.40
.93
1.01

2.05
.30
509

A A 4
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Tibto 7.3: Logistic war—sion m odth predicting consistent adoption of the media climate
of opinion <1»thinkino in Julv that Bush would win and in August that Gore would win);
ED2K Data.
Media skepticism
Sex(male=1)
Race (white=1)
Years of education
Age
Political ideology
(5= extreme liberal;
•5 ^extreme conservative)
Political extremity
Political interest
(1=low -4=high)
Political knowledge
(O=low- 1=high)
Political discussion
(days in the past week)
News exposure
(mean days in past week)
Intercept
R2
N
Notes: * p<.05; ** p<.01; — p<.001

B (s.e.)
-1.34*
(-58)
-.42*
(21)
-.00
(33)
.01
(06)
-.00
(00)

"

e
.26
.65
.99
1.01
.99

-.00
(03)

.99

-.17*
(06)
-.03
(14)
.65
(71)
-.11
(11)
.04
(08)

.84
.96
1.92
1.04
.88

.16
.06
501
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Chapter 8: Media skepticism and cultivation effects.

Cultivation theory was introduced by George Gerbner (Gerbner, 1973; Gerbner & Gross,
1976; Gerbner et al., 1977) more than two decades ago. Since then, it has become one of
the most influential theories about the effects of mass media on society. Briefly, it states
that television has the ability to influence viewers’ peiteptions of social reality.
Television is seen as a powerful and centralized agent of socialization that tells “most of
the stories to most of the people most of the time” (see Gerbner et al., 1980). It is
perceived to have a univocal, recurrent, stable and unambiguous system of messages. A
quantitative large-scale television content analysis, designed to trace this system of
messages, shows that the world of television is very different than the real world. The
cultivation hypothesis states that television viewers, who spend many hours a day (most
of their time) with TV’s distorted, highly stylized, stereotyped, and repetitive messages,
will tend to adopt its dominant depictions of “the world outside”. In Gerbner’s words
(1990, p. 249), “cultivation means the specific independent (though not isolated)
contribution that a particularly consistent and compelling symbolic stream makes to the
process of socialization and enculturation”.
But what happens if people do not trust television? What happens when people are
skeptical of television’s skewed presentation of reality? Cultivation scholars, who depict
audiences as the passive and helpless victims of televised reality, may be ignoring the
active part played by audiences in the communication process. Do people have the ability
to resist the mediated reality? Does cultivation work differently on those who trust the
214
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media, compared to those who do not? In other words, does media skepticism moderate
cultivation effects? This is yet another aspect of my “media skepticism as an intervening
factor in media effects” hypothesis.
“In its simplest form, cultivation analysis tries to ascertain if those who spend more
time watching television are more likely to perceive the real world in ways that reflect the
most common and repetitive messages and lessons of the television world, compared
with people who watch less television” (Morgan & Signorielli, 1990, p. 17). This strategy
has yielded results indicating that perceptions of heavy-viewers are closer to televised
reality than those of light-viewers. This was the case with regard to assessments of realworld statistics and facts (“first order cultivation”) as well as to the transformation and
extrapolation of these assessments into broader values, beliefs and ideologies (“second
order cultivation” see Hawkings & Pingree, 1990). For example, heavy-viewers did not
exaggerate only the number of cops or crimes; they also tended to perceive the world as a
mean and frightening place. Cultivation research found alienation fear, anomie and
interpersonal mistrust among heavy TV viewers. The researchers concluded that heavy
exposure to TV influences not only viewers’ knowledge of real-world statistics, but also
the way in which they think about the world they live in, their apprehensions, and their
faith and trust in others.
Thus, cultivation theory’s most famous finding is that “the hegemonic message of
the media is the call for law and order in a dangerous world” (Katz, 1987, p. S32) and
that atomized heavy-viewers adopt this message and “lock themselves in for fear of going
out” (p. S32). But other second order extrapolations from televised content patterns by
heavy-viewers also emerge from the research. According to cultivation scholars, since
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women are grossly underrepresented and stereotyped in the televised world, heavyviewers tend to adopt more stereotypical gender roles than light-viewers (Morgan, 1982).
Also, since “television seeks large and heterogeneous audiences...[and hence to] steer a
middle course along the supposedly nonideological mainstream...heavy-viewers are
significantly and substantially more likely to label themselves as being ‘moderate’ rather
than either ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’” (Gerbner et al., 1994, p. 29). Cultivation effects
were also found in other domains (e.g. attitudes towards the elderly, perceptions of racial
tensions), in other countries and cultural contexts, and also in experimental designs (for a
more detailed review see Morgan and Shanahan, 1997; Rubin et al., 1988). Morgan and
Shanahan (1997) recently performed a meta-analysis of 82 published cultivation studies
that contained a total of 5,633 different findings. Though their analysis yielded only a
relatively modest cultivation effect (average effect size .09), they claim that this effect,
though not large in magnitude, should not be treated as trivial.
Very relevant to the present research is the fact that cultivation effects were found in
the context of news watching, not just for television watching in general. Many of the
discrepancies Gerbner and his colleagues found between the real world and the televised
world could be found when comparing the world of news to the real world. The reason
for this is, of course, that news highlights dramatic and deviant events at the expense of
more boring but nonetheless prevalent stories. Violence, for example, is a major theme in
TV news as well as fiction (Lichter & Lichter, 1997).
As Jamieson and Slovic (1997) point out, the realism of the news genre, as compared
to drama, facilitates cultivation; news is therefore expected to have a greater cultivation
effect than fiction:
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It is reasonable to believe that whatever the effects of prime time drama,
they are inhibited at least somewhat by our awareness of their fictional
nature. It is plausible as well that whatever the effects of crime reports, they
are magnified by our awareness that palpable individuals with personal
identities are the victims and alleged perpetrators, (p.4)
And indeed, Jamieson and Slovic present data from three sources that support the
news cultivation of crime risk perceptions hypothesis. In each source they find
associations between perceptions of risk of crime and news watching (national, and
especially local news). They show that fear of crime is associated with news watching
even when controlling for neighborhood or metropolitan area crime statistics. That is,
news reports of crime affect fear of crime independently of actual crime rates (for similar
evidence see Fishman, 1980; Liska & Baccaglini, 1990; Mutz, 1998). Jamieson and
Slovic interpret their findings about news watching as “particularly consistent with
cultivation theory” (p. 36).
The evidence for news cultivation has recently received some indirect support from
research arguing that cultivation is, in fact, an artifact of “source confusion” (Mares,
1996). People are cultivated by fiction, according to Mares’ findings, because they
confuse it with news. If this is indeed the case, then it is clear that news has the ability to
influence audiences’ perceptions of social realities.
In sum, some research finds that news, and not only televised fiction, has the ability
to cultivate perceptions of the world in its audiences. This research suggests that the more
you watch news, the more you believe the violent world of news prevails in the real
world. In this chapter I wish to find whether people accept the picture of the world
presented by news, even when they do not trust the news media.
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Criticisms of cultivation. The criticisms of cultivation theory are many. Due to
space limitations, I will mention only the main ones (see Weimann, 2000 for a detailed
review). It has been argued that many of the findings regarding the outcome measures
can be explained by other variables not included in the analysis (Hughes, 1980); that
there is a possibility that reverse causation (some underlying personality disposition)
causes the heavy viewing (see Wober, 1986); that audience selectivity (Rubin & Perse,
1987) could account for cultivation findings; and that the effects might be genre-specific
(Gunther, 1994). Many concerns have been raised about measurement issues (e.g. claims
about response bias; see Rubin et al., 1988). The theory has also been attacked for
treating the diverse spectrum of televised texts as a single monopolistic mainstream, and
for neglecting the possibility that audiences might have divergent interpretations of
televised texts (Newcomb, 1978). The most problematic early concerns had to do with
the fact that after controlling for a few demographics, some of the effects became very
small in size87.
In response to these early criticisms, cultivation researchers have made some
elaborations and corrections to their theory (Gerbner et al., 1980), most notably by
introducing the concepts of “mainstreaming” and “resonance”. Mainstreaming is the way
in which television viewing interacts with other, usually demographic, variables in its
impact on the outcome measures. “Mainstreaming means that television viewing may
absorb or override differences in perspectives or behaviors that stem from other social,
cultural, and demographic influence” (Gerbner et al., 1994, p. 31). Resonance is another
17 An additional early concern was that cultivation’s finding were not replicated in Great Britain (in a study
by Wober). But it later became dear that Wober’s study strengthened cultivation findings, since British
audiences watched much less violence than their American counterparts and hence were much less prone to
cultivation effects.
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form of interaction between TV viewing and demographic variables, “which implies that
special circumstances of life can make TV’s message highly salient for certain groups. In
these cases, there is a congruence between people’s everyday realities and TV messages,
which results in booming and amplifying TV’s impact” (Gerbner et al., 1980, p. 10).
Thus, contemporary conceptualization of the cultivation hypothesis involves a complex
and dynamic process, rather than a straightforward one. Despite the usefulness of
mainstreaming and resonance to their theory, Gerbner and his colleagues insist that some
“across-the-board” effects still exist, and that these offer the most compelling evidence of
television’s contribution to conceptions of social reality (see Gerbner et al., 1997).
There is some literature that suggests that hypothesizing about the moderating role of
media skepticism in cultivation makes sense. For example, it was found that correlations
between amount of viewing and social reality beliefs occurred for those who believed
television to be an accurate representation of real life, but not for those skeptical towards
television’s presentations (Potter, 1986). Research findings regarding the role of
audiences’ “believability” or “perceived realism” (Chen, 1991; Perse, 1986; Rubin et al.,
1988; Slater & Elliott, 1982) provide similar results: the cultivation hypothesis works
when people trust what they see on TV to be real, but does not work when audiences
have doubts about the realism of television contents. It is thus worth examining whether
media skepticism intervenes in news cultivation processes.
The possible strategies to examine the different cultivation hypotheses are diverse.
First, cultivation could occur “across the board”. This means that television exposure
should be associated with the outcome measure in the general population. As Gerbner
noted, if such effects are found, they present the most compelling evidence for
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cultivation. The cultivation hypothesis predicts that those who watch heavy doses of
television will view the world as dangerous and mean place, compared to those who
watch only limited amounts of television. If we expect media skepticism to moderate the
“across-the-board” cultivation process, we could formulate the following hypothesis:
H IJa : Media skepticism will interact with television exposure in its effect on
“social mistrust” perceptions. The effect of TV viewing on “social mistrust”
perceptions will be weaker for those skeptical toward television than for non
skeptics.
As discussed above, according to cultivation theory, television exposure is expected
to be associated not only with perceptions of the world as mean and dangerous, but also
with other outcome measures. The data at hand contain two such possible outcomes of
television watching: political beliefs and gender-related beliefs. As noted earlier,
according to cultivation theory, since females are symbolically annihilated and grossly
stereotyped in television, “most heavy-viewers absorb the implicit assumptions that
women have more limited abilities and interests than males” (Gerbner et al., 1994, p. 28).
Moreover, since (due to the economy of the entertainment industry) television supposedly
presents a politically “balanced,” middle-of-the-road point of view, cultivation theory
expects heavy television viewing to cultivate less ideologically-committed political
positions. But, since attitudes toward the press are hypothesized to moderate the process,
media skepticism is expected to interact with television viewing in the following ways:
HIJb: The effect of TV viewing on perceptions of women as having more limited
capacities than men will be weaker for those skeptical toward television than for
those not skeptical toward television.
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H U c: The effect of TV viewing on political “moderateness” will be weaker for
those skeptical toward television than for those not skeptical toward television.
As noted in the cultivation literature, “across-the-board” effects are often hard to
find. An alternative strategy has been to look for effects within specific groups.
According to the mainstreaming and resonance hypotheses, television viewing is
expected to interact with other demographic variables in their effect on the outcome
measures. Since I believe that media skepticism will interfere with the cultivation
process, I expect a three-way interaction (TV-viewing * demographic variable * media
skepticism). Among non-skeptical respondents, heavy-viewers from diverse social
backgrounds should be either closer to (mainstreaming) or more remote from (resonance)
light-viewers in the outcome measure. However, if media skepticism indeed moderates
such processes, there should be no such complex relationship among skeptical
respondents. Hence,
H IJd : There will be a three-way interaction between television-viewing, media
skepticism and demographic factors in their effect on the outcome measure. Whereas
non-skeptical viewers are expected to be “mainstreamed”, skeptical and heavy
television viewers are expected to remain unaffected by TV’s mainstream.
This hypothesis will be operationalized using education, race and gender as the
interacting demographic variables. Mainstreaming predicts that both educated and
uneducated, and white and non-white, heavy-viewers will be closer in their perceptions of
the world as mean, in their gender positions, and in their level of political moderateness
than their light- viewing counterparts. Since skepticism toward television should
moderate this process, I expect those who trust the media to be mainstreamed compared
to media-skeptics, who should remain unaffected by the media’s mainstreaming
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messages. Hypotheses hi.3d.A, hl.3d.B, hl.3d.C, hl.3d.D, hl.3d.E and hl.3d.F are
variations of this hypothesis using the three outcome measures and the two interacting
demographic variables.
Independent variables: News exposure vs. general TV exposure. Cultivation
research deals mainly with exposure to televised fiction. My dissertation deals with
attitudes toward news and news producers. Thus, when testing hypotheses HI .3a through
HI.3d I plan to utilize not only measures of TV exposure in general, but also measures of
exposure to TV news. As I mentioned earlier, TV news, as well as fiction, conveys the
message of a scary and violent world. The same discrepancies that Gerbner and his
colleges found between the real world and the televised world can be found when
comparing the world of news and the world of reality. Thus high doses of news also
cultivate social mistrust. However, if media skepticism moderates the cultivation process,
this association should exist for trustful audiences, but not for skeptical ones. Thus, the
cultivation hypotheses will be examined with two kinds of measures of exposure to the
media. Study 1 uses GSS data, which measures general exposure, and the other studies
use other data sets, with measures of exposure to news in particular.

Study 1: GSS data: General television exposure.
In this section, I test the hypotheses using exposure to TV in general as the main
independent variable. The NORC General Social Survey Data contain such a general
exposure measure, as well as measures of confidence in television and a few cultivation
outcome variables. GSS data were the basis for much research in cultivation, (e.g.,
Signorielli, 1990). A cumulative file containing all respondents who answered the
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exposure, confidence in television and outcome measures items in the years 1972-1996
was created88. The total N for the file was 35,285. However, since not all the questions
were asked in all years, the actual Ns were considerably lower and depended on the
specific variables under investigation in the specific models.

Measures.
Outcome Measures.
Social mistrust (Gerbner’s Mean World Index). GSS respondents were asked if
they thought “most people would try to take advantage of them or would try to be fair”, if
they would say that “most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing
with people” (TRUST), and if they would say that “most of the time people try to be
helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves” (HELP). This mistrust
scale was labeled by Gerbner and his colleagues the “Mean World Index” (MWI), and
has been validated and checked for reliability many times in the past (see Rubin et al.,
1994, pp. 154-5). For the cumulative GSS file, Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was
.66. The three items were coded so that the mistrustful option would have a value of “2”,
the reversed option a value of “0”, and “not sure” a value of “1”. These were then
summed, creating an index varying between 0 and 6, with a mean of 2.86 and a standard
deviation of 2.24.
Gender positions. Respondents were also asked whether they agreed or disagreed
that “most men are more emotionally suited for politics than most women”, that “women

" The rationale for the use o f the cumulative, thus huge, GSS file is simple. Cultivation is expected to be a
very small effect, according to meta-analysis (Morgan & Shanahan, 1997). To detect such a small effect
one needs considerable statistical power. Hence, the larger the sample, the better.
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should take care of running their home and leave running the country to men”, whether
they thought a woman should or should not work “if she has a husband capable of
BQ

supporting her”, and whether they would vote for a female candidate for president . All
items were coded so that a negative attitude toward females (“the television answer”,
according to cultivation scholars; e.g., Morgan, 1982) would have a value of “2”, a
positive attitude would have a value of “0”, and a neutral/uncertain attitude, a value of
“ 1”. Reliability for the scale was .66. The scale was the mean of the four items multiplied
by 4. It ranged between 0 and 8, with a mean of 2.0 and a standard deviation of 2.37. The
distribution of this variable was highly skewed toward higher values (more egalitarian
positions, right skew; skewness=.99; se=.01), with about 50 percent of cases having a
value of “0” (endorsing the most egalitarian position toward women).
Political “moderateness”. The GSS surveys contained an item asking respondents
to rank themselves on a “liberal-conservative” scale. To create a measure for
“moderateness” from the GSS data, “extreme” liberals and conservatives were assigned a
value of “ 1”, regular liberals and conservatives a value of “2”, those ranking themselves
as “slightly” liberal or conservative a value of “3”, and “moderates” a value of “4” (as
mentioned earlier, according to cultivation scholars, “moderation” is the TV answer). The
mean score for this variable was 3.02, with a standard deviation of .92.

Independent variables.

** The GSS data contain a few more gender items. Some o f them were rejected since using them would
substantially reduce the N (all the women-in-military hems). Other hems were not included due to vague
wording (e.g. OPSEX).
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Media skepticism. GSS respondents were asked how much confidence they had in
television. Answer categories were “a great deal” (coded “ I”), “only some” (coded “2”),
or “hardly any” (coded “3”)- About IS percent of respondents chose the first category, 56
percent chose the second, and about 29 percent chose the third.
Television watching. The GSS survey included an item measuring the number of
hours respondents watched television on an ordinary day. Clear outliers - respondents
who gave an answer of more than 1S hours of daily watching - were not included in the
analysis90. The new variable (without the outliers) had a mean of 2.92, with a standard
deviation of 2.05.

Results.
MAcross the board’*. To test Hypotheses HI.3a through HI.3c, three multiple regression
models were run. The first stage of each model was designed to check for the original
cultivation hypothesis. Accordingly, the dependent variables were the different outcome
measures (social mistrust, gender positions, political moderateness), and the main
independent variable was television exposure. For statistical control purposes,
demographic variables of education, race, sex, social class and age were inserted as
covariates. Also used in the models was the skepticism measure. My first hypothesis
predicted that media cynicism would interact with television exposure in its effect on the
outcome measures. The effect of TV viewing on the outcome measures is expected to be
weaker for those skeptical toward television than for non-skeptics. Hence, the second step

90 IS hours was chosen as the cut-off point since this was the 99* percentile. People reporting 10 or 12
hours a day with the TV on could still be giving an accurate account (e.g. the guards in the Annenberg
school). But IS hours starts to sound like a measurement error, given our need to sleep.
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of each model tests for the hypothesized TV-watching*media-skepticism interaction.
Centering was used in the reported models to minimize multicolinearity.
Models 1 and 2 in Table 8.1 test Hypothesis HI .3a. Model 1 shows that the
cumulative GSS data are consistent with Gerbner’s cultivation hypothesis. Television
viewing is indeed associated with mean-world perceptions, and in the right direction: the
more viewing a respondent reported, the more he or she tended to perceive the world as
mean (all demographic factors being equal). However, the interaction term in Model 2,
testing for the interaction between TV viewing and mistrust in TV, did not significantly
add to the variance explained by Model 1. In other words, there are no significant
differences in the effects of TV viewing on the outcome measure between TV skeptics
and non-skeptics. Hypothesis HI.3a does not gain support from the data.
Similarly, Models S and 6 test Hypothesis HI.3c. In accordance with the cultivation
hypothesis, Model S shows that even after controlling for demographics, those who watch
more television tend to be more politically moderate than those watching less television.
But again, Model 6 shows that the interaction between television viewing and television
skepticism is not statistically significant The effect of TV viewing on moderateness is
not associated with the level of confidence in TV. Thus, Hypothesis HI.3c? is also not
supported by the data.
Model 3 tests the relationship between respondents’ gender attitudes and television
viewing. Although there is a significant effect of TV viewing on gender positions, it is
not in the direction predicted by cultivation theory. Controlling for race, education, sex
and class, heavy TV viewing is significantly associated with more egalitarian attitudes
toward women, not the other way around (note that the coding of the “gender positions”
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variables is 8= non-egalitarian positions, and 0=egalitarian positions). This could reflect a
shift in TV reality toward a more feminist direction since Morgan tested the genderrelated cultivation hypothesis in the early 1980s. One could argue that contemporary
heavy-viewers encounter more females as lawyers, judges or business managers than past
heavy-viewers did. Women might even be overrepresented in executive and professional
roles on TV today, compared to “real life” statistics and to their past “symbolic
annihilation” on TV, documented by cultivation scholars. Such a shift in televised
content, if it has indeed occurred (and one would need to run a large-scale content
analysis to investigate this possibility), might explain the interesting cultivation pattern
that emerges out of Model 3. However, the GSS data (an additional unreported model)
did not find evidence for a year * TV viewing interaction. In other words, the effect of
TV viewing on gender positions did not change over the years. There is no evidence in
the GSS data for the “content change” explanation for the negative direction of the TV
viewing coefficient in Model 391.
All of this makes it difficult to explain the results of Model 4. As the table shows,
TV viewing interacts with confidence in television in its effect on attitudes towards
females. To interpret this interaction, the different levels of TV viewing and confidence
in television were put into the equation, and the mean values were used for all control
variables. The results are presented in Figure 1. As the figure shows, the effect of TV
viewing on chauvinistic gender positions (the more TV viewing, the more egalitarian the
position) is negative for those having “hardly any” confidence in TV and positive for
91A more plausible explanation for this negative coefficient will be offered in the next section.
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those with “a great deal” of such confidence, with those having “some confidence” in the
middle. This pattern is similar, but not identical, to what HI.3b predicted. The slope for
skeptics (indicating a positive effect of television on gender position) was expected by
HI.3b, but this hypothesis expected skeptics to be unaffected, not negatively affected as
Figure 3 shows. It seems as though television “cultivates” chauvinism for non-skeptics
and feminist positions for skeptics. Perhaps this is due to differing interpretations of
televised texts; perhaps it is a boomerang effect for those having the least confidence in
TV.
To sum up, we have so far seen little evidence that media skepticism moderates
“across-the-board” cultivation effects. In all models, television-viewing was associated
with the outcome measure. But in two of the three cases there was no interaction effect of
TV-viewing and confidence in television in their effect on the outcome measure. In the
third case the interaction between television-viewing and confidence in TV was not
exactly the one predicted by the hypotheses. Overall, then, there is little support for
Hypothesis 1.3 in the data.
Mainstreaming. Media skepticism does not seem to moderate the so called “across
the board” cultivation effects in the GSS data, at least when social mistrust and political
moderateness were the outcome variables. But what about mainstreaming? According to
cultivation theorists, heavy television viewing brings people of diverse demographic
backgrounds closer in their perceptions o f the world. An example of such an effect is
presented in Figure 2a: heavy-viewing educated and uneducated television viewers are
closer in their social mistrust than their light-viewing counterparts. Is this process
affected by people’s attitudes toward television? Hypothesis H I.3d predicts that the
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mainstreaming effect will occur only for audiences who have faith in television. Those
who do not trust television are expected to remain unaffected by its presentation of the
world. Hence, educated and uneducated heavy-viewing and skeptical audiences’
perceptions of reality are expected to remain far apart (see Figure 2B). This is in fact a
three-way interaction between television-viewing, confidence in TV and another
demographic measure in their joint effect on an outcome measure.
Six OLS regression models were run to test for Hypothesis HI .3d. The first stage of
each model was designed to test whether mainstreaming occurs (a two-way interaction
between TV-viewing and a demographic variable). Two demographic variables
(education and race) and three different outcome measures (MWI, gender positions and
political moderateness) were used. Education and television viewing were coded as
dichotomous variables to facilitate interpretation. For the sake of parsimony, only
significance levels are presented. In five of the six models these interaction effects
emerged as significant ones. The models were interpreted using the mean values of all
control variables. Figures 8.3 through 8.7 present the interpretations of Models 7 through
11 respectively.
Figure 3 shows that although educated respondents tend to see the world as less
mean and evil than less-educated respondents, uneducated and educated heavy television
viewers are closer in their perceptions of the world than their light-viewing counterparts.
Hence, this model supports mainstreaming theory. Similar mainstreaming effects are
found in Figures 8.4,8.6 and 8.7. In each, educated and uneducated, as well as white and
non-white, heavy-viewers are closer in their perceptions of the world than their lightviewing counterparts. However, the significant interaction reported in Model 9 is not in
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the direction expected by the mainstreaming hypothesis. Only heavy-viewing highlyeducated respondents seem to be affected by the televised message, while the uneducated
are virtually not affected. The distance in political moderateness is greater between
educated and uneducated heavy-viewers than between educated and uneducated lightviewers (no mainstreaming). In sum, the mainstreaming hypothesis works in four of the
six models.
The second stage of each of the models was designed to test for the effect of
confidence in television on these two-way-interactions. The results show that the threeway interaction advanced by Hypothesis HI.3d is not found in any of the six models. The
interaction between television viewing and education or race is not affected by the level
of confidence in television. In other words, the mainstreaming process is not moderated
by audiences’ skepticism toward the media. In Models 7,8,10 and 11 all respondents are
“mainstreamed” regardless of their attitudes toward the media, but Hypothesis HI .3d
does not gain any support from the data.

Conclusion.
Overall, this study did not provide much evidence in favor of a moderating effect of
media skepticism in cultivation processes. Skepticism did not reduce “across-the-board”
cultivation effects in the case of the social mistrust index or political moderateness. When
mainstreaming took place (in four out of six models in Table 8.2), it was not related to
audiences’ level of confidence in TV. In sum, as cultivation predicts, TV viewing is
indeed associated with social mistrust and with political moderateness. To the extent that
these associations are indeed evidence of cultivation effects (and not, for instance, of
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audience selectivity), these effects are not influenced by audiences’ skepticism toward the
media. As far as the analysis of the cumulative GSS tile can tell, skeptical audiences are
as likely as any others to be cultivated or mainstreamed by heavy exposure to television.
The audience, as active, cynical and critical as it might be, does not have the ability to
resist TV’s repetitive and distorted messages. The extremely large data set seems to
corroborate Morgan and Shanahan’s meta-analysis finding of a “small but significant”
cultivation effect.
Yet this study tested the moderating role o f news media skepticism in the association
between general media exposure and cultivation outcome measures. One could argue that
the general exposure measure used here does not correspond with the specific nature of
the interacting item (mistrust in the news media). If media skepticism moderates
cultivation, than it probably affects news cultivation, not some general television
cultivation. Thus, hypotheses HI.3a through H1.3d.e should be tested using measures of
news exposure, in addition to general media exposure. This is exactly what I do in the
rest of the chapter.

Study 2: NES1996 data: News exposure.
The 1996 National Election Study provides data to assess whether news cultivation
effects are affected by media skepticism. Respondents were asked how much of the time
they thought they could trust the media to report the news fairly. Response categories
were “just about always” (coded “1”), “most of the time” (coded “2”), “ only some of the
time” (coded “3”), “almost never” (coded “4”), and “none of the time” (coded “5”). This
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item, averaging 2.69, with a standard deviation of .75, serves as my measure of media
skepticism.
Independent variable: News media exposure. NES respondents were asked for the
number of days in the past week they watched national and local news on TV and the
number of days they read a daily newspaper. Most of the tables reported in this section
used the mean o f the local and national news items as a measure of news exposure
(reliability for this measure was .69). This is because cultivation deals specifically with
television, and because the newspaper item substantially lowered the reliability of the
news media exposure scale. However, I did run models using a measure of exposure that
included both the newspaper item and a scale with the mean of the three items (local
news, national news, and daily newspaper) in addition to the models I report here. These
models provided similar results to those reported in the tables.
Social mistrust (Gerbner*s Mean World Index). NES also contains the TRUST
and HELP items of the social mistrust index. Reliability for these two items was .62. The
items were coded so that the mistrustful option would have a value of “1” and the
reversed option a value o f“0”. They were then averaged, creating an index varying
between 0 and 1, with a mean o f .50 and a standard deviation of .41.
Gender positions. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a gender role
scale in which “ 1” represented “women and men should have equal roles” and “7” meant
ua woman’s place is in the home”. The mean for this item was 2.24, with a standard
deviation of 1.65.
Political “moderateness”. As in Study 1, a measure for “moderateness” was created
by assigning “extreme” liberals and conservatives a value of “ 1”, regular liberals and
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conservatives a value o f“2”, those ranking themselves as “slightly” liberal or
conservative a value of “3”, and “moderates” a value of “4”. The mean score for this
variable was 2.88, with a standard deviation of .92.

Results.
Across the board. Table 8.4 tests the hypotheses about “across-the-board” cultivation
effects. Models 1 through 3 test Hypothesis HI.3a. As cultivation predicts, TV news
watching is associated with perceptions of a mean world, after controlling for race, age,
sex and education (Model 2; the bivariate association, reported in Model 1, was zero).
The more news respondents watched, the higher they scored on the social mistrust index.
However, as Model 3 shows, there was no significant interaction between exposure and
media skepticism. In other words, there is no evidence for differential cultivation effects
for skeptics and non-skeptics.
Models 4 through 6 test HI.3b. Here, television news exposure was associated with
chauvinistic positions only in the bivariate case (Model 4), and the association
disappeared after controlling for demographics. There was also no significant interaction
between exposure and media skepticism. This interaction was also tested without the
demographic controls, again with null results.
Models 7 through 9 test HI .3c. With or without controls, news exposure is
associated with political moderateness. The more one reports watching TV news, the
more moderate she or he is. However, the hypothesized interaction was again not
significant. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect of news watching on
political moderateness is the same regardless of one’s skepticism toward the media.
233

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In sum, the 1996 NES data show some associations that may be interpreted as news
cultivation, but these associations do not interact with media skepticism, as Hypothesis
1.3 predicts. To increase confidence in the findings, the hypotheses were also tested using
alternative measures of news media exposure. Each of the tests provided evidence for
news cultivation92, but none yielded a significant exposure*media skepticism interaction.
Local news and crime risk perceptions. According to prior research, local news
cultivates the perception of a mean world much more than national news does, because of
its greater emphasis on crime issues. This is why I tested Hypothesis HI.3a with specific
attention to local news. The findings are presented in Table 8.4. In addition to social
mistrust (Gerbner’s Mean World Index), I used “fear of crime” as another outcome
measure potentially affected by cultivation. Like Jamieson and Slovic (who also tested
their news cultivation hypothesis on NES data), I found that both measures are correlated
with local news watching. The more people watched local news, the more they were
afraid that they or one of their family members “might be the victim of an assault during
the coming year”. This association was only borderline significant (p=.05 for MWI;
p=.09 for fear of crime) after controlling for demographics. However, the interaction with
media skepticism was again not statistically significant. In other words, to the extent that
local news cultivates crime risk and social mistrust, these processes are not affected by
media skepticism.
Mainstreaming. Table 8.5 provides nine tests for mainstreaming, corresponding
with the interactions between exposure and education, race and sex in their effect on the

92 For example, I tried using a measure that contains newspaper as well as TV news exposure. This measure
was positively associated with gender positions and political moderateness, and negatively associated with
MWI. However the exposure'media skepticism interaction was not significant.
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three outcome measures. This interaction was not significant in seven of the nine cases.
However, two models do provide support for mainstreaming. Model 1 shows a significant
interaction between education and exposure in their effect on the mistrust index. Figure
8.8 provides an interpretation of this significant interaction. As mainstreaming predicts,
TV exposure does bring people of diverse backgrounds closer in their social mistrust.
While educated and uneducated light news watchers are far apart in their perceptions of
the world as mean (uneducated score much higher on the MWI in this group), heavy
news watchers’ perceptions of the world as mean are much closer. The effect of news
exposure on MWI is negative for the relatively uneducated, while it is positive for the
highly educated. Similarly, Model 6 shows a significant interaction between race and
exposure in their effect on political moderation. Figure 8.9 provides the interpretation for
this interaction. Again, in accordance with mainstreaming, white and non-white heavy
viewers are closer in their political moderateness than their light-viewing counterparts.
While light-viewing whites tend to be much more moderate than light viewing non
whites, the moderateness scores of heavy news watchers almost converge.
However, those two mainstreaming effects are not affected by media skepticism. As
Models 1 and 6 show, the three-way interactions exposure*education*skepticism and
exposure*race*skepticism are non-significant in both cases. When mainstreaming effects
do take place, they are not influenced by people’s attitudes toward the media. In cases
where heavy news exposure brings people of diverse backgrounds together in their
perceptions of the world, it does so regardless o f their media skepticism.
Summary. The overall finding, using the 1996 NES data, is that media skepticism
does not seem to moderate news cultivation and mainstreaming effects. Television news
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exposure was associated with social mistrust and political moderateness (and, without
controls, also with chauvinistic gender positions). One could interpret these associations
as evidence for TV news cultivation effects. However, they did not interact with media
skepticism as my hypotheses predicted they should. I also tested (following Jamieson &
Slovic) for local news cultivation effects on risk of crime and social mistrust. Again, I
found main effects, that were not affected by media skepticism.
The NES 1996 data do not provide much evidence of news mainstreaming effects.
Only two of the nine models testing for mainstreaming found evidence for
mainstreaming. However, there were no significant three-way interactions with media
skepticism. In other words, even when there are mainstreaming effects, they are not
affected by audience skepticism.

Study 3: The APPC 2000 data.
Another data source that enables us to test cultivation hypotheses is the Annenberg Public
Policy Center 2000 election study. A random fourth of the rolling cross-section
respondents were asked what grade they would give the news media for the way they
were reporting on the presidential campaign. The answer categories were “A - excellent”
(coded “0”), “B - very good” (coded “1”), “C - average” (coded “2”), “D - poor” (coded
”3”). and ”F - very poor”(coded ”4"). As mentioned earlier, this item correlates highly
with other media skepticism items and can serve as a measure of media skepticism.
Unfortunately, the APPC data had no measures of social mistrust, nor any measures of
gender positions. Therefore, the following analysis is restricted to news cultivation
effects on political moderateness.
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Independent measure.
News exposure. The news exposure measure in this study is the average of three
items, each measuring the number of days in the previous week in which subjects
watched “the national network news on TV”, “cable news, such as CNN or MSNBC”, or
“the local TV news - for example, ‘Eyewitness News’ or ‘Action News’”. Reliability for
this measure was .61. Again, I focus on the TV items because of cultivation's focus on
TV, and because the newspaper and radio exposure items did not load with the TV items
and thus lowered the reliability. The mean for this scale is 3.48, with a standard deviation
of 2.01.

Dependent measure.
Political “moderateness”. I use here a similar measure of “moderateness” to the one
I used in the previous studies (“very” liberal or conservative^, regular liberals and
conservatives=2, and “moderates”=3>. The mean for this measure is 2.31, with a standard
deviation of .65.
Results. Table 8.6 presents models testing the hypotheses on the APPC primary
season data. Models 1 and 2 are designed to test the association between TV news
exposure and political moderateness. As these models show, news watching was
associated with political moderateness: The more one watched TV news, the more he or
she reported being politically moderate. This was also the case after controlling for race,
age, sex and education. As in the previous studies, in the next stage I entered an
exposure’ skepticism interaction to the OLS regression model to test for HI.3c. In this
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case, Model 3 produced a significant interaction. However, the interpretation of the
interaction, presented in Figure 8.10, does not correspond with HI.3c. According to this
hypothesis, non-skeptics should be cultivated, while skeptics are expected to remain
unaffected by their exposure to television. This is (almost) the opposite of what Figure
8.10 shows. According to Model 6, television cultivates moderateness for skeptics,
whereas the effect of television news on moderateness is negative for non-skeptics. This
pattern is not in line with what Hlc predicted. What the findings suggest is that skeptics
are cultivated the most in terms of political moderateness, compared to all other groups.
This is the opposite of what I hypothesized, namely, that skeptics should be cultivated the
least.
Mainstreaming. In order to test for the moderating role of media skepticism, the
same procedure that was applied in the previous studies was applied to the APPC data.
That is, the test for mainstreaming is the interaction between television and a
demographic variable on their joint effect on the outcome measure. The test for the
moderating role of media skepticism in mainstreaming is the three-way interaction
between exposure, the demographic variable and media skepticism. The results are
presented in Table 8.7. Model 1 shows no significant interaction between education and
news exposure on their effect on moderateness. In other words, there is no difference in
the effect of television for educated and uneducated audiences. Similarly, Model 2 shows
no interaction between race and exposure. In other words, the significant association
between exposure and political moderateness is not affected by respondents’ race.
However, unlike Models 1 and 2, Model 3 produced a significant sex*exposure
interaction. The interpretation o f this interaction is presented in Figure 8.11. The findings
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cannot be interpreted as mainstreaming; rather, the interpretation of the interaction is that
the moderateness cultivation effect is stronger for females than it is for males. Contrary to
the mainstreaming hypothesis, television news amplifies the distance between males’ and
females’ political moderateness scores rather than reducing it. Light TV news-viewing
females are slightly more moderate than light male viewers. But this difference gets
bigger rather than smaller as people watch more TV news.
For each of the three interacting variables, the three-way exposure* skepticism*
demographic variable interaction is not significant. Again, there is no support for HI.3d.
However, in this case it would be more accurate to say that the “media skepticism as a
moderator in mainstreaming” hypotheses could not be tested since there was no
mainstreaming effect in the data.
Summary. Study 3 tested the hypotheses on the APPC 2000 data, and found a
significant association between news watching and political moderateness that is in line
with cultivation research, but no evidence for mainstreaming. To the extent that we can
interpret the positive effect of TV news exposure on moderateness as a cultivation effect,
this effect does not depend on audiences’ media skepticism.

Study 4: The PTR data.
Respondents in the PTR study answered the social mistrust and political moderateness
items, which enabled us to test the same set of hypotheses on the PTR data set. The
measure of media skepticism used in this data set is different than those used in the
previous studies. Respondents were asked if they thought that the media “help society to
solve its problems” (coded “0”) or “get in the way of society solving its problems”
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(coded “1”)- Since talk radio listeners were over-sampled, weighting is used throughout
the analysis. Also, the panel nature of the PTR data allowed for testing the hypotheses at
two different points in time (Wave 1 and Wave 4), though not on the very same cases
(since people were added to the panel to compensate for mortality). Since these two sets
of data provided almost identical results when analyzed separately, I collapsed the two
sources so that the new variables contain data from cases that were added to the study in
Wave 4 as well as from the original Wave 1 data.
Social mistrust (Gerbner’s Mean World Index). Like NES and GSS, the PTR
study also contained the TRUST and HELP items of the social mistrust index. However,
this time respondents were also asked to provide an indication of the strength of their
social mistrust. The items were coded so that feeling “strongly” that “most people can be
trusted” or that people “try to be helpful was coded “1”, while feeling “not too strongly”
about these perceptions was coded “2”. Feeling “strongly” that you “can’t be too careful
with people” or that people are “looking out for themselves” was coded “4”, while
feeling not so strongly about it was coded “3”. The two recoded items were then
averaged, creating an index varying between 1 and 4, with a mean of 2.29 and a standard
deviation o f 1.31. Reliability for this scale was .70.
Political “moderateness”. The measure o f “moderateness” I use in this study is the
same one I used in Study 3 (“very” liberal or conservative^, regular liberals and
conservatives^, and “moderates”^ ) . The mean for this measure was 2.31, with a
standard deviation of.65.
TV news exposure. TV news exposure was measured on an ordinal scale with four
categories. Respondents were asked how often they watched “national TV evening news
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programs on ABC, CNN, NBC or CBS”. Response categories were “regularly” (coded
“4”), “sometimes” (coded “3”), “hardly ever” (coded “2”), and “never” (coded “0”). The
mean for this item was 3.4S, with a standard deviation of .82.
Results. The models in Table 8.8 test for cultivation effects and for their interaction
with media skepticism. Models 1 through 3 have social mistrust as the dependent
variable. Unlike the other data sets, the sign for the coefficient for news exposure is
negative. However, this negative association becomes statistically insignificant when
controlling for the demographic variables. In other words, unlike in the other data sets,
which showed that TV news exposure is related to low interpersonal trust, in the PTR
data news consumption is related to increased trust. This association disappears in the
presence of controls. Also, Model 3 shows that exposure does not interact with media
skepticism (i.e., there is no support for HI.3a in this model). In sum, although the
direction of the TV exposure effect is different than what I found in previous studies, the
test for HI.3a consistently gives the same result. To the extent that television exposure is
associated with social mistrust (or with opposite perceptions, for that matter), this
association is not moderated by media skepticism.
Models 4 through 6 test for cultivation effects on political moderateness. As in the
previous studies, TV news exposure was positively and significantly associated with
moderateness, even when controlling for demographics. However, as in the previous
study, Model 6 shows that the exposure*skepticism interaction is again not significant.
Thus, there is no evidence supporting HI.3c in the PTR data. The effect of exposure to
TV news on moderateness is the same for skeptics and non-skeptics.
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Mainstreaming. Mainstreaming and its interaction with skepticism were tested
using the same procedure that was applied in the previous studies. As Table 8.9 shows,
the two-way exposure*demographic variable was only significant in two out of six
models. In Model S, exposure significantly interacted with race in their joint effect on the
Mean World Index. However, the interpretation of the model, presented in Figure 8.12,
shows that the interaction is not mainstreaming. The distance between the perceptions of
whites and non-whites increases, instead of decreasing as mainstreaming predicts. The
pattern presented in Figure 8.12 is in fact the one suggested by the resonance hypothesis:
television supposedly amplifies the differences between whites and non-whites because
the televised world may echo the mean world realities of non-whites. Nonetheless, as in
most previous cases, there was no three-way interaction between news exposure, media
skepticism and race. This means that however we choose to interpret the two-way
interaction presented in Figure 8.12, this interaction is not related to media skepticism.
The other two-way interaction in Table 8.9 was found in Model 4, which tested for
the mainstreaming effect of TV news on political moderateness, using race as the
interacting variable. In this case, the interaction could indeed be an example of a
mainstreaming process. According to this model (interpreted in Figure 8.13), television
brings whites and non-whites closer in terms o f their political moderation. While lightwatching whites were more moderate than non-whites, this difference gets smaller as TV
news watching increases, until there are no such differences between whites and non
whites in the heaviest viewing category. These results replicate the same mainstreaming
pattern that was revealed in the NES data.
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The second stage of Model 4 added to the equation all the rest of the two-way
interaction terms accompanied by the three-way exposure*skepticism*race interaction.
Unlike most other similar models reported in this chapter, the three-way interaction was
borderline significant this time (p=.071). An interpretation of this interaction is presented
in Figure 8.14. As predicted by HI.3d, non-skeptics show the same mainstreaming
pattern that was revealed in the two-way interaction model. However, skeptical audiences
were not unaffected by TV as HI.3d predicted, but showed a reverse pattern: while non
white skeptics were unaffected, white skeptics became more moderate as their exposure
to TV news increased. This is not very strong evidence for HI.3d, given the .07 p-value
and the peculiar interaction pattern.
In addition to the two-way interactions in Table 8.9, some attention should be given
to Model 2. In this case, although there was no education*exposure interaction (needed as
evidence for mainstreaming), there was a significant three-way education*exposure*
skepticism interaction. Figure 8.IS examines the patterns revealed by this interaction.
Again, there is no evidence for the moderating role of media skepticism in
mainstreaming. Rather, it appears that the effect of TV news watching was positive for
non-skeptics and negative for skeptics, with a stronger effect for educated respondents in
the two groups. Neither skeptics nor non-skeptics showed a clear mainstreaming pattern.
If anything, it is the skeptics’ pattern that was closer to mainstreaming (educated and
uneducated heavy-viewers were more alike in their political moderation than their lightviewing counterparts).
In sum, there is nothing in Table 8.9 that suggests that media skepticism moderates
mainstreaming effects. The six models did not find strong evidence of mainstreaming, but
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even when they did find an exposure*demographic interaction, it was not affected by
skepticism in the way predicted by HI .3d. The pattern that appears from the borderline
significant three-way interaction in Model 3 is not far away H I.3d. Here, non-skeptics
were cultivated while skeptics were not. However, skeptics were not unaffected by TV,
as HI .3d predicts, but rather demonstrated a different pattern, one that might be
interpreted as being closer to resonance.
Summary. As in the other data sets, the PTR data demonstrate the effect of
television news exposure on political moderateness. Unlike the other data sets, it does not
contain evidence for a news cultivation effect on social mistrust. In fact, the sign of the
insignificant coefficient for this effect was negative, whereas it was positive in Studies 1
and 2. In any case, there was no evidence for the moderating role of skepticism in
cultivation. The association between exposure and moderateness was not influenced by
audiences’ skepticism toward the media.
Although two o f the models found the three-way interactions by HI .3d, there was
not much support for skepticism’s moderating role in mainstreaming either. In one case,
Model 6 of Table 8.9 (Figure 8.14), non-skeptics were cultivated, while skeptics were
affected differently. This is the closest I got in this chapter to getting support for my
skepticism as moderating the mainstreaming hypothesis. But it does not offer strong
evidence for the hypothesis, because skeptics were affected (albeit differently from non
skeptics) by television exposure. The direction of the pattern revealed in Figure 8.14 is
not what HI .3d predicts.
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Study 5: The EDialogue Data.
Another potential test for the hypotheses comes from the Electronic Dialogue data, using
the social mistrust index and political moderation as dependent variables. This time
media skepticism is measured using not a single item but, rather, a scale containing four
items from Gaziano and McGrath’s News Credibility Scale, as well as items measuring
general trust in the fairness and accuracy of the news media, an item measuring whether
respondents thought the news media help society or get in the way of society solving its
problem, and a general evaluation of the work the media did in their coverage of the 2000
campaign (see Chapter 2 for a detailed description of this scale). Reliability for this
media skepticism scale, varying between 0 and 1, was .89. The mean was .56, with a
standard deviation of .18. While the use of the scale is superior to the use of single items
as measures of skepticism, the disadvantage of this data set for the study of cultivation
effects is the relatively small sample size, which stems from design limitations (i.e., the
media skepticism battery was administered only to EDialogue discussion participants and
controls). As we shall see, this relatively low N (around 640 in most of the models) is not
large enough to detect significant cultivation effects, which are very small and so require
relatively large-sample data sets to become evident.
Social mistrust (Gerbner's Mean World Index). The EDialogue baseline survey
included the three MWI items. The items were treated exactly the same way as they were
in Study 1 (GSS data). Reliability for the social mistrust scale was .73. The scale had a
mean of .45, with a standard deviation of .39.
Political moderateness. As a measure of political moderateness, I used the absolute
value of a measure of a party-ideology extremism index (coded “5” for very-liberal-
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strong-Democrat and “-5” for very-conservative-strong-Republican, with “0” for
moderate-independent in between). The absolute values of this index provide a measure
of extremism, so they were flipped to create a measure o f moderateness varying between
“0” (for extreme partisans) and “5” (for independents-moderates). The mean value for
this measure was 2.25, with a standard deviation of 1.64.
TV news exposure. As in Study 2 (NES data), TV news exposure was
operationalized as the mean number of days in the past week in which subjects watched
national and local news. Reliability for these two items was .70 (mean = 3.86; SD=2.16).
Results. Table 8.10 presents OLS models testing for hypotheses HI .3a and HI .3c.
As in the previous studies, the exposure measure was entered by itself in the first step of
the regressions, the demographic controls were entered in the second step, and the media
skepticism scale and interaction terms were entered in the third step. In this case,
probably due to the small N, there were no significant cultivation effects. Nevertheless,
the coefficients were generally in the direction predicted by cultivation: more news
exposure was associated with higher wsocial mistrust” scores (this time only after
inserting controls) and with more moderate political opinions93. However, there was once
again no significant interaction between skepticism and exposure in either the “social
mistrust” or moderateness models (Models 3 and 6, respectively). Once again,
Hypotheses H1.3a and H13.c do not receive confirmation.
Mainstreaming. Six unreported “mainstreaming models” paralleling those reported
in Table 8.9 were run to test for mainstreaming (exposure*education, exposure*race, and
93 To compare the magnitude o f the associations in this and other studies, it is recommended to use the beta
coefficients (reported in the middle row o f each table entry throughout this chapter). For example, the
standardized coefficient for the effect o f TV exposure on moderateness was .06 in EDialogue, the same
effect size as in NES. The corresponding beta in the APPC and PTR data was .04.
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exposure*sex for each of the two outcome measures). Three-way interactions testing for
the moderating role of skepticism in mainstreaming were entered in the second step.
However, neither of the two-way or three-way interactions was statistically significant i.e., there was no evidence for mainstreaming in any of the models. There was also no
suppression of mainstreaming by the three-way interactions as predicted by Hypothesis
H13.d. In sum, the EDialogue data do not offer evidence for mainstreaming, nor do they
offer support for HI.3d, which predicted skepticism would moderate mainstreaming.

Conclusion.
Taken together, the studies reported above offer at least some evidence consistent
with cultivation and news cultivation. Study 1 demonstrated that general television
watching was associated with the social mistrust index and with political moderateness.
The same associations were found in the NES data presented in Study 2, but this time
using a news watching rather than a general TV exposure measure. An association
between news exposure and political moderateness was also found in Study 3, this time
using the APPC data, and in Study 4, using the PTR data. The long and short of it is that
the more people watch national and local TV news (and not just TV in general), the
higher their MWI scores, and the more politically moderate they are. As to the
association between exposure and gender positions, I found a negative association
between general TV watching and chauvinistic positions. But the same association was
positive for news watching (and without statistical controls) in Study 2.
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Altogether, this chapter presented 13 separate tests for cultivation (three for general
TV watching cultivation and the rest for news cultivation). In eleven of these models
there was a significant association between television exposure and the cultivation
outcome measure, and in nine of these eleven, the sign o f the coefficient was in the
direction expected by Gerbner and his colleagues. Also, nine of the cultivation effects
remained significant even after controlling for demographics. The two insignificant
effects came from a relatively small data set (EDialogue), and in this case, the
coefficients were in the direction predicted by cultivation.
In sum, the findings are generally in line with cultivation research. However,
cultivation is only one possible interpretation of the data. Another possible interpretation
could be selective exposure. For example, television watching (news watching included)
could be the result, rather than the cause, of lack of interpersonal trust. When people do
not trust other people, they might prefer to spend more time alone with their TV sets,
compared to their more trusting counterparts. Similarly, political extremists might spend
less time watching national or local mainstream news than their moderate counterparts,
because they would rather receive political information from more partisan sources.
Besides the possibilities of reverse causation and selectivity, cultivation has also been
attacked on other methodological bases, including the possibility of response bias, the
assumption that TV contents are uniform, not distinguishing among different audiences,
and so on. The associations presented above could easily be attacked on many of these
grounds. In short, the findings presented above do not offer conclusive evidence for
cultivation, though they do demonstrate that a few of the associations reported by
cultivation researchers hold even when the independent variable is TV news watching,
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and despite the relatively tight demographic controls. Fortunately, testing the hypotheses
forwarded in this chapter does not necessitate resolving all the methodological conflicts
surrounding cultivation theory.
My hypotheses in this chapter are not concerned with cultivation per se, but with the
way media skepticism interacts with cultivation. Of the 13 models testing for hypotheses
HI.3a through HI.3c, only two found significant exposure*skepticism interactions. In
other words, television exposure affected not only the non-skeptics, as I predicted, but all
respondents regardless of level of skepticism. Even in the two cases in which I did find
significant exposure*skepticism interactions (Model 4 in Table 8.1 and Model 6 in Table
8.6), the patterns of interaction were not exactly those predicted by my hypotheses. In
fact, the interaction pattern presented in Model 6, Table 8.6 was the opposite of what I
predicted: cultivation, in this case, was stronger for skeptics than for non-skeptics.
Only one model provided some evidence that could be interpreted as a moderating
effect of skepticism in cultivation: Model 4 in Table 8.1, interpreted in Figure 8.1. In this
case, television exposure “cultivated” chauvinistic positions for non-skeptics (as HI.3c
predicted). While HI.3c predicted a weaker or zero effect of TV exposure on gender
positions for skeptics, the association was actually negative. Does this mean that TV
“cultivates” feminism for skeptics? Perhaps this association reflects divergent
interpretations of televised texts by skeptics and non-skeptics respectively94.
In sum, in this chapter I tested for the moderating role of media skepticism in
cultivation processes using three different cultivation outcome measures and five separate

94 In any case, this model is not inconsistent with the other studies. Study 1, unlike the other studies, deals
with cultivation in general, not with news cultivation per se. For this reason, the results obtained in Study I
are not really comparable to the other studies.
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data sources, each utilizing different sampling strategies and different measures of media
skepticism. Based on these observations, we may conclude that to the extent that the
associations between exposure and outcome measures are evidence for cultivation (and,
as I've pointed out, that is not necessarily the case), these associations are probably not
affected by audiences’ skepticism toward the media. In most cases, the effect of media
exposure did not interact with media skepticism. That is, when I found associations
between outcome measures and TV exposure, the supposed cultivation effects occurred
for skeptics and non-skeptics alike. My hypotheses HI.3a, HI .3b and HI.3c did not gain
any support from the models.
As for mainstreaming, the interactions that emerged in four of six models testing for
general television mainstreaming in Study 1 (but only in four of 24 models testing for
news mainstreaming) showed the interaction patterns expected by mainstreaming theory.
It appears that, as with general television programming, news watching has the potential
to bring people from diverse backgrounds closer in their perceptions of the world.
However, these news mainstreaming effects were rarer than general exposure effects.
Thus, the evidence for news mainstreaming is far from overwhelming.
But even when we did find evidence for mainstreaming effects (either in the news or
in the general exposure models), these effects were not moderated by media skepticism.
Hypothesis H I.3d predicted that while non-skeptics would be “mainstreamed” (i.e.,
heavy-viewers from diverse backgrounds would be closer in the outcome measure than
their light-viewing counterparts), the distance in their perceptions of the world, caused by
demographics, would not be affected by TV exposure for non-skeptics. Not even one of
the 24 models showed this pattern, however. Although we did get two significant three250
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way interactions, these could be attributed to mere chance, due to the large number of
models). The closest we got to this pattern was in Model 4, Table 8.9 (Figure 8.14), in
which non-white skeptics remained unaffected by exposure to TV news but their white
counterparts were affected by such exposure. This is the only model that could be
interpreted as skeptics being “non-mainstreamed” while skeptics are “mainstreamed” (as
predicted in HI .3d), but the non-mainstreaming pattern that emerges from this model was
not the one I expected.
In terms of contribution to theory, this chapter offers the following modest insights:
First, it offers additional empirical evidence for news cultivation. The only study I have
encountered so far that actually tested news cultivation hypotheses was Jamieson and
Slovic’s paper. This chapter replicates their findings in four different data sets, and shows
that the effects reported by Jamieson and Slovic could be found even when the
independent variable was national, rather than local, news exposure (or with a scale
combining national and local news exposure items). Moreover, in this chapter I tested
news cultivation effects on three different outcome measures relating to three different
issues. As far as I know, this is the first evidence for news cultivation in these domains.
Second, this chapter tested, for the first time, for mainstreaming effects in the context of
news. The findings show that, unlike in the context o f general TV exposure, these news
mainstreaming effects are relatively rare. T hird, and most important for my thesis, this
chapter tested, for the first time, whether or not news cultivation effects are moderated by
people’s attitudes toward the media. The null findings are surprising from the theoretical
standpoint. If we accept the main effects presented above as media effects, then people
are affected by the news media despite their lack o f trust in same.
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Null findings are, in many ways, harder to interpret. Why didn't the hypotheses
work? Many explanations could be offered. A natural instinct is to blame some study
artifact, resulting, perhaps, from measurement error. However, the fact that the same
results were replicated in five separate data sets using different survey designs and
separate measures of skepticism helps to alleviate the concern that the null results are an
artifact of measurement error. In addition, the fact that skepticism did moderate media
effects other than cultivation, as we saw in Chapters 6 and 7, shows that it is not the
measurement of media skepticism that is causing the null finding.
On another level, one could argue that the associations between television exposure
and the cultivation outcome measures are not really a media effect but something else,
hence skepticism does not moderate them. Skepticism toward the media is only expected
to moderate media effects. If the main effects presented in this chapter are not media
effects, one could argue that skepticism toward the news media is irrelevant in this case,
hence the null TV exposure* skepticism interaction. Indeed, given the amount of criticism
of cultivation in the literature, one should be cautious about the findings. The intention of
this chapter was not to resolve the methodological difficulties in cultivation research, but
rather to examine the moderating role of skepticism in cultivation, to the extent that we
interpret the association between exposure to cultivation outcome measures as media
effects. If one does not accept these associations as evidence for a media effect, then the
test for an interaction with media skepticism is indeed irrelevant
One way to resolve this issue would be through the use of experimental designs. For
example, repeated exposure o f experimental subjects to televised news violence (e.g.,
crime stories) should produce stronger cultivation effects for non-skeptics than for
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skeptics. Such a design could resolve the debate over whether a media effect is
moderated by skepticism - or not moderated, should the results we found in this chapter
be replicated in such a study. Experimental manipulation and random assignment to
treatments would enable us to test for the hypothesized moderation with somewhat less
concern over whether the association between exposure and the cultivation outcome
measures represents a media effect or something else.
Null findings can always be viewed as representing some study artifact. However,
there is still the possibility that the null findings indicate that there was no association in
the data. In our case, it could simply be that media skepticism does not moderate the
association between television news exposure and social mistrust, political moderateness,
and gender positions. These associations are only a few possible cultivation effects, and
of a specific type. They are all referred to in the literature as “second order” effects. The
more basic social realities cultivated by television - the “first order” cultivation effects were not examined at all in this chapter due to lack of adequate data.
It could be that skepticism moderates first order but not second order, cultivation. In
other words, it could be that the more basic, fact-related perceptions stemming from
exposure to news are indeed moderated by skepticism and suspicion toward the news
media. Cultivation implies, first and foremost, that televised “statistics” influence
viewers. First order cultivation refers to, for example, assessments about the rate of males
employed in law enforcement, the rate of all crimes that are violent, and the rate of
occurrence o f fatal violence between strangers or acquaintances. It could be that skeptics
are less likely to accept the television answer to these questions than non-skeptics
because of their lower trust in the news media. Second order cultivation, which is viewed
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by cultivation scholars as extrapolations of the first order information into broader
perceptions and values (like fear and mistrust), was not affected by skepticism, as we
have seen, but it is still worth examining whether first order cultivation would be.
In sum, more evidence is needed using other first and second order cultivation
outcome measures, and probably also other research designs, before we can clearly
determine whether the null findings mean that media skepticism does not intervene in
cultivation. In other words, the research presented in this chapter needs to be replicated in
order to advance our knowledge of the intervening role of media skepticism in
cultivation. First order outcome measures and other second order outcome measures (e.g.
attitudes toward the elderly, minorities, sexual minorities, various professions, and other
typical cultivation outcomes) should be used.
If we repeat this analysis using additional designs and outcome measures and still get
the same null results, we could probably conclude that news media skepticism does not
moderate cultivation. In that case we could probably argue that cultivation is so powerful,
so insinuating, so manipulative, so robust, that it affects even those least trusting of
television. The possibility of tracking such a powerful media effect not in terms of its
magnitude, but rather in terms of its reach (all heavy-viewing audiences, regardless of
their skepticism), should probably motivate scholars desperately seeking for such media
effects to pursue this line of research.
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Table 8.1: Multiple rw n w lon models predicting cultivation outcome m w u iw . uelno
television exposure. confidence in television and dereoQraohic variables (GSS1972-19961
B

P

Dependent variable:
Dependent variable:
Social mistrust (MWI) Gender positions

Dependent variable:
Political moderateness

(S.E)
Model 1

Model 2

i
o

TV hours

.06
(.01)

Sex (Male=1)

Race (White=1)

Age

Class

Confidence in TV

-.16—
-.23
(00)
.20***
.04
(03)
-J.20—
-.19
(05)
-.02*“
-.17
(00)
-.27***
-.08
(03)
.10**
.03
(03)

.22
(.00)
.05
.01
(03)

7.09—
(14)
.15—
11,347

7.51—
(12)
.15—
11,347

Model 5
.01*
.02
(-00)

3.37—
(12)
.18—
12,697

.01*
.02
(00)
-.02—
-.06
(00)
-.11—
-.06
(.01)
.17—
.06
(02)
.00
-.01
(00)
-.06—
-.04
(01)

-.02—
-.06
(00)
-.11—
-.06
(01)
.17—
.06
(02)
.00
-.01
(00)
-.06—
-.04
(01)
-.05—
-.04
(01)

-.09**
-.02
(03)
-.05—
-.02
(01)
3.63—
(14)
.18—
12,697

Model 6

I
otoi*

(TV hours - TV hours)*

R2
N

.22
(.00)
.05
.01
(03)
-.09**
-.02
(03)

.10**
.03
(03)
.00
.00
(01)

CONTV - CONTV

(CONTV-CONTV)
Constant

-.23—
-.30
(00)
.15—
.03
(03)
-.07
-.01
(05)

-.02*
-.02
(01)
-.23—
-.30
(00)
.15—
.03
(03)
-.07
-.01
(05)

I
oCO

Education

.07—
.06
(01)
-.16—
-.23
(00)
.20—
.04
(03)
-1.20—
-.19
(05)
-.02—
-.17
(00)
-.27—
-.08
(03)

Model 4

i
oCO

TV hours - TV hours

Model 3
-.02*
-.01
(01)

-.04
(01)
.01
.01
(.00)
3.44—
(05)
.01—
14,013

3.54—
(04)
.01—
14,013

Notes: * p<.05; ** p<.01; — p< 001; The minimal tolerance is .77.
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Table 8.2: Testing ter the moderating rote of confidence In television on malnstraamlna
effects (GSS1972-19961.
Dependent
variable = Social
mistrust (MWI)
Model 7

Dependent
variable =
Gender positions
Model 8

Dependent
variable =
Moderateness
Model 9

Education * exposure
Education * exposure *
confidence in TV
R2
N
Demographic variable race

P<.001
n.s.

p<.001
n.s.

p<.01
n.s.

.13
11,365
Model 10

.15
12,726
M odem

.01
14,038
Model 12

Race* exposure
Race * exposure *
confidence in TV
R2
N

P<.05
n.s.

p<.001
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

.15
11,346

.18
12,696

.18
1,900

Demographic variable =
education

Notes: All models control for education, race, sex and social class.
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Table 8.3: Multiple regression models predicting cultivation outcome measures. using
television ntw« exposure. madia skepticism and demographic variables (NES 1996).
B

P

Dependent variable:
Social mistrust (MWI)

News media
exposure

Model
1
.00
.02
(00)

Dependent variable:
Gender positions

Dependent variable:
Political moderateness

Model
4
.07—
.10
(01)

Model
7
.02*
.06
(01)

(S.E)
Model
2
.01*
.05
(-00)

Model
3
.01*
.05
(00)

•

.

Race (White=1)

.19—
-.16
(02)

.20—
-.16
(02)

-

-

Age

•00—
-.15
(00)
-.01
-.02
(02)

•00—
-.15
(00)
-.01
-.02
(02)

Sex(Male=1)

Education

.49
.00
1515

Model
9
.02*
.06
(01)
.10
.03
(08)

.01—
.17
(00)

-.01
-.03
(00)

-.01
-.03
(00)

.08
.02
(08)

-.10
-.05
(05)
-.10*
-.13
(01)

-.10*
-.05
(05)
-.05*
-.13
(01)

3.59
.02
1244

.13—
-.11
(06)
.01
.02
(01)
3.60
.03
1244

Model
6
.02
.03
(02)
-.10
-.02
(12)

.01—
.17
(00)
.08
.02
(08)

•

•

•

-

.05—
-.30
(00)

.05—
-.30
(00)
.06—
.12
(00)

.08—
-.13
(01)

.08—
-.13
(01)
.20—
.09
(05)

Media skepticism

Exposure*media
skepticism
Constant
R2
N

Model
8
.02*
.06
(01)
.09
.03
(08)

Model
5
.02
.03
(02)
-.09
-.01
(.12)

1.48
.13
1515

.00
.07
(00)
1.49
.15
1515

2.25
.01
1463

2.63
.06
1463

-.03
-.03
(02)
2.64
.07
1463

2.88
.00
1244

Notes: 9 p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.
The lowest tolerance was .80. Centering was used in all models (the coefficients for news media
exposure, media skepticism and the interaction are the coefficients for the centered terms).
Alternative measures of news media exposure (using newspaper exposure, and a combined
measure of TV news exposure and newspaper exposure) were tried separately. In all cases the
exposure*skepticism interaction was not significant
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T iblt 8 i: Multiple repression nwd»l» predicting tear of crime and MWI. using local
television n w ii mdoiuw . media skepticism. and demographic variables (NES 19961.
B
P
(S.E)

Local news
exposure
Race (White=1)

Age

Sex (Male=1)

Education

Dependent variable:
Social mistrust (MWI)
Model 1 Model 2
.01
.01*
.03
.05
(.00)
(00)
-.19“ *
-.16
(02)
-.00***
-.14
(00)
-.01
-.02
(02)
-.05—
-.29
(00)

Media skepticism

Exposure*media
skepticism
Constant
R2
N

.49
.00
1514

1.46
.13
1514

Model3
.01*
05
(00)
-.20—
-.16
(02)
-.00—
-.14
(00)
-.01
-.02
(.02)
-.05—
-.30
(00)
.06—
.11
(01)
.00
.01
(.00)
1.47
.15
1514

Dependent variable:
Fear of crime
Model 4
.02*
.05
(00)

2.26
.00
1517

Model 5 Model 6
.02*
.02*
.05
.05
(01)
(01)
-.32—
-.33—
-.11
-.12
(01)
(01)
-.00
-.00
-.03
-.03
(00)
(00)
-.29—
-.29—
-.15
-.15
(04)
(04)
-.02*
-.02*
-.05
-.05
(01)
(01)
.06*
.05
(03)
-.00
-.00
(01)
2.63
2.64
.04
.05
1517
1517

Notes: * p<.10; * p<05; ** p<.01; — p<.001.
The lowest tolerance was .80. Centering was used in all models (the coefficients for news media
exposure, media skepticism and the interaction are the coefficients for the centered terms).
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Table 8.5: Testing for th« moderating rote of confidence in television on mainstreaming
effects (NES 19961. .
Dependent
variable = Social
mistrust (MWI)
Model 1

Dependent
variable =
Gender positions
Model 2

Dependent
variable =
Moderateness
Model 3

Education * exposure
Education * exposure *
media skepticism
R2
N
Demographic variable =
race

p<.05
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

.13
1,515
Model 4

.15
1,463
Model 5

.04
1,245
Model 6

Race * exposure
Race * exposure * media
skepticism
R2
N
Demographic variable =
gender

n.s
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

p<.10
n.s.

.15
1,515
Model 7

.08
1,463
Model 8

.04
1,245
Model 9

Gender * exposure
Gender * exposure media
skepticism
R2
N

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

.13
1,515

.15
1,463

.04
1,245

Demographic variable =
education

Notes: All models control for education, race, sex and age. Centering was used in all models.
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Tibto 8.6: MuHloto war—ston m odtlt predicting cultivation outcome m m u m . using
f ievision n m exposure. im dli skepticism and demographic vartebies (APPC 2000>.
B
P
(S.E)
News media
exposure
Race (White=1)

Age

Sex (Male=1)

Education

Dependent variable:
Political moderateness
Model 1 Model 2
.01*
.01*
.04
.04
(.00)
(00)
.03
.01
(05)
-.04
-.01
(00)
-.02
-.01
(02)
.00
.01
(00)

Media skepticism

Exposure*media
skepticism
Constant
R2
N

2.31
.00
2,403

2.26
.00
2,403

Model 3
.01*
.04
(00)
.03
.01
(05)
-.04
-.00
(00)
-.00
-.00
(02)
.00
.02
(00)
-.06***
-.09
(01)
.01*
.04
(00)
2.21
.01
2,403

Notes:# p<.10; * p<.05; **p<01; — p<.001.
The lowest tolerance was .87. Centering was used in all models (the coefficients for news media
exposure, media skepticism and the interaction are the coefficients for the centered terms).
Alternative measures of news media exposure (using newspaper exposure, and a combined
measure of TV news exposure and newspaper exposure) were tried separately. In all cases the
exposure*skepticism interaction was not significant
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Table 8.7: T—tfna for the modTitina role of media skepticism on mainstreaming effects
(APPC 20001.

Demographic variable =
education
Education * exposure
Education * exposure *
media skepticism
R2
N
Demographic variable =
race
Race * exposure
Race *exposure * media
skepticism
R2
N
Demographic variable =
gender
Gender * exposure
Gender * exposure *
media skepticism
R2
N

Dependent
variable =
Moderateness
Model 1
n.s.
n.s.
.01
2,403
Model 2
n.s.
n.s.
.01
2,403
Models
p<.001
n.s.
.02
2,403

Notes: All models control for education, race, sex and age. Centering was used in all models.

261

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 8.8:WLS models predicting cultivation outcome immuiw. using television ntw»
exposure. madia skepticism and demoorapiiic variables (PTR1996).
B
P
(S.E)

News media
exposure
Race (White=1)

Age

Education

Model 1 Model 2
-.08***
-.01
-.06
-.00
(02)
(02)
-.42*“
-.13
(06)
-.01*"
-.18
(00)
-.11*
-.05
(04)
-.13*"
-.29
(01)

Media skepticism

Exposure * media
skepticism
Constant
R2
N

2.45
.00
2,068

5.17
.13
2,068

Dependent variable:
Political moderateness
Model 3
-.01
-.00
(02)
-.42*"
-.13
(06)
-.01*"
-.18
(00)
-.11*

Model 4
.04*
.05
(01)

Model 5
.03*
.04
(01)
.07*
.03
(04)
.00*
.04
(.00)
-.02
-.01
(03)
.00
.00
(00)

Model 6
.03*
.04
(01)
.06
.03
(04)
.00*
.04
(00)
-.02
-.01
(03)
.00
.00
(00)
-.07
.05
(03)
.02
.01
(03)

.00
2,031

.01
2,031

.01
2,031

oto•'

Sex (Male=1)

Dependent variable:
Social mistrust (MW1)

(04)
-.13*"
-.29
(01)
.11*
.04
(04)
-.01
-.00
(05)
5.16
.14
2,068

Notes: * p<.10; * p< 05; " p< 01; *" p<.001.
The lowest tolerance was .83. Centering was used in all models (the coefficients for news media
exposure, media skepticism and the interaction are the coefficients for the centered terms).
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Table 8.9: T ilin g for the moderating rote of confidence in television on mainstreaming
effects (PTR1996).
Dependent
variable = Social
mistrust (MWI)
Model 1

Dependent
variables
Moderateness
Model 2

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
P<.01

.14
2,068
Model 3

.01
2,031
Model 4

Race * exposure
Race * exposure * media
skepticism
R2
N
Demographic variable =
gender

P<.01
n.s.

P<.05
P<10

.14
2,068
Model 5

.01
2,031
Model 6

Gender * exposure
Gender *exposure *
media skepticism
R2
N

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

.14
2,068

.01
2,031

Demographic variable =
Education
Education * exposure
Education * exposure *
media skepticism
R2
N
Demographic variable =
race

Notes: All models control for education, race, sex and age. Centering was used in all models.
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Table 8.10: OLS models predicting cultivation outcome m m rn w , w ing television news
exposure. madia ilm Hlchin and demographic variables (EDIalooue 2000I.

Age

Sex (Male=1)

Education

Media skepticism

Exposure * media
skepticism
Constant
R2
N

.41
.00
638

1.25
.10
638

Model 3
.01
.03
(00)
-.09*

Model 4
.03
.04
(03)

o00
•*

-.07
(04)
-.05—
-.23
(00)
-.04
-.05
(03)
-.03—
-.15
(.00)

Race (White=1)

Dependent variable:
Political moderateness

(04)
-.05—
-.23
(00)
-.04
-.05
(03)
-.03—
-.15
(00)
.11
.05
(08)
.02
.02
(03)
1.26
.10
638

2.16
.00
640

Model 5
.04
.06
(03)
-.07
-.01
(18)
-.01*
-.07
(00)
-.25*
-.07
(12)
-.19—
-.21
(03)

5.28
.06
640

Model 6
.04
.06
(03)
-.04
-.01
(.18)
-.01*
•

Model 1 Model 2
-.00
.01
-.05
.02
(00)
(00)
•
O
00•

News media
exposure

Dependent variable:
Social mistrust (MWI)

o00

B
P
(S.E)

(00)
-.26*
-.08
(12)
-.18—
-.21
(03)
-.92—
-.10
(33)
-.10
-.02
(15)
5.24
.07
640

Notes: * p<.10; • p<.05; ** p<01; — p<.001.
The lowest tolerance was .82. Centering was used in all models (the coefficients for news media
exposure, media skepticism and the interaction are the coefficients for the centered terms).
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Figure 8.1: Tha affect of TV m w «ui» (hour* of daily witching) on aw d w equality
pogWong (Owgalitarian positions. 8»non-ggaHtarian pggitiongh bv confidence in TV
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Figure 8.2: An example of a mainstreaming effect and of the hypothesized moderating rote
of m dlw ict skepticism in mainstreaming.
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Figure 8.3: Interpretation of Model 7
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Figure 8.4: Interpretation of Model 8
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Figure 8.5: Interpretation of model 9
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Figure 8.6: Interpretation of Model 10
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Figure 8.8: Interpretation of Model 1 (Table 8.5)
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Figure 8.9: Interpretation of Model 6 (Table 8.5)
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Figure 8.10: Interpretation of Model 3 (Table 8.6)
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Figure 8.11: Interpretation of Model 3 (Table 8.7)
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Figure 8.12: Interpretation of Model 3 (Table 8.9)
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Figure 8 -13 : Interpretation of Modal 4 (Table 8 -9 )
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Figure 8.14: Interpretation of tha Modal 4. T«bh 8.9. thr—-wav Interaction
IPTR 1996 data!.
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Figure 8.1 S: Interpretation of the Model 2. Table 8.9. thr—-wav interaction
(PTR1996 datai.
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Chapter 9: Media skepticism and priming.

Virtually all reviews of priming mention that the concept originated in cognitive
psychology. The starting point is almost always the “accessibility” or “availability”
heuristic. Psychologists found that “people solve problems with what comes to mind”.
When a construct is accessible in people’s memories, it is presumed to influence their
judgments more than when it is not accessible. “Priming” refers to the enhancement of a
construct’s impact on judgments by making it more cognitively available. In media
studies, “priming effects” refer to the ability of the news media to make certain constructs
or considerations more influential in decision making. Priming effects imply that while
the media are not so powerful in telling us what to think, they are extremely powerful in
telling us with what to think: what considerations to use (what constructs will be
available in our minds), and how much weight to give to the different considerations
when we think.
The concept of media priming has been widely applied in the political
communication domain. Providing the first evidence of media priming, Iyengar and
Kinder’s experimental subjects watched news telecasts that were manipulated to contain
stories dealing with defense (e.g., their Experiment 1), while their control group watched
the same newscast without the defense items (an unemployment item was shown
instead). For both groups, Iyengar and Kinder (1987:65*9) calculated the effect of
presidential-defense-performance-rating on overall presidential performance (i.e., the
regression coefficient for the effect of problem-specific evaluations on general
274
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presidential evaluations). The pruning effect is the significant difference between the
coefficients of the experimental and the control groups (i.e., an issue-exposure * issuespecific-evaluation interaction was their test for priming). They found this interaction to
be significant at the .05 level, not only in this example, but also in an additional eight of
their 11 models93 dealing with various issues including inflation, arms control,
unemployment and energy. In some cases, “the importance of the particular problem for
the president’s overall standing more than doubled thanks only to increase in television
news coverage.” (p.68). In sum, Iyengar and Kinder’s experiments demonstrated that
exposure to a newscast containing a particular problem primes that problem, and makes it
an important consideration in audiences’ presidential approval. “By calling attention to
some matters while ignoring others, television news influences the standards by which
governments, presidents, policies and candidates for public office are judged” (Iyengar &
Kinder, 1987:63).
Other scholars have demonstrated priming effects using public opinion surveys
rather than an experimental methodology. For example, Krosnick and Kinder (1990)
found that the intrusion of the Iran-Contra scandal into the media agenda96 shifted the
considerations that people used to evaluate the president, with more emphasis placed on
foreign affairs. Again, the priming effect was operationalized as a difference in
coefficients in regression models predicting presidential evaluation, this time, difference
between the coefficients for people interviewed before and after the scandal appeared on

95 In two other models the p-values for the interactions were at the 2 5 level. The direction o f these
insignificant effects was consistent with their priming hypotheses.
96 On November 25,1986 the Attorney General made a dramatic announcement about the diversion of
funds from the secret sale o f weapons to Iran to the Contras in Nicaragua.
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the top of media agenda. In sum, there is both experimental and non-experimental
research demonstrating “media priming effects”.
The literature on media priming tells us that the media are very influential in telling
audiences with what to think - in particular, how much weight they should give to the
different considerations when they think. But why should people give more weight to the
problems and criteria set by the media when they do not trust the media? Why should the
media “prime” certain topics in the minds of those who do not trust them? If media
skepticism moderates media effects, then the priming effect should be weaker for media
skeptics than for non-skeptics.
Experimental evidence suggests that media priming is indeed moderated by audience
trust in the media. In a series of experiments, Miller and Krosnick (2000) found an
exposure * issue performance * trust * knowledge interaction effect on presidential
evaluations, such that knowledgeable audiences who trusted the media were affected by
priming, while other audiences were not. This led them to suggest that “further
investigation of the role of media trust in regulating agenda setting and priming seems
merited” (p. 303).
Given these past findings, and the rationale of my “moderating role of media
skepticism in media effects” thesis, we may formulate the following hypothesis:
HI.4a: The priming effect will be weaker for media skeptics than for non-skeptics
(an exposure*issue performance*media skepticism interaction).
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Given Miller and Krosnick’s finding of a trust*knowledge interaction, we should expect
knowledgeable and media-trusting audiences to be more susceptible to priming than other
audiences. Hence,
H14.b: There will be a four-way knowledge*skepticism*exposure*issueperformance interaction such that the priming effect will be stronger for
knowledgeable and trusting audiences than for any other group.

Study 1: The PTR data.
The dependent variable in this study is an overall opinion regarding President Bill
Clinton. All PTR respondents were asked for their “overall opinions” of the President.
Response categories were “very favorable” (coded “5”), “mostly favorable” (coded “4”),
“mostly unfavorable” (coded “2”), “very unfavorable” (coded “ 1”), and “can’t rate”
(coded “3”). Respondents were also asked to rate the way President Clinton was handling
his job on some specific issues (the economy, foreign policy, the deficit, Medicare and
welfare reform). Response categories were “approve” (coded “1”) and “disapprove”
(coded “0”). Since economic issues dominated the media agenda at the time of the study
(as the media content analysis in the agenda setting study showed; see Table 6.1), the
media presumably “primed” the economy as a consideration in people’s judgments about
the President. So the influence of the evaluation of Clinton in the economic domain on
the general opinion of him should be higher as exposure to the news media increases
(exposure and issue performance are expected to interact in their effect on the overall
presidential evaluation). HI .4a predicts that this priming effect will be weaker as a
function of media skepticism.
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Table 9.1 presents cumulative logistic regression models testing HI.4. Cumulative
logit is the most highly recommended method for ordered categorical dependent variables
(Allison, 1999; McCullagh, 1980). Unlike OLS, it does not require that the dependent
variable be continuous or normally distributed. Cumulative logit also does not make any
assumption about the distance between the observed categories 97. As before, weighting
was used throughout the analysis because of the overrepresentation of talk radio listeners
in this file. Model 1 shows a significant two-way exposure * issue-performance
interaction effect on overall Clinton evaluation, controlling for ideology, involvement and
political knowledge. As Figure 9.1 shows, approval of Clinton’s handling of the economy
was stronger for those receiving more media coverage than for those low on media
exposure. That is, the weight assigned to economic issues was stronger for those
receiving more media coverage. Since economy was at the top of the media agenda at
that time, this could be interpreted as evidence for priming. That is, one could read the
data as suggesting that the media “primed” economic issues as a consideration for
presidential evaluation.
On the other hand, additional models showed no evidence for a statistically
significant interaction of media exposure with specific evaluations of Clinton’s handling
of foreign affairs, the deficit, Medicare and welfare reform. That is, increased media
exposure did not lead audiences to assign more weight to these issues when evaluating
the president These null interactions, at least in the cases of the deficit, Medicare and
welfare, do not contradict priming theory. Since these issues received only limited media
attention at the time of study they were not supposed to be “primed” by the media.
97 An OLS model (which is less appropriate for ordinal dependent variables) provided the same patterns for
the relevant variables in terms o f coefficient signs and significance.
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Priming theory does not argue that media exposure should increase the importance of any
issue in political decision-making or evaluation, only issues that receive media attention.
The fact that exposure did not interact with evaluation of Clinton’s handling of foreign
affairs is contrary to what one might expect according to “priming”, because foreign
affairs did receive ample media attention (the issue ranked second on the media agenda at
the time of study).
In sum, the data could be interpreted as containing evidence for media “priming” of
the economy, but not of foreign affairs, at the time of the first wave of the PTR study
(early 1996). However, the focus here is not on priming by itself, but rather on the role
played by media skepticism in priming processes. HI.4a predicts that priming will be
weaker as a function of media skepticism. Step 2 of Table 9.1 examines this hypothesis.
As the table shows, there was no evidence for a three-way exposure* skepticism*
evaluation of Clinton on the economy interaction effect. That is, the association between
overall Clinton evaluation, media exposure and specific evaluation of Clinton in the
economic domain was the same regardless of media skepticism. The exposure*economicevaluation interaction took place for skeptics and non-skeptics alike. Thus, there is no
evidence for HI .4a in the PTR data.
Hypothesis 1.4b predicted a four-way interaction between media exposure, media
skepticism, political knowledge and issue-specific presidential evaluation in their effect
on overall presidential approval. Knowledgeable and trusting audiences are expected,
following Miller and Krosnick, to be more influenced by priming than other audiences.
Step 3 of the model tests this hypothesis. As the table shows, there was no evidence for a
four-way exposure* knowledge* skepticism* specific evaluation of Clinton in the
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economic domain interaction effect on overall Clinton evaluation. If we divide
respondents to four groups based on their levels of political knowledge and media
skepticism (low-knowledge-low-skepticism; low-knowledge-high-skepticism; highknowledge-low-skepticism and high-knowledge-high-skepticism), these groups will not
show significantly different patterns of priming. The priming effect is not stronger for
knowledgeable non-skeptics than for other respondents. Thus, HI.4b did not receive
support from the data.

Study 2: NES 1996 Data.
The dependent variable in this study is overall presidential approval rating. The question
wording for this item was, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is
handling his job as president?” Response categories ranged from “approve strongly”
(coded “4”) to “disapprove strongly” (coded “ 1”). Respondents were also asked to
evaluate the president's performance in specific domains: the economy, “our relations
with foreign countries”, the environment, and health care. These variables were also
coded “4” for “approve strongly” and “1” for “disapprove strongly”, with varying
categories in between.
The content analysis showed that the news media devoted a lot of attention to foreign
affairs and the economy in the weeks preceding the NES 1996 data collection, and much
less attention to the environment and health (see Table 6.6). Hence, according to priming
theory, news exposure should increase the weight audiences gave to economic and
foreign affairs when judging the president’s overall performance. That is, media exposure
is expected to interact with the evaluation of Clinton’s handling of these two specific
280
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domains in their effect on overall presidential evaluation. However, my hypotheses
predict that these patterns will be stronger for non-skeptical audience, especially those
with high levels of political knowledge.
Table 9.2 presents cumulative logit models testing the hypotheses regarding the
media’s priming of economic issues. Similarly, Table 9.3 presents models testing the
hypotheses regarding media priming of foreign affairs. All models control for
demographics, political interest, ideology and knowledge. As the first step of each model
shows, both cases provide evidence for the priming hypothesis. In other words, the
coefficient for the news-exposure * issue-specific-evaluation interaction effect was
statistically significant in both cases.
For an interpretation of Step 1 of Table 9.2, examine Figure 9.298. The figure shows
that the effect of the issue-specific evaluation of Clinton in the economic domain was
stronger for those who were exposed to the media seven days in the previous week than
for those with less media exposure. As media exposure decreased, the association
between Clinton’s handling of the economy and people’s overall presidential evaluation
weakened. It may therefore be argued that the media “primed” economic issues in August
and September of 1996, and thus influenced the accessibility of these issues for political
judgments.
The interpretation of Step 1 of Table 9.3 is presented in Figure 9.3. Again, this figure
shows that the association between evaluation of Clinton’s handling of a specific issue this time foreign affairs - and overall presidential approval was stronger for those who

* The figure actually presents OLS estimates o f the predicted values. Cumulative-logit equations predict
the log odds o f being in higher versus lower categories, which are much less intuitively interpretable. As I
mentioned earlier, the results achieved using the two separate methods were almost identical.
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reported higher media exposure. The data can be interpreted as evidence that the media
“primed” foreign affairs. By stressing foreign affairs in their coverage, the media
(supposedly) increased the weight people assigned to foreign issues when evaluating the
president.
In contrast to economic and foreign issues, and in line with “priming theory”, there
was no exposure*health-care-evaluation or exposure*environment-evaluation interaction
(models not presented). In other words, these issues, which did not receive much media
attention, were not “primed” by the media. Their weight in overall evaluation of the
president was unrelated to their level of media exposure. In sum, the data can be
interpreted as providing evidence for media priming of economic and foreign affairs
issues during the time of study.
However, my focus in this chapter is not on priming effects per se, but on the way
these effects are influenced by audience trust in the media. The hypotheses regarding the
moderating effect of media skepticism on news priming are tested in Steps 2 and 3 of
Tables 9.2 and 9.3. HI.4a predicts a three-way exposure*skepticism*issue-evaluation
interaction, such that the priming effect would be weaker for media skeptics. However, as
Step 2 of both models shows, no such interaction was found in the NES 1996 data: there
was no evidence that media skeptics significantly differed from their non-skeptical
counterparts in the way they were (apparently) influenced by the media. The association
between the issue-specific evaluation of Clinton (in the economic and foreign affairs
domains) and overall presidential approval was stronger for heavily-exposed individuals,
regardless of media skepticism.
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HI.4b predicted that the priming effect would be stronger for politically
knowledgeable non-skeptics (a four-way interaction between knowledge, exposure
skepticism and specific evaluation of Clinton’s handling of the economy or foreign
affairs). However, as Step 3 of Tables 9.2 and 9.3 shows, there was no evidence in the
NES data for the predicted interaction. In other words, knowledge and skepticism do not
jointly influence the priming process; the exposure* issue-evaluation interaction pattern is
essentially the same, regardless of media skepticism.
Conclusion.
The data at hand provided two examples that could be interpreted as evidence for media
priming effects: the priming of economic issues in early 1996, and the priming of
economic and foreign affairs issues during the late stages of the 1996 campaign. In both
ft

examples, the association between overall presidential approval and evaluations of
presidential performance on specific issues that received vast media exposure was
stronger for audiences who reported heavy news exposure, controlling for demographic
and political factors. However, contrary to what my hypotheses predicted, to the extent
that we could interpret these interactions as evidence for media priming effects, these
effects were not affected by audience trust in the media. Printing effects took place
regardless of media skepticism, as skeptics and non-skeptics were equally likely to be
affected by the media. This was the case in two separate data sets using different
sampling designs and two different measures of skepticism.
There was also no evidence for stronger priming effects for knowledgeable non
skeptics, compared to other respondents. The four-way interaction hypothesized by

283

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Miller and Krosnick (2000) was not significant in the two data sets used in this study.
Thus, to the extent that the two-way interactions are indeed evidence for priming effects,
these effects were not jointly affected by audience trust in the media and political
knowledge. Again, this was the case in two independent data sets with two separate
measures of skepticism.
Thus, the data failed to replicate the earlier experimental findings reported by Miller
and Krosnick (2000). A potential explanation for this could be the difference between
experimental and survey research designs. The experimental effect is more short-term in
terms of the time span between exposure to media contents and measurement of the
response to the media messages. Miller and Krosnick’s subjects were asked about their
trust in the media and about their overall and specific presidential evaluations
immediately after their exposure to the experimental manipulation. This time conjuncture
might have led to a more conscious response pattern on the part of the experimental
subjects, compared to that of the survey respondents. Media contents for the present
survey-based studies were monitored for a relatively long time span, and exposure took
place in the natural setting of everyday life. Under these conditions, the possibility that
survey respondents would respond in accordance with their guesses about the purpose of
the study is very small, especially in comparison to an experimental design.
It could also be that the post-manipulation trust-in-the-media measurement in the
experimental studies was influenced by the specific contents viewed in the different
experimental conditions. For example, some story manipulations may have been
perceived as more credible than others, thereby influencing other responses in the post
survey. Another possibility is that the specific content of the different manipulations
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created the reported patterns. It is important to note that in both studies presented here, as
well as in the Miller and Krosnick experiments, the media skepticism questions were
asked after the presidential evaluation questions. However, as I have pointed out, answers
to all questions could have been influenced by more or less credible specific stories in the
experimental manipulation, but no stimulus in the surveys used here could have
influenced subjects’ answers to the skepticism question. Thus, one set of explanations for
the discrepancies in findings between the present studies and those reported by Miller and
Krosnick (2000) lies in the differences between laboratory experiments and survey
correlation-based designs.
Another possibility is simply that the two-way interactions presented here are not
evidence for priming but, rather, that they are a result of coincidence or of another kind of
artifact (e.g. some sort of response bias). Indeed, apart from a general news media content
analysis there is not much in my survey data that links actual news exposure to news
contents. I am assuming that respondents who watched more news were exposed to more
prominent media issues, and hence more prone to media priming of these issues. The
opposite process also makes some sense, that is, that those who spend more time with the
media receive more coverage of less prominent issues, rather than more coverage of the
same prominent issue. However, one could dispute this assumption and dismiss my twoway interaction findings as something other than priming. This would explain the
discrepancy between this my findings and those of Miller and Krosnick (2000).
It is unlikely that the patterns of priming I found in the survey data were solely due
to chance. Also, the fact that priming effects were found on issues that received ample
media attention, but not on those that did not receive media attention, negates the
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possibility of response bias or other artifacts of this kind. Media exposure was associated
with what it is supposed to prime, not with some general tendency of involved audiences
to rely more heavily on all issues in their presidential evaluation, regardless of their
prominence in the media. So although I cannot say exactly why my hypothesis was not
supported by the data, I think they do demonstrate an association between media priming
and media skepticism.
One possible explanation for the null findings could simply be that media skepticism
does not moderate media priming, i.e., that skeptical and non-skeptical audiences are
equally likely to be affected by media priming. Priming tells us that the media supply
audiences with considerations to use when making political decisions. They do not tell
audiences what to think, but what weight to put on what standards when they think about
politics. One explanation of the null interaction between priming and media skepticism is
simply that this influence is not related to audience trust Audiences may not believe the
actual contents of news stories, but they can still use the standards set by the media,
especially issue prominence standards, when evaluating politicians.
Some scholars conceptualize priming effects as resulting from media agenda setting.
That is, the media set our personal agendas, and we then use these agendas when we
make political evaluations. The media tell us what to think about, and consequently, we
use these issues as important standards and criteria for our political decision-making. If
we accept this view of priming as an outcome of agenda setting, we can explain the null
result as being due to the fact that the personal agendas of skeptics were, in fact,
influenced by the news media, at least to some degree (if we accept the findings
presented in Chapter 6 as agenda setting). Though substantially less prone to media
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agenda influences than non-skeptics, the correlations between general media agenda and
public agenda for skeptics were rather high - .58 in the PTR data and .51 in the NES data
(see Tables 6.2 and 6.7). Although skeptics were somewhat less likely than non-skeptics
to mention the economy and foreign affairs as their most important problems, many did
learn from the media about the importance of these issues. The differences in agenda
setting could have been too small to create differences in its consequence, priming.
Since the null hypotheses could not be rejected, and since this null findings stands in
contrast to previously published findings that were obtained using a different
methodology, more research is probably needed to gain more knowledge about media
skepticism and priming. Meta-analysis will eventually be required that would combine
these contradictory findings to reach more valid conclusions.
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Figure 9.1: Priming: the effect o f issu e performance on
Clinton approval, by media exposure
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Figure 9l2: Tha effect of issue evaluation on overall Clinton
evalutfton (intapratation of Step 1, Table 9.2)
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Figure 9.3: The effect of issue evslustion on overall Clinton
evslustion (interpretation of Step 1, Table 9.3)
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Table 9.1; Priming, madia iton B d w i and political knowledge. Cumulative logit models
predicting Clinton overall avaluatktn uaina avaluation of Clinton'* performance on tha
aconomv (PTW1990.

Evaluation of Clinton’s
performance on economic issues
(CLINEC)
Media exposure
CLINEC * exposure
Media skepticism
Skepticism * exposure
Skepticism * CLINEC
CLINEC * skepticism *exposure
Knowledge
Knowledge* CLINEC
Knowledge * exposure
Knowledge * skepticism
Knowledge * CLINEC * exposure
Knowledge * CLINEC * skepticism
Knowledge * skepticism * exposure
Knowledge * skepticism * CLINEC
* exposure
R2
Unweighted N

Step 1
1.58***
(45)

Step 2
1.17"
(73)

Step 3
n.s.

n.s.
.32*
(.15)

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
.93*
(.51)
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

.44
1,519

.45
1,415

.45
1,415

Notes: Table entries are weighted cumulative logit regression coefficients. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors.
p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; *** p <.001.
All models control for demographic factors, political interest, political ideology and political
knowledge.
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Table 9.2; Primlno. media skepticism and political knowledge. Cumulative log It mod«t«
predicting Clinton ovarall tob approval using avaluation of Clinton's parformanca on tha
aconomv INES19961.

Evaluation of Clinton's
performance on economic issues
(CLINEC)
Media exposure
CLINEC *exposure
Media skepticism
Skepticism * exposure
Skepticism * CLINEC
CLINEC * skepticism * exposure
Knowledge
Knowledge * CLINEC
Knowledge * exposure
Knowledge * skepticism
Knowledge * CLINEC * exposure
Knowledge * CLINEC * skepticism
Knowledge * skepticism *exposure
Knowledge * skepticism * CLINEC
* exposure
R2
N

Stepl
1.50***
(07)

Step 2
1.46***
(.41)

Step 3
1.46*
(88)

-.19*
(07)
.07**
(02)

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

.63
1,304

.63
1,304

.62
1,308

Notes: Table entries are cumulative logit regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors.
# p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; *** p <.001.
All models control for demographic factors, political interest, political ideology and political
knowledge.
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T»bh 9.3: Priming, media skepticism and political hw w hdw . Cumulative logit modele
predicting Clinton overall job approval using •valuation of Clinton's performance on
foreign affaire (WES 19ML

Evaluation of Clinton's
performance on foreign affairs
(CLINFOR)
Media exposure
CLINFOR * exposure
Media skepticism
Skepticism * exposure
Skepticism * CLINFOR
CLINFOR * skepticism * exposure
Knowledge
Knowledge * CLINFOR
Knowledge * exposure
Knowledge * skepticism
Knowledge * CLINFOR * exposure
Knowledge * CLINFOR *
skepticism
Knowledge * skepticism * exposure
Knowledge * skepticism *
CLINFOR * exposure
R2
N

Step 1
.83***
(09)

Step 2
.76*
(35)

Step 3
n.s.

-.25—
(06)
.09—
(02)

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.

n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

.53
1,309

.54
1,305

.55
1,305

Notes: Table entries are cumulative logit regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors.
# p<.10; *p<.05; **p<01; — p <.001.

All models control for demographic factors, political interest, political ideology and
political knowledge
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Chapter 10: Media skepticism as a moderator in media effects.

In the beginning of this section I asked: Does audience trust in the media matter in media
effects? The answer, it seems, depends on the type of media effect in question. Trust in
the news media seems to moderate the perception of the media’s climate of opinion (a
component of the spiral-of-silence effect): the higher the skepticism, the higher the
rejection of the mediated opinion climate. There is also evidence for a moderating role of
audience mistrust in the agenda setting process: trusting audiences tended more than
skeptical audiences to converge with the mainstream news media on the most important
problems.
On the other hand, trust in the media does not seem to moderate news cultivation
effects: media skeptics and non-skeptics did not significantly differ in the way they were
(presumably) affected by the media on cultivation outcome measures. Also, trust in the
media does not seem to moderate priming effects, as skeptics did not differ from non
skeptics in the way they used the standards set by the media when making political
evaluations.
It is important to note that the fact that HI.l and H1.2 were supported, while H1.3
and HI .4 received no confirmation, is not by itself contradictory. Agenda setting and
cultivation, priming and spiral-of-silence are different theories representing different
phenomena, perhaps with different cognitive processes operating in the background. We
cannot expect the intervening role of media skepticism to be identical across this broad
range of theories. However, since in Chapter 5 these separate theories were discussed
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under one framework, and since the same explanations were used to justify the separate
hypotheses, some consistency could have simplified our interpretations of the findings.
Absent such consistent findings, we must ask ourselves: Why did media skepticism
moderate the acceptance of the media's climate of opinion and agenda, while not
interfering with news cultivation and priming processes? This question can be answered
on various levels. In the following pages I offer two major kinds of explanations:
methodological and conceptual.

Methodological explanations.
Model specification. One methodological explanation for the fact that HI .3 and
H1.4 were not supported, in contrast to H l.l and H1.2, might have to do with imperfect
specification of the statistical models. For example, it might be that the hypothesized
moderation of media effects by media skepticism takes place under certain conditions
that occurred in the case of agenda setting and spiral-of-silence, but not in the case of
priming and cultivation. From the theoretical standpoint, Petty and Cacioppo's (1986)
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) offers one such condition - that of involvement.
According to ELM, involvement fosters people’s motivation to engage in issue
relevant thinking. Under this condition of personal relevance, elaboration likelihood is
said to be high. This means that people will attend more carefully to the message,
scrutinize it, and consequently make up their minds about it based on its substantial
argumentative and informational qualities. On the other hand, when messages are not
important or personally relevant to recipients, they will not allocate cognitive resources to
evaluating the substantial qualities of the message. Rather, they will use “peripheral
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cues...triggering relatively primitive affective states that become associated with the
attitude object” (p. 18). Petty and Cacioppo see source credibility as such a peripheral
cue. Thus, ELM sees source credibility as a relevant factor in persuasion only when
elaboration is low. When the issue at stake is relevant and important to the recipients,
they will not use the credibility shortcut; rather, they will base their judgments on the
substantial qualities of the message. This is a major modification of the source credibility
hypothesis. As mentioned above, my resistance hypothesis is an extension of the classic
source credibility hypothesis. Thus, it might be that ELM modifications apply to media
skepticism and media effects. Is low involvement a necessary condition for the resistance
hypothesis to work?
No evidence in the data suggested that this is the case. In many of the models
reported in Chapters 6 through 9, an interaction of skepticism with political involvement
was tried. Since it was not statistically significant it was not reported. However, in these
interaction models I used political involvement (measured as interest in politics,
sometimes combined with measures of news attention) as the operationalization of
“involvement”. One might argue that this is not exactly what Petty and Cacioppo had in
mind. The problem is that the data at hand did not contain better measures tapping factors
such as personal relevance or responsibility. In many cases, it is even hard to think about
such factors conceptually. What would be considered as “personal relevance” when the
outcome measure is overall presidential evaluation? What would be considered “personal
involvement” of people with the perceived climate of opinion (other than actually
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working on a campaign)? For these reasons, I do not find ELM’s ideas applicable in the
contexts of priming, cultivation and spiral-of-silence".
Study artifacts. Another way to explain the fact that skepticism moderated agenda
setting and the perception of opinion climate but not cultivation and priming is to look for
some plausible artifacts. This could be done in two general ways: attacking the validity of
the null findings in the cases of cultivation and priming, or attacking the validity of the
confirmation of the hypotheses in the cases of agenda setting and spiral-of-silence. For
example, the fact that we got evidence that could be interpreted as consistent with
priming or cultivation does not assure us that what we observed is indeed a priming or a
cultivation effect - and if they are not effects, the null findings about the intervening role
of skepticism are meaningless. On the other hand, how can we be sure that the agenda
setting and spiral-of-silence effects are indeed media effects and not something else?
What about possible reverse causality (namely that people adopt alternative agendas
because they hate the media)? Another possibility is that moderating role of skepticism in
priming or cultivation might be too small to be detected by the interaction tests, possibly
due to lack of statistical power. That is, an argument can perhaps be made for small
effects in cultivation and priming and large, robust effects in agenda setting and spiral-ofsilence. In other words, one solution to the inconsistency may lie in some study artifact
that leads us to false conclusions either in the cases of cultivation and priming or in the
99 Still, it could be that some factor other than involvement is intervening in the moderating role o f media
skepticism in media effects, in particular priming and cultivation, given the null findings in this area. To the
best o f my knowledge, none o f the relevant existing theories suggest such factors. Another possibility is
that some non-linearity other than interaction conceals the moderating effect o f skepticism. Much
exploratory analysis in each o f the chapters was devoted to examining this possibility (mainly using
quadratic models, but also by running separate models by level o f skepticism). There was no evidence here
for such non-linearities either. In sum, potential non-linear and interactive forms were tested to the extent
possible by the data and negated. The possibility o f other untestable factors intervening in the process
deserves o f further research.
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cases of agenda setting and climate-of-opinion perceptions. One advantage of statistical
methods is the fact that you never have to say you are certain: there are always reasons
for doubt.
True, we are never immune from reaching erroneous conclusions. However, the
replication of findings across data and the use of statistical controls provide some
protection from study artifacts. An additional important tool that we have at our disposal
is theory to direct us. In all cases we expected that effects would take place, and we found
them. This is a very good justification to move on and study the ways in which these
effects are affected by trust in the media. Guided by these theories and the body of
research they represent, we gain confidence that what we got is what we think we got.
This is the reason that, while being cautious about some of the findings (as we always
should be), I prefer substantial theoretical explanations to blaming invisible study
artifacts for the inconsistencies in the findings. We have theoretical reasons to suspect
that the main effects in all chapters were media effects. Assuming they are indeed media
effects, let us move forward and try to learn something substantial about trust in the
media and the effects of the media, rather than speculating about artifacts, which can
always affect our studies.
Conceptual explanations.
Automatic versus deliberate effects. Another possible explanation has to do with
the automatic process of cultivation and priming compared with the other two
hypothesized effects. This means that the reason the hypotheses worked for agenda
setting and opinion climate perception but not for cultivation and priming is simply
because the former are more straightforward, deliberate and conscious effects, while the
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latter are more unconscious and irresistible, even for the most skeptical audiences. People
cannot resist processes they are totally unaware of. Hence, they cannot resist priming and
cultivation despite their media skepticism.
It could be that cultivation effects are so manipulative, so unconscious from the
audience’s perspective, so demanding for heavy-viewers in terms of repeated exposure,
that even those who are most skeptical about the media are influenced by them. This is
exactly the way Gerbner and his colleagues thought about cultivation. For cultivation
scholars, the univocal, repetitive, stable and unambiguous televised presentations of
reality are so compelling that they are in fact automatic, and as such, irresistible. The
realism of the presentation may be an issue when the content is televised fiction (Potter,
1986). However, it becomes irrelevant for cultivation scholars, when the content creating
the effect is news (Jamieson & Slovic, 1999). Cultivation is perceived to be an
unconscious effect. If you spend much time with television, you accept its mediated
realities without thinking or knowing that you do so. What you think about the news
media becomes irrelevant under such conditions.
Priming, like cultivation, is also an unconscious effect. People do not know that they
are affected by media content when they put more weight on certain criteria in their
evaluation of the president or other political figures. If they are consciously seeking for
ways to express their mistrust in the news media, they would have to change their
answers to questions about issue-specific and general presidential evaluations, and assign
less weight to issues that receive ample media attention in order to convey their media
skepticism through their survey responses. This is not a very easy cognitive task.
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In contrast to priming and cultivation, agenda setting effects and media effects on the
perception of the climate of opinion are quicker and more direct, on the one hand, and at
least somewhat more conscious and deliberate, on the other. When audience members
answer questions like “Who will win the presidential race?” or “What is the most
important problem facing the country?” they are more aware of the “media answer” than
when they answer questions about gender positions or their social mistrust. It could be
that when answering such questions, skeptical audiences are deliberately trying to express
their mistrust of the media. By contrast, news cultivation and priming effects could be so
subtle that they are in fact irresistible, even for the most skeptical audiences.
This possibility - that respondents' answers to agenda setting and opinion climate
questions involve some conscious resistance to the media - is in fact testable. If the
answers to survey questions are due to deliberate resistance, one might expect that people
resisting the media would spend more time thinking about the answer to those questions
than those not resisting the media. Their thoughts when asked who would win the
election in November might be a bit more elaborate. For example: “The media say that
Clinton is going to win. But I don’t trust these liberal media. I think it’s going to be
Dole”. Conscious resistance requires deliberation and we could try to capture this
deliberation by measuring response time or by asking respondents to list the thoughts that
went through their minds when they answered the agenda setting and opinion climate
questions.
Alternate sources of information. Yet another possible explanation for the
inconsistency between the confirmation of H l.l and HI.2 and the null findings for H1.3
and HI .4 has to do with the fact that, as we shall see in Section 3, the information diet of
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skeptics is different from that of non-skeptics. Media skeptics actually get less
mainstream media and more talk radio and political information over the Internet (which
I shall consider as non-mainstream media) than non-skeptics. Some of these sources,
especially the Rush Limbaugh PTR show, are similar to mainstream news in their overall
presentation of reality and the overall standards they use to evaluate politicians. However,
when it comes to pre-election opinion climate, they offer a real alternative - for example,
in 1996 Limbaugh repeatedly asserted that Dole would win despite ‘the liberal media”.
The political agendas of some of these channels differ at least somewhat from those of
the mainstream media100. It may well be that the outcome measures of skeptics actually
represent media effects of exposure to more non-mainstream news. In this case, the
inconsistent results we got for the different theories would actually be a result of
differences between mainstream and non-mainstream channels in some aspects of the
content, and similarities in other aspects.
In order to explain the results using this “altemate-sources” explanation, one must
start with a content analysis of these non-mainstream sources and compare them with
mainstream sources. If this explanation of the inconsistent findings is correct, then the
“social indicators” presented by non-mainstream and mainstream media should be
roughly the same, at least in relation to the outcome variables utilized in Chapter 8
(gender attitudes, social mistrust, political moderation). We should also find differing

100The PTR research team actually analyzed the agenda content o f the Limbaugh show for the same period
discussed in Study I o f Chapter 6. The rank order correlation between the Limbaugh agenda and the
general mainstream media agenda (presented in Table 6.1) was .42 (p<. 10). Taxes,ranked 11.5 on the'
media agenda, were ranked first on Limbaugh’s agenda. Foreign policy, ranked second on the mainstream
agenda, was ranked eighth on Limbaugh’s agenda. However, almost all the last places on the mainstream
media agenda also occupied the last places on Limbaugh’s agenda. Some o f the issues that received much
attention on the media agenda also received much attention in the Limbaugh show (e.g. dissatisfaction with
politicians, economy, morality).

301

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

agenda and climate of opinion contents between the two, at least for the time periods
corresponding to the data collection in the different data sets. From our knowledge of
some non-mainstream content (especially PTR), it is likely that the content would indeed
differ in terms of climate of opinion and issue priority. However, from what we know
about the content of the Limbaugh show, there is little reason to expect the “social
indicators” of mediated realities to be the same as in the mainstream media (there was
relatively little discussion of crime on the show; also, political “moderation” hardly
applies to the show’s presentation of reality). Thus, while there is reason to suspect that
alternate sources might be influencing the results presented in this section, there is little
in what we know about the content of these non-mainstream alternatives that supports the
claim that Limbaugh (for example) uses the same criteria to evaluate politicians, and
presents the same picture of the world, as the mainstream media do.

Discussion.
In the last pages we asked: “Why did skepticism moderate agenda setting and spiral-ofsilence but not cultivation and priming?” A few potential explanations for this
inconsistency were offered. First, the results could be an outcome of an artifact or
artifacts in one or a few of the studies. The second possibility was that the results might
reflect the different media diets of skeptics and non-skeptics. The third explanation
suggested that the findings could simply reflect the more conscious and straightforward
nature of agenda setting and climate-of-opinion effects, in contrast with the automatic
and unconscious nature priming and cultivation. More research would be needed to
determine which of the processes are in fact taking place.
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In a way, the findings offer a crucial validation for the media skepticism measures
used in this study. The fact that the survey questions I used influenced some media
effects demonstrates that these items indeed measure audience mistrust in the media. The
findings also give extra validation to the agenda setting literature and to the media effects
component of the spiral-of-silence theory. That is, if a hypothesized media effect is
affected by audience trust in the media, we can interpret this pattern as strengthening the
case for a “media effect”, rather than for some statistical artifact.
So audience trust in the media seems to matter in media effects, at least some of the
time. This is not a surprising finding, yet it is an important one. In many ways it echoes
the claims by reception theorists about audiences’ ability to “resist” some of the
persuasive powers of media texts (e.g., Morley, 1980; Livingstone, 1997). Audiences
emerge stronger from the findings presented in this section: they are critical and active,
and do not accept the media’s agenda and climate of opinion at face value. In this respect,
the findings tell us that mistrust in the media is liberating.
However, some caution is warranted when we interpret the data. First, the fact that
audiences can resist the media could also be interpreted as rigidity - as refusal to give in
to the realities reported by the media. This is exemplified by the fact that media skeptics
refused in 1996 to accept the media’s prediction that Clinton would win the election.
Rather than resistance or liberation, this could simply be interpreted as shutting one’s ears
and eyes to reality. Second, we should remind ourselves that there was no evidence for a
moderating role of media skepticism in the more insinuating news cultivation and
priming effects. This suggests that if media skeptics are inoculated, it is only against
some media effects. Third, the effects of the media were weaker for media skeptics, but
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they still existed. Thus, mistrustful audiences are not totally immune, but only less
susceptible to, some influences of the media. Ironically, skeptics were as prone to media
cultivation and priming as were non-skeptical audiences. This finding highlights the fact
that we cannot talk about a far-reaching resistive ability, only of a limited one.
In sum, the effects of audience mistrust in the media, even when present, were not
huge. There are clearly other factors in addition to trust in the media that influence the
outcome variables in agenda setting and opinion-climate perceptions. The general
literature on trust suggests that mistrust should lead to lower influence. And indeed, this
is what we found in the cases of agenda setting and opinion climate. However, we did not
find mistrust in the media to be associated with no influence of the mainstream media. In
addition, it seems that only rarely, if at all, did skepticism result in a total boomerang
effect101. Skeptics were not trying to say that the exact opposite of what media say is true.
While mistrust implies suspicion and disbelief, it does not necessarily imply automatic
and unconditional rejection, certainly not an automatic and unconditional acceptance of
the very opposite of what the media say. The realities portrayed by non-skeptics often
conflict with those presented by the media, but the fact that non-skeptics do not give
answers that are the direct opposite of the “media answers” suggests that their resistance
is not childish.
The reception literature offers some examples of audiences reading media texts
upside-down (“the thieves are the good guys / the detectives are the bad guys” kind of
oppositional readings; e.g. Fiske, 1986). While these critical interpretations might take
place when audiences encounter fiction (and this is not necessarily the case; see Condit,
101 For example, even in the most skeptical category respondents thought Clinton would win in 1996 (68.4
percent, compared to 93.8 percent in the least skeptical category).
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1989), there was no evidence of similar response patterns of skeptics when it came to
news effects. For example, not many skeptics said that issues related to the elderly or
women’s issues were the most important problems just because the media hardly ever
reported on these issues. Skeptical and resistant as they may have been, audiences did not
go this far in their reaction to media texts. This response pattern suggests that mistrustful
audiences are suspicious and more resistant, but do not go all the way to blatant cynicism.
What they say about the media might sound cynical at times, but what they do with it is,
for the most part, skeptical.
The main implication of this section, I maintain, is that we should probably pay more
attention to audience skepticism toward the news media when we build theories about
media effects. The hypothesis that media skepticism moderates media effects should also
be tested on other kinds of effects such as news framing, and theories dealing with
knowledge gains. In short, as always, much is left for further research.
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Chapter 11: News exposure and mistrust in the media.

In the previous section we saw that, at least some of the time, mistrust in the media
affects the media's influence on audiences: when people do not trust the news media,
they resist some of its effects. This short chapter sets the stage for the following section,
which deals with another consequence of mistrust in the media. In the following chapters,
I ask, What are the effects of media skepticism on audience news exposure patterns?
Trust was defined in Chapter 1 as an expectation by the trustors that gains rather than
losses would result from their interaction with the trustees. Research in various fields
shows that trust leads to cooperation and participation, and mistrust decreases them. If
trust facilitates interaction, then in the present context trust should facilitate audience
exposure to the news media. If mistrust inhibits interaction, then mistrust in the news
media should inhibit the exposure of mistrusting audiences to sources they mistrust.
What is the information environment of media skeptics? What kinds of news media
do they consume? Do they watch TV news despite the fact that they do not trust them?
Do they expose themselves to mainstream press and radio even while holding negative
attitudes toward their producers? Or do they seek other sources of information outside the
mainstream media to satisfy their need for political information? The second main
research question I investigate in this section of my dissertation is thus:

RQ2: Do media skeptics differ in their media exposure patterns from non-skeptical
audiences?
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As far as I know, not much research has been devoted to this question. There is some
evidence that media exposure patterns are associated with attitudes toward the media
(Cohen, 1981). But this evidence comes from a totally different culture and a media
environment without new media technologies or Political Talk Radio (the study
investigated media exposure patterns after a 1978 media strike in Israel). Some have
reported that PTR exposure is related to attitudes toward the media (Pfau et al., 1998).
The association between media skepticism and media exposure patterns certainly
deserves another look.

Assumptions about the audience.

To develop hypotheses about media skepticism and media exposure, we can borrow a
few postulates from the rational choice literature.
1. Rational audiences. Rational choice scholars often assume that “all human
behavior is directed to the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain” (Lupia &
McCubbins, 1991, p. 23). Rationality does not only imply pursuit of pleasure,
however; it also implies utility maximization. Human energy and cognitive
resources are limited. People are not computer processors. They cannot process
infinite amounts of information over short time spans. They therefore rely on
simple shortcuts to reach otherwise complex decisions. This is perfectly
consistent with the assumption that people are rational (Carmines & Kuklinski,
1991; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991).
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2. People want to hold accurate knowledge about the non-immediate world. This
assumption was discussed in more detail in Chapter S. To reach reasoned
decisions, rational people have to hold some knowledge of the world. As
discussed in Chapter S, this does not mean that people hold full and accurate
information, but rather that when they do spend resources on acquiring
information, political or otherwise, they want this information to be as correct as
possible. Knowledge helps us reach decisions, because it helps us predict the
consequences of our choices. When we make decisions we want to rely upon
correct facts, and we strive to get these correct facts when we spend energy on
collecting information.
3. People have an incentive to ignore many stimuli (Lupia & McCubbins,
1991:29). We cannot consume and process information from the environment all
the time. In fact, the normal response to a given stimulus is simply to ignore it. It
follows, according to Lupia and McCubbins, that “if a person can attend to only
one stimulus, then he or she will attend to the stimulus for which the expected
benefits are extremely high relative to the expected costs” (1991, p. 29).
It follows from these assumptions and from the definition of trust that people will
choose to expose themselves to news information they trust. Trust is an expectation by
the trustor that the trustee can be relied upon and that the interaction with the trustee will
increase the probability of gains, rather than losses, to the trustor. Assumption 3 suggests
that rational audiences need not attend to all news sources to collect information about
the world. We need not, and indeed cannot, expose ourselves to all news sources all the
time. Assumption 3 states that we have an incentive to ignore many stimuli. Indeed, we
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regularly ignore political stimuli - or rather choose not to attend to them. No one watches
CNN or CSPAN all the time, though these stations are always on the air. Ditto for online
political information. More news exposure to more news sources might increase the data
we have about the world, but not necessarily the knowledge useful for political decision
making. Thus, it is perfectly rational to obtain political information selectively rather than
trying to attend to all political information. Indeed, we must select, because we are not
physically capable of attending to all political information all the time.
Assumption 3 implies that if people must select, if they can attend to only one
stimulus or set of stimuli, then they will attend to the stimuli for which the expected
benefits are high relative to the costs. This means, by definition of trust, that they will try
to attend to sources they trust rather than to sources they mistrust. In the words of Lupia
and McCubbins, “information is valuable only when it improves the accuracy of
predictions about the consequences of choices” (1991:20). If the information is incorrect
it is not of much value to rational audiences. Rational audiences should attend to sources
that will assist them in gaining correct knowledge about the world, sources that will
benefit their political decision-making. That is why they should prefer sources they
perceive to be accurate and trustworthy.

Assumptions about the sources.
For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that media news sources are of only two types,
mainstream and non-mainstream, generally overlapping the distinction between
traditional and non-traditional news media. Non-mainstream channels are distinguished
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from mainstream channels by the fact that they present themselves as alternatives to the
mainstream media institutions. This difference is expressed in genre and format
differences. For example, non-mainstream channels are, in some cases at least, seemingly
more easily accessible to the average person (e.g. talk radio offers the opportunity to call
in, and so forth). But the difference between mainstream and non-mainstream media is
also manifested in the content of those channels. Non-mainstream sources attempt to
present alternative information and a different point of view from the mainstream media.
They are also very cynical about mainstream media.
Further, let us assume that mainstream sources consist of national and local TV and
radio news, (e.g. general network news, all-news cable networks like CNN and MSNBC,
public television and National Public Radio) and daily newspapers, and that non
mainstream news consists of Political Talk Radio and political information over the
Internet. This assumption may seem far-fetched, but it should be read and interpreted
probabilistically. Some of the content in what I define as “mainstream” media probably
fits into the definition of non-mainstream sources. Clearly, some space in network TV
news is dedicated to counter-media materials (especially in the coverage of “media
scandals”). Much space in some partisan newspapers is dedicated to arguing and counterarguing with mainstream news. Some mainstream channels do allow participation of
ordinary citizens (e.g. CNN’s Talkbaek Live). However, most of these features of “non
mainstream” news are much more prevalent on PTR and over the political Internet.
On the other hand, by saying that the Internet and PTR may be considered as “non
mainstream” media, I am not suggesting that most of their content is non-mainstream. In
fact, the Internet is flooded with sites presenting the very same information originating
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from the same mainstream sources. However, the features of non-mainstream news are
much more prevalent online and in talk radio than in the mainstream press and TV news,
as we saw in Chapter 4. Over the Internet, even mainstream channels such as CNN.com
are much closer to being non-mainstream than their televised counterparts. For example,
they provide space for audience reaction and interaction, and audience responses to the
news sometimes contain a good deal of anti-media or counter-media argumentation.
Given that (as we saw in Chapter 4) much of the content of PTR and the Internet
falls into the definition of non-mainstream news, it seems reasonable to assume that the
probability of encountering these materials over these channels is higher than the
probability of encountering anti- and counter-mainstream news content while watching
Jennings, Rather or Brokaw. People who seek non-mainstream news would probably find
it not in USA Today, but rather on the Limbaugh Show. The assumption that the Internet
and PTR can be considered non-mainstream has little to do with technology per se.
Rather, it has to do with the ways in which technologies are implemented in a given
context. In the current news environment, it is plausible to assume that it is easier to find
“non-mainstream” content over the Internet or on PTR than on national and local TV
news and newspapers. Further, some current research finds that attitudes toward the
mainstream media are negatively associated with PTR listening (e.g., Pfau et al., 1998).
In the context of Internet research, some have talked about the “displacement” of
television by online media (Kayany & Yelsma, 2000). Skepticism toward TV news may
be operating in this process.
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Hypotheses.
In sum, we assume that sources can be divided to mainstream and non-mainstream
sources. If trust in sources predicts exposure, as it was suggested above, then it should be
hypothesized that

H2.1. Media skepticism will be associated with lower levels of exposure to the
mainstream news media. Trust in the media will be associated with higher levels of
exposure to the mainstream media.
H2.2. Media skepticism will be associated with higher levels of exposure to non
mainstream news media. Trust in the media will be associated with lower levels of
exposure to the non-mainstream news media.
Structure of the section.
In the previous section each chapter dealt with a different media effect, focusing on
separate processes and different outcome measures. This section will be different since
all of the following chapters share the same dependent measures. In all cases, the
explained phenomenon is news media exposure and the dependent variables are measures
of exposure to various media outlets. In contrast to the previous section, each chapter in
this section will build on the findings discussed in prior chapters.
In Chapter 121 will draw hypotheses from the theory of selective exposure.
According to this theory, people choose to attend to sources congruent with their prior
beliefs, attitudes and preferences. Based on selective exposure theory, I will hypothesize
that skepticism toward the mainstream media will result in reduced exposure to the
mainstream media and increased exposure to alternative channels. These hypotheses will
be tested on four separate data sets. Structural equation models testing for the cross313
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lagged effect of skepticism on exposure will be used to address the issue of causal
direction.
In Chapter 13 I will add a motivational factor to the equations predicting exposure. I
will argue that motivational factors, highlighted and advanced by Uses & Gratifications
theory, interact with attitudes toward the media when people make their exposure
decisions. This chapter focuses on one such motivational factor, the need for cognition.
Cognitive needs, it will be argued, increase media exposure. But does the effect of media
skepticism on media exposure depend on these cognitive needs? Does skepticism toward
the media matter less when cognitive needs are present? These questions will be explored
in Chapter 13.
In Chapter 141 test the same hypotheses forwarded in Chapters 12 and 13, this time
on variables capturing overall media diets, rather than exposure to specific news outlets.
The questions investigated in this chapter deal with the overall composition of news
exposure. Do skeptics consume non-mainstream sources instead of - or rather in
addition to - mainstream news? Multinomial models with media diets as dependent
variables will be used to answer this question.
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Chapter 12: Media skepticism and selective exposure.

Selective exposure is said to be “one of the most widely accepted principles in sociology
and social psychology”, and “a basic fact in the thinking of many social scientists about
communication effects” (Sears & Freedman, 1967:194). The principal of selectivity has
guided research in communication for decades. For political scientists and
communication scholars, selectivity has been the primary explanation - apart from
reinforcement - for the failure of research to document campaign effects. For social
psychologists, selective exposure has played a central role as a prime mechanism for
dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957). Some have even argued that selectivity may
explain why experimental and survey methodologies often lead to quite different
conclusions (Hovland, 1959). It would not be exaggerating, then, to say that the notion of
selective exposure has had an immense influence on the social sciences.
When searching electronic databases, however, one might get the impression that
selective exposure has been abandoned over the past decade. A keyword search for the
term “selective exposure” in 20 political science, sociology and communication journals
resulted in 22 hits for the years 1980*89, but only 9 hits for 1990-99102. However, this
reduced scholarly attention may simply reflect a tendency to accept selectivity as selfevident. Rather than rejecting selective exposure, we may simply be less excited by it.
We grew up with selective exposure. It is old news. It is a non-finding.
In his summary of communication research, Klapper (1960:19) described selective
exposure as the fact that “by and large, people tend to expose themselves to those mass

102 The database used for the search was JSTOR.
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communications which are in accord with their existing attitudes and interests.
Consciously or unconsciously, they avoid communication of opposite hue”. Berelson &
Steiner (1964) added that “people tend to see and hear communications that are favorable
or congenial to their predispositions; they are more likely to hear congenial
communications than neutral or hostile ones”. This viewpoint is shared by many scholars,
including Lazarsfeld et al. (1948), Hyman and Sheatsley (1947), Lipset et al. (19S4), and
Childs (1965).
The main explanation for the fact that people attend to sources that are congruent
with their own opinions is the human need for consistency. People strive to be consistent
and to avoid dissonance, hence they carefully choose to encounter only reaffirming and
congenial communications. They simply shun information that runs counter to their
attitudes and stay away from communications that could lead to discordant feelings.
Though the term “selective exposure” is most often applied to audience preferences
for contents that support their political beliefs and attitudes, it should be noted that
selectivity also refers to the message source. For example, Wheeless (1974) argues that
perceptions of the sources as well as of the messages account for selectivity. Most
relevant for this chapter, he found that when offered a list of public figures, people chose
to be exposed to information from sources they trusted, and rejected sources they
mistrusted (his subjects were asked to indicate the information items “they definitely did
not want provided to them’').
Wheeless argues that attitudes toward the source predict selectivity better than
attitudes toward concepts discussed by the source. This makes sense in light of
consistency theory. If I strive to be consistent, I won’t expose myself to sources that I
316
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mistrust (a simple consistency triangle). I will also try to stay away from content that
includes dissonance-invoking opinions, though doing so may sometimes be harder than
avoiding “untrustworthy” sources, because I cannot tell in advance what the attitudes
expressed by any sources, on any matter, will be. In fact, my attitudes toward the source
are often the only a priori cue I have that might come into play in my exposure decision
(e.g., when I cannot guess in advance what the opinions expressed on a specific subject
matter will be).
In this chapter, I apply this line of research to people’s mistrust of the media. If
selectivity takes place, then people should try to avoid sources they mistrust. Those who
despise journalists and perceive mainstream news to be inaccurate, sensational and self
motivated should look for alternatives to these mainstream channels if they seek correct
political information and strive for consistency. The question I ask in this chapter, then,
is: Does media skepticism lead to selectivity in exposure?
Selective exposure leads to the hypothesis that skepticism will be associated with
lower levels of exposure to the mainstream news media. Trust in the media should be
associated with higher levels of exposure to the mainstream media (H2.1). On the other
hand, selective exposure also implies that media skepticism will be associated with
higher levels of exposure to non-mainstream news media. Trust in the media should be
associated with lower levels of exposure to non-mainstream news media (H2.2).
Selectivity, however, implies more than an association between media skepticism
and media exposure. One of the major criticisms of selective exposure theory is the lack
of evidence regarding causality. This is why Sears and Freedman (1967) distinguish
between selective exposure, which represents “preference for supportive, rather than
317
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nonsupportive, information” (p. 196), and what they call “de facto selectivity”, which
refers to audiences’ tendency to share the viewpoints of communicators. The latter, they
argue, is merely a descriptive statement that is “noncommittal to the cause of this bias”
(p. 196). In other words, the fact that people share the viewpoints of their information
sources is not enough to support the general hypothesis that people have a motivated
tendency to seek out supportive information and/or to avoid nonsupportive information
(Kleinhesselink & Edwards, 197S).
The question of causal direction is most relevant to the issue of news media exposure
and media skepticism. Even if the two are correlated, one must keep in mind the
possibility of reverse causation and the potential influence of intervening factors. A
negative correlation between mainstream media exposure and media skepticism may
indeed reflect the tendency of mistrustful audiences to avoid or reject the mainstream
media. However, it might also reflect a tendency of those who consume higher doses of
mainstream news to end up as trusting audiences. Conversely, higher exposure of media
skeptics to non-mainstream sources may be due to their tendency to prefer non
mainstream information. However, it could also be that exposure to non-mainstream
channels - in particular, to expressions o f resentment and mistrust of the mainstream
media on these channels - causes negative attitudes toward the media in audiences’
minds.
A second source of concern is related to intervening variables. As Sears and
Freedman (1969:202) note, existing attitudes “often represent only one o f several
variables that correlate highly with exposure, and their selection as the best predictor
might be unnecessarily arbitrary”. Other factors could be the causes of both exposure and
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the supposed pre-existing attitudes. For example, demographic factors are often said to be
the source of political attitudes through socialization, but these factors are also said to
have a strong influence on audience media exposure patterns.
To sum up: I have mentioned two methodological issues that need to be resolved in
order to infer selectivity: reverse causation and intervening factors. The former problem
will be addressed by cross-lagged analysis (presented towards the end of this chapter)
that aims at addressing the issue of causal direction. The second will be addressed by
employing various controls for potential intervening factors, some of which are discussed
in the next few paragraphs.

Constraints on media selectivity: Possible intervening variables in models predicting
exposure.
Early media research stressed that people’s freedom to select media content that fits their
prior opinions and likes is a major factor in exposure decisions. But the activity of the
audience is not unlimited, as later scholars argued in response to these claims. Audiences
are constrained by many factors in their exposure choices. First, technology and
individuals’ ability to absorb it affect their exposure decisions. For example, if one
cannot afford cable, he or she will probably not rely on CNN or MSNBC as a major
source of news. Second, there are constraints caused by schedules, personal as well as
institutional (Cohen, 2000). For example, if I get home from work after 7:00 PM every
day, the likelihood that I watch the evening news is very low, since the networks
broadcast the evening news at 6:30 Eastern Standard Time (or 5:30 Central time). This
decision, along with many others, has an effect on the choices individuals make. People
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are free to give up their job and look for one that will allow them to get home in time to
watch Peter Jennings at 6:30. Alternatively, they could buy a VCR and tape the show in
order to watch it later. But these alternatives require an effort that not many people are
likely to make, even for the noble cause of becoming an informed citizen.
Thus, people are free to select the media environment they want, but they are also
constrained, due mainly to their other obligations, but also to media menus. Reagan
(1996) uses the concept of the media’s “information repertoire”: individuals do select
media materials, but they are limited by what the media have to offer. Brosius et al.
(1992) use the metaphor of “media diets” to describe how audiences come up with their
exposure patterns. And indeed, media exposure decisions are similar to nutrition
decisions. First, in neither case can people consume everything. There is a biological
limit on the amount of food the human body can absorb; likewise, people cannot get all
of the news from all of the sources all of the time. Cognitive limits prevent us from
attending to multiple media sources at the same time, and biological limits hinder our
ability to attend to the media all the time (e.g. we must sleep). For these reasons, the
models presented in this chapter control for employment, student status and, in some
cases, schedule flexibility and having children at home.
Second, our media choices and nutritional diets are limited by resources such as
money to subscribe to cable services or time to cook. Computer literacy is another kind of
resource that determines whether or not people can attend to online political
communication. Time is a crucial resource as well, since busy people have less time to
consume any form of communication. Third, preferences and tastes shape the
composition of both types of diet People watch, listen to and read what they like in the
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same way that they eat what they like. This is why the models in this chapter control for
factors such as political involvement (usually operationalized as close following of
politics) and political knowledge. Fourth, nutrition, like media exposure, is embedded in
one’s context and culture. In both cases, we consume what we have been socialized to
consume. Differences between sexes, races and educational backgrounds determine, at
least to some extent, our media habits. This is why such factors are controlled for in the
analysis that follows.

Data analysis.
The aim of the rest this chapter is to describe the associations between media skepticism
and exposure to various news media outlets. Following selective exposure research,
skepticism should be associated with higher exposure to alternative sources of political
information and lower exposure to mainstream news. In this section of the chapter, I
describe these associations. In the next section, I try to take an extra step and explore the
causal mechanism underlying these associations. In the following chapters I explore the
intervening role of need for cognition in this process, and explore how media skepticism
is associated with people’s overall media diets.
Given that, as described above, exposure decisions are a function of media
skepticism as well as of resources, motivations and demographic factors, I use various
intervening factors as controls. Motivational controls include political interest,
knowledge and extremity. Those more interested in politics (and media skeptics are
generally more interested in politics than other audiences) tend to watch more news. This
is why the models control for such involvement variables. Resource covariates include
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being employed, being a student, and (when present) other indicators regarding audience
schedules. Those with less available time are expected to watch, read and listen to less
news simply because they do not have the time to attend, given their tighter schedules.
Demographic background controls are also utilized, since demographic factors account
for much variance in exposure given the diverging tastes, possibilities and economic
resources of people of diverse backgrounds. Much has been said about differences in
accessibility to new information technologies (“the digital divide") resulting from purely
demographic factors. Demographic factors are also related to cultural and economic
factors that may come into play when audiences make exposure decisions. Hence, the
statistical models control for motivational and resource factors.

Study 1: The Electronic Dialogue data.
Given their repeated measurement of media exposure and media skepticism, the
EDialogue data offer us more than one possibility to examine the association of media
skepticism and news media exposure. In fact, one can try a variety of lags between
skepticism and exposure, thereby testing for the sensitivity of the analysis for
measurement lag.
The question wordings for the exposure items were “Please tell me how many days
in the past week you did each of the following (a) Watch national network news on TV
(Peter Jennings/ABC, Dan Rather/CBS, Tom Brokaw/NBC, Fox or UPN); (b) Watch
cable news, such as CNN or MSNBC; (c) Watch local TV news (“Eyewitness” or
“Action News"); (d) Read a daily newspaper; and (e) Hear radio shows where listeners
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call in to discuss politics and public affairs”. Question order was randomized to minimize
bias. These are the dependent variables in Tables 12.1 and 12.2.
Table 12.1 presents the results of OLS Models with the individual Wave 4 exposure
questions as the dependent variables. The skepticism measure used in these models was a
Wave 4 measure. Thus, the tables test for the cross-sectional effect of skepticism on
exposure. As the results show, the best predictors of exposure to all mainstream outlets
are age and political interest. The older the respondent, the higher his or her reported
mainstream news exposure, and the lower his or her score on the non-mainstream news
measures. All other things being equal, those reporting higher political interest also
reported higher exposure to national and local TV news, as well as to a daily newspaper
and to the non-mainstream and mainstream media in general. Non-whites reported
significantly more local TV news exposure (a fact that may be related to the
overrepresentation of Asians and Native Americans in the EDialogue sample). Females
reported more local TV news and general mainstream news exposure, while males
reported significantly more exposure to PTR. Employment was associated with lower
exposure to national and local TV news, as well as with significantly lower scores on the
general news media scale. Knowledge had a significant effect on PTR and general non
mainstream exposure, and on cable news watching. This data set does not, for the most
part, replicate the expected association between knowledge and news exposure. In fact,
there was a borderline significant negative effect o f knowledge on exposure to local TV
news.
H2.1. and H2.2 deal with the association between mainstream media skepticism and
exposure to mainstream and non-mainstream news. Skepticism was negatively associated
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with exposure to national, local and cable TV news, with daily newspaper reading, and
with a combined measure of mainstream media exposure. However, the coefficients for
local and cable TV news were not statistically significant. In contrast to the negative
association between skepticism and exposure to mainstream news outlets, the coefficient
for PTR and for general non-mainstream news exposure was positive and significant. In
other words, controlling for political and demographic variables, the higher the
skepticism expressed by respondents, the more they attended to PTR and to a combined
index composed of exposure to PTR and the Web. Skeptical audiences listened to more
political talk radio than their non-skeptical counterparts. The statistical models in Table
12.1 account for 13-35 percent of the variance in the dependent variables. The models
predicting exposure to national TV news, newspapers and mainstream media in general
had relatively high R-squares of between .25 and .35.
As discussed above, the Wave 4 skepticism to Wave 4 exposure is only one way to
formulate the models. Alternative models, using data collected at different points in time,
are presented in Table 12.2. The table presents only the coefficients for the skepticism -*
exposure associations. Though all control variables used in Table 12.1 were also used in
all models in Table 12.2, the effects of these covariates (which were generally similar in
size and significance to those reported in Table 12.1) are unreported in order to save
space.
The first set of models presents the coefficients for the effects o f Wave 4 skepticism
on Wave 6 exposure measures. The signs for the effects of skepticism on exposure to
mainstream news sources (national and local newspapers and the general mainstream
media exposure scale) are negative, but these effects are not significantly different from
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zero. The effect of skepticism on PTR exposure was, as in Table 12.1, positive and
significant. The second set of models reports the effects of Wave 4 skepticism on Wave 7
exposure. In this case, the effect o f skepticism on TV exposure and on mainstream news
media exposure is negative and significant. The significant effect of skepticism on
exposure to PTR disappears, given the longer time lag between skepticism and exposure.
The third set of models presents the effects of Time 4 skepticism on measures of
exposure that are composed of the averages of the Wave 6 and Wave 7 measures. In this
case, the effects of skepticism on national TV news exposure and on general mainstream
media exposure were significant. In addition, the effect of Wave 4 skepticism on daily
newspaper reading was also significant in this case.
In sum, the Electronic Dialogue data show some evidence for associations between
media skepticism and news media exposure. O f the four models reported in Tables 12.1
and 12.2, the effect of skepticism on general mainstream media exposure and on network
TV news exposure was significant in three cases. The effect of skepticism on PTR
exposure was positive twice, and on daily newspaper exposure only once. Thus, there
appears to be some indication that media skepticism is associated with enhanced
exposure to PTR and with decreased exposure to the mainstream media, especially to TV
news.
H2.2 deals with consumption of political information from the Internet (as a partly
non-mainstream source) and media skepticism. This issue is examined in Tables 12.3 and
12.4. The dependent variables in Table 12.3 are general Internet use and exposure to
political information over the Internet These variables were significantly associated with
younger age and higher political interest, but also (in the case of online political
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information) with schedule flexibility and political knowledge. The coefficient for the
effect of skepticism on exposure was positive in both cases, but not statistically
significant. As in the previous models, the associations were examined using measures
collected at different points in time, with varying time lags between skepticism and
exposure. In all of the cases, the effect of skepticism and exposure was positive but
statistically insignificant.
Table 12.4 presents two logistic regression models predicting participation in online
chats and visiting a Web site to find information on current affairs (both coded “ 1” for
online exposure and “0” for no exposure). While the latter was significantly related to
political knowledge, the former was associated with lack of political knowledge. In both
cases the coefficient for media skepticism (positive for participating in online chats and
negative for visiting a Web site to find current affairs information) were insignificant.
Other models tested for the effects of Wave 4 skepticism on Wave 7 exposure. In both
cases the coefficients were positive (skepticism was associated with somewhat higher
odds of exposure to online political information). However, neither of these coefficients
was significantly different from zero.
In sum, the EDialogue data do not contain significant evidence for an association of
media skepticism with exposure to online political information. However, three out of
four models (reported in Tables 12.1 and 12.2) did contain significant effects of
skepticism on exposure to national TV news, and to the general mainstream news media
measure. Two models contained positive and significant associations between skepticism
and exposure to political talk radio.
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Study 2: The APPC 2000 data.
The primary-season APPC data (11/12/1999 through 1/31/2000) contained the same
exposure measures as the Electronic Dialogue data. The sample size of the RCS study for
this period was 12,666, of whom 2,500 (a random fourth, approximately) answered the
media evaluation item. Table 12.5 presents OLS models predicting exposure to various
news media outlets. As in the EDialogue models, political interest and age were among
the best predictors of media exposure, with young respondents reportomg more PTR and
Web exposure103 and older respondents reporting higher exposure to all forms of
mainstream news. All other things being equal, political knowledge was associated with
exposure to TV news, daily newspaper, PTR, and with the general mainstream media
scale. Employed respondents reported less exposure to all sorts of TV news, but more
exposure to PTR. Education was associated with exposure to daily newspapers and to
political information on the Web. Males watched more cable news than females, and
females watched more national and local TV news than males. Whites reported more
exposure to daily newspapers, while non-whites reported significantly higher national
and local TV news exposure and lower exposure to PTR. Conservatives reported higher
exposure to PTR, general non-mainstream news and local news, while liberals reported
higher exposure to cable news and daily newspapers. Political extremity was associated
with more exposure to cable news and PTR, and less exposure to national TV news.
Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 focus on the association between media skepticism and news
media exposure. As predicted by H2.1, media skepticism was negatively associated with
exposure to national TV news, local TV news, cable TV news, and with the general

103 Note that this finding is inconsistent with results obtained by other models in this chapter.
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mainstream media exposure scale. All of these associations were statistically significant
at the .001 level. In other words, those skeptical of the mainstream media tended to
consume less mainstream news. As predicted by H2.2, mistrust in the media was
positively associated with PTR exposure and with general non-mainstream media
exposure. Those trusting the media tended to consume more mainstream news and less
non-mainstream news. However, the positive effect of skepticism on exposure to online
political information and the negative effect of skepticism on exposure to daily
newspapers were not statistically significant.
The APPC data allow us to examine the association between skepticism and talk
radio exposure in somewhat more detail. Survey respondents who indicated talk radio
exposure were also asked to name the talk show hosts they listened to in the previous
week. Models predicting exposure to the four most mentioned answers are presented in
Table 12.6. The dependent variables are coded “ 1” for mentioning the host, and “0” for
no exposure in the previous week. Logistic regression coefficients and standard errors
are presented. Exposure to the Limbaugh show is explained by interest in politics,
political knowledge, employment and gender (males had higher odds of mentioning
Limbaugh than females). The more conservative one's scores were on the party-ideology
index (lower scores), the higher the odds that one listened to the Limbaugh show.
Surprisingly, Limbaugh listeners tended to be somewhat less educated than those
reporting not listening to the show.
The prediction equations for the other shows (Liddy, Dr. Laura and the Stem show the latter two not strictly political talk radio) were much less successful in terms of
variance explained, compared to the R-squared for the Limbaugh show. Age and political
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extremity were the only significant predictors o f listening to the Stem show. The partyideology index was the only significant predictor of listening to Dr. Laura. None of the
covariates was significantly associated with listening to Liddy.
Our main concern here is in the effect of media skepticism on talk radio exposure.
Media skepticism was positively associated with listening to the Rush Limbaugh show.
Each one-unit increase in the skepticism scale was associated with a 56 percent increase
in the odds of listening to Limbaugh (b=.45; eb=l .56; p<.001). However, there was no
significant association between skepticism and listening to the other shows. This implies
that the positive and significant coefficient for the effect of media skepticism on general
talk radio exposure could be entirely a function of listening to Limbaugh, given the
higher exposure to Limbaugh compared to all other talk show hosts in this data set.
In sum, the APPC primary season data shows media skepticism to be negatively
associated with mainstream media exposure and positively associated with non
mainstream news exposure, in particular, Limbaugh. Those mistrustful of the media
tended to attend to more political talk radio, and to less mainstream national and local TV
news. There were no associations between skepticism and newspaper readership and
exposure to online political information.

Study 3: The PTR data.
The PTR study utilized somewhat different measures of news media exposure. The
question wording for the exposure items was, “Next, I’d like to know how often you use
certain types of publications and watch and listen to certain TV and radio programs. As I
read each, tell me if you use them regularly, sometimes, hardly ever, or never”. The list
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o f media outlets included “(a) The news or editorial sections of a daily paper, (b)
National TV evening news programs on ABC, CNN, NBC, or CBS. This is different
from the local news about the area in where you live, (c) News magazines such as Time,
US News, or Newsweek, (d) CSPAN, (e) Programs on National Public Radio, such as
Morning Edition or All Things Considered, and (f) The News Hour on PBS with Jim
Lehrer”. Responses were coded so that “ 1” represented “never” and “4” represented
“regularly”104.
Table 12.7 presents OLS models predicting exposure to the various news sources.
Age was positively related to general mainstream news exposure and to exposure to
national TV news, to the News Hour on PBS and to daily newspaper reading. Age was
negatively related to reading magazines. Whites tended to attend less frequently to almost
all news outlets, controlling for all political and demographic covariates. Males scored
higher on the general mainstream news scale, and reported higher NPR and newspaper
exposure. Education was positively and significantly associated with exposure in five of
the seven models reported in Table 12.7. Of the political variables, interest was again a
strong and significant predictor of exposure in all cases. Political knowledge predicted
news exposure in five out of seven cases. Ideology was associated with exposure to the
mainstream media in general, and to NPR, PBS, daily newspapers and newsmagazines in
particular. The explained variance in these models varied between 26 percent for general
mainstream exposure and 6 percent for the NPR model.
Note that the models presented in Table 12.7 are comparable to those presented in
Study 2 (Table 12.S) in terms of the magnitude, direction and significance level o f the
l0* Since the PTR data did not contain measures o f exposure to political information on the Web, there are
no general non-mainstream indices in the following model (there is no way to combine internet with PTR).
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coefficients (betas should be compared because of differences in the coding of some of
the variables). However, the coefficients for the effects of media skepticism were much
smaller in magnitude and statistical significance, despite the consistency in coefficient
signs. Most importantly, the coefficient for media skepticism on national TV news
exposure was insignificant, while in Study 2 the comparable coefficient was significant at
the .001 level. The only significant result was obtained for the effect of skepticism on
PBS news exposure. The effect of media skepticism on general mainstream media
exposure was negative and borderline significant (p=.065). The effects of media
skepticism on NPR exposure, daily newspaper and magazine readership were negative
(as predicted) but not significantly different from zero. There is not enough evidence to
suggest that mistrust in the news media is associated with decreased exposure to these
formats.
Turning to the effects of media skepticism on PTR, Table 12.8 presents models
predicting exposure to the Limbaugh show, liberal talk radio, other conservative talk
radio, and all forms of PTR. The dependent variables are hours of listening in a typical
week (calculated from separate questions about the number of times a week and another
question about the usual listening time). Political interest was positively associated with
PTR exposure in all models. Age positively predicted exposure to Limbaugh, liberal and
general talk radio exposure. Education was significantly related to exposure to liberal
PTR and exposure to PTR in general. Males listened more frequently to Limbaugh and to
PTR in general. Conservative ideology was associated with exposure to Limbaugh, other
conservative PTR, and PTR exposure in general.
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Our main interest is again the effect of media skepticism on exposure. All other
things being equal, mistrust in the media was associated with exposure to the Limbaugh
show and to PTR in general. Again (similarly to the APPC data), there was no evidence
for an association between skepticism and liberal or other conservative PTR. In other
words, those mistrusting the media tended to spend more time listening to political talk
radio, particularly the Rush Limbaugh Show. Since Limbaugh listening comprised a
majority of talk radio listeners (even in this data set, which oversampled talk radio
listeners), it is possible that the association between skepticism and PTR exposure
reflects the tendency of Limbaugh listeners (vs. listeners to the genre in general) to be
skeptical about the media.
To sum up, the PTR data show that skepticism is associated with lower exposure to
mainstream news, in particular Lehrer’s News Hour, and higher exposure to talk radio,
especially Limbaugh.

Study 4: NES data.
NES exposure measures are similar to the EDialogue and APPC measures. Respondents
were asked how many days in the past week they watched “national news on TV”, “local
TV news, such as ‘Eyewitness News’ or ‘Action News’”, how many days they “read the
daily newspaper”, and how many days in they past week they listened to "programs on
radio in which people call in to voice their opinions about politics”. An additional
question asked about the number of days in the past week that respondents listened to the
Limbaugh Show in particular. These are the dependent variables in the OLS models
presented in Table 12.9.
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The models show results similar to those obtained by other data sets. Once again,
political interest was consistently a strong predictor of attention to all news media. Age
was positively associated with exposure to all mainstream media. Educated people read
newspapers and the relatively uneducated attended to local TV news. Males read more
papers and listened more frequently to Talk Radio, while females watched more local
news. Knowledge was positively related to newspaper exposure. Political extremity was
significantly associated with exposure to PTR. Political moderateness was associated
with exposure to the mainstream media. Conservatives scored higher on exposure to
PTR. The R-squares are, again, comparable to those reported in the previous studies.
Our concern here is with media skepticism. As in virtually all the other data sets,
listening to political talk radio (in general, but also to the Limbaugh show in particular)
was positively and significantly associated with skepticism toward the mainstream media.
However, unlike in some of the other data sets, media skepticism was unrelated to
exposure to all mainstream sources. Though the signs of the coefficients were negative
(as predicted), there was not enough evidence to reject the null hypotheses in all
mainstream models. We cannot conclude from the NES data alone that skepticism is
associated with reduced exposure to the mainstream media.
Turning to the association between skepticism and Internet exposure, Table 12.10
presents a logistic regression model predicting exposure to political information over the
Web, given Web access. Young, educated and politically interested respondents had
significantly higher odds of attending to online political information. The effect of the
gender variable was borderline significant, with males having higher odds of exposure.
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H2.2 predicted that given Web access, skeptics would report higher consumption of
political information from the Internet. This is exactly what Table 12.10 shows. Media
skepticism was positively and significantly associated with exposure to political
information over the Internet. Each one-unit increase on the skepticism measure was
associated with a 48 percent increase in the odds of reporting exposure to political
information on the Web.
In sum, the NES 1996 data support the hypotheses regarding an association between
media skepticism and PTR exposure, exposure to online political information, and
general non-mainstream media exposure. However, there was no evidence supporting the
hypothesis relating skepticism to reduced exposure to mainstream news sources.

Reconciling inconsistent findings.
So far in this chapter, I have applied the same statistical strategy in different data
contexts, with the aim of answering a relatively straightforward research question.
Unfortunately, the different data do not provide a wholly consistent answer. There were
inconsistencies both within the EDialogue data and across the different data sets.
Skepticism was negatively associated with mainstream news exposure in three out of the
four EDialogue models, in the APPC data and in the PTR data, but not in NES.
Skepticism was positively associated with exposure to political online information only
in the NES 1996 data (this hypothesis was not tested on the PTR data). The most
consistent evidence is for the association between skepticism and PTR. In all data sets,
skepticism was associated with increased exposure to PTR, and to the Limbaugh show in
particular. There was no evidence for an association between skepticism and other talk
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radio shows. This finding was consistent across the different data sets. Also, general non*
mainstream media exposure (consisting of PTR listening and exposure to online political
information) was positively associated with skepticism in three data sets (this hypothesis
was not tested on the fourth data set).
In the beginning o f this chapter I asked whether media skepticism was related to
exposure to mainstream and non-mainstream media. Strictly speaking, in terms of
statistical hypothesis testing, the answer was not consistent. The inconsistencies could be
due to any inconsistency among the different data sources, including sampling design and
sample size, measurement, interview modules, and the specific context o f data collection
(i.e., the specific media environment in a particular election year). But the different data
diverge on each of these possible sources of inconsistency, making it almost impossible
to separate out the reasons for the discrepancy.
We could say, for example, that we have some evidence for each of the hypotheses:
that under certain circumstances skepticism is indeed associated with reduced exposure to
mainstream news and with increased exposure to non-mainstream sources. The problem
is stating the exact conditions necessary for the hypotheses to work. Doing quantitative
social science is sometimes frustrating. Even simple questions are sometimes hard to
answer with confidence.
Another thing that should be said is that in the vast majority o f cases, even when the
coefficients for the effect of skepticism on exposure were not significantly different from
zero they were nevertheless in the direction predicted by the hypothesis (negative for
mainstream sources and positive for non-mainstream sources). From a total of 30
insignificant effects obtained from all four data sources, 26 were in the predicted
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direction105. As we know, one cannot deduce that there is no real association in the face
of insignificant effects. All we can say is that there is no evidence for an association.
Qualitatively, the inconsistencies are less grave, especially in light of the different
measures (hence different variances and different measurement errors) used in the
different data sets and sampling designs. So one must highlight not only the
inconsistencies in statistical tests of significance, but also the fact that the patterns found
in the different data sets were generally similar.
There is still much room for speculation about discrepancies in specific findings. The
prime suspect could simply be the differences between Summer 1996 and Winter and
Summer o f2000. One could argue, for example, that a positive association between
mainstream media skepticism and online news exposure existed in 1996 (NES) but
subsequently disappeared (no evidence for such an association in the APPC and
EDialogue data). One could also argue that skeptics made more of an effort to reach
online political information in 1996 - there were certainly fewer online outlets in 19% whereas today anyone with access who is interested in politics can get news from the
Web. Another explanation might be related to the election year cycle: The only data in
which there was no evidence for a skepticism-general-mainstream-exposure association
is NES, collected between September and early November of 1996. All other data were
collected either in the summer, spring or winter o f the election year (the ED data have
both pre-election season (July) and post-election season (December) measures of
skepticism, the APPC data I’m using were collected from December through February,
and the PTR measures of skepticism are also primary-season data). One might argue
>os These figures exclude Tables 12.8 and 12.6, in which specific types o f talk radio listening were explored
in detail, diverging from Hypothesis H2.2.
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further that in the months immediately prior to an election skepticism is unrelated to
mainstream exposure, since skeptics need more political information in this period and so
consume the information despite their skepticism. Perhaps during election periods
skeptics do expose themselves to mainstream sources simply because such sources are
adequate channels for getting information from the candidates and about them.
One could continue to speculate further, and each potential explanation may be a
valid explanation. But without the ability to choose one explanation over the others, each
one is also as good as a guess. Speculation, though sometimes an elegant and powerful
tool for resolving conflicting findings, also represents a slight departure from the strict
rules of science.
A totally different, and a much more plausible, approach is a meta-analytical one.
Meta-analysis acknowledges that no single study is perfect. “The purpose of meta
analysis is to use the data from multiple studies to generate a more accurate interpretation
of findings than is possible by considering the studies one at a time” (Hamilton & Hunter,
1998:2). Meta-analysis generally has the ambitious goal of identifying the sources of
study imperfection and correcting for them. Thus, its aim is not only a better
interpretation o f separate studies that resolves conflicting evidence, but to understand
what kinds of artifacts created the discrepancy between the studies. In the context of the
present research, however, the goal is much more modest: it is simply to cumulate the
results of different studies.
Hunter, Schmidt and Jackson (1982:2) propose five steps in the process of
cumulating results across studies:
1) A descriptive statistic is calculated for each study, and averaged across studies;
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2) The variance of the statistic is estimated across studies;
3) The variance is corrected by subtracting the amount of variance due to sampling
error;
4) The mean and variance are corrected for other study artifacts;
5) The corrected standard deviations are compared to determine if the effect is
constant across studies.
The meta-analysis literature then tells how to model for the intervening effects of the
confounding factors (study artifacts). This latter stage was not pursued in the current
study, given the small number of studies with a large number of potential confounding
factors. Hence, a rather simple procedure was applied in order to get an estimate of the
average effect size, following the recommendations o f Hunter et al. (1982) and Kim and
Hunter (1993).
First, each separate correlation was corrected for attenuation. The observed
correlation was divided by the product of the square root of its reliabilities to obtain a
conservative measure of association that was not due to measurement error. The
reliabilities for the different media skepticism items were calculated from the error terms
for each item, obtained from the CFA factor loadings reported in Chapter 2106 (for the
EDialogue data, the reliability of the skepticism scale, Cronbach’s a - .90, was used). In
the case of media exposure, a reliability score of .65 was used.
Second, after correcting each correlation for measurement error, the average
correlation of the studies was estimated, weighting each individual correlation by its
sample size:

'“ See Figure 2.1.
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r = S[Nirj]/ENi

where r* is the individual study correlation and Ni is the N of the individual study107.
Third, the corresponding variance was calculated:
s2r = I[N i(r, - F)2]/S N i
This must then be corrected for sampling error. I used the following formula for
estimating sampling error:
s2e = [(1- ? )2K]/ IN j where K= the number of studies.

Hunter et al. (1982:44) suggest subtracting the sampling error variance from the
observed variance to correct for the sampling errors. The results of this analysis are
presented in Table 12.11. All associations between skepticism and mainstream media
exposure are negative. The average effect for national and local TV news is around -.14.
The average association between skepticism and newspaper exposure is -.07. The average
effect of skepticism on overall mainstream exposure is -.18. On the other hand, all
associations between skepticism and non-mainstream media exposure are positive. The
average association between skepticism and exposure to PTR is .16. The average
association between Internet exposure and skepticism is .05. The average effect of
skepticism on non-mainstream news media exposure is .12. The average effect sizes vary
from small (for Web and newspaper exposure) to moderate (mainstream media
exposure). According to these figures, media skepticism explains only a fraction of the
variance in mainstream and non-mainstream media exposure. In terms of hypothesis

107 Hunter et al. do not recommend using the Z transformation if all correlations are bivariate Pearson
correlation, such as those used in this chapter.
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testing, the average effects of skepticism on general mainstream and non-mainstream
exposure are both significant at the .05 level. However, the effects of skepticism on
national and local TV exposure, on daily newspaper reading, and on PTR exposure are
borderline significant, all at the .10 level. The average effect of skepticism on exposure to
political Internet was not significantly different from zero.
In sum, on average across studies, media skepticism is associated with less exposure
to mainstream media and more exposure to non-mainstream media. Though the
associations are not large in magnitude they are, in most cases, significantly different
from zero.

Exposure and skepticism: Cross-lagged analysis.
The previous section provided evidence supporting the hypotheses regarding the
association between skepticism and exposure. Though the coefficients were not always
comparable in size and magnitude, the overall pattern was that skeptics tended to be
exposed more than non-skeptics to PTR (and in some cases, to online political
information) and less than non-skeptics to the mainstream news media. In this section I
assume that there is indeed a small negative correlation between skepticism and exposure
to mainstream sources and a small positive correlation between skepticism and exposure
to non-mainstream sources. Here I go one step further and explore the causal mechanism
underlying this association. What causes what? Does skepticism influence subsequent
exposure patterns? Or does current exposure influence future skepticism? This question
will be investigated using structural cross-lagged models.
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As discussed above, a rival explanation to selectivity for interpreting associations
between media skepticism and mainstream and non-mainstream media exposure could be
that increased exposure to mainstream news might result in enhanced trust in mainstream
news. Heavy viewers, listeners or readers may be convinced, as a result of their heavier
exposure, that journalists are doing a proper job. On the other hand, those who listen to
PTR and read anti-media messages over the Internet could be persuaded by the anti
media materials contained in these formats that journalists are far from doing a proper job
in covering politics. They might accept some of Limbaugh’s arguments and be persuaded
that the media are biased and unfair. They might leam from Web sites and chat rooms
about inaccuracies and mistakes in the mainstream media. In short, the direction of the
association may be from skepticism to exposure (as selective exposure implies), but it
could also be the other way around.
The structure of the models I tested is presented in Figure 12.1. The endogenous
variables are skepticism (measured in discussion 8) and exposure (measured in discussion
7). The equations test for the effects of past exposure on subsequent skepticism,
controlling for previous skepticism, and for the effects of past skepticism on subsequent
exposure, controlling for past exposure. Both equations control for a few background
variables, including race (measured by a dummy variable, coded “1” for whites), gender,
age and years of education. The models also control for the party-ideology index,
political knowledge and political involvement. They allow for all possible correlations
between the exogenous variables. The measurement part of the model describes
skepticism as a latent factor influencing two manifest constructs - the News Credibility
Scale (Gaziano & McGrath, 1988) and two mistrust items (general trust in the news
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media and specific trust in the press). This conceptualization of skepticism as a latent
factor effectively incorporates measurement error into the model. Separate analyses
found that, in general, allowing for correlated errors between present and past NCS and
mistrust did not significantly improve the fit of the models, and created empirical
identification problems in some cases. For this reason, the reported models do not allow
for such correlated errors in the measurement part of the models.
Nine structural models were tested, each testing for a different type of exposure.
Maximum Likelihood estimation was used in all cases. Since ML estimation of SEMs
could be sensitive to starting values (given the possibility of convergence at a local,
rather than a global maximum), a few different starting values were tried for each model,
other than those selected by the software by default. The results are presented in Table
12.12.

In terms of the chi-square test for the overall fit of the models, all models should be
rejected, at least strictly speaking (the p-value should be larger than .05). However, it is
well known that this chi-square test is very sensitive to sample size. That is, if the sample
size is too large, “then the chi-square statistic might be significant even though
differences between the observed and model-implied covariances are slight” (Kline,
1998, p. 128). To reduce the sensitivity of the chi-square test to sample size some
researchers have suggested dividing it by the degrees of freedom. “Although there is no
clear-cut guideline about values of x2/df is minimally acceptable, a frequent suggestion is
that this ratio be less than 3” (Kline, 1998, p. 128). All nine models in Table 12.12 abide
by this rule, and have %2/df values around two. Also, other goodness of fit measures that
are less sensitive to sample size, like Jdreskog-SOrbom’s Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)
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and Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), as well as the Bentrer-Bonett’s Normed Fit
Index (NFI), all show close to perfect fit for all reported models. In sum, it seems that the
reported models are all satisfactory in terms of their fit, though their chi-square tests
provide low p-values.
In all models both constructs demonstrate an impressive stability. The effects of
previous on subsequent skepticism were all in the .70 range. As we know by now, media
skepticism is rather stable. Those trusting the media in late July and early August tended
to trust them in December, and vice versa for those mistrusting the media. Exposure was
also rather stable (with betas varying between .41 and .69). In all o f the models,
subsequent exposure was associated with past exposure.
Unsurprisingly, given the results of the multivariate analysis reported above for the
EDialogue data, in most cases both lagged effects were not statistically different from
zero. However, the lagged effect of skepticism on national TV news exposure was
negative and significant. The lagged effects of skepticism on exposure to all mainstream
media sources and all TV news sources were borderline significant. On the other hand,
the pattern was reversed for non-mainstream media. In this case, the cross-lagged effect
of skepticism on exposure was positive and borderline significant.
The purpose of the analysis is to compare the effect of skepticism on subsequent
exposure to the effect of exposure on subsequent skepticism. In this case, the absolute
values of the beta coefficients should be compared, since exposure and skepticism have
different metrics. Such a comparison shows that, in general, the effects of skepticism on
subsequent exposure to mainstream media are stronger (in absolute value) than the effects
of exposure to mainstream media on subsequent skepticism (Models 1 ,2 ,3 ,8 and 9, but
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not in the daily newspaper case - Model 4). On the other hand, the cross-lagged effects of
exposure to non-mainstream sources on subsequent skepticism were stronger than the
skepticism -> exposure crossed-lagged effects (Models 5, 6 and 7). However, the
differences in effect size were rather minor in most of the models. In Models 1 (national
TV news), 8 (all mainstream sources) and 9 (all TV sources), the differences are slightly
bigger. These models show a negative effect of skepticism on subsequent exposure and a
non-significant effect of exposure on skepticism. In Model 7 (non-mainstream), the effect
of exposure on skepticism is stronger than the effect of skepticism on exposure. One
might deduce that the direction of causality is from skepticism to reduced exposure, in
the case of exposure to mainstream news media, and from exposure to enhanced
skepticism, in the case of non-mainstream media.
However, some caution is warranted in this case. Although causality is at the heart of
social theory, it is very hard for social scientists to present compelling evidence for causal
statements, even when longitudinal data are collected and analyzed. As noted by Kessler
and Greenberg (1981), the simple comparison of diagonal correlations in cross-lagged
analysis may present several methodological problems such as (1) inconsistency of
measurement, (2) failure to control for changes in variables across time, and (3) temporal
erosion.
The first and second concerns forwarded by Kessler and Greenberg do not, in my
opinion, pose a severe threat to the validity of the findings in Table 12.12 or to my
interpretation of these findings, described above. The first concern comes from the
possibility that the cross-lagged correlations are, in fact, a product of changes in the
reliability and/or the validity of the measurement over time. Since the same measurement
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tools were used over the different waves (i.e., the same survey questions), and since my
models incorporate measurement error of media skepticism, this seems to be only a
negligible concern.
Kessler and Greenberg’s second concern arises from the possible relationship
between current and previous values of the same variables. This concern is built into the
structural models. Indeed, previous skepticism predicts consequent skepticism and
previous exposure to various outlets predicts later exposure to the same outlets. But the
models control for these previous values. Hence, the cross-lagged effects should be
interpreted as the effects of exposure on subsequent skepticism and of skepticism on
subsequent exposure, over and above the stability of skepticism and exposure. Given
controls for background variables, the cross-lagged effects in the models are actually not
only on top of previous exposure and skepticism, but also over and above possible
common sources of both exposure and skepticism. In sum, given the statistical controls,
there is little reason for concern about the effects of past exposure and skepticism.
The third problem mentioned by Kessler and Greenberg, that of temporal erosion,
raises reason for concern in the current study. Temporal erosion takes place when the
independent and dependent variables are measured at slightly different points in time,
and, as a result, the differences between the two cross-lagged correlations might be an
artifact o f the two different time lags. In the above analysis past skepticism was measured
in Wave 4 (late July), while past exposure was measured at the baseline (March).
Subsequent skepticism was measured in Wave 8 (December), and subsequent exposure in
Wave 7 (October). In other words, the exposure-to-exposure measurement lag is
approximately nine months, while the skepticism-to-skepticism lag is only five months.
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Admittedly, this is not an ideal design for a cross-lagged analysis: the mere time lags
could influence the strength of the cross-lagged effects. However, this is the best that
could be done with the data at hand. The same analysis was conducted with Wave 4
measures of exposure as the tl exposure measures. The resulting models had much lower
fit statistics, and in some cases, empirical identification problems. The results of these
unreported models pointed to the same conclusions: the association between skepticism
and subsequent exposure was larger than the association between exposure and
subsequent skepticism for the mainstream media models, with the reverse pattern
obtaining in the non-mainstream media models.

Conclusions.
At the beginning of this chapter I outlined the arguments of the somewhat outdated
theory of selective exposure and asked whether its principles apply to media skepticism
and news media exposure. Selectivity, I argued, refers not only to the ideological valence
of news message contents, but also to perceptions of the sources. In particular, people
were found in prior research to prefer trusted sources and to reject mistrusted sources
when offered a variety of information sources in experimental contexts. When applying
this finding to news exposure, I hypothesized that media skepticism would be associated
negatively with exposure to mainstream news and positively with exposure to non
mainstream news.
The results were not wholly consistent across data sets (this was particularly true for
hypothesis tests), but when summarized by meta-analytical techniques they generally
supported the hypotheses. There was a negative association between skepticism and
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national and local TV news exposure and general mainstream news exposure. There was
also a positive association between skepticism and PTR listening and non-mainstream
news exposure. On the other hand, in the case of skeptics’ tendency to report lower
newspaper exposure and higher exposure to political information online, the average
associations were not significantly different from zero.
However, one must note that these associations do not present trust-based selectivity
as a strong force in news exposure diets. First, in terms of slope size, the coefficients
were generally small. For example, in the PTR data, the effect of stating that the media
“help society” rather than “get in the way o f society” was only -.05 - that is, the skeptical
answer was associated with a decrease of only .05 in a 1-4 general mainstream media
exposure scale (controlling for the other factors). In the most extreme case, the difference
between those most skeptical and those least skeptical was merely associated with a
decrease of 1.6 days in the past week of attending to national TV news, and 1.3 decrease
in genera] mainstream news media exposure scores (both in the case of the APPC data).
Though it may at times be substantial, this is not an extremely strong effect. For the sake
of comparison, the differential between the most and least involved respondents might
correspond to an increase of four, or even five days in the past week of exposure to the
media (after controlling for all covariates). This is a much more powerful effect. In other
words, media skepticism may play a role in guiding audience news selections, but it is
definitely not the only factor that comes into play in the process. The most skeptical,
employed, 40-year-old white female who is moderate politically and has 12 years of
education with median values on political involvement and knowledge would still have a
predicted value of 3 on the 1-7 mainstream media exposure score. This figure was
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calculated on the APPC data, which contained a relatively large effect of skepticism on
exposure. Thus, even the most skeptical audience members watch the national and local
news on TV and read the daily newspaper. Their skepticism might lead them to
somewhat less exposure to these channels, on average, but not to a total rejection of the
mistrusted media sources.
Second, media skepticism explains only a fraction of the variance in exposure. With
an average r equaling •. 18 (the largest r in the meta-analysis), the variance explained in
exposure by skepticism is 3.25 percent. This figure comes from the average bivariate
correlation between skepticism and mainstream media, which corrects the separate
effects for attenuation (usually a correction upward). Even if you took the upper point in
the confidence interval for this correlation between skepticism and exposure, the variance
explained would still be only 12 percent. This estimate is for the upper limit of the
strongest average effect, with a correction upward for the measurement error. So, at best,
skepticism accounts for little more than one-tenth of the variance. In actuality, the
variance explained is usually less than a few percentage points.
So the evidence points to only a modest association between skepticism and
exposure. However, in order to demonstrate selectivity we still have to confront the
argument of reverse causality. That is, how do we know that skepticism influences
exposure and not the other way around? The evidence for selectivity from the cross
lagged models is, again, modest In the cases of exposure to non-mainstream content, it
seems that rather than mistrust influencing exposure, the opposite was happening: that
is, that non-mainstream channels were actually cultivating mistrust of the mainstream
media in their audience. This makes sense in view of some of the content carried by
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these channels. Non-mainstream news media often contain critical reviews of
mainstream news information, accompanied by cynical references to the practices and
norms of mainstream journalism (several examples from talk radio programs and
alternative Web pages were provided in Chapter 4). Exposure to attacks on the media
might lead people to think that the media are not trustworthy.
Still, the effect of skepticism on mainstream media exposure was stronger than the
effect of exposure to the mainstream media in general on skepticism. This finding is, of
course, consistent with selective exposure theory. However, this small and borderline
significant effect faces the methodological problem of temporal erosion. Thus, while the
data suggest that some selectivity takes place (that is, that the direction of the association
between skepticism and exposure is from the former to the latter), more evidence is
definitely required to increase our certainty about this finding. The results I presented
above merely represent an attempt to do the best I could with data that were not collected
for the purpose of testing for these research questions. Another research design would
probably provide more accurate results. However, this weak evidence is enough to
provoke us to test this research question in more appropriate settings in the future.
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Table 12.1: Ordinary Least Squirw models predicting tm o iu ri to various n m outlets
(davs in the past w—k: EDialooue 2000 data).
B

P

(SE)
MEDSKEPcu
->EXP(M
Political
ideology
Political
extremity
Political
interest
Political
knowledge
Student
Employed

Education
White
Male
R square
N

.07
.04
(06)
.80—
.30
( 11)
-.88
-.06
(65)
.02
.00
(51)
-.50*
-.09
( 22 )
-.01
-.01
(04)
.04—
29
( 00)
-.00
-.00
(05)
-.40
-.05
(.28)
-.41
-.08
(.19)
.25
547

Cable
TV
news
-.76
-.05
(57)
-.04
-.05
(03)

Daily
NP

PTR

Non
mainstream

Mainstrea
m

- 1.20*
-.08
(54)
.02
.03
(03)

1.22"
.11
(45)

1.05*
.10
(42)
-.06*
-.10
( 02 )

-.74*
-.06
(39)
-.00
-.00
( 02)

-.01
-.00
(07)
.62—
.24
( 12)
-1.27*
-.09
(67)
-.72
-.06
(53)
-.44*

.04
.03
(06)
.47—
.17
(13)
1.47*
.10
(70)
.40
.03
(54)
-.08
-.01
(24)
-.01
-.01
(-04)
.02"
.14
(-00)
.04
.03
(06)
-.37
-.05
(30)
.16
.03
( 21 )
.13
549

.05
.03
(06)
.69—
.24
( 12)
.76
.05
(67)
-.02
-.00
(52
.21
.03
(.23
-.04
-.03
(04)
.06"
.37
( 00)
.04
.03
(06)
.13
.01
(.30
-.03
-.00
(.20
.30
556

. 10*
.09
(05)
.38—
.19
(09)
1.38—
.13
(51)
-.18
-.02
(40)
-.00
-.00
(-17)
.02
.03
(03)
-.01—
-.09
( 00 )
.05
.05
(-04)
-.45
-.08
(.43)
.21
.05
(16)
.15
559

.04
.03
(05)
.66 —
.31
(08)
-.38
-.03
(49)
-.27
-.02
(38)
-.20*
-.10
(18)
-.04
-.04
(03)
.05—
.39
( 00)
-.00
-.00
(04)
-.33
-.05
( 21 )
-.30*
-.07
(15)
.35
562

r

Age

-1.25*
-.09
(52)
-.02
-.03
(03)

Local
TV
news
-.38
-.03
(54)
-.02
-.02
(03)

o00

Schedule
flexibility

National
TV news

(-22 )
-.06
-.05
(.04)
.04—
.26
( 00 )
-.07
-.05
(06)
-.65*
-.09
(29)
-.36*
-.07
( 20 )
.18
554

-

.13—
-.20
(03)
.07
.05
(05)
.27"
.12
(-10)
1.68"
.15
(56)
.42
.04
(.44)
.23
.05
(.19)
-.01
-.01
(03)
.00
.05
( 00)
.04
.04
(05)
-.19
-.03
(25)
.44"
.10
(17)
.19
544

Notes: *p< 10; * p< 05; " p< 01; — p<.001. Table entries are unstandardized and standardized
regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 12.2: T—Mno the
(EDIaloque 2000 Data).

ik w U e lm n K P O M W

issociatione with alternative time laom

Alternative models with different exposure and skepticism variables
(slopes reported only for the skepticism -» exposure slopes)
B
National TV Local Cable Daily
TV
NP
TV
news
P
news news
(SE)
-.57
-.44
10
-1.02
1.MEDSKEPm ->
-.04
-.03
.00
-.06
EXPOSURE ds
(64) (62)
(59)
(63)
456
456
456
456
-1.21*
-.43
-.53
-.70
2. MEDSKEPm->
-.04
-.09
-.03
-.03
EXPOSURE d7
(63)
(59)
(-53)
(56)
N
505
503
501
503
-.54
-.04
-.97*
-1.12*
3. MEDSKEPm->
-.04
-.09
-.00
-.06
EXPOSURE
(56)
(56)
(48)
(51)
N
547
547
547
548

PTR

Mainstream

1.40.12
(49)
456
.49
. 03
(55)
499
.65
.05
(.47)
546

-.68
-.06
(44)
456
-.76*
-.07
(40)
508
-.85*
-.08
(37)
549

Notes: *p<10; * p< 05. Table entries are unstandardized and standardized regression
coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. All models control for the party-ideology index,
political extremity, political knowledge and involvement, schedule flexibility, employment, student
status, age, sex, years of education and race.
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Table 12.3: OLS mod>l«
(EDialooue 2000 Data).

predicting

w
p
w
u
w

General Web use
(hours in past week)

MEDSKEP* -» EXPOSURE*
Political ideology
Political extremity
Political interest

Student (=1)
Employed (=1)
Schedule flexibility
Age
Education
White (=1)
Male (=1)
R square
N
MEDSKEP*,-* EXPOSURE 47
N
MEDSKEPm-» EXPOSURE
N

P
.06
-.01
-.01

.13
oto
1*

Political knowledge

B
S.E.
2.30
(1.89)
-.03
(.11)
-.03
(23)
.99*
(.41)
-1.27
(2.33)
2.75
(175)
-.82
(.77)
-.16
(.15)
-.08“
( 02)
.05
( 02)
-.67
(113)
.18
(77)
.05
463

08
-.05
-.05
-.17
.02

-.03
.01

to

the

World

Wide

Web

Political information on
the Web
(days in past week)
B
P
S.E.
.05
.65
(56)
.01
.01
(03)
.04
.05
(06)
.37“
.16
(.12)
1.60*
.13
(69)
.11
.01
(52)
.06
.28
(.23)
.08
.08
(04)
-.11
-.01*
( 00 )
.07
.06
(06)
-.07
-.51
(31)
-.01
-.06
( 21 )
.10
463
.45
(50)
462
.51
(.44)
559

.04
.04

Notes: *p<10; * p<.05; “ p<.01.
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Table 12.4: Logistic m m w lon modela predicting w p oiu rt to political Information and
political discussion on the World Wide Web (EDIatooue 2000 Datal.
B
(SE)
MEDSKEP* ->
EXPOSURE«
Political ideology
Political extremity
Political interest
Political
knowledge
Student
Employed
Schedule
flexibility
Age
Education
White
Male
Rsquare
N
MEDSKEPm-*
EXPOSURE „
N

Went to a chatroom
to discuss current
affairs (1=yes)
1.00
(75)
.02
(04)
-.03
(09)
.13
(19)
-1.93*
(103)
.26
(.72)
-.36
(-31)
.01
(06)
-.01
(06)
-.07
(09)
-.34
(41)
.57*
(-29)
.09
250

Visited a Web site to
find info on current
affairs ( 1=yes)
-.04
(100 )
-.07
(06)
.03
( 11)
.11
(24)
5.57***
(135)
.26
(82)
.61
(38)
-.08
(07)
.00
( 01 )
.06
(.12)
-.24
(50)
-.75*
(39)
.26
251

.23
(93)
180

.95
(1. 12)
180

Notes: "p<.10; * p<.05; — p<.001.
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Table 12.5: Ordinary Least Soummmodels predicting
fdavs in the past weak: APPC 2000 d m i.

to various ntw» outlets

m
d
m
u
w

B
P
(SE)

National
TV news

Local
TV
news

Cable
TV
news

Daily
NP

PTR

Political
info on
the Web
(given
Web
access)

Non
mainstream

Mainstrea
m

Media
skepticism

i
to
T

-.37—
-.13
(0 5 )
-.04**
-.05
(0 1 )
-.02
-.18
(0 3 )
.39—
.14
(0 6 )
.05
.03
(0 3 )
-.39
-.02
(.40)
-.30*
-.05
(1 3 )
.02—
.14
(0 0 )
-.03
-.03
(0 2 )
-.39*
-.03
(2 0 )
-.3 2 -.06
( 10)
.09
2,403

-.25—
-.08
(0 6 )
.05—
.05
(0 1 )
.05*
.03
(0 3 )
.45—
.16
(0 6 )
.03
.02
(0 3 )
-.49
-.02
(4 3 )
-.55—
-.09
(1 4 )
.01*
.05
( 00) .
.04*
.04
(0 2 )
-.36
-.03
(2 2 )
.3 9 .06
( 11)
.07
2,405

-.08
-.02
(0 5 )
.04*
.04
(0 1 )
-.05
-.02
(0 3 )
.53—
.18
(0 6 )
.13—
.08
(0 3 )
-.23
-.01
(4 3 )
.06
.01
(.14)
.03—
.22
(0 0 )
.08—
.08
(0 2 )
.54*
.04
(2 2 )
.16
.02
(.11)
.15
2,409

.11*
.04
(0 5 )
-.0 5 -.07
(0 1 )
.07*
.05
(0 3 )
.25—
.10
(0 5 )
.0 9 .06
(0 3 )
-.30
-.01
(3 6 )
.3 7 .07
(1 2 )
-.00*
-.04
(0 0 )
.01
.02
(0 1 )
-.38*
-.04
(.18)
.12
.02
(0 9 )
.05
2,407

.01
.00
(0 6 )
-.00
-.00
(0 2 )
.01
.01
(0 3 )
.25—
.10
(0 7 )
.10*
.08
(0 4 )
-.04
-.00
(4 2 )
-.05
-.01
(.17)
-.01*
-.06
(0 0 )
.05*
.06
(0 2 )
.04
.00
(2 6 )
.25
.05
(-13)
.04
1,456

.07*
.04
(0 3 )
-.03*
-.05
(0 1 )
.04
.04
(0 1 )
.20—
.12
(0 3 )
.09—
.10
(0 2 )
-.04
-.00
(2 4 )
.27—
.08
(0 8 )
-.01—
-.10
(0 0 )
.05—
.08
(0 1 )
-.15
-.02
(1 2 )
.12*
.04
(0 6 )
.10
2,409

-.28—
-.14
(0 3 )
.00
.01
(0 1 )
-.02
-.01
(0 2 )
46—
.25
(-04)
.08—
.08
(0 4 )
-.55*
-.04
(2 5 )
-.35—
-.08
(0 8 )
.02—
.23
(0 0 )
.02*
.03
(0 1 )
-.21
-.03
(1 3 )
.03
.00
(0 6 )
.24
2.409

Political
ideology
Political
extremity
Political
interest
Political
knowledge
Student
Employed
Age
Education
White
Male
Rsquare
N

-.15
(0 5 )
.00
.00
(0 1 )
-.05*
-.03
(0 3 )
.45—
.16
(-06)
.13—
.08
(-03)
-1.01*
-.05
(3 9 )
-.54—
-.09
(1 3 )
.03—
.24
(0 0 )
-.00
-.00
(-02)
-.67**
-.06
(2 0 )
-.36—
-.07
(1 0 )
.20
2,401

Notes: # p<10; * p<05;** p< 01; "* p<001. Table entries are unstandardized and standardized
regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 12.6: Logistic Regression models predicting m d o w i w to talk radio (W litaw d in flu
paat wsek; 0» did not liatan in ha oast w—k; APPC 2000 data).
B
(SE)
Media skepticism
Party-ideology
index
Political extremity
Political interest
Political knowledge
Student
Employed
Age
Education
White
Male
Rsquare
N

Limbaugh

Liddy

Dr. Laura

Stem

.45***
(08)
-.28***
(04)
-.02
(07)
.74*“
(.14)
.30***
(.06)
-.09
(73)
.40*
(.24)
-.00
(.001
-.05
(03)
.39
(51)
.32*
(19)
.29
2,370

.14
(28)
-.09
(.11)
.00
(19)
.24
(37)
.18
(.21 )
-5.80
(23.37)
-.37
(79)
-.03
( 02)
-.09
(.12)
-.72
(92)
1.05
(71)
.06
2,370

.18
(.55)
-.21
(.12)
-.16
(18)
.21
(32)
.26
(18)
-3.51
(14.06)
1.27
(95)
-.01
( 01)
.01
(09)
-.43
(96)
.26
(53)
.09
2,370

.24
(23)
.12
(09)
-.26*
(14)
.17
(24)
.03
(15)
-5.21
(14.46)
.43
(74)
-.07***
( 01)
.01
(09)
.21
(83)
.44
(45)
.13
2,370

Notes: *p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.
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Table 12.7: Wtlohted Least Souatas model* predicting
(4»"regularlv”; 1«Mnever": PTR 1996 Data).
B
P
(SE)
Media
skepticism
Partyideology
index
Political
extremity

Age
Education

National
TV news

CSPAN

NPR

PBS

Daily
Magazines
newspaper

-.05"
-.03
(03)
.01.06
( 00)
.01
.03
( 00)

-.02
-.01
(03)
.00
.00
( 01)
.00
.00
( 01)
.28—
.30
( 02)
.06*
.03
( 02)
.01—
.11
(.00)
.00
.00
(.00)
-.19—
-.08
(05)
-.03
-.02
(03)
.13
2,027

.04
.02
(04)
-.00
-.02
( 02 )
.03*
.05
( 01 )
.28—
.24
(03)
.15—
.07
(04)
-.00
-.02
( 00)
.03.07
( 01)
-.20 *
-.07
(06)
-.01
-.00
(04)
.10
1,989

-.07
-.03
(04)
.01*
.05
( 02 )
.02
.03
( 01 )
.18—
.17
( 02)
-.00
-.01
(04)
.00
.01
( 00)
.03—
.09
( 01)
-.08
-.02
(06)
.19—
.09
(04)
.06
2,020

-.10*
-.04
(05)
.02*
.05
( 00 )
-.00
-.01
(.01)
.32—
.25
(05)
.55—
.23
( 02)
.oo.07
( 00)
-.00
-.00
(.01)
-.04
-.01
(06)
.07
.03
(05)
.18
2,022

-.04
-.02
(04)
.02*
.05
( 00 )
.03*
.04
( 01)
.31—
.28
( 02)
.09*
.04
(04)
.01—
.09
( 00 )
.02*
.05
( 01 )
.02
.01
(-06)
.09*
.04
(04)
.13
2,025

I

Political
knowledge

All
mainstream

CO
N

Political
interest

.38
( 01)
.15—
.11
(03)
.00—
.07
( 00)
.03—
.1 1

White
Male
R square
Unweighted
N

to various news outlets

m
p
o
iu
w

( 00)
-.08*
-.04
(03)
.05*
.04
.02
.26
2,027

-.02
-.01
(-04)
.01*
.04
(.00)
.01
.02
( 01)
.30—
.25
( 02)
.07
.03
(04)
-.00-.06
( 00)
.09—
.21
(-01)
-.16*
-.06
(-05)
-.03
-.01
(04)
.15
2,022

Notes: #p<. 10; * p<05; ** p<01; *** p<001. Table entries are unstandardized and standardized
regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 12.8: Weighted L«««t Squares models predicting tm w u w to political talk radio
(houfa in a raqular week: PTR 1996 Data).
B

Limbaugh

Liberal
PTR

.16”
.06
(-07)
-.11—
-.28
( 01)
.03
.04
( 02)
.18—
.12
(04)
.11*
.04
(07)
.00*
.06
( 00)
.01
.01
( 02)
-.04
-.01
( 10)
.15*
.05
(07)
.12
1,531

.04
.02
(05)
.01
.02
( 00 )
-.01
-.02
( 01 )
.06*
.06
(03)
.03
.01
(06)
.00*
.07
( 00)
.03.08
( 01)
.00
.00
(07)
.07
.03
(.05)
.02
1,531

P

(SE)
Media
skepticism
Partyideology index
Political
extremity
Political
interest
Political
knowledge
Age
Education
White
Male
R square
Unweighted N

All PTR
Other
conservative
PTR
.05
.26*
.02
.06
(.11)
(05)
-.04—
-.16—
.02
-.21
(03)
( 02 )
.02
.03
.02
.02
( 02)
(03)
.06*
.30—
.11
.05
(03)
(09)
.07
.15
.03
.03
(05)
(.12)
.00
.01.02
.07
( 00)
( 00 )
.02
.06.04
.07
( 00 )
( 01)
-.00
-.04
.03
-.00
(07)
(16)
.07
.30.03
.07
(05)
(13)
.04
.10
1,531
1,531

Notes: *p<.10; * p< 05; ** p< 01; *** p< 001. Table entries are unstandardized and standardized
regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 12.9: Ordinary L m t S q u aw models predicting tin o iu r i to various news outlets
(dsvs in flu oast week: NES Data).
B
8
(SE)
Media
skepticism
Partyideology
index
Political
extremity
Political
interest
Political
knowledge
Age
Education
White
Male
R square
N

All
National
mainstream TVnews
-.02
-.01
(-06)
.00
.00
(.01 )

-.01
-.00
(09)
.01
.01
( 02)

Local
TV
news
.04
.01
(09)
-.00
-.00
( 02)

-.09—
-.07
(03)
.68—
.34
(.04)
. 10*
.05
(04)
.04—
.37
( 00)
.02
.03
( 02)
-.02
-.02
(13)
.03
.01
(09)
.30
1,506

-.12“
-.07
(.04)
1.01—
.37
(06)
.05
.00
(06)
.04—
.31
( 00)
.01
.01
( 02)
-.22
-.02
(.18)
-.14
-.02
( 12)
.27
1,504

-.16—
-.09
(04)
.72—
.28
(07)
-.03
-.01
(07)
.02—
.18
( 00 )
-.07*
-.07
(-02 )
.03
.00
(19)
-.30*
-.05
( 12)
.13
1,504

Daily
All
newspaper PTR
-.12
-.03
(09)
-.01
-.01
(03)
-.00
-.00
(04)
.30—
.10
(-07)
.29—
.11
(07)
.04—
.29
( 00)
.12—
.11
(03)
.10
.01
( 20 )
.53—
.09
(14)
.16
1,506

Limbaugh Allnonmainstream
(PTR+ Web)
.09* .11—
.04*
.10
.06
.06
(03) ( 02)
( 01 )
-.06—
-.02—
.05— -.24
-.12
-.14 (08)
( 00 )
( 02 )
.05— .06—
.03“
.07
.12
.07
( 01 ) ( 01)
( 01)
.22— .15—
.12—
22
.20
.20
(03) ( 02 )
( 01)
.07
.02
-.05
.03
.00
.00
(03) ( 02)
( 01)
-.00
.00
-.00
-.00
.00
-.03
( 00 ) (.00 )
( 00)
-.00
.01
.01*
.00
.03
.06
( 00 )
( 01 ) (.01 )
-.16 -.02
-.07
-.04
-.05 -.00
(08) (05)
(04)
.25— .16—
.14—
.11
.10
.12
( 02 )
(06) (03)
.11
.19
.13
1,505 1,506
1,506

Notes: *p<.10; * p< 05; “ p< 01;— p< 001. Table entries are unstandardized and standardized
regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 12.10: Logistic reoreaaIon modtl predicting w n w u it to political Information ow r
tha World WldaWab.

Education
White
Male
Rsquare
N

I

-.04
(08)
’->1
o

Media
skepticism
Partyideology
index
Political
extremity
Political
interest
Political
knowledge
Age

Political information on
the Web (given web
access)
B
e
(se)
.40*
1.48
(-19)
.04
.90
(.04)

(.15)
-.15
(15)
-.03**
( 01)
.21"
(08)
.21
(48)
.55*
(26)
.16
400

.84
2.02
.86

.96
1.24
1.24
1.65

Notes: , p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.
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Table 12.11: M itM nilvsh summarizing the associations bthw tn media skepticism and
madia exposure

Average effect size
Number of studies
SNj
Corrected Std

National
TVnews
-.14
4
6,722
.08

Mainstream
Average effect size
Number of studies
SN)
Corrected Std

-.18
4
6,652
.09

Local TV
news
-.13
3
4,613
.08

PTR

Web

.16
.05
4
3
6,256 4,516
.09
.08

Daily
newspaper
-.07
4
6,740
.04

Non
mainstream
.12
3
4,686
.05
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Table 12.12: Structural Equation Models testing the cross-legged association between
skepticism and axpoaura.
Model

B
skep-*
skep8

P

1. National TV
news
2. Local TV news
3. Cable TV
news
4. Daily
newspaper
5. PTR
6. Political info
on the Web
7. Non
mainstream
(PTR + Web)
8. All mainstream
9. Television

(s.e)
.72—
.69
(05)
.72—
.69
(05)
.72—
.69
(05)
.72—
.70
(05)
.71—
.69
(-05)
.77—
.72
(05)
.75—
.74
(05)
T i

es

(05)
.72—
.69
(05)

B
exp-*
exp8

P

(se)
.55—
.52
(04)
.50—
.50
(04)
.62—
.61
(03)
.69—
.69
(03)
.49—
.49
(.04)
.41—
.41
(05)
.53—
.53
(05)
.64—
.64
(.04)
.62—
.62
(.04)

B
exp-*
skep8

P

(se)
.00
.00
(04)
-.03
-.04
(.03)
.02
.02
(-04)
-.02
-.02
(04)
.03
.03
(.04)
.05
.05
(04)
.07*
.08
(04)
-.02
-.02
(02)
-.01
-.01
(04)

B
skep-*
exp8

N

X
(d.f.=20)
p-value
X2/df-

GFI

AG
FI

NFI

414

38.02
p=.008
X/df=1.90
40.03
p=.004
X /df=2.00
40.86
p=.003
Xi/df=2.04
42.23
p=.002
x/df=2.11
38.18
p=.008
x/df=1.90
37.72
p=. 009
X /df=1.88
35.70
p=.016
xVdf=1.78
38.98
p=.006
x/df=1.95
38.06
p=.006
x/df=1.90

.98

.94

.97

.98

.93

.97

.98

.95

.97

.98

.93

.97

.98

.93

.97

.98

.92

.96

.98

.92

.96

.98

.93

.97

.98

.93

.97

P

(se)
-.11*
-.09
(05)
-.06
-.05
(05)
-.04
-.03
(-05)
-.00
-.00
(02)
-.01
-.01
(05)
.05
.04
(06)
.01
.01
(05)
-.07*
-.06
(04)
-.09*
-.07
(05)

416
409
414
407
335
308
395
398

r - . —r
political knowledge and political involvement (these covariates all have direct paths to both
endogenous variables, and are assumed to be correlated with the exogenous variables).
Maximum Likelihood estimates are presented. All models were tested for their sensitivity to
different starting values.
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Figure 12.1: Structural model teetino forth* cross-b o a t offsets of skepticism on
oxoosure and of exposure on skepticism

Exposure 7

Exposure

Skepticism

Skepticis

NCS

E

Mistrust

s

NCS

Mistrust

s

e
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Chapter 13: The moderating role of need for cognition.

In the previous chapter, I explored the association between media skepticism and
exposure to various mainstream and non-mainstream news sources in light of theories of
selective exposure to communication. I presented some evidence demonstrating that
skeptics are less likely to attend to mainstream channels. Simply put, those who do not
trust the mainstream media tune out and look for other sources of information. Hence,
they tend to select alternative and non-mainstream media (like political talk radio and
political information on the World Wide Web) as their information sources. Those
trusting the media have no problems with the mainstream media as their primary source
of political information. These non-skeptical audiences tend to attend more frequently to
national TV news and daily newspapers and to mainstream news in general, and less to
non-mainstream sources, compared to their skeptical counterparts.
However, these findings were not replicated in all four independent data sets. The
discrepancy in the results was partly resolved through meta-analysis. However, given the
small number of studies, this analysis did not offer a complete account as to why the
studies differed in their results. One possibility is simply that the models specified in the
previous chapter were not totally accurate. In this chapter I try to improve the accuracy
by modeling for the interaction between skepticism and other factors that come into play
when audiences select their news sources. In a sense, this could be viewed as a search for
the conditions under which skepticism influences exposure. While my limited metaanalytic efforts did not yield an explanation as to why certain associations are significant
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in some of the data sets and not in others, the models presented in this chapter might fill
the void and contribute to a better understanding of the association between skepticism
and news exposure selections.
This chapter adds a motivational factor to the exposure equations. As uses and
gratifications research (e.g., Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973) tells us, audience needs
serve as primary determinants of their media choices. Tastes and perceptions regarding
media credibility also come into play: given plenty of choices and possibilities, people
are likely to attend to what they like. In a way, gratification research tells us that these
factors interact when people build their media diets. In this chapter the focus is on the
interaction between perceptions about the source and people’s needs or motivations to
attend to the message. People may expose themselves to news content they do not trust,
value or appreciate, just in order to gratify cognitive needs. On the other hand, given no
such need for cognition, audiences would rely entirely on their attitudes toward the
source and not watch what they do not trust.

Uses and gratifications research.
This chapter adds uses and gratifications to the models predicting media exposure. The
school of uses and gratifications has provided us with one of the most important
theoretical contributions to our understanding of media exposure. In a nutshell, uses and
gratifications research tells us that audience exposure patterns are contingent on their
social and psychological needs (Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973; Katz, Gurevitch &
Hass, 1974). People have different exposure patterns because they have different
motivations to attend to the media. According to a metaphor often used by gratification
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scholars, the media are a toolbox. You use what you want, when you want, according to
your needs. Escapist viewers are said to prefer comedies and soaps, while inquisitive
viewers are found to prefer news or documentaries. Excited viewers are more likely to
choose relaxing content, while bored viewers are more likely to seek arousing content
(Zillmann, 1988). In the most parsimonious version of the uses and gratifications
approach, viewers are divided into instrumental viewers, who seek specific content for
identifiable needs, and ritual viewers, who are less selective and use TV out of habit or
because they have nothing better to do (Rubin, 1993). Gratifications research represents
the meeting point between those who explain exposure to communication by
psychological factors such as personality structure (Finn, 1997), and theories of selective
exposure processes in which individuals try to avoid dissonant or otherwise disturbing
materials (Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974). All of these perspectives highlight the individual
freedom and personal choice of active, gratification-seeking audiences. However,
gratifications research describes exposure to communication as a means of gratifying a
holistic set of human needs, while selective exposure focuses on a more limited set of
principles guiding human behavior, such as avoiding dissonance or interacting with
likable and trusted objects.

Motivational factors in news exposure.
In the previous chapter I examined the association between media skepticism and news
media exposure. Since selective exposure research tell us that people choose to attend to
information consistent with their existing attitudes (including attitudes toward sources), it
is trivial to claim that when people feel alienated and mistrustful toward mainstream
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news, they will watch less mainstream media and seek more non-mainstream information
sources as a substitute.
However, this simple hypothesis ignores another basic gratification finding: people
have many needs motivating their attention to the media. “One set of media materials is
capable of serving a multiplicity of needs and audience functions” (Katz, Blumler &
Gurevitch, 1974:517). The reasons for watching news are diverse (Gantz, 1978; Wenner,
1985). Following Freud, Schramm (1949) claimed that news consumption is guided by
either reality motives or pleasure motives (or both). The traces of this reality/play
distinction can be found in the writings of later scholars who talked, instead, about
information/entertainment (Rubin, 1984) or content/process (Cutler & Danowski, 1980).
However, later scholars have offered numerous additional motives. Wenner (1985) offers
a map of news gratifications that contains 16 different motivations, including egodefense, expressive, tension reduction, stimulation, and so on). In the following
paragraphs I review only the main families of gratifications mentioned in the literature on
news.
Some people attend to the news to fulfill social integrative needs (Levy, 1977). These
social gratification seekers are not very interested in the political world, but they do not
want to lose touch with other people. They want to belong to the community, to be up-todate with what is going on, and to be able to use news information as an icebreaker in
conversations. In fact, some people watch TV news just because they want to share
leisure time with a news-watching spouse. In short, these people use the news media in
order to connect with others. It is the social context of exposure, not exposure per se, that
gratifies such news watchers.
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For others the news may fulfill “surveillance” functions (Wright, I960). These
audience members attend to the news in order to get bits of information necessary for
their daily lives, and do not care much about the rest. They watch the news to learn about
tomorrow’s school strike. They wait for the weather and traffic reports or the news from
the stock market, and watch other components of newscasts simply because they are there
(see Gantz et al., 1991). Note that issues of media credibility are almost always irrelevant
when it comes to these bits of practical information reported by the news. Journalists
usually play only a minor role when it comes to reporting about what NASDAQ did or
about the weather. Audiences seeking this practical information might find news
gratifying regardless of their media skepticism.
Still others expose themselves to news in order to gratify their cognitive needs. They
want to better understand the political world, to get to know the arguments and counter
arguments. They get gratification from thinking and deliberating, from encountering
problems from different angles, and from trying to “solve” problems even when these are
unrelated to them personally, just as others may enjoy cracking riddles and puzzles. For
these people, the desire to think and to know (vs. merely some social or practical
function) is their motivation for news exposure. Comparing information, learning
different angles of the same stories and arguing with texts is a gratifying media
experience for people with cognitive needs. Intuitively, audiences high in need for
cognition will be those who care most about the validity of media reports and will be the
most motivated to learn the “truth” in the news, compared to social-integrative or to
practical-functional surveillance-motivated audiences.
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However, need for cognition is not all about information. Gratification research
distinguishes between orientational gratifications, which are “message uses for
information that provide for the reference and reassurance of self in relation to society,”
and para-orientational gratifications, which are “process uses that ritualistically reorient
news content through play activity” (Wenner, 1985:175). In no sense is the goal o f this
para-orientational activity merely information gain (Stephenson, 1967). Rather, the aim is
to “play” with information, to receive gratification from ritualistic exposure to
information, from trying to understand complex realities, and from thinking about these
realities.
In sum, the motivations for news exposure are diverse. Most of us probably attend to
news due to multiple motivations. Many may use news to gratify each o f the needs
mentioned above, at least to some extent. Yet we also differ in the extent to which we
have these motivations and the extent to which we use news to fulfill them. According to
uses and gratifications theory, these different needs lead to different exposure patterns. In
this chapter, I focus on need for cognition as a predictor o f news exposure and as a factor
moderating the role of skepticism in exposure to news communication.
Need for cognition.
The main concept I use in the remaining o f the chapter derives from a psychological
research tradition about “need for cognition” (Cohen et al., 1955; Cohen, 1957; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1982; Perse, 1992). Cohen et al., (1955:291) defined the need for cognition
(NCOG) as “a need to structure relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways. It is a
need to understand and make reasonable the experimental world”. They argued that need
for cognition may qualify as a need since it directs behavior toward a goal, and since
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tension is caused “when this goal is not attained”. Later, Petty and Cacioppo (1982:118)
clarified that the term “need” is used in a “statistical (i.e., likelihood or tendency) rather
than biological (i.e., tissue deprivation) sense”. They defined need for cognition as “a
tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking” (p. 116).
Other scholars (reviewed by Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) have characterized people with
need for cognition as people who “have fun” thinking, who are motivated by a “quest for
reality”, who feel frustrated when they are unable to understand. Research has found that
need for cognition predicts verbal ability and knowledge (Tidwell et al., 2000), study
skills and academic achievement (Guelgoez, 2001) and performance on various problem
solving tasks (Nair et al., 2001).
The need-for-cognition construct has often been applied in persuasion research
(Kaufman & Stasson, 1999; Zhang, 1996). Most relevant for this study, and as uses and
gratifications research (Katz et al., 1974) predicted using the framework of “cognitive
needs”, need for cognition was found to be connected with utilitarian local news viewing
and attention to government news reports, but not with attention to sports (Perse, 1992).
Undergraduates who expressed a liking for heavy metal music ranked lower in need for
cognition than non-fans (Hansen & Hansen, 1991). Recently, Tuten & Bosnjak
(2001:391) found that need for cognition “was significantly and positively correlated
with all Web activities involving cognitive thought”. In sum, what psychologists
conceptualized and called “need for cognition” was found to be useful in the field of
communication, particularly in gratifications research.

j0 7

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Need for cognition as a moderating factor in the effect of skepticism on exposure.
Uses and gratifications claims that exposure to communication is guided by social and
psychological needs, including a need for cognition. However, motivational factors,
important as they might be, are not everything. Even according to gratifications research,
human needs interact with other factors when people select media content in order to
gratify themselves. First and foremost, the media environment is a crucial interacting
factor. “Audience members, naturally enough, can only make choices among options
actually available to them” (Backer & Schoenbach, 1989, p. 19). There is ample evidence
that the media environment interacts with audience needs in their effect on audience
exposure. Typically, these studies show that the presence - or lack - of some sort of
media has consequences in terms of audience exposure patterns. For example, Weimann
(19%) documented, using a before-after technique, that the introduction of cable TV to
Israel resulted in increased exposure to movie and music channels. Others have also
found (Schoenbach & Backer, 1989; Webster, 1986) that cable TV allows viewers to
specialize their viewing and concentrate on their favorite genres, which are often
entertainment genres.
The interaction of media environment with audience motivations is further
demonstrated by the finding that for those who have cable television, preference for
entertainment is related to decreased exposure for news, while for those who have no
cable TV, preference for entertainment is related to increased exposure to news (Prior,
2001). Arguably, those who prefer entertainment sometimes have no option but to watch
news (people without cable are at times “forced” to watch news genres) and must satisfy
their need for entertainment via news watching. 0* was also found that local news
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audiences tended to be larger when no competing entertainment programming was
scheduled; see Webster & Newton, 1988.)
In sum, there is evidence that audience motivations interact with media environments
in their joint effect on audience exposure. In this chapter, I argue that motivational factors
interact not only with systemic factors such as media environments, but also with
individual attitudes and predispositions such as attitudes toward the sources. People with
stronger needs might be willing to pay higher costs in order to satisfy their needs - for
example, to expose themselves to sources they do not like. Hence, the urge to satisfy
certain needs could result in decreased selective exposure to communication.
To hypothesize about the interaction between need for cognition and media
skepticism I need to highlight two important points:

1. Selective exposure and uses and gratifications are not the same thing. The
former deals with tastes and predispositions, while the latter deals with needs
and motivations. However, given the human need to avoid dissonance (which
is definitely not the only need motivating human behavior), one can make the
argument that “selective exposure” is contained within gratification research.
2. Selective exposure processes and uses and gratifications processes do not
work separately, but rather in conjunction. One need may at times “give in” to
other needs. The tendency to attend to trusted and likeable sources (stemming
from a human need for consistency) might be weakened in the presence of
other human needs.
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It follows that separate needs interact with each other in the way they influence
exposure to communication. Selectivity in exposure to communication is guided by these
complex interactions as uses and gratifications tells us. When need for cognition is low,
selective exposure is motivated by a desire for consistency (or dissonance avoidance).
Thus, people with no cognitive needs will rely more heavily on their attitudes toward the
media when they select their news sources. On the other hand, when need for cognition is
high, selective exposure is weaker. Thus, people with cognitive needs rely less on their
media skepticism when they select their news sources. That is, they are willing to expose
themselves to un-trusted sources in order to satisfy their cognitive needs. As in the
previous chapter, consistency-motivated selective exposure is conceptualized as the
negative effect of media skepticism on mainstream media exposure, and alternatively, the
positive main effect of media skepticism on non-mainstream media exposure. Since, as
discussed above, need for cognition is expected to interact in the process, I hypothesize
that:
H2.3. Media skepticism will interact with need for cognition in their effect on
mainstream media exposure. The effect o f media skepticism will be weaker for those
with higher levels of need for cognition.
It is important to note that this is only one possible formulation of the general process
I am describing. Trust-based selectivity is expected to interact with other needs as well,
not only with need for cognition. However, since the data do not contain measures for
other individual needs and motivations, my analysis is limited to need for cognition only.
In the following paragraph, I discuss the operationalization of need for cognition.
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Measuring need for cognition.
The first attempt to create a need for cognition measurement instrument was
conducted by Cacioppo and Petty (1982). They created a pool o f opinion statements that
appeared to be relevant to the need-for-cognition concept. Statements that were judged in
preliminary testing to be ambiguous were revised or eliminated. The remaining pool of
45 items was administered to groups “who were known to differ along the dimension of
need for cognition” (university faculty members vs. factory assembly line workers).
Items that discriminated between the groups were retained. They were found to be
internally correlated and loaded on only one factor in a factor analysis, even when
applied to different samples from different populations. The scale was tested for
discriminant and convergent validity by examining the associations o f need for cognition
with other constructs (field independence and open-mindedness in the case of convergent
validity, test anxiety and social desirability in the case of discriminant validity). Similar
examinations o f this scale were conducted by different scholars in different contexts (e.g.
Forsterlee & Ho, 1999).
The need-for-cognition measure used in the EDialogue study was a shortened version
of the need for cognition instrument, consisting of nine statements:
a I would prefer complex to simple problems.
b It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it
works.
c I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me
personally.
d Thinking is not my idea of fun.
e

I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with hew solutions to problems.
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f

Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much,

g I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve,
h I only think as hard as I have to.
i

I find satisfaction deliberating long and hard for hours.

Respondents were asked to rate how well each of these statements described them.
Response categories were “a lot like me” (coded “5”), “somewhat like me” (coded “4”),
“uncertain” (coded “3”), “not too much like me” (coded “2”), and “not at all like me”
(coded “1”). The variables measuring reactions to statements b, d, f and h were reversecoded. Reliability for the nine items was .76. To build a scale, the nine items were
averaged. The resulting measure had a mean of 3.S, with a standard deviation of .66. The
bivariate correlation between the need for cognition measure and media skepticism was
.10(p<.05).

Results.
OLS models testing for the interaction between media skepticism and need for cognition
are presented in Table 13.1. Basically, these are the same models presented in the
previous chapter (Tables 12.1 and 12.2). The dependent variables are again various
measures of exposure to various news media sources (number of days in the past week).
All models control for the party-ideology index, political extremity, political knowledge
and involvement, schedule flexibility, employment, student status, age, sex, years of
education and race. But in addition to the effects of these covariates (not reported in the
table in order to preserve space), need for cognition was introduced into the models, as
well as the need for cognition by media skepticism interaction, predicted by H2.3.
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Centering was used in all models, in order to reduce multicollinearity caused by the
correlation between the interaction terms and the interacting variables (the coefficients
for the centered terms are reported). As in the previous chapter, the analysis was
replicated four times to test for the sensitivity of the results to different measurement lags
between skepticism and exposure.
The second column on the left (A models) presents the results from models predicting
national TV news exposure. While the cross-sectional model (Model A l) did not show a
significant skepticism by need for cognition interaction, in all the other models this
interaction was significant or borderline significant. In other words, Wave 4 skepticism
interacted with need for cognition in their effect on Wave 6 national TV news exposure
(Model A2). Wave 4 skepticism interacted with need for cognition in their effect on
Wave 7 (Model A3) national news exposure and on the average Wave 6 and Wave 7
combined national TV exposure measure (Model A4).
The interpretation of the significant interactions is presented in Figure 13.1. In all
models, media skepticism had a strong and negative effect on national TV news exposure
for those with low need for cognition. For those with no cognitive needs, mistrust in the
mainstream media reduced exposure to national TV news. These people watched the
most national TV news (compared to all other groups) when they trusted the media and
the least (again, compared to all other groups) when they mistrusted them. Thus, the
effect of media skepticism on exposure to TV news as a mainstream outlet is strongest
among people with relatively low cognitive needs. Exposure patterns for those who
testify that they do not enjoy thinking and that “they only think as hard as they have to”
are heavily influenced by their trust or mistrust in news sources.
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In all models, the negative effect of media skepticism on national TV news exposure
decreased as their need for cognition increased. The more people enjoyed deliberating
and solving puzzles, the lower the influence o f mistrust in the media on their choice of
national TV news as a source of social information. Still, even for those with moderate
(NCOG=3) and relatively high (NCOG=4) need for cognition scores, the effect of
skepticism on exposure was negative. That is, despite the fact that they were less
influenced by their mistrust in the media than the low-need-for-cognition respondents,
people with relatively high need for cognition were still negatively affected by their
mistrust when making media choices. The more they trusted mainstream news, the more
they watched national TV news, and vice versa for skeptics.
In contrast, for those with the highest scores on the need for cognition scale, the effect
of skepticism on exposure was positive rather than negative. For people who are excited
by thinking about complex problems even “when they do not affect them personally”,
skepticism toward the mainstream media is associated with more exposure to national TV
news. The more they trust the media, the less likely are they are to watch national TV
news.
The third column on the left (B models) in Table 13.1 presents models testing for the
same interactions, this time with local rather than national news exposure as the
dependent variable. In two of the four models (B l, B3), the interaction between
skepticism and exposure was not statistically significant. On the other hand, Wave 4
skepticism did interact significantly with need for cognition in their effect on Wave 6
exposure (Model B2). The same significant interaction (between Wave 4 skepticism ano
NCOG) was found when the dependent variable was the average of Wave 6 and Wave 7
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reports of local news exposure (Model B4). The interpretation of the interaction,
presented in Figure 13.2, is similar in both cases to the pattern that was found when
national news exposure was the DV. In other words, skepticism was negatively related to
exposure to local TV for those with low and moderate levels of need for cognition. For
those extremely high on cognitive needs, the association was reversed.
In the fourth column on the left in Table 13.1 (C models), the dependent variable is
exposure to cable TV news. Here, in all cases (Models C l, C2, C3, C4), the skepticism
by need for cognition interaction was statistically insignificant.
The dependent variable in the fifth column (D Models) is exposure to daily
newspapers. In this case, there was evidence for a significant skepticism*NCOG
interaction in all four models (D1 through D4). The interpretations of these interactions
are presented in Figure 13.3. As in the previous cases, skepticism was negatively
associated with newspaper reading for those expressing low cognitive needs. This
association weakened as need for cognition increased. However, for those with high need
for cognition (NCOG=5), skepticism was positively associated with newspaper exposure.
That is, for those who “enjoy tasks that involve coming up with new solutions to
problems”, mistrust in the media was associated with increased exposure. Those who
enjoy deliberation read newspapers even though they do not trust the mainstream media.
The first column on the right (E models) presents models with general exposure to the
mainstream media as the dependent variables. As in the D models, in all four cases
(Models El through E4), the NCOG*skepticism interactions were statistically significant.
That is, Wave 4 skepticism interacted with need for cognition in their effect on Wave 4,
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Wave 6, Wave 7, and average Wave 6 and 7 general mainstream media exposure
measures.
Figure 13.4 presents the interpretation of these significant interactions. As in the
previous cases, when need for cognition was low, skepticism negatively affected general
mainstream media exposure. In other words, for those who reported that “thinking is not
their idea o f fun”, mainstream media skepticism was associated with lower mainstream
media exposure. However, as need for cognition increased, the negative effect of trust in
the media decreased. For those with moderate levels of NCOG, skepticism was still
negatively associated with mainstream media exposure (but the association was much
less steep than for those with low need for cognition). For those with high need for
cognition (NCOG=5, and in some cases also when NCOG=4), the effect of skepticism on
mainstream media exposure was positive. That is, those who reported high satisfaction
from deliberation and problem-solving were exposed to more mainstream news even
when their mistrust in the media increased.

Non-mainstream media.
Another set of OLS models, this time predicting exposure to non-mainstream media
sources (PTR and the Internet), was run to test for the skepticism by need-for-cognition
interaction. The results are presented in Table 13.2. As in Table 13.1, all models control
for ideology, political extremity, political knowledge, political involvement, schedule
flexibility, employment, student status, age, sex, years of education and race. Again,
centering was used to reduce multicollinearity (and the coefficients for the centered terms
are reported).
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The second column on the left (F Models) presents the results for models predicting
exposure to political talk radio. In contrast to all previous models, the coefficients for the
effects of skepticism were all positive. Also, need for cognition had a significant and
positive main effect on PTR exposure. All other things being equal, as need for cognition
increased, PTR exposure increased. PTR exposure is thus related to a desire to think, to
solve problems, and to know for the sake of knowledge. In contrast to the “mainstream”
models, there was no significant interaction between media skepticism and need for
cognition in their effect on exposure to PTR. Regardless of need for cognition, skeptics
were more likely to listen to political talk radio than non-skeptics, and regardless of
media skepticism, those high on need for cognition were more likely to listen to PTR.
The third column on the left (G Models) presents models predicting use of the World
Wide Web for campaign information. As the models show, neither skepticism nor need
for cognition are significantly related to exposure for online political information. In
other words, the data failed to replicate research findings relating Web usage to need for
cognition (Tuten & Bosnjak, 2001). There was also no evidence for significant media
skepticism by need for cognition interaction in any of the models. The data included
other measures of WWW use for political information. The skepticism by need for
cognition interaction was also tested with these other dichotomous measures using
logistic regression models. There was no evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis that
the skepticism*NCOG interaction is zero.
The first column on the right (I Models) presents models predicting general non
mainstream news consumption (the average of PTR exposure with the campaign
information on the Web item). In two cases, the coefficient for need for cognition was
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positive and significant. That is, the higher the need for cognition, the higher the
exposure to non-mainstream news formats. In one case, the coefficient for the effect of
skepticism on exposure was positive and significant. That is, the higher the mistrust in the
mainstream media, the higher the exposure to non-mainstream formats. However, the
NCOG*skepticism interaction was insignificant in all three models. In other words, when
skepticism affected exposure to non-mainstream news, it did so regardless of need for
cognition. When need for cognition affected exposure, it did so regardless of audience
trust or mistrust in the media.

Political involvement as an interacting factor.
Another possible way to construct the need-for-cognition concept is through variables
measuring interest in or close following of politics. Interest in politics is very different
from need for cognition. The concept of need for cognition relates to problem-solving in
general. It refers to satisfaction from the acquisition o f information for the sake of
deliberation and not for any practical purpose. It does not relate to politics but to
cognitive needs in general. However, measures of interest in politics might tap some of
these needs when applied to the political domain. If audience needs can be divided into
information-related and entertainment-related needs (as they often are, e.g. by Rubin,
1984), then items measuring close following of politics might be tapping general
preference for information, as opposed to entertainment (see Prior, 2001).
The data sets at hand all have variables tapping political involvement and closefollowing of politics. The typical question wording (e.g. from the EDialogue study) is,
“How often would you say you follow what is going on in government and public
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affairs?” with “most of the time”, “some of the time”, “only now and then”, and “hardly
at all” as answer categories. If this taps preference for news or some other cognitiveinformational need, then this involvement factor should also interact with media
skepticism in their joint effect on various forms of exposure.
The OLS exposure models were thus run once again, this time testing for the
skepticism*political involvement interaction. Two separate data sources were used: the
EDialogue data and the NES 1996 data. Altogether, 42 models were tested (38 on the
EDialogue data and six on the NES data). There was no evidence for an involvement by
skepticism interaction. This null finding seems to be due to lack of construct validity; the
involvement factor probably taps something other than need for cognition. Thus, the
results of this analysis were substantially different from those presented elsewhere in this
chapter. Need for cognition is substantially different than political involvement and close
following of politics. It is thus not the tendency to seek political information, but rather
the tendency to enjoy deliberation and to seek for solutions for problems, that interacts
with media skepticism in their effect on mainstream media exposure.

Summary.
In this chapter I examined the way a motivational factor - need for cognition - intervenes
in the association between media skepticism and media exposure. When people select
media contents, needs interact with preferences (and trust, as a like-dislike attitude could
be conceptualized as a “preference” in this matter). Hence, people may expose
themselves to news sources they do not trust just in order to fulfill cognitive needs.
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In one of the previous chapters I asked why people should attend to the mainstream
news media when they do not trust them. One answer suggested by this chapter is that
people may consume mainstream news despite their media skepticism, just because they
enjoy listening to diverse points of view, because they like to deliberate about problems,
because they get satisfaction from thinking per se. Those who are motivated by a need for
cognition, in fact, consume more mainstream news as their skepticism increases. This
could be consumption for the sake of media criticism - that is, cognitive skeptics may
simply want to argue with the media. Alternatively, the increased consumption of
mainstream media materials by cognitively-motivated skeptics could reflect their lack of
functional alternatives to the mainstream media. They attend to mainstream news, despite
their mistrust, just in order to be exposed to politicians appearing in the media and to
their different arguments. One additional possibility is that for those with high need for
cognition, the causal direction of the association is reversed. Among this potentially
critical group (skeptics with high need for cognition), it could be that media exposure
results in media skepticism and not the other way around, as my cross-lagged analysis
demonstrated in the previous chapter. At any case, the models presented above show that
for those with high cognitive needs, media skepticism is positively associated with media
exposure.
However, for people with low or moderate cognitive needs, the association between
skepticism and exposure is negative. Mistrusting audience members who were low on
NCOG had the lowest exposure to the mainstream news media: these people do not
consume mainstream media when they do not trust them. On the other hand, trusting but
low-in-cognitive-needs audience members had the highest exposure to the mainstream
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news media. Thus, the negative effect of media skepticism on mainstream news exposure
was strongest when need for cognition was at its lowest level. This negative effect
decreased as need for cognition increased. This was true for both national TV news
exposure and newspaper reading, as well as for mainstream news exposure in general.
When the dependent variable was exposure to the non-mainstream media, on the
other hand, the pattern was different. In the case o f exposure to PTR and to the political
Internet, there was no evidence of an interaction between skepticism and need for
cognition. Skeptics consumed more non-mainstream formats regardless of their cognitive
needs. This analysis, together with the models reported in the previous chapter, provides
some empirical validation for the distinction between PTR and the Internet, on the one
hand, and the mainstream media, on the other. Simply put, the models show that
skepticism plays different roles in exposure to these two distinct families of news
formats.
The evidence for a skepticism by need-for-cognition interaction may hold the key to
explaining the inconsistencies between data sets in the estimated effect of media
skepticism on media exposure (as discussed in the previous chapter). Due to the focus
and design of a few of the studies, some may contain more people with high cognitive
needs (e.g., people who agreed to participate in online political conversations might be
high on NCOG to begin with, which may consequently reduce the estimated effect of
skepticism on exposure). Unfortunately, only one of the data sets contains the need-forcognition battery. It would have been interesting to examine whether the incorporation of
the skepticism by need for cognition interaction would hold in the different data sets, thus
bringing more consistency to the results.
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In terms of contribution to communication theory, the findings demonstrate the
manner in which different needs interact in the way they influence exposure to the media.
The need to avoid dissonance (highlighted by the concept of consistency), in this case,
gives in to the need for cognition. In a sense, this is an interaction between the
consistency-motivated selective exposure to uses and gratifications research. Other such
interactions of selective exposure with other needs (escapism, social integrative, etc.), are
possible. More research should be conducted to test for these plausible hypotheses.
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Figure 13.2: Modrts predicting local and cabte n m w o t u n

Madai B2. CV=LocaJ TV news exposure

Model B4. CV=Local TV news exposure
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Figure 13.3: Models predicting expoeure to daily n m n ip w i
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Figure 13.4; Mod«l« predicting general mainstream news media exposure
Model E|. DV*Gener»l mainstream exposure
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T«bl» 13.1: The rote of n—d for cognition. OLS Models testing for skepticism by n—d for
cognition infraction.
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multicollinearity; Table entries are the coefficients for the centered variables, with
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for the party-ideology index, political
extremity, political knowledge and involvement, schedule flexibility, employment, student
status, age, sex, years of education, and race.
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Table 13J : The rote of n—d tor cognition. OLS Models teetino for skepticism by n—d tor
cognition infraction.
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Chapter 14: Media skepticism and news diets

In the last chapters we explored possible associations between skepticism and media
exposure. We found that skeptics are more likely to attend to non-mainstream sources
like political talk radio and the political Internet, sources that contain much counter
mainstream media materials and anti-mainstream media information. We also found that
skeptics tend to be somewhat less exposed to the mainstream media. In the previous
chapter, it was also shown that this negative association is strongest for people with low
need for cognition. For those with high need for cognition, the association between
skepticism and mainstream news exposure is actually reversed - they attend more as they
become more skeptical. Do skeptics attend to non-mainstream news instead of
mainstream news? Or do they rather consume non-mainstream materials in addition to
mainstream contents? What is the overall pattern of exposure of skeptics, compared to
non-skeptics? At this point these questions remain unanswered.
In the previous chapters, different models predicting exposure to different media
were presented side by side. That is, the analysis has so far treated exposure to different
news media as separate dependent variables. However, though they do represent distinct
behaviors (watching TV and reading the paper are not the same thing), they are not
totally independent behaviors. When it comes to news media exposure, exposure to one
source may come at the expense of the others. We simply cannot attend to everything all
the time. Most of us need to work or to go to school. All of us need to sleep. Some of us
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have better things to do with our time than attend to all the news media every day.
Indeed, only a negligible minority of survey respondents reports exposure to all news
sources. For example, of the 12,666 who completed the APPC survey in November,
December 1999 and January 2000, only IS people (.01 percent) reported maximal
exposure (seven days in the previous week) to all news sources (network, cable and local
TV news, political talk radio, and political information online). 99.9 percent of
respondents could not, or did not want to, attend to all news sources every day.
In Chapter 12,1 used the concept of media diets to describe the overall composition
of media exposure. I argued that exposure decisions are like nutritional decisions. In both
cases, we cannot consume everything. In both cases, individual resources, but also market
supply, limit our menus. In both cases, personal tastes and preferences come into play
when we decide what to consume. In this chapter I use skepticism to predict not exposure
to any particular source or group of sources, as I did in the previous chapter; rather, the
overall composition of the media diet, in terms of exposure to mainstream and non
mainstream news, will be the dependent variable throughout this chapter.
In Chapter 12,1assumed that all sources could be divided into two categories:
mainstream and non-mainstream. I further assumed (probabilistically) that network news
and daily newspapers could be considered as mainstream sources, and that PTR and the
political Internet could be considered as non-mainstream news sources. It follows that all
audiences should fall into one of the following four categories: low on exposure to both
non-mainstream and mainstream news sources; high on both non-mainstream and
mainstream exposure; or low on exposure to one o f them and high on the other. Hence,
one of the dependent variables in this chapter - media diet - is composed as follows. In
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the data sets analyzed, an average mainstream exposure variable (average days in the
previous week in which respondents watched national and local news and read a daily
newspaper), and an average non-mainstream exposure variable (average number of days
in the previous week in which they listened to PTR and attended to political information
online) were calculated. Those who scored below the median on both variables were
coded “low-low”. Those who scored above the median on both variables were coded
“high-high”. Those who scored below the median on non-mainstream and above the
median on the mainstream variable were coded “low-non-mainstream-high mainstream”,
and vice versa for those who scored high on non-mainstream and low on mainstream.
Obviously, these four categories do not constitute “ordered categories”, hence the
methods I use for their analysis are methods for unordered categorical data (chi-square
tests of cross-tabulated data for the bivariate level and multinomial models for
multivariate analysis).
Another way to conceptualize news media diets is to compare the amount of reported
exposure to mainstream and non-mainstream sources within individuals. Rather than
comparing individuals to some central tendency, this approach looks at what portion of
one’s diet is mainstream or non-mainstream, regardless of the way one scores on
mainstream and non-mainstream in comparison to others. This alternative
conceptualization of news diets is the other dependent variable used in this chapter. A
simple way to operationalize this conceptualization is to subtract the variable tapping
average non-mainstream news exposure from the variable tapping average mainstream
news exposure. If both measures are on the same scale, as they are in both data sets used
in this chapter, then this difference will reflect the amount of mainstream exposure
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relative to the amount of non-mainstream exposure, or in other words, the exposure gap
in favor of the mainstream. This variable, which I later call the exposure differential,
reflects the composition of individual news diets.
The hypotheses I test do not differ substantially from those tested in Chapters 12 and
13. They are the same hypotheses, applied this time for overall news consumption. Their
logic derives from the same theories mentioned in the previous chapters. That is, I begin
by testing the “selective exposure”-type hypothesis, then add the motivational factor of
need for cognition to the analysis. Unfortunately, the analysis was restricted to two data
sets only: the EDialogue and the APPC data. The reason is that the other data did not
have full measurement of non-mainstream exposure (NES and the PTR data do not have
continuous measures of exposure to online political communication).

Overall reported exposure.
Before testing hypotheses about media skepticism and the amount of non-mainstream
news in the audience's diets, it is worth considering the overall amount of news media
consumption by skeptics and non-skeptics. After all, an essential parameter of diets is
their overall nutritional value. Do skeptics and non-skeptics differ significantly in the
time spent with the news media? The problem is, we have no direct measures that would
be suitable to accurately answer this question. We could compare their overall “closefollowing of politics”, a variable that significantly and positively correlated with
exposure to all news sources, both mainstream and non-mainstream. In both data sets,
skeptics did not differ significantly from non-skeptics in their response to the closefollowing four-item question, after controlling for demographic and political variables
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(age, sex, years of education, race, ideology, extremity, and knowledge). On the bivariate
level, there was no significant difference on the close-following items in the EDialogue
data. On the other hand, in the APPC data, skeptics and non-skeptics did differ
significantly, though not tremendously, with skeptics reporting slightly more closefollowing than non-skeptics (MnofMkepik3=2 .97 , M skeptics =3.07, t=2.62, p<.01, N=2464)108.
Another possibility would be to create an overall news exposure measure using the
different exposure items. In other words, we could take the average days of exposure to
the various sources in the previous week, or rather, the maximum days of exposure to any
of the sources. In the EDialogue data, skeptics did not significantly differ from non
skeptics on either of these overall exposure indicators, with or without controls (though
skeptics scored lower, on average, on both o f these measures). In the APPC data, skeptics
scored significantly lower on both indicators of overall exposure, both with and without
political and demographic controls (in the bivariate case, for the average days of exposure
variable Mlw,Mk*piics=2.96, M skeptics =2.79, t=3.08, p<.01, N=2469; for the maximum
reported days o f exposure variable —MIWMirfr.i«=6.18. M skeptic* =5.78, t=3.22, p<.001,
N=2469). However, the interpretation of these results has to take into account the fact
that the list of sources includes four mainstream sources and only two non-mainstream
sources (Internet and PTR). The implication, given that skeptics tend to report more non
mainstream and non-skeptics more mainstream exposure, is that skeptics may rank lower
on exposure just because the questions provide more opportunities to report mainstream

IMSome other analysis, reported in Chapter 4, finds that skeptics and non-skeptics differ on a “political
involvement” variable (rather than dose-following). Although dose-following o f politics is a component o f
the political involvement variable, they do not tap the same things. Close-following probably better reflects
our interest here (time spent with the media) than the involvement variable, which also contains measures
o f attention to politics in general.
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exposure. The only way to correct for this artifact would be to create a measure that
would give equal weight to the mainstream and non-mainstream sources. Such a measure
could be, for example, the mean of the overall mainstream measure and the overall nonmainstream measure. When the exposure variable was calculated this way, the difference
between skeptics and non-skeptics was insignificant at the bivariate level, but significant
at the multivariate level. In all comparisons, skeptics scored, on average, somewhat lower
than non-skeptics.
We do not have sufficient data to accurately compare the time skeptics and non
skeptics spend with the news media. When asked about close-following of politics (a
consistent predictor of all forms of exposure, and arguably a surrogate measure for
exposure), skeptics scored somewhat higher. When asked about days of exposure to
various outlets in the previous week, non-skeptics reported more exposure (a situation
that could be affected by the representation of mainstream and non-mainstream sources in
the questionnaires). In any case, it is important to note that the differences between
skeptics and non-skeptics on either of these measures are only minor. There are no signs
in the data to suggest that we have two groups that differ radically on the amount of time
they spend on news consumption. It seems much more probable that, on average, the
levels of general total exposure are similar for both groups.
In sum, skeptics do not differ radically from non-skeptics in terms of time spent on
news consumption. They do not totally shun or boycott the news media. In the next
pages, we examine whether the overall composition of the media diets of skeptics and
non-skeptics - in terms of exposure to mainstream and non-mainstream materials differs even though the sum total media-dose appears to be the same.
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Study 1: The APPC data.
The bivariate association between media skepticism and media diet is presented in Figure
14.1. According to this figure, skeptics were almost as likely as non-skeptics to attend
either to high doses of both mainstream and non-mainstream or low doses of both. 33.8
percent of non-skeptics, compared 34.2 percent of skeptics, scored below median on both
mainstream and non-mainstream exposure. 19.8 percent of non-skeptics, compared to
19.2 percent of skeptics, scored high on both mainstream and non-mainstream exposure.
However, non-skeptics were more likely than skeptics to score above median on
mainstream exposure and below median on non-mainstream exposure (34.4 compared to
27.0 percent). On the other hand, skeptics tended more than non-skeptics to belong to the
high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream exposure category. The differences between
skeptics and non-skeptics, presented in Figure 14.1, were statistically significant
(X2=34.40, df=3, p<.001).
To test whether these differences hold over and above statistical controls, a
multinomial model was utilized, with the media diet variable as the dependent variable.
This model is presented in Table 14.1. The multinomial model is a regression-like
procedure for unordered categorical data (Allison, 1999:112). In a four-category
dependent variable, the multinomial model consists o f three equations, each modeling for
the log of the probability of belonging to one category divided by the probability of
belonging to another [log (Ph/P m); log (Pa/P*); log (Pg/P*)]- The column on the right
presents a chi-square test for the null hypothesis that all the coefficients for a given
variable are zero (a test for the overall effect o f a variable). These tests show that media
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skepticism, the party-ideology index, political involvement, political knowledge,
employment, age and education all significantly affect media diets.
To understand the pattern of effects, one needs to interpret the coefficients in the
three equations. The reference category in this analysis is “low-low”. This means that
each equation is a contrast between the “low-low” category and the other categories. The
interpretation of the coefficients is similar the interpretation in a binary logit model. For
example, the odds that a male would be in the high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream
exposure category rather than in the low-low category are about 1.24 [exp(.22)] times the
odds of females, all other things being equal. Similarly, employed respondents have
significantly higher odds than unemployed of being in this category rather than in the
low-low category, but unemployed have significantly higher odds than employed of
being in the low-non-mainstream-high-mainstream category rather than in the low-low
category. The higher the political knowledge and involvement, the higher the odds of
being in either the high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream, high-mainstream-low-nonmainstream or high-on-both, rather than in the low-low category. Older people have
significantly higher odds of being in either the high-high or the high-mainstream-lownon-mainstream group than of being in the low-low group, compared to younger
respondents. Education was significantly associated with higher odds of high exposure to
both mainstream and non-mainstream media, rather than low exposure to both.
Ideologically conservatives had higher odds of being in the high-non-mainstream-lowmainstream group than of being in the low-low group.
Our interest here is, of course, in the effects of media skepticism on the media diet
variable. Skepticism had a significant positive effect on high exposure to non-mainstream
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media accompanied by low exposure to mainstream news media, compared to low
exposure to both mainstream and non-mainstream news media. Each one-unit increase on
the five-category skepticism variable was associated with a 33-percent increase in the
odds o f exposure to high-non-mainstream with low-mainstream, rather than low exposure
to both [exp(.28)=1.33]. Skepticism also had a significant effect, this time negative, on
low exposure to non-mainstream media accompanied by high exposure to mainstream
media, compared to low exposure to both mainstream and non-mainstream media. Each
one-unit increase on the skepticism scale decreased the odds of being in the former rather
than the latter group by 22 percent [exp(-.24)=.78]. The effect of skepticism in the third
case, which contrasts the low-low and the high-high categories, was again negative. Each
one-unit increase on the skepticism scale decreased the odds o f being in the highmainstream-high-non-mainstream {rather than the low-mainstream-low-non-mainstream
group) by 19 percent [exp(-.20)=.81].
In sum, the multinomial model provides results very similar to bivariate cross
tabulation of skepticism and media diets. Skeptics have higher odds of high exposure to
non-mainstream materials and lower odds of high exposure to mainstream materials.
Even when controlling for various intervening factors, skeptics have higher odds of being
in the high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream condition than non-skeptics, and lower odds
of being in the high-mainstream-low-non-mainstream condition. To contrast the high-low
group with the low-high group, we can subtract the coefficient for the former from the
coefficient for the latter (Allison, 1999:114). This means that each one-unit increase on
the skepticism scale corresponds to a 41 percent decrease in the odds of exposure to high-
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non-mainstream-low-mainstream news media rather than to high-non-mainstieam-lowmainstream news media [exp(-.24-.28)=.59].
So skeptics are more likely than non-skeptics to be exposed to a diet composed of a
high dose of non-mainstream and a low dose of mainstream media. However, the
criterion in this comparison is the median respondent. The majority of the respondents in
Figure 14.1 fall into either the high-high or in low-low categories. However, most of
them probably do not attend to an equal amount of mainstream and non-mainstream
content. Someone who is in the “high-high” category might be relatively high on both
mainstream and non-mainstream exposure. However, this person might still consume
higher amounts of non-mainstream than mainstream, or higher amounts of mainstream
than non-mainstream media. Alternatively, someone who is in the “low-low” category
might score relatively low on both mainstream and non-mainstream exposure, but still
attend more to the former, or perhaps to the latter. Hence, one can conceptualize “media
diets” relative to individuals rather than to the median.
For this reason, an alternate media diet variable was created. The difference between
the average mainstream exposure variable and the average non-mainstream exposure
variable was calculated. Positive values on this variable indicate higher exposure to
mainstream news, while negative values indicate higher exposure to non-mainstream
news. A value of zero corresponds to exactly the same score on the mainstream and non
mainstream media exposure variables. The mean value on this difference score was 2.43,
the median 2.50, and the mode 3.50, representing a left-skew (a tendency toward positive
values). That is, more people reported higher exposure to mainstream media (composed
of national and local TV news and daily newspapers) than to non-mainstream (composed
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of the Internet and PTR). This variable can be divided into three categories, with one
category representing more mainstream exposure than non-mainstream, the second
representing more non-mainstream exposure than mainstream, and the third representing
roughly equal exposure. (The cut-points between the categories were -.80 and +.80,
meaning that people with a difference score below .80 in absolute values were considered
to attend to approximately the same amount of mainstream and non-mainstream
media)109.
The cross-tabulation of the skepticism variable with this alternate conceptualization
of diet is presented in Figure 14.2. On the whole, most respondents, skeptics and non
skeptics alike, tend to get more mainstream news than non-mainstream news. Only a
minority in each group reports more non-mainstream than mainstream news exposure.
However, skeptics are more likely to be in the “roughly equal” and the “more non
mainstream” groups than non-skeptics, while non-skeptics are more likely to be in the
“more mainstream than non-mainstream” group than skeptics. These differences are
statistically significant (x2=15.56, df=2, p<.001), and the results hold even after
controlling for political and demographic variables, as the multinomial model presented
in Table 14.2 shows. Note that the sign of the borderline significant coefficient in the
second column on the left is positive. This demonstrates that each increase on the
skepticism scale corresponds to an increase in the odds of being in the “more non
mainstream than mainstream exposure” group, rather than in the “roughly equal” group
[the odds ratio is exp(.17)=1.18]. On the other hand, the coefficients in the second and

109.80 was selected as the cut-point given the range o f the scale (+7 to -7 ). People who scored below .80
did not consume dramatically more o f one than the other.
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third columns are negative. This means that each increase on the skepticism scale
corresponds with a decrease in the odds of being in the “more mainstream” rather than
the “roughly equal” exposure group [the odds ratio is exp(-.20)=.81], and that each
increase in the skepticism scale corresponds with a decrease in the odds o f being in the
“more mainstream” rather than the “more non-mainstream” group [the odds ratio in this
case is exp(-.20)=.69].
Since the difference between the mainstream and non-mainstream media exposure
variables is a continuum (ranging between -7 and +7, the former representing an average
of seven days in the previous week of exposure to non-mainstream sources and zero days
of average exposure to mainstream sources, and vice versa for the latter), OLS could be
used to model for the relative consumption of mainstream and non-mainstream materials.
This would not only be more readily interpretable than the categorical multinomial
analysis, but also more accurate, in the sense that it involves less loss of information. In
other words, one does not need to collapse those who report six more days of mainstream
than non-mainstream with those who report .90 more days of mainstream than non
mainstream (as the previous analysis did). We could easily model for the overall
difference between mainstream and non-mainstream materials, thus accounting for not
only the direction of the difference (more mainstream, more non-mainstream, or roughly
the same) but also the magnitude of difference (how much more mainstream than non
mainstream exposure). An OLS regression with this difference score as the dependent
variable is reported in Table 14.3.
As the model presented in Table 14.3 shows, liberals tend to report higher exposure
to mainstream relative to non-mainstream sources. The higher the score on the party402
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ideology index, the higher the reported difference between mainstream and non
mainstream exposure (in favor of the mainstream). This can be easily explained by the
well-documented higher exposure by conservatives to PTR (see Cappella, Jamieson &
Turow, 1998). In addition, political extremism was negatively associated with the
[mainstream - non-mainstream] difference score. This means that the higher the
extremism, the lower the exposure difference in favor of mainstream media. In other
words, extremists tend to resort more to non-mainstream news. The coefficient for the
political involvement variable was positive and significant. This means that, all other
things being equal, the higher the political involvement, the higher the difference in
exposure in favor of the mainstream media (involved get more mainstream than non
mainstream, on average). Students had a significantly lower exposure differential than
non-students. This could be related to higher Internet access among students than among
non-students, potentially resulting in more exposure to online political materials for the
former. The coefficient for the employment dummy variable was also negative and
significant. The employed scored, on average and after controlling for all other factors, .68 points lower on the [mainstream - non-mainstream] exposure difference score. This
could be due to increased workplace computer accessibility, as well as to more time
listening to the radio in general (and PTR in particular) because of work-related
commutes. Education and gender were both associated with lower exposure differentials
(males and educated reported lower differences between mainstream and non-mainstream
exposure).
Our main focus here is on the possible effect of media skepticism on this indicator of
media diets. As the OLS model presented in Table 14.3 shows, the coefficient for media
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skepticism is negative and significant. That is, even when controlling for various political
and demographic factors, the higher the skepticism, the lower the [mainstream - non
mainstream] exposure differential. As explained above, lower scores on the differential
dependent variables represent higher exposure to non-mainstream than mainstream news.
Higher scores represent higher exposure to mainstream, relative to non-mainstream news
media. Each one-unit increase on the skepticism measure corresponds, according to the
model in Table 14.3, to a decrease of .35 on this difference scale. That is, skeptics tend
less to be exposed to more mainstream than non-mainstream, and tend more to be
exposed to more non-mainstream than mainstream news. This was one of the best
predictors of the dependent variable, as is evident from a comparison of the standardized
coefficients (skepticism had a beta o f. 14, higher than almost all other variables in the
model except age).
In sum, the APPC data show that the news diets of media skeptics tend to be
composed of more non-mainstream and fewer mainstream sources. This finding holds
both when conceptualizing “diets” relative to the median respondent, and when
comparing the amount of exposure to mainstream and non-mainstream sources within
individuals. Many skeptics ranked high on both mainstream and non-mainstream
exposure (making it tempting to say that they get non-mainstream sources in addition to
mainstream sources). However, they differed from non-skeptics by tending to belong to
the high-non-mainstream low-mainstream group (making it tempting to say that they get
non-mainstream information instead o f mainstream information). When I ran the model
in Table 14.3 in the four separate “median-based diet” groups, I got a negative coefficient
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for media skepticism in each of the four models110. So on all levels of overall diet, the
reported differential o f exposure was lower for skeptics than for non-skeptics. Even in the
low-low condition skeptics tended to report more non-mainstream than mainstream news
exposure - or at least lower differences in favor o f mainstream sources.
In sum, the APPC data show that the news diets of media skeptics contain more non
mainstream news than those of non-skeptics. Many skeptics consume a lot of mainstream
in addition to non-mainstream news, although the dominance of the mainstream media in
the news diets of media skeptics (measured by the difference score) drops as skepticism
increases. Skepticism toward the mainstream news media does not cause people to totally
substitute mainstream with non-mainstream sources. However, it does relate to an
increase in the consumption of non-mainstream compared to mainstream contents.

Study 2: The Electronic Dialogue data.
The same analysis was replicated in the Electronic Dialogue data. In the previous
chapters, each analysis performed on the Electronic Dialogue data was replicated a few
times, using data originating in different waves, in order to test for the sensitivity of the
analysis to measurement lags. This is also the case in the following analysis. However, in
this chapter, for the sake of parsimony, I report only the findings for a particular lag
structure. In all EDialogue models reported in this chapter the dependent variables are
based on exposure indicators measured in Wave 6. The skepticism variable used
throughout this chapter is based on indicators o f skepticism measured in Wave 4. In other
110 The effect o f skepticism on the exposure differential was -.04 in the high-high group, -.01 in the lownon-mainstream-high-mainstream, -.08 in the high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream group, and -.16 in the
low-low group.
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words, the models presented in this chapter all test for the effect of skepticism in Wave 4
on media diets, measured by exposure in Wave 6. Additional models using data
originating from different waves had similar patterns to the ones presented here.
As in the previous study, the first stage in the analysis was to cross-tabulate the fourcategory media diet variable against media skepticism. The result is presented in Figure
14.3. As the in the previous study (compare to Figure 14.1 - the patterns are strikingly
similar), the differences in the rate of skeptics and non-skeptics in the high-high and lowlow categories were only minor. However, as in the APPC data, non-skeptics were more
likely to be in the “low-non-mainstream-high-mainstream” category than skeptics (33.0
versus 21.3 percent). On the other hand (again like the previous study), skeptics were
more likely than non-skeptics to be in the “high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream” group
(23.6 versus 16.1 percent). The differences between skeptics and non-skeptics, presented
in Figure 14.3, were statistically significant (x2=l 1.89, df=3, p<.01).
So, in the bivariate case, skeptics tend more than non-skeptics to be on a “high-nonmainstream-low-mainstreanT news diet, and non-skeptics tend more than skeptics to be
on a “low-non-mainstream-high-mainstream” news diet. In order to examine whether
these differences hold over and above potential intervening variables, a multinomial
model was tested, with the four-category media diet variable as the dependent variable.
This model is presented in Table 14.4. The first column on the right presents chi-square
statistics testing the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients for each of the variables
are zero. According to these tests, media skepticism, political ideology, political
involvement and knowledge, age, student status and being white all significantly affect
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media diets. Note how close these results are to those reported in Table 14.1 (the only
differences are that in Table 14.1 education was significant and age insignificant).
The patterns of effects of all covariates are similar to those discussed in Study 1. For
example, unemployed respondents had significantly higher odds than employed
respondents of being in the low-non-mainstream-high-mainstream category rather than in
the low-low category. As in Table 14.1, the higher the political involvement, the higher
the odds of being in either the high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream, high-mainstreamlow-non-mainstream or high-on-both categories, rather than the low-low category. Older
people had significantly higher odds than younger respondents of being either in the
high-high or in the high-mainstream-low-non-mainstream groups, rather than in the lowlow group. As in the previous study, students had significantly lower odds of being in the
lower non-mainstream higher-mainstream group than in the low-low group. In many
other cases, the coefficients presented in Table 14.4 resemble the coefficients in Table
14.1 in sign and magnitude, though not in the significance levels. Despite the differences
in significance levels, the overall patterns presented by the two models are similar.
Our focus is again on the effect of media skepticism on media diet. The equation on
the second column on the left contrasts being low on both mainstream and non
mainstream exposure with being high on non-mainstream and low on mainstream news
exposure. As was the case in the APPC data, the coefficient for media skepticism in this
equation is positive and significant. The higher the skepticism, the higher the odds of
being high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream rather than low on both (the adjusted odds
ratio was exp(3.56)=35.16). Unlike in the APPC data, the coefficients for media
skepticism in the other two equations were not significantly different from zero.
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However, the sign of the skepticism coefficient in the equation contrasting low-low with
low-non-mainstream-high-mainstream exposure was negative, as in the APPC data,
indicating that the lower the skepticism, the higher the odds of being in the low-non
mainstream-high-mainstream group. Note that in contrast to the APPC data, the
coefficient of skepticism in the third equation (reported in the second column on the
right) is positive and not significant. In these data, skeptics are actually slightly more
likely to be in the high-high than in the low-low category. We could contrast the second
and third column on the left by subtracting the coefficients. According to this
comparison, skepticism is negatively related to the odds of being in the low-nonmainstream-high-mainstream group rather than the high-non-mainstream-lowmainstream group (the adjusted odds ratio is exp(-.29-3.56)=.02; that is, each one-unit
increase on the skepticism scale decreases the odds of being in the latter category, rather
than the former, by about 98 percent).
In sum, as in the APPC data, skeptics have higher odds of having a high-nonmainstream-low-mainstream news media diet. As before, the next stage is to compare the
composition of diets within persons, which we do by modeling for the difference between
the mainstream and non-mainstream variables. Figure 14.4 presents the cross-tabulation
of media skepticism and this variable. The coding of the diet composition variable is the
same as in the previous study (a change of less than .80 in absolute value constitutes
“roughly equal” consumption). As in Study 1, skeptics and non-skeptics alike tended to
get more mainstream than mainstream news information (76.8 percent of non-skeptics
and 63.S percent of skeptics reported higher exposure to mainstream than non
mainstream). However, also as in Study 1, higher rates of media skeptics than non408
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skeptics reported roughly the same exposure to mainstream and non-mainstream media
news (24.6 of skeptics, compared to 17.6 percent of non-skeptics) or more non
mainstream than mainstream news (11.9 percent of the skeptics, compared to 5.6 percent
of non-skeptics). As in Study 1, these differences were statistically significant (x2=l 1.32,
df=2, p<.01). As in the previous study, in order to examine whether these differences
hold over and above statistical controls, a multinomial model was used, with the threelevel composition of diet as dependent variable. The model is presented in Table 14.5.
Once again, skepticism significantly affected the dependent variable. A one-unit increase
on the skepticism scale was associated with a decrease of about 80 percent in the odds of
attending to more mainstream than non-mainstream news (vs. approximately the same
amount of mainstream and non-mainstream [exp(-1.63)=.19]), and with an 87 percent
decrease in the odds of attending to more mainstream than non-mainstream news.
Again, the relationship between media skepticism and this variable could be tested in
OLS formulation. This is done in Table 14.6. The dependent variable in this model is the
exposure differential, i.e., the difference between mainstream and non-mainstream
exposure scores. Maximal gap between mainstream and non-mainstream in favor of
mainstream news corresponds to a differential score of 7. Maximal gap between
mainstream and non-mainstream in favor of non-mainstream news corresponds to a
differential score of -7. A differential score of zero represents exactly the same amount of
mainstream and non-mainstream exposure. As before, the distribution was skewed, with
more respondents reporting higher mainstream than non-mainstream exposure. The
average difference score was 2.26. The median was 2.33. The mode was zero.
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This variable is the dependent variable in Table 14.6. The patterns evident from the
model and the parallel model from the APPC study (presented in Table 14.3) are
strikingly similar. As before, liberal ideology, moderateness, political involvement,
unemployment and older age are significantly associated with higher difference score,
indicating larger exposure gaps in favor of the mainstream media. The coefficients for the
other variables were also similar in sign and magnitude to those presented in Table 14.3,
though not always in the level of statistical significance.
Our main interest is, of course, in the coefficient for media skepticism. As in the
APPC data, skepticism was significantly and negatively associated with the [mainstream
- non-mainstream] difference score. That is, the higher the skepticism, the lower the
difference between mainstream and non-mainstream exposure. Since the range of the
skepticism scale in the EDialogue data varies between 0 and 1, the coefficient represents
the maximal shift in the difference score as a result of skepticism. Those most skeptical
would score, on average, 1.79 lower on the difference score than those least skeptical1" ,
all other things being equal.
In sum, the EDialogue data replicates the findings from the APPC data. In both data,
skeptics had higher odds than non-skeptics o f having a '’high-non-mainstream-lowmainstream” media diet. In both data sets, the dominance of mainstream content in the
news diets of media skeptics was lower than for non-skeptics. The next stage is to expand
the analysis to include the need for cognition factor. This is done only for the EDialogue
data, since the other data sets do not contain a need for cognition measure.

111 Again, this is comparable to the magnitude o f the effect in Table 3. Since the skepticism variable in the
APPC data varies between 1 and 3, one needs to multiply the coefficient in Table 3 by 3: -.35*5=-1.75.
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The role of need for cognition.
In Chapter 13,1 hypothesized that need for cognition would interact with media
skepticism in their effect on media exposure. The rationale was that motivational factors,
such as need for cognition, influence our exposure decisions, in addition to general
attitudes toward the source, such as trust in the media. People with high cognitive needs
might watch mainstream news despite the fact that they do not trust them. The results,
presented in Chapter 13, show that people low on cognitive needs had a strong negative
association between mistrust in the mainstream media and exposure to the mainstream
news media. As need for cognition got higher, the negative effect of media skepticism on
media exposure got weaker. In fact, for those with the highest levels of need for
cognition, the effect of skepticism on mainstream news exposure was positive, indicating
more exposure by skeptics than by non-skeptics at this level of need for cognition.
In this section, I test the same interaction between media skepticism and need for
cognition. This time, however, the dependent variable is not exposure to one or another
news source, but rather the overall media diet. Earlier, I showed that diets could be
conceptualized in a relative way - by comparing respondents to the median observation
in mainstream and non-mainstream exposure - or individually, by comparing the amount
of mainstream and non-mainstream each individual receives.
A multinomial logit regression model testing for the interaction of media skepticism
and need for cognition is presented in Table 14.7. The dependent variable in this case is
the “relative diet” variable, so the categories of the variable are “low-low”, “high-high”,
“low-non-mainstream-high-mainstream” and “high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream”.
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As in all interaction models presented in this dissertation, centering was used to reduce
multicollinearity. The first column on the right presents chi-squares testing for the null
hypothesis that all the coefficients for a given variable are zero. As these tests show,
media skepticism and need for cognition (but also ideology, involvement, employment,
age and student status) significantly affected the four-level diet variable. There was also a
significant media skepticism by need for cognition interaction effect on the dependent
variable.
However, in order to interpret this interaction we need to examine the coefficients for
the interaction term in each of the equations comprising the multinomial model. The
second column on the left presents the equation contrasting the low-low against the highnon-mainstream-low-mainstream groups. In this case, the need for cognition by media
skepticism interaction was not significant. That is, the positive effect of media
skepticism, in this case, does not depend on the level of need for cognition. As media
skepticism rises, the odds of exposure to a high dose of non-mainstream accompanied by
a low dose of mainstream news increase, regardless of need for cognition.
On the other hand, the coefficient for the interaction term was significantly different
from zero in the other equations. The interpretation of the interaction pattern for the
second equation, contrasting the low-low group with the iow-non-mainstream-highmainstream, is presented in Figure 14.S. The Y-axis in this figure represents the
probability of being in the latter category rather than in the former. As the figure shows,
for people with low need for cognition, the effect of media skepticism is negative. That
is, the higher the skepticism, the lower the probability that they would be in the low-non
mainstream-high-mainstream category. However, this effect gets weaker as need for
412
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cognition increases. In the highest levels of need for cognition, the effect of media
skepticism is positive, rather than negative: for people with high need for cognition, the
higher the skepticism, the higher the probability of having a low-non-mainstream-highmainstream media diet than of having a low-low news diet.
A similar pattern is revealed in the third equation, which contrasts the low-low
against the high-high groups. The interpretation of the significant need for cognition by
media skepticism interaction demonstrated by this equation is presented in Figure 14.6.
The effect of skepticism in this case is negative for those with low to moderate need for
cognition. The effect of skepticism is positive (and stronger than in Figure 14.5) for those
with high need for cognition.
It is also possible to test the skepticism by need for cognition interaction on the
individual composition of the media diet variable. As before, this variable consists of the
difference between mainstream and non-mainstream exposure variables. It represents the
dominance of mainstream sources in respondents’ media diets. Higher values represent
high dominance of mainstream sources in respondents’ diets. Lower values represent
lower dominance. Negative values represent higher dominance of mainstream sources in
respondents’ news diets.
An OLS model with this variable as the dependent variable is presented in Table
14.8. As before, liberal ideology, political moderateness, political involvement, age and
unemployment were significant predictors of higher mainstream dominance in
respondents’ news diets. In addition, there were significant and negative main effects of
media skepticism and need for cognition, as well as a significant effect o f the need for
cognition by media skepticism interaction term. That is, the effect of media skepticism on
413
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the personal diet dependent variable depended on the level of need for cognition. The
pattern o f interaction is presented in Figure 14.7.
As before, the effect of media skepticism on media diets was negative for those with
low need for cognition. As need for cognition increased, the effect of skepticism got
weaker. In the highest level of need for cognition, the effect of skepticism on exposure
was positive. Note that the predicted values for those with maximal skepticism and low
need for cognition are negative (representing more non-mainstream than mainstream
news exposure), while the predicted values for those with maximum skepticism and high
need for cognition are positive (representing more mainstream than non-mainstream
exposure). That is, according to this analysis, it could be said that skeptics with low
cognitive needs consume non-mainstream materials instead o f mainstream materials,
while skeptics with high cognitive needs consume non-mainstream news in addition to
mainstream materials.
Also, note that the spread of the predicted values in the low skepticism condition is
higher than the spread of predicted values in the high need for cognition condition. This
means that need for cognition is much more consequential in determining exposure diets
for non-skeptics than for skeptics. In other words, the [mainstream - non-mainstream]
exposure differential of media skeptics varies around zero, depending on the level of need
for cognition. However, skeptics with high need for cognition are not far in their
predicted value from those with low need for cognition. They have roughly the same
exposure to non-mainstream or mainstream news media. On the other hand, non-skeptics
vary dramatically in the [mainstream - non-mainstream] exposure differential, depending
on need for cognition. Non-skeptics with low need for cognition get much more
414
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mainstream than non-mainstream news, while those with high need for cognition get
roughly the same amount of mainstream and non-mainstream news.
In sum, controlling for various political and demographic controls, the amount of
non-mainstream relative to mainstream news consumed by individuals is a function o f an
interaction effect of two factors: media skepticism and need for cognition. For those with
low need for cognition, the effect is negative (and the exposure differential is lower for
skeptics than for non-skeptics). For those with high need for cognition, the effect is
positive but somewhat weaker.

Conclusion.
In the previous chapters we found that media skeptics are less likely to attend to various
mainstream news sources (such as network TV news) and more likely to attend to non
mainstream and less traditional media sources (such as political talk radio and online
news). We did not examine the possible connection between the former finding and the
latter. Although watching national network news and local news and listening to talk
radio are different behaviors, they are not independent behaviors. Exposure to one media
source or to a set of sources may come at the expense of exposure to other channels.
Rather than analyzing the influence of media skepticism on exposure to different news
media channels separately, we examined in this chapter the influence of skepticism on the
overall pattern o f news media exposure.
Thus, this chapter was designed to explore whether the hypotheses regarding trustbased selective exposure and the moderating role of need for cognition apply not only
when the dependent variable is exposure to a particular source, but also to overall news
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diets. Diets were conceptualized in relation to the median audience member as well as for
each individual audience member in relation to him- or herself. In both cases, media
skepticism was a significant predictor of media diet. Skeptics had a lower likelihood of
having a “low-non-mainstream-high-mainstream” news diet and a higher likelihood of
having a “high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream” diet than their non-skeptical
counterparts, even after employing a series of political, demographic and schedule-related
controls. Though most skeptics and non-skeptics alike received “more-mainstream-thannon-mainstream” news, the exposure differential between mainstream and non
mainstream exposure was significantly lower for skeptics. That is, the dose of non
mainstream news on their diets was higher. Skeptics were also more likely than non
skeptics to have “more non-mainstream than mainstream” contents or “approximately the
same amount of mainstream and non-mainstream”, again, after controlling for an array of
potentially intervening factors.
In sum, while in previous chapters we learned that skepticism influences exposure to
particular news sources, in this chapter we found that skepticism influences the overall
media diet of audiences. Though skeptics and non-skeptics do not differ radically in their
sum total of news media exposure, the composition of their diets is significantly different:
a higher portion of the news diet of skeptics is composed of non-mainstream news. This
could mean that skeptics sometimes substitute non-mainstream for mainstream news. It
does not mean, however, that they totally abandon the mainstream media in favor of PTR
and the Internet. They do consume mainstream news - just less o f it than non-skeptics.
The next chapter summarizes what we have learned in this section about media
skepticism and news media exposure. The findings from this chapter and the previous
416
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ones will be discussed and interpreted in light of what we know about trust in general.
The limitations and importance of these studies will be outlined.
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T»blt 14.1: Multinomial model predicting overall media d it lithr»nc» eitw orv i» lowmainetraam-k>w-non-main»tream). APPC 2000 Primary m s o n data (n»2370).
Low-low vs.
high-non-mainstream
low-mainstream
Media skepticism
Party-ideology index
Political extremity
Involvement
Political knowledge
Student
Employment
Age
Education
White
Male

.28—
(07)
-.05*
(02)
.05
(04)
.20*
(07)
.20—
(04)
.13
(06)
.68—
(20)
-.01
(.00)
.04
(03)
-.03
(-24)
.22
(13)

Low-low vs.
low-nonmainstream
high-mainstream
-.24—
(06)
.00
(02)
-.03
(03)
.45—
(07)
.15—
(04)
-.96*
(.53)
-.25*
(14)
.03—
(00)
-.00
(02)
-.08
(.21)
-.01
(11)

Low-low vs.
high-high
-.20**
(07)
-.02
(02)
-.01
(04)
.79—
(08)
.20—
(04)
-.38
(52)
.14
(17)
.01—
(00)
.07—
(02)
-.31
(23)
.20
(13)

R-squared
-2LL
Note: * p<.10; • p<.05; **p<.01; —p<.001.
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Likelihood
ration chi
square
(df=3)
60.24 (3)—
8.44 (3)*
4.50
104.23 —
31.94 —
4.65
23.10—
82.19—
13.98**
1.92
5.59
.26
658.33—

Table 14.2: Multinomial model predicting composition of nwdh diet APPC 2000 Primary
saason data (n»2370).
More non-mainstream
than mainstream vs.
more mainstream than
non-mainstream
-.37—
(08)
.03
(02)
-.09*
(05)
.08
(10)
-.16“
(05)

Likelihood
ration chi
square (df=3)

CM
CO
r

Roughly equal Roughly equal vs.
more mainstream
vs. more
non-mainstream
than
than mainstream non-mainstream
-.20“
Media
.17*
skepticism
(06)
(-09)
.04*
Party-ideology
.01
index
(02)
(-03)
Political
-.01
-.10—
(03)
extremity
(-06)
.20*
Involvement
.28—
(07)
(.11)
.02
Political
.18“
(04)
knowledge
(06)
-.19
Student
-.51
(-45)
(69)
-.50**
Employment
.06
(30)
(.18)
Age
-.01
.02—
(.00)
(00)
Education
-.04*
.01
(03)
(02)
.14
.09
White
(.21)
(34)
.16
-.26*
Male
(.12)
(.19)
R-squared
-2LL

1.34

(.61)
-.56*
(25)
.03—
(00)
-.05*
(03)
-.05
(30)
-.43*
(.16)

25.76—
5.25*
8.84*
15.23—
8.53*

11.39“
45.28—
5.20*
.25
9.69“
.12
225.58—
(df=22)

Note: * p<.10; * p<.05; “ p<01; —p<001.
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Table 14.3: OLS modal predicting composition of m ute diet APPC 2000 primary —n o n
data (n«2370).
B
0
(s.e.)
Media skepticism
Party-ideology index
Political extremity
Involvement
Political knowledge
Student
Employment
Age
Education
White
Male
R-squared
N

Roughly equal
vs. more
non-mainstream
than
mainstream
-.35—
-.14
(05)
.03*
.04
(01)
-.07*
-.05
(.02)
.24—
.10
(05)
-.01
-.01
(03)
-.69
-.04
(37)
-.68—
-.13
(.12)
.03—
.23
(00)
-.04*
-.05
(01)
.07
.01
(.17)
-.30**
-.06
(.09)
.16
2,370

Note: • p<.10; * p<.05; -p<.01; —p<001.
The dependent variable is the difference between the mainstream and the non-mainstream
exposure score (-7 = high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream; +7 = high-mainstream-low-nonmainstream; 0 = exactly the same score on the non-mainstream and mainstream exposure
variable).
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Table 14.4: Multinomial modri predicting overall nwdh dirt Iw hrtnw category is lowmainstream-low-non-mainstreaml. EDiatoaue (n«4S9).

Media skepticism
Party-ideology index
Political extremity
Involvement
Political knowledge
Employment
Schedule flexibility
Student (=1)
Age
Education
White
Male

Low-low vs.
high-nonmainstream
low-mainstream
3.56***
(89)
-.05
(05)
.13
(10)
.34
(20)
2.46*
(109)
-.52
(.37)
.01
(07)
-.13
(91)
.00
(01)
.14
(.09)
-.31
(.51)
.24
(33)

Low-low vs.
low-nonmainstream
high-mainstream
-.29
(80)
.04
(04)
-.07
(09)
.56—
(17)
-.07
(91)
-.71*
(31)
-.01
(06)
-2.12*
(116)
.06—
(01)
.02
(08)
-.17
(.47)
-.35
(28)

Low-low vs.
high-high
1.14
(82)
-.06
(04)
.10
(09)
1.07—
(19)
.69
(100)
-.23
(34)
.07
(06)
-2.01*
(121)
.03—
(01)
.13
(08)
-1.15*
(45)
.07
(30)

R-squared
-2LL

Likelihood
ration chi
square
(dN3)
12.16**
6.75*
5.56
35.92—
6.15*
6.02
2.70
7.53*
43.56—
3.66
7.36*
3.73
.41
222.49—
(df=36)

Note: * p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; —p<001.
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Tibto 14.5: Multinomial model predicting composition of imdl» diet EDIalooue (n«424h

Media skepticism
Party-ideology index
Political extremity
Involvement
Political knowledge
Employment
Schedule flexibility
Student (=1)
Age
Education
White
Male

Roughly equal
vs. more
non-mainstream
than mainstream

Roughly equal
vs. more
mainstream than
non-mainstream

.35
(1.11)
-.08
(07)
.01
(.14)
.38
(.26)
3.19*
(1.56)
-.23
(57)
.03
(09)
.50
(108)
-.03
(02)
.04
(12)
1.43
(82)
.19
(45)

-1.63*
(70)
.05
(.05)
-.03
(08)
.18
(.14)
-.19
(83)
-.26
(29)
-.02
(05)
-.20
(-66)
.03*”
(01)
-.11
(07)
.74*
(35)
-.18
(.26)

More non
mainstream than
mainstream vs.
more mainstream
than non
mainstream
-1.98*
(101)
.13*
(06)
-.04
(13)
-.20
(24)
-3.38*
(1.47)
-.03
(46)
-.05
(08)
-.70
(101)
.06***
(01)
-.16
(11)
-.69
(80)
-.37
(41)

R-squared
-2LL

Likelihood
ration chi
square
(df=2)
7.87*
5.57*
.16
2.63
5.81*
.81
.45
.48
16.89—
3.54
6.15*
1.16
.21
83.03—

Note: # p<10; * p<.05; **p<.01; —p< 001.
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Table 14.6: OLS model predicting composition of media dl«t EDIeloouo 2000 data.

Media skepticism
Party-ideology index
Political extremity
Involvement
Political knowledge
Employment
Schedule flexibility
Student (=1)
Age
Education
White
Male
R-squared
N

Roughly equal vs.
more
non-mainstream
than mainstream
-1.79-.14
(57)
.09*
.11
(03)
-.14*
.07

(58
.24
.10
(12)
-1.19*
-.09
(70)
-.58*
-.11
(23)
-.03
-.03
(.04)
-.55
-.04
(60)
.05—
.31
(00)
-.07
-.05
(06)
.17
.02
(32)
-.31
-.06
(21)
.23
455

Note: # p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; —p<001.
The dependent variable is the difference between the mainstream and the non-mainstream
exposure score (coded -7 = high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream; +7 = high-mainstream-lownon-mainstream; 0 = exactly the same score on the non-mainstream and mainstream exposure
variable).
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Table 14.7: Th> n—d for cognition interaction: Multinomial modal predicting overall media
dial freference category is low-malnstream-tow-non-malnstream). EDialogua (n«424l.

Media skepticism
Party-ideology index
Political extremity
Involvement
Political knowledge
Employment
Schedule flexibility
Student (=1)
Age
Education
White
Male
Need for cognition
Skepticism * Need for
cognition
R-squared
-2LL

Low-low vs.
high-nonmainstream
low-mainstream
2.40*
(100)
-.05
(05)
.11
(.11)
.22
(22)
2.68*
(123)
-.67*
(40)
-.02
(.07)
-1.30
(.95)
.00
(01)
.13
(10)
-.43
(53)
.26
(35)
.45
(28)
2.03
(145)

Low-low vs.
low-nonmainstream
high-mainstream
-.57
(85)
.03
(05)
-.10
(09)
.56**
(.19)
.10
(102)
-.87*
(33)
-.04
(06)
-2.25*
(121)
.06***
(01)
-.05
(09)
-.27
(50)
-.42
(30)
-.30
(23)
3.40**
(126)

Low-low vs.
high-high
.67
(89)
-.07
(05)
.09
(10)
1.13—
(21)
.78
(111)
-.33
(36)
.06
(06)
-2.15*
(124)
-.04**
(01)
.13
(09)
-1.29**
(47)
-.01
(-32)
-.01
(24)
3.30**
(127)

Likelihood
ration chi
square
(df=3)
9.34*
6.20*
5.30
35.80—
5.42
7.82*
3.36
6.91*
37.78—
2.78
8.28
4.09
6.81*
9.45*
.46
236.78—
(df=42)

Note: # p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; —p<001.
Centering was used to reduce multicollinearity. Coefficients for the centered terms are presented.
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Table 14.8: OLS model predicting composition of media dlat EDIalooue 2000 data.

Media skepticism
Party-ideology index
Political extremity
Involvement
Political knowledge
Employment
Schedule flexibility
Student (=1)
Age
Education
White
Male
Need for cognition
Skepticism * Need for
cognition
R-squared
N

Roughly equal vs.
more
non-mainstream
than mainstream
-1.96—
(59)
.08*
(03)
-.14*
(07)
.26*
(.13)
-1.18
(76)
-.62*
(.24)
-.05
(.04)
-.64
(63)
.05—
(00)
-.05
(06)
.10
(33)
-.32
(22)
-.36*
(16)
1.75*
(80)
.23
455

Note: # p<.10; * p<.05; **p<.01; —p<.001.
The dependent variable is the difference between the mainstream and the non-mainstream
exposure score (coded -7 = high-non-mainstream-low-mainstream; +7 = high-mainstream-townon-mainstream; 0 = exactly the same score on the non-mainstream and mainstream exposure
variable).
Centering was used to reduce multicoilinearity. Coefficients for the centered terms are presented.
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Figure 14.1: Exposure to mainstream and non mainstream madia,
by madia skapticism, APPC 2000 Data (parcants)
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Figure 14.3: Exposure to the mainstream and non mainstream madia,
by madia skepticism; EDialoguo 2000 Data (parcanta)
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Figure 14.5: Skepticism by need for cognition interaction
(probability of low non-mainstream, high mainstream)
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Figure 14.6: Skepticism by im d for cognition interaction
(probability of high-high, rather than low-iow)
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Chapter 15: The news environment of media skeptics

This chapter concludes and discusses the findings regarding media skepticism and news
media exposure. It follows from the definition of trust, and from what we know about
trust in general, that one of the possible consequences of mistrust in the media is reduced
exposure to the mainstream news media by media skeptics. Simply put, mistrust leads to
lower cooperation and lower engagement, which in the context of audience-media
relations could be translated to lower exposure. In the language of communication
research, this implies trust-based selective exposure. Following this logic, this section
tested hypotheses relating to the association between news media skepticism and news
media exposure.
In Chapter 12,1 tested a set of simple skepticism-based selective exposure
hypotheses. Though the different data yielded somewhat different findings, the overall
pattern (evident from the meta-analysis synthesizing the different findings) suggested a
relatively small negative correlation between media skepticism and exposure to the
mainstream media. There was a negative association between skepticism and national and
local TV news exposure and general mainstream news exposure. There was also a
positive association between skepticism and PTR listening and non-mainstream news
exposure. In a cross-lagged structural model, the lagged negative effect of skepticism on
mainstream exposure was stronger than the lagged effect of exposure on skepticism.
None of the available statistical methods allow us to deduce causality from non-
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experimental data. However, the cross-lagged analysis shows that a causal argument is
consistent with the data. That is, the models could be interpreted as suggesting that the
direction of the association is from trust-in-the-media to mainstream media exposure, and
not the other way around. On the other hand, since the lagged effect of non-mainstream
exposure on skepticism was stronger than that of skepticism on exposure, it appears that
in the case of exposure to non-mainstream sources, the direction of the association is
from exposure to skepticism.
In the next stage I tested for the intervening role of need for cognition. Trust-based
selectivity, 1 argued, does not operate in a vacuum. Other factors influencing exposure
interact with skepticism in their influence on exposure. People may expose themselves to
mainstream news media despite their skepticism, just because they enjoy thinking,
deliberating and arguing. On the other hand, when they rank low on need for cognition,
they rely more heavily on their skepticism in their exposure decisions: when they mistrust
the news media, they watch much less mainstream news. Chapter 13 tested this
interaction on the Electronic Dialogue data. The findings supported the hypothesized
interaction, even when controls for demographic, schedule-related and political factors
were employed. However, there was no evidence for a similar interaction when the
dependent variables were indicators of exposure to non-mainstream media.
In Chapter 141tested the hypotheses presented in the previous chapters, this time
with media diets, rather than exposure to a given source, as the dependent variable. The
analysis demonstrated that skepticism significantly influenced the news diets of
respondents. Skeptics were more likely to have a “high-non-mainstream-lowmainstream” news diet than non-skeptics. They were also less likely to have a “low-non432
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mainstream-high-mainstream” news diet. Their diets contained higher doses of non
mainstream media than the diets of non-skeptics. The insertion of the need for cognition
factor showed that the need for cognition by skepticism interaction held when modeling
for news diets (expressed either in relation to the median or when comparing the amount
o f mainstream and non-mainstream within individuals) and not only when modeling for
exposure to specific sources.
We now have a more complete picture of the association between skepticism and
exposure. We know that skeptics do not differ radically from non-skeptics in the amount
of their overall news exposure. Though some analyses found more news exposure by
skeptics and other analyses less (depending on how they are asked about close-following
of politics, or about the number of days of exposure to various sources in the past week),
the differences in absolute terms were not huge. But the composition of the news diets, as
opposed to the total amount o f exposure, varied rather noticeably according to skepticism
and need for cognition levels. Non-skeptics, especially those with low cognitive needs,
relied more heavily on mainstream media sources, while skeptics had higher doses of
non-mainstream news in their diets, both relative to non-skeptics and in absolute terms.
Still, many media skeptics reported high exposure to mainstream materials. In fact,
most skeptics consume more mainstream than non-mainstream materials, although (as we
have seen) the non-mainstream component in their diet was considerably higher than that
of their non-skeptical counterparts. Thus, many people are exposed to at least some
mainstream media despite the fact they do not trust them. Does this mean that the
perceived violation o f trust matters less in the case o f audience-media relations than in
other cases? Why do people who are skeptical about mainstream news still attend to it
433
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despite their mistrust? This is indeed, as Kohut and Toth (1998) have argued, the central
conundrum about the relations of the American news media with their audience today.
One answer might be that news gratifies diverse needs regardless of trust. This was
evident when we modeled for skepticism by need for cognition interaction. Doing so
showed us that skepticism is less important in the presence of cognitive needs. However,
when need for cognition was low, it played a more central role in media exposure. As I
noted in Chapter 13, need for cognition is just an exemplar of one need. Other needs integrative and escapist needs, for example - might come into play. Some people watch
the news just in order to be able to discuss it with other people. If this is the case,
skepticism should interact with integrative needs similarly to the way it interacted with
cognitive needs. In other words, when other motivations are present, the effect of mistrust
in the media should decrease.
Another way to state this argument is to say that trust in the media does not matter in
media exposure when the motivations to attend to the media are irrelevant to the gains
and risks that stand at the core of the trust relations. In the interpersonal context, mistrust
does not necessarily lead to a boycott. We may hang out with someone we do not trust
just because he or she is fun to be with. We would not put our lives in their hands, but we
would still interact with them socially. If we have other gains to obtain that are relatively
unrelated to the core of trust, we would still be friends with these mistrusted people. In
audience*media relations, the core of trust is accuracy, credibility and objectivity. People
may perceive that the media fall short of fulfilling these commitments, but still find the
exposure to be an exciting pastime or an important means of connecting to society. In
other words, we may know that the news is untrustworthy, but we still watch, because it
434
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is fun, because it is interesting, because it helps us stay in touch with other people and
with society at large.
Another explanation for the fact that people attend to mainstream news despite
mistrusting it has to do with the relative absence of functional alternatives. Skeptics’
higher exposure to the political Internet and to PTR might show that they are seeking
alternatives to the mainstream. However, in current media environments a real alternative
to mainstream news is hard to find. According to this explanation, which does not
preclude but rather supplements the previous one, the confines of the menu limit the
media diets of skeptical audiences.
To begin with, non-mainstream news media are not as widely accessible as
mainstream news. There is no “alternative” channel that offers a national evening
television program. The Internet, as widely accessible as it is, is less likely to be reached
by some groups than by others. This is evident by the fact that students and employed
persons report higher exposure to online news, considered here as non-mainstream. Most
probably they attend more to the Web because they have more opportunities to do so,
since they likely have a connected PC in their offices or on campus. Although almost
everybody has access to Political Talk Radio, listening to talk radio is also partly
determined by demographics and lifestyles. Working people are more likely to hear PTR,
because they can listen to the radio while commuting to and from work, unlike those who
are unemployed. In sum, lifestyle and student status have an important influence on
media exposure. For some, these factors might be more influential than skepticism
toward the news media. In other words, some skeptics might attend to the mainstream
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news despite their mistrust, just because of habits, lifestyles and the increased
accessibility and popularity of channels that disseminate mainstream news.
Second, it is not obvious that a real functional alternative to the mainstream media
exists. As Bagdikian (1985) argued, the diversification of media channels provides
audiences with more of the same instead of a real alternative. Despite the tendency by
some talk radio shows and some Internet Web sites to argue with the mainstream media
about news facts and about their interpretation, it clear that these sources, dubbed here as
“non-mainstream”, have their own biases and problems, ideological leanings and
imperfections. So although they sometimes present themselves as “alternative” channels,
it could be argued that they rarely offer a real, trusted alternative that could compensate
skeptics for what the mainstream media deprive them of. Television, a favorite American
pastime, still does not offer a real functional substitute to mainstream news. Most
attempts to create such a substitute (and CNN was definitely created with the ambition of
offering an alternative to network news) have ended up providing more of the same - or
redefining the mainstream altogether. The apparatus needed for the production of TV
news requires resources that media watchdog organizations (that are very active online)
probably cannot recruit. In sum, the televised options that skeptics have are still limited.
If they want to watch news on TV, they probably have to attend to the mainstream.
A major limitation of the study has to do with the measurement of exposure.
Measures of exposure are always at least somewhat suspect of bias. This is because
people can hardly ever report the exact amount of time they spend with the media. In the
words of Price and Zaller, “accurately assessing levels of exposure to news media in
surveys can be very difficult. In trying to estimate their typical rates of media use,
436
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respondents may have trouble recalling the details of what may often be a set of low
salience behaviors” (p. 13S). According to Price and Zaller, much “guesswork” takes
place when people are asked to report their media consumption. This problem is
supplemented by a tendency to over-report news exposure. Price and Zaller found that
although data collected by the Arbitron Ratings company indicated that about 6 percent
of adults listened to NPR at least once a week, 35 percent of NES respondents said they
did so (p. 136).
Another problem in measuring news exposure is the use of survey questions referring
to broad types of news, which do not distinguish between specific contents within each
type. An elaborated measurement scheme, not present in any of the four data sets, could
have been much more telling for the current purpose of study. For example, we could
have benefited from knowing what exactly people read when they read the daily paper112.
Some people get the paper every day but only go over the ads and sports, hardly ever
reading the news section thoroughly. The current analysis treats these people as if they
were “exposed” to news. The measurement of exposure to political information on the
Internet is similarly problematic. What do respondents do online? What sites do they
visit? Do they go to online outlets of mainstream news sources? Do they get online
information by visiting politicians’ Web sites? Do they read comments by other users,
which may contain anti-media facts and interpretations? Do they visit the Web sites of
media watchdog organizations, discussed in Chapter 4? We have learned a lot about the

112The question used in most data sets was worded, “Please tell me how many days in the past week you
did each o f the following: read a daily newspaper...”
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association between skepticism and exposure, but a more detailed measurement could
have led to even more insights.
One assumption discussed earlier received some empirical validation from the
analyses presented in this section. In chapter 12 I labeled national network TV news,
cable TV news, local TV news and daily newspapers as “mainstream” news media, and
Political Talk Radio and Political information over the Internet as “non-mainstream
political information”. This assumption was based on the presumption that since non
mainstream information is more prevalent online and in PTR, those seeking anti
mainstream and counter-mainstream information would be more likely to find it there.
Admittedly, this might seem like a far-fetched assumption. However, the fact is that
measures of exposure to PTR and online political information behaved differently than
measures of exposure to national and local network news and daily newspapers, in terms
of their association with media skepticism. This was evident almost throughout the
analysis, replicated in a few data sets as well as in more complicated settings, like the
need for cognition interaction and media diet models.
At the very least, the fact that skeptical audiences attend more than their nonskeptical counterparts to the Internet and PTR attests to different kinds of informationseeking by audiences who mistrust the mainstream media. In other words, the findings
suggest, at the very least, that media skeptics need diversity. This makes sense in light of
the definition of trust. One possible strategy to reduce the uncertainty that stands at the
core of trust is simply to gather more information from different sources. The fact that the
so-called “non-mainstream” information was a more essential ingredient of skeptics’
political information diets despite the fact that the overall level of exposure of skeptics
438
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and non-skeptics was not radically different, points to a possible substitution. Instead of
getting all their news from broadcast and cable television and from newspapers, they turn
to talk radio and the Internet in addition to mainstream news.
In Chapter 121mentioned selective exposure as the cognitive mechanism behind the
different exposure pattern of skeptics. In light of the fact that most skeptics do get most
of their information from mainstream sources despite their mistrust in mainstream news,
it is possible to suggest that the need for cognitive consistency does not lead people to
avoid mistrusted news channels completely. Rather, it appears that skeptics select to
diversify their information sources. A court might be satisfied with one or two witnesses
when they seem credible. But when the testimonies are untrustworthy, conflicting or
otherwise suspicious, the court might need more witnesses in order to determine the truth.
Likewise, when audiences are skeptical about their news sources, when they perceive
their news information to lack credibility, they try to corroborate the information they
receive with different news sources.
The different pattern of association between skepticism and exposure to those
sources I called “mainstream” and those I called “non-mainstream” suggests that there
may be substantial differences in the content or format of each. Hence, the findings could
and probably should be related to the fact that much of the content available on PTR and
through the Internet is self-promoted as an alternative to mainstream news; that much of
it argues and counter-argues with mainstream news, exposes mistakes and contradictions,
offers alternative information, and allows more access to non-authoritative “regular”
citizens. In other words, one could argue that there is something is substantive that
distinguishes PTR and many online news outlets from other outlets, hence the separation
439
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between mainstream and non-mainstream. However, it is beyond the scope of this
dissertation to pursue this issue further. The hard labor of conceptualizing PTR and
online news as “non-mainstream” and refining its place vis-a-vis the mainstream media is
a matter for other research endeavors.
Our interest here is in mistrust in the media and its consequences. We have
established that mistrust is associated with lower engagement with mainstream news. But
we also wondered why this association was weaker than one might expect, given research
on trust in other areas.
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Chapter 16: Audience trust in the media matters.

Synopsis of the dissertation.
In recent decades audience trust in the media has declined. The rate of GSS respondents
reporting “hardly any” confidence in the press increased by more than 25 percentage
points between 1973 and 19%. While most scholars have thus far concentrated on the
sources of media skepticism, the main focus of this dissertation was its consequences.
The main question explored here has been: Does audience trust in the media matter? The
answer to this question appears to be generally positive.
One consequence of skepticism toward the media, examined in Section 1, is a
reduced susceptibility to mainstream media influence. As we have seen, the higher the
skepticism of an audience member, the more likely she or he is to remain unaffected by
media agenda setting; the higher the trust in the media, the more likely she or he is to
accept the media’s agenda. The higher the skepticism, the higher the rejection of the
mediated opinion climate; the higher the trust in the media, the higher the acceptance of
the mediated opinion climate. There was no evidence, however, for a moderating role of
media skepticism in cultivation and priming effects.
The difference in the moderating role of skepticism between spiral-of-silence and
agenda setting and priming and cultivation can be explained by the more deliberate
nature of the former effects compared to the more automatic and unconscious nature of
the latter. When people are asked about gender attitudes or about social mistrust, they are
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unaware of the media answer. However, when asked about the likely winner of an
election, they are aware of media projections. When they are asked to evaluate the
president, they might not know that the media set the standards for their answer.
However, when asked for the most important problem facing the nation, they know what
problems are stressed by the media, and they may or may not accept them. People cannot
resist the effects of the media if these effects are unconscious. Thus, there is no evidence
that skepticism matters when it comes to unconscious media effects. Still, Section 1
showed that one consequence of media skepticism is the moderation of some media
effects.
Another consequence of media skepticism, examined in Section 2, is its effect on
audience news exposure patterns. The news diets of media skeptics have a lower
component of mainstream news and a higher component of non-mainstream sources,
such as PTR and Internet news. This is especially true in the absence of need for
cognition. People with low cognitive needs rely more heavily on media skepticism when
selecting the sources they attend to. In contrast, those who enjoy listening to diverse
points of view, who like to deliberate on social problems, and who get satisfaction horn
thinking per se, rely less heavily on media skepticism when they compose their media
diets.
The causal mechanism in the association between media skepticism and news
exposure was explored using cross-lagged analysis. It was found that the lagged effect of
skepticism on mainstream media exposure was greater than the lagged effect of
mainstream news exposure on media skepticism. Though no currently available statistical
method can fully substantiate causality using non-experimental data, the argument that
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the direction of the association is from media skepticism to mainstream news exposure,
and not vice versa, was consistent with the data. On the other hand, the data suggested
that in the case of non-mainstream exposure, the causal mechanism is reversed: exposure
to non-mainstream sources may be priming mistrust in the mainstream news media.
In sum, this dissertation presents evidence demonstrating that audience trust in the
media matters, at least when it comes to media exposure decisions and to some media
effects. For scholars studying trust this could serve as another example that trust is
consequential. Trust in spouses is associated with greater marital satisfaction (Holmes &
Rempel, 1989), while mistrust is related to psychological distress. Trust in government is
associated with civic engagement and taxpaying (Scholz & Lubell, 1998), while mistrust
is associated with riot participation (Gamson, 1968). Trust in doctors and nurses has
consequences for the effectiveness of medical treatments (Davies & Rundall, 2000).
Trust in peers is related to teamwork (Porter & Lilly, 1996). Trust in persuasive sources
is related to effective persuasion (Hoviand & Weiss, 1951). The analogous consequence
of trust in the context of media-audience relations is thus the association between
audience mistrust in the media, lower mainstream news exposure, and reduced
susceptibility to mainstream media influence.
Audiences emerge stronger from this study. They are active and critical. They are not
influenced by sources they do not trust They do not accept the media's agenda and
opinion climate presentation at face value. When they mistrust mainstream news, they
seek alternative sources. Reception theorists use concepts like “liberation” and
“resistance” when discussing critical audience interpretations of media texts. Such
concepts stress the critical ability of those watching television. But in addition to the
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critical capabilities of news audiences stressed by reception scholars, this study
highlights, at least in some respects, the “rationality” of the audience.

Media skepticism and the rational audience.
Rational choice scholars in political science define rationality as behavior motivated by
the pursuit of pleasure and the desire to avoid pain (e.g., Calvert, 1985; Sniderman et al.,
1991). Lupia and McCubbins (1998) assumed that in order to behave rationally, people
need information about the surrounding world. Assuming that to the extent they scan the
environment to collect such information, people want this information to represent the
world correctly, and given the definition of trust, the lower exposure of skeptics to the
mainstream media is quite rational. As Lupia and McCubbins state, “If a person can
attend to only one stimulus, then he or she will attend to the stimulus for which benefits
are extremely high relative to the expected costs” (1998, p. 29). Trust is an expectation by
the trustor that the interaction with the trustee will lead to gains rather than losses
(Coleman, 1990). Hence, if we can attend to only one stimulus or set of stimuli, we attend
to sources we trust. Trust is an expectation that the word of the trustee can be relied upon
(Rotter, 1967), that is, that it represents the world correctly. If we are indeed motivated to
collect correct information, we attend to sources we trust.
Audience rationality can also be used to explain some of the findings about
skepticism and media effects. Rationality implies a desire for correct information. Thus,
it is only rational that those skeptical of the media would be less willing to accept the
media's presentation of the world - their agenda as well as their societal opinion
portrayal. Audiences use skepticism as a tool when processing media messages: when
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they are skeptical, they are more likely to reject some messages. However, skepticism
does not lead to automatic rejection of media portrayals, nor to automatic acceptance of a
picture of the world that is the direct opposite of that portrayed by the media (examples
for such oppositional readings were suggested by Fiske, 1987). Skeptical audiences are
simply more cautious, and therefore less likely to accept certain aspects of the media’s
presentation of the world.
On the face of it, the fact that skepticism does not seem to moderate priming and
cultivation effects appears to negate the idea of audience rationality described above.
How can rational audiences accept the media’s presentations of social realities when they
mistrust the news media? How can they use the standards set by the media in political
decision-making when they are skeptical about the media’s fairness? Mistrust is an
expectation that the word of the trustee cannot be relied upon. How can rational
audiences motivated by a desire for correct information be cultivated or “primed” by the
news media despite their mistrust in the media?
One plausible explanation is the unconscious nature of cultivation and priming, in
contrast to agenda setting and opinion climate perception. Cultivation and priming are
described in the literature as a non-deliberate response to media exposure. Since skeptics
are unaware of the influences of the media in the cases of priming and cultivation, they
cannot resist them. Since people are affected automatically by priming and cultivation,
their mistrust in the media does not come into play in these effects. Thus, the lack of
evidence for a moderating role of skepticism in cultivation and priming does not negate
audience rationality. Rationality requires deliberate processing. It is bypassed when
media effects are unconscious. Audiences are thus rational, but not infallible.
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Though skeptics receive, on average, less mainstream news than non-skeptics, they
expose themselves to a good deal of mainstream news. This may also seem irrational at
first sight. How can rational audiences attend to news they do not trust? One explanation
I offered is related to other gratifications obtained by news watching. Rationality is the
pursuit of pleasure. Some get pleasure from thinking about different aspects of political
issues and listening to diverse points of view. Thus, the effect of skepticism on exposure
is lower for people with high need for cognition. Need for cognition is only one example
of the needs that interact with skepticism. Skeptics probably attend to mainstream news
despite their skepticism, in order to gratify other needs, such as social needs or need for
entertainment. This is totally rational, since rationality is the pursuit of pleasure.
Another explanation for the fact that skeptics attend to some mainstream news
despite their mistrust might be the relative absence of functional alternatives. Mainstream
news is everywhere, while alternatives are, at present, less pervasive. Non-mainstream
news is found mostly on the radio and the Internet. Skeptics indeed tend more than non
skeptics to attend to those alternative channels. However, if they want to watch TV news,
they have few alternatives. Thus, skeptics may still watch mainstream TV news simply
because they have no real choice. From this perspective, their exposure to mainstream
news can still be viewed as rational.
The view that audiences use their trust or mistrust in the media rationally, as a tool,
when making news media exposure decisions or while processing news messages, does
not imply that mistrust in the media is in itself totally rational. Some of the writers about
trust state that trust is often a guess (Boyle & Bonacich, 1970) or an intuition, and as
such, not based totally on reason.
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As has been repeatedly noted, the focus of this dissertation is on the consequences of
trust and mistrust in the media, not its sources. However, it follows from the social
psychological literature about trust that mistrust is either the result of perceived violation
of trust in the past, or of some information about the trustee that casts doubt on the trust.
We cannot tell what the sources of audience perceptions of past violation of trust are.
Some have argued that this information comes from politicians, while others have argued
that it comes from meta-communicative sources in the media. It is also possible that
media skepticism spreads mimetically in society (as suggested by Cappella, 2001), for
example, by interpersonal communication.
There are many examples available to the general public of information about past
violations of trust by media institutions. We know about certain rare cases in which
journalists overused their imagination and fabricated stories (e.g. the Janet Cook scandal).
We know of other instances in which journalists got the facts wrong by mistake113. Other
journalistic blunders we know of are the results of manipulations of journalists by
sources. Journalists have been charged with taking words out of context - or even
distorting whole stories - on a daily basis (see quotes in Chapter 4). The public may use
these instances as exemplars and develop mistrust in the institutions of the media.
We have seen that trust (including media trust) is often no better than a guess, due to
the uncertainty component in the definition of trust. On the other hand, however,
audiences have plenty of information about media practices that casts doubt on trust.

113 For example, a CNN-Time 1998 broadcast “Valley o f Death” arguing that a US elite unit used nerve gas
in the early 1970s against American defectors in Laos. An investigation o f this story revealed that although
the broadcast was prepared after exhaustive research and reflected the deeply held beliefs o f the CNN
journalists who prepared it, their claims could not be supported (Abrams, 1998).

448

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Why some audience members use this information and develop mistrust while others do
not remains unexplained by this dissertation.

Implications for liberal democracy.
Some of the consequences of media skepticism examined in this dissertation may be
desirable in a liberal democracy. We want our fellow citizens to be informed by a variety
of sources. We do not want them to be automatically affected by the news media. Could
it be that as adherents of liberal democracy, we need to encourage skepticism toward the
news media?
Political Scientists Joseph Nye says that “In the long term, the quality of life in a
democracy is hindered by too much trust - and by too little trust. If people believe
everything they are told, that isn't healthy. But if they believe nothing, that isn’t healthy
either." (Cited by Lamberst, 1998). We certainly do not want our fellow citizens to be
media cynics. We do not want audiences to reject all the information they encounter in
the media. The media do play an important role in democracy, because they provide us
with a plethora of facts and interpretations that connect us with other people and make
possible the creation of democratic society. However, we do want our fellow citizens to
be cautious when reading media texts. We do want audiences to be critical.
In recent years, media scholars have invested efforts in developing media literacy
programs designed to improve “the ability to access, analyze, evaluate and communicate
messages in a wide variety of forms” (Firestone, 1993; Cited in Hobbs & Frost, 2001:1)
Current approaches to media literacy include ideological analysis “designed to help
people become more sensitive to the relationship between ideology and culture”
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(Silverblatt et al., 1999:3); autobiographical analysis ‘"which investigates media content
as a way to promote personal discovery and growth” (p. 66); mythic analysis which helps
in “identifying the mythic function of media programming and providing perspective on
media content as a retelling of traditional myths” (p. 143); and analysis of production
elements that increases audience “awareness of stylistic elements such as editing,
composition, point of view, angle, connotation” (p. 196), and so forth.
One implication of this study is that media literacy interventions should probably
include news literacy programs. Such programs should enhance healthy skepticism
toward news. They should teach the practices of news production, the norms of
journalism, and the obstacles facing journalists implementing these norms. When tackling
the problem of trust, they should teach caution rather than blatant mistrust, suspicion
rather than cynicism. News literacy students should learn how to compare reports from
different news media sources, and news reports with information available from non
news sources. Like the media skeptics studied in Section 2, news-literates should be able
to seek diverse news information. Arguably, such diversity can increase the quality of
audience information.
We found that skeptics were less likely to be affected by news in the more deliberate
process of agenda setting and opinion climate perceptions. On the other hand, we found
that media skepticism probably does not moderate priming and cultivation because
people cannot resist unconscious influences. If we desire citizen deliberation rather than
automatic audience responses to media content, we should enhance audiences’ ability to
resist messages. News literacy programs should thus cover the potential influences of
news (Potter, 2001). Audiences should leant that they are cultivated by repetitive and
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sometimes distorted messages, highlighting violence and altering audience perceptions of
the world. They should also become aware of the fact that their political considerations
and priorities are sometimes shaped by news. We do not recommend these measures
because we want to eliminate news effects altogether. On the contrary, we want
audiences to respond to what is happening in the world, as conveyed to them by the
media. But we want this process to be deliberate, not unconscious. Increasing audience
awareness of media effects may assist in facilitating citizen deliberation about media
facts - a deliberation that lies at the core of the democratic process.

Implications for media scholars.
One contribution of this study to media scholars is the validation of the measures of
media skepticism. Convergent validity was manifested by the high correlation between
skepticism survey items and open-ended comments about the media in an electronic
discussion. Discriminant validity was manifested by the relatively low correlation
between skepticism and potentially confounding constructs. Though skepticism is
correlated with political ideology, the two are far from being the same. Many liberals are
skeptical about the media and many conservatives are non-skeptics. Also, media
skepticism is not merely a tendency not to trust. The correlation between the media
skepticism measure and interpersonal mistrust was at the -.08 range. Neither is skepticism
an artifact of political extremity. The correlation between political extremity and media
skepticism was low (in the .13 range). Thus, the media skepticism measures capture what
they are supposed to, namely, audience feelings of alienation and mistrust toward the
mainstream media.
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In addition to validating measures of media skepticism, this dissertation also
contributes to our understanding of the concept by examining its stability. Individual
skepticism scores measured in August correlated strongly with skepticism scores
measured in May. Changes in media skepticism between these two time points were only
marginal. Aggregate changes in media skepticism over short time spans are minimal.
Changes over decades are only gradual. Thus, media skepticism does not change
erratically or capriciously with each encounter of every audience member with media
stories. Audience evaluations of the media are not whims.
Now that we have at hand a valid, reliable and stable measure of media skepticism
that interacts with media effects and is associated with media exposure, we should use it.
I believe the main implication of this study is that communication scholars should pay
more attention to audience trust and mistrust in the news media when building media
theories. In addition to trying to explain media skepticism, we should also try to
understand how this skepticism affects the interactions between news and audiences. The
role of media skepticism in other communication theories should thus be examined by
future research.

Implications for journalists.
The implication of this study for journalists and editors is simple. Some journalists have
dismissed survey findings about diminishing audience trust as representing nothing more
than responses people give to pollsters, with no actual consequences (Layton, 1998).
Others have pointed to the various methodological problems that could impair such
surveys. Should it really matter for journalists if a growing number of citizens doesn't
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trust large segments of the press? Ben Bradlee, former editor of The Washington Post, is
doubtful. "We journalists are not there to be loved. And I don't know that other
professions are getting more respect. Not Congress. Not politicians. Not businessmen”
(Cited by Lambert, 1998). As Bruce Sanford (1999) argues, journalists resist survey
findings about dwindling audience trust by saying they are not in the business of being
liked or popular:
Throughout the communications industry, editors and reporters saw a badge of
honor in the statistics. This was the tough-minded “do I look like I want a
date?” school that permeates journalism. No one expressed it better than
Angus McEachran, who as editor of The Pittsburgh Press had driven
the...newspaper to a winning streak of Pulitzer Prizes. “If I wanted to be
loved,” he would say, “I would have been a ski instructor.” (p. 17)
In sum, journalists tend to dismiss the evidence about shrinking audience trust as
statistical artifacts, or to claim that it does not matter for journalism as a profession. They
often reply to sentiments of mistrust with the assertion that they are not there to be liked.
But trust and liking are not the same. Some journalists claim that survey findings about
audience mistrust do not matter. But the findings of this dissertation show, to the
contrary, that mistrust in the press is not merely a statistic or an artifact of survey
methodology. It has practical consequences. Audience skepticism results, at least
sometimes, in the mass media’s decreased influence on public perceptions and in
audiences’ decreased exposure to mainstream media. I do not know how journalists
should respond, if at all, to the fact that mistrustful audiences are less influenced by them.
But at the very least, they should note that the documented audience mistrust probably
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represents a real phenomenon with real implications on the societal effect of media
institutions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A p p en d ix 1: D ata s e t s .

Five data sets are used in this dissertation: the National Election Study (NES) 1996, the
Electronic Dialogue 2000 data, the political talk radio study data (1996), the Annenberg
Public Policy Center election 2000 primary season data, and (in some cases) NORC’s
General Social Survey data (1973-96). All of the data described in the following pages
consist of nationally representative large samples of adult Americans. 1 have two face-toface surveys, two telephone surveys and one Internet survey. Three of the data sets use
random digit dialing sampling, while the other two use multiple stage area probability
sampling designs. Each of the data sets uses a slightly different measure of attitudes
toward the media. The data also differ in terms of measurement of the various outcome
variables.
In sum, although all five data sets use large samples of adult Americans, they diverge
on many methodological qualities. Yet another (sometime even more essential)
difference between these separate data is the context in which they were gathered.
Though almost all data were gathered in an election year, there were substantial
differences between the 2000 and 1996 campaigns, and between the primary season and
general election season within these two election years. The outcome variables include
news exposure, perception of the climate of opinion, and public agenda. These factors are
all influenced by the different campaign dynamics at the time of data collection.
The rationale for the use of multiple data sets is simple. If the same results are
replicated under these different conceptualizations, designs and contexts, it will serve as
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strong evidence for, or against, the hypotheses. This is because such consistent evidence
contributes to our ability to generalize from specific observations to more universal
conventions that lie at the basis of social theory. If, on the other hand, the findings are
inconsistent across data sets, then more hypothesizing will be necessary to identify the
reasons for the inconsistency.

The General Social Survey.
The GSS is an almost annual "omnibus" personal interview survey of U.S.
households conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). The first
survey took place in 1972, and since then more than 35,000 respondents have answered
over 2500 different questions. The project is funded mainly by the National Science
Foundation, although other agencies and organizations114 provide funding necessary for
data collection. The design stresses replication, the literal repetition of items and item
sequences. “The manifest aim of replication is to facilitate research on social change (and
stability). A fortunate consequence of replication has been the accumulation of cases in
subgroups'’ (GSS, 2000). Across the years GSS has used a variety of sampling designs
(the changes are detailed by General Social Survey, 2000). Almost all GSS interviews are
administered face to face. Response rates reported for the annual surveys vary between
73 percent and 82 percent (see Smith, 1994). Fortunately, GSS replicated a trust-ininstitutions battery of survey questions, which includes items measuring respondents’
trust in television and in the press. A cumulative file, containing all respondents who
1,4 In 1998, for example, GSS received funds from the Lilly Endowment, the Fetzer Institute, Academy
Sinica, the Lilly Corporation, the National Institutes o f Mental Health, the Office o f Naval Research, the
American Association o f Retired Persons, and the Luce Foundation,
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answered the exposure, confidence-in-television and confidence-in-the-press questions,
was created. The total N for the file was 35,285.

The National Election Studies -1996.
NES conducts national surveys of the American electorate in presidential and
midterm election years. Since only the 1996 study included a measure of the main
concept of this dissertation (trust in the media), the data analysis is limited to NES 1996
data only. The study population for the 1996 pre/post NES includes all US citizens of
voting age on or before Election Day 19%. Eligible citizens must have resided in housing
units in one of the 48 coterminous states. The sampling design was a “multiple-stage area
probability sample design”, similar to the one used by GSS (see National Pre-post
Election Study, 2000). The field period for the pre-election study was September 3 to
November 4,19%, and for the post- election study, November 6 through December 31,
1996. Interviews were completed with 1714 pre-election respondents; 1534 of the
respondents re-contacted after the election were re-interviewed. The overall response rate
was 71 percent for the pre-election study; the re-interview rate was 90 percent for the
post-election survey. NES reports that response rates varied significantly by geographic
region and PSU type. It was also found that the sample overrepresents educated
respondents and voters. But these biases in response and non-response are reduced by
weighting.
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The political talk radio study.
The PTR data consist of a five-wave panel study designed to investigate the effects
of political talk radio listening on political attitudes during the 1996 election year. A full
description of the sample and design can be found elsewhere (Cappella, Turow &
Jamieson, 1997; Yanovitzky & Cappella, 1999). The first wave was conducted between
February 21 and March 5, 1996. Of the 5159 numbers dialed by the random-digit-dial
system, 2086 calls resulted in contacts, of which 1666 respondents completed the
interview. The minimum response rate at Wave 1, calculated using AAPOR guidelines,
was 33 percent. The sampling design and administration of the surveys was conducted by
Princeton Survey Research Associates. The study was funded by grants to Kathleen Hall
Jamieson and Joseph Cappella by the Carnegie Foundation and the Ford Foundation. Chisquare tests of statistical significance were employed to examine differences in the
character of the sample across waves due to respondents being added to or dropping out
of the panel. No statistically significant differences across waves were found on
demographic attributes (age, gender, education, income and race), thus removing
concerns about the comparability of the sample across waves. Since talk radio listeners
were oversampled, weighting was used throughout the analysis. In the cultivation
analysis (Chapter 8), the Wave 1 cases are supplemented by the oversampled Wave 4
cases, who were asked exactly the same questions in Wave 4.
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The APPC-2000 rolling-cross-section data.
The Annenberg Public Policy Center Year 2000 election study is one of the largest
and most extensive election data collecting efforts in the history of social studies. The
data are gathered using the rolling-cross-section (RCS) method, which offers tight
controls for time. The RCS is a cross-sectional survey in which the day of interview is
approximately random (in fact, what is randomized is the date of release to the sample,
i.e., the date of the first attempt to contact a respondent). This enables highly accurate
close following of campaign trends in addition to the more conventional cross-sectional
analysis. Approximately 60-300 participants were interviewed on each day of the election
year. The data consists of a national sample and a few state samples during primary
season and major campaign events. All participants are adults, contacted through a
random-digit-dial system. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish.

The Electronic Dialogue data.
The ED project is a unique Web-based research endeavor that involves a series of
Internet surveys and electronic political discussions designed to investigate, among other
things, the effects of participation in homogeneous and heterogeneous electronic
deliberative forums on various opinions and attitudes. It consisted of 60 experimental
groups, each having series of eight online discussions in the course of the 2000 election
year. Each event consisted of a 50-minute-long electronic group conversation and short
pre- and post-discussion Internet surveys. All participants also completed rather long and
extensive baseline Internet surveys, which included measures of various political
attitudes and exposure to various forms of communication. All of the surveys were also
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administered to a control group. Members of the control group only completed the
surveys (baseline and pre/post-event short surveys) and did not participate in any other
activity. In fact, they did not even know that electronic discussions were held and that
other survey respondents participated in such electronic forums. Another group of
participants was a “set-aside” group that completed the baseline survey only. This group
was used for recruiting new members to the discussion groups, to replace some of the
attrition. Participants in the ED project were part of a random sample of the American
population whose households were offered WebTV units in return for weekly completion
of Internet surveys. The recruitment and maintenance of this panel were executed by a
Web-based consumer research and opinion polling company operating from Menlo Park,
CA. Knowledge Networks invited an RDD sample of all US households with telephones
to join their panel. Over SO percent of the households accepted their offer (InterSurvey,
2000). A sub-sample of their panel was invited to join the Electronic Dialogue project.
50.7 percent of the respondents who received the recruitment survey agreed to participate
in the project.

460

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A p p en d ix 2: M ea su res.

This appendix describes the measures used as covariates in the analysis in the various
chapters. Note that the coding of some variables in some of the chapters is different from
that described below, especially when they are the main dependent variables in the
analysis. This is particularly true regarding the use of media exposure scales in Section 3.
The media exposure items described below are used as controls in various models. The
actual exposure items used as dependent variables in Section 3 are described in this
section.

The Electronic Dialogue data.
Political party-ideology index. Participants were asked about their party
identification and its strength. They were also asked about their overall ideological
leanings, on a continuum from strong liberal to strong conservative. The two
components, which were highly correlated, were combined to form an 11-point scale with
“strong liberals-strong Democrats” coded as “+5”, “strong conservatives-strong
Republicans” coded as “-S”, and “moderates-independents” coded as “0” (M=-.26;
SD=3.18).
Political extremity. Political extremity was simply the absolute value of the partyideology index. Moderates were coded “0” and extremists, both liberal and conservative,
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were coded “5”, with varying values in between. This variable had an average of 2.74,
with a standard deviation of 1.64.
Political knowledge. Various dimensions of political knowledge were combined to
form a single scale measure. Items included ten general political and civics knowledge
questions (e.g. who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not),
seven questions about the personal backgrounds of the presidential candidates (e.g. which
one of the Democratic candidates was a professional basketball player, which one of the
GOP candidates was a former POW), and an additional seven questions about issue
positions of candidates in the Democratic and Republican presidential primaries (e.g.
which of the Democratic candidates supported universal health care, which of the
Republican candidates supported vouchers). All 24 items were scored “1” for correct
answers and “0” for incorrect. The items were averaged to create a scale (Cronbach
alpha=82; M=.62; SD=.19).
News media exposure. Participants were asked how many days in the previous week
they watched national network news, local TV news, and cable news on TV; read a daily
newspaper, or listened to talk radio. A scale ranging from 0-7 was created by averaging
the five items (Cronbach alpha=.64; M=3.19; SD=1.58).
Political discussion. Respondents reported the number of days in a typical week they
discussed politics with two family members or close friends and two other acquaintances.
The average of these four items was used as a scale for measuring political conversation
(Cronbach alpha=.65; M=1.99; SD=1.12).
Political involvement. Three items - attention to campaign news on TV, attention to
newspaper stories about the campaign, and “close following” of the campaign - were
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averaged to form a scale measure of involvement (Range: 1-4; Cronbach alpha=.76;
M=2.70; SD=1.10).
Scheduleflexibility. The number of timeslots selected by respondents when their
availability for discussions was canvassed serves as a measure of schedule flexibility.
Busy participants who were available for fewer timeslots had lower values, while flexible
participants, who said they could make it to relatively many timeslots, had higher values.
Since no one was available at all 16 times, the flexibility scale ranged from 0 to 12
(M=2.15; SD=1.92).
Interpersonal trust. Three forced-choice items from the General Social Survey
tapped trust in other people (e.g., “Generally speaking, most people can be trusted”
versus “You can’t be too careful in dealing with people”). Trustful selections were coded
“ 1” and mistrusful selections were coded “0.” The scale was the average of the three
items (Cronbach alpha=.74; M=.54; SD=.39).
Neighborhood participation. Respondents were asked whether they participated in a
variety of neighborhood activities in the past 12 months. The activities included adult
education classes, exercise at a workout club, self-help groups, reading/religious groups,
organized recreation leagues, church-related activities, neighborhood associations, or
youth development programs. A scale was created by scoring each membership as “ 1”
and then averaging (Cronbach alpha=.53; M=21; SD=.21).

The APPC election 2000 data.
Political party-ideology index. The party-ideology index was created in the same
manner as for the Electronic Dialogue data. Participants were asked about their party
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identification and its strength. They were also asked about their overall ideological
leanings, on a continuum from strong liberal to strong conservative. The two
components, which were highly correlated, were combined to form an 11-point scale with
“strong liberals-strong Democrats” coded as “+5”, “strong conservatives-strong
Republicans” coded as “-S”, and “moderates-independents” coded as “0”. The variable
had an average of -.25 and a standard deviation of 3.00.
Political extremity. Political extremity was again operationalized as the absolute
value of the party-ideology index. Moderates were coded “0” and extremists, both liberal
and conservative, were coded “5”, with varying values in between. This variable had an
average of 2.53, with a standard deviation of 1.62.
Political knowledge. Political knowledge was operationally defined using six items:
correctly recognizing which one of the Democratic candidates supported universal health
care (correct answer: both Bradley and Gore), which one was the son of a former senator,
which one was a former basketball player, which one of the GOP candidates supported a
ban on soft money, which one was currently a state governor, and which one was
currently a senator. The rationale for using these questions and not others among all the
knowledge items in the survey was that this combination produced the highest reliability
(a=0.84). For each respondent, the correct answers were coded “1” and the incorrect “0”.
The items were then summed up. The average value was 2.59, with a standard deviation
of 2.03.
Political discussion. Respondents were asked the number of days in a typical week
they discussed politics with two family members or close friends and online or at work.
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The political discussion scale was the average of these two items. The variable had a
Cronbach alpha of .60 (M=1.52; SD=1.72).
News exposure. This scale is the average of four media exposure items, each
measuring the number of days in the past week in which respondents reported watching
national network, cable and local TV news, and reading a newspaper. Cronbach’s alpha
for this scale was .60.
Political interest. The question wording for the interest item was: “Some people
seem to follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time,
whether there is an election or not. Others are not that interested. Would you say you
follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the
time, only now and then or hardly at all?” The answers were coded “1” (least interest)
through “4” (most interest) (M=3.01; SD=.97).

The PTR1996 data.
Political party-ideology index. As in the previous two data sets, participants were
asked about their party identification and its strength. They were also asked about their
overall ideological leanings, on a continuum from strong liberal to strong conservative.
The two components were combined to form an 11-point scale with “strong liberalsstrong Democrats” coded as “+5”, “strong conservatives-strong Republicans” coded as “5”, and “moderates-independents” coded as “0”. The variable had an average of -.48 and
a standard deviation of 3.18.
Political extremity. Political extremity was again operationalized as the absolute
value of the party-ideology index. Moderates were coded “0” and extremists, both liberal
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and conservative, were coded “5”, with varying values in between. This variable had an
average of 2.51, with a standard deviation of 1.64.
Civic knowledge. This scale was composed of two items, one asking how much of
the House and Senate vote were needed to override a presidential veto, the other
measuring knowledge of which party had the majority in the House of Representatives.
Reliability for this measure was .75. The two items were coded “0” for incorrect and “ 1”
for correct and then summed (M=1.38; SD=.74).
Issue knowledge. The issue knowledge scale was composed of four items measuring
knowledge of political issues: What part US troops made up of NATO forces in Bosnia,
flat tax, the death penalty, and mothers on welfare. The items were coded “0” for
incorrect and “ 1” for correct and then summed (M=1.25; SD=.96).
Political interest. As in the APPC 2000 data, the question wording for the interest
item was: “Some people seem to follow what is going on in government and public
affairs most of the time, whether there is an election or not. Others are not that interested.
Would you say you follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the
time, some of the time, only now and then or hardly at all?” The answers were coded “1”
(least interest) through “4” (most interest) (M=3.37; SD=.82).

The 1996 NES data.
Media skepticism. The media skepticism measure in the NES 1996 data is an item in
which respondents were asked how much of the time they thought they could trust the
media to report the news fairly. Response categories varied between “none of the time”
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(coded “5”) to “just about always” (coded “1”). The mean for this item was 2.69, with a
standard deviation of .75.
Political ideology index. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a
conservative-liberal scale, and on a party identification scale. The answers to these
questions were combined into one variable varying from “+5” (“extremely liberal-strong
Democrat”) to “-5” (“extreme conservative-strong Republican”). The variable had a
mean of .00 and a standard deviation of 2.93.
Political extremity. Political extremity was operationally defined as the absolute
value of the party-ideology index. Moderates were coded “0” and extremists, both liberal
and conservative, were coded “5”. This variable had an average of 2.49, with a standard
deviation of 1.54.
Political interest. Respondents were asked about their interest in the campaign, the
amount of attention they gave to the campaign in general, and also to its coverage in
newspapers, national television and local television. All items were coded so that “5"
represented most interest and attention and “0” represented least attention. The scale - the
average of the five items - had a reliability of.76, a mean of 2.56 and a standard deviation
of 1.12.
Political knowledge. Respondents were asked to identify what job or political office
was held by A1 Gore, William Rehnquist, Boris Yeltsin and Newt Gingrich. Answering
correctly was coded “1” while all other answers were coded “0”. The scale was the sum
of the four items (M-2.19, SD=2.2l).
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Political discussion. Political discussion was measured by the number of days
respondents discussed politics with friends or family in the past week. The mean for this
measure was 1.98, and the standard deviation was 2.21.
News exposure. Respondents were asked about the number of days in the past week
they watched national or local news on TV or read a daily newspaper. The answers to
these three items were averaged to create a scale (Cronbach’s alpha=.55, M=3.67;
SD=1.99.).

Descriptive statistics for demographic variables.
In all studies, respondents reported their age, level o f education (coded in years
throughout the dissertation), race (coded “1” for whites throughout), sex (coded “ 1” for
males throughout), employment, and student status (the latter two variables are coded
l=full-time or part-time; 0=other). Descriptives for these variables are presented in the
following table:
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ED

APPC

PTR

NES

42.19

45.49

45.84

47.53

Mean (SD)

(15.17)

(17.00)

(16.90)

(17.41)

Education

13.30

14.39

13.91

13.32

Mean (SD)

(1.33)

(17.80)

(2.45)

(2.66)

Percent male

50.00

46.70

50.40

44.80

Percent white

79.80

89.70

84.20

84.80

Percent student

3.90

1.80

NA

NA

Percent employed

63.82

72.40

NA

NA

Age
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